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MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE: A TAX SYSTEM 
APPROACH TO FLOOD INSURANCE 
 
CHARLENE LUKE† & AVIVA ABRAMOVSKY‡ 
 
*** 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has fallen short in 
fulfilling its promise as a social safety net for flood loss victims.  In place of 
the NFIP, this Article proposes a mandatory social insurance plan that 
would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority to provide basic 
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence.  Any 
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing 
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets, 
environmental protection, and property rights.  This Article argues that 
government intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the 
foreseeable future, and that the focus of that intervention should be on the 
ex ante provision of a social safety net.  The program proposed in this 
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the 
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative 
environmental externalities, and to provide the impetus needed for 
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 Early on the morning of August 30, 2015, the life of Alice and her 
son will change forever when floodwater rips through the ground floor 
apartment rented by Alice. Miraculously, Alice will have sufficient 
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warning of the imminent collapse of a dam that she and her son will be able 
to escape with their lives.1 Many of the personal possessions that will be 
destroyed in the disaster are irreplaceable — the first baby tooth lost by her 
son and saved by Alice, the family photographs that Alice never has had 
the time or money to digitize and upload to the cloud, the souvenirs Alice 
purchased on a road trip taken many years ago when times were better.  
Alice will, however, be able to take some comfort in the knowledge that 
with each paycheck she has received over the past three years, she has been 
participating in a national flood loss security plan — a plan that will now 
help her in making a dignified fresh start. 
If, however, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
continues on its present course, the outcome for Alice may well be very 
different. Without new legislation, the program will not even exist in 2015; 
in 2010 the program briefly lapsed,2 and in 2011 the program has been 
extended for multiple short-term periods with the most recent extension 
ending on December 23, 2011.3 Even if Congress acts to extend the current 
version of the NFIP, Alice will almost certainly not have purchased flood 
insurance because of the low participation rates associated with the NFIP.  
Instead, Alice will likely be scrambling for ad hoc, piecemeal post-disaster 
assistance.4 She may think back to the news coverage of ten years before5 
                                                                                                                                      
1 See Henry Fountain, Danger Pent Up Behind Aging Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
22, 2011, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/science/22da 
m.html?pagewanted=all (“[O]f the nation's 85,000 dams, more than 4,400 are 
considered susceptible to failure . . . .”). 
2 See Rebecca Mowbray, Lapses in National Flood Insurance Program Bring 
Policy Renewals to a Halt, NOLA.COM (June 30, 2010, 6:53PM), http://www.n 
ola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/06/lapses_in_national_flood_ insur.html. 
3 As of December 21, 2011. See Resolution Making Further Continuing 
Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-68 (extension through Dec. 23, 2011); Resolution 
Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-67, 125 Stat. 769 
(extension through Dec. 17, 2011); Consolidated & Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55 § 101, 125 Stat. 552 (extension 
through Dec. 16, 2011); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-36 
§ 130, 125 Stat. 386 (extension through Nov. 18, 2011); Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, 125 Stat. 363 (extension through 
Oct. 4, 2011); National Flood Insurance Program Reextension Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-250, 124 Stat. 2630 (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4026) 
(extension through Sept. 30, 2011). Additional extensions have been proposed, 
including one that would extend the NFIP through May 2012. See H.R. 3628, 
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1548, 112th  Cong. (2011). 
4 See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: 
Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1473 
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and realize that she has become trapped in her own version of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
Flood losses are only likely to escalate in the coming years.6  
Before the next massive flood occurs7 — indeed before the next flood that 
devastates an individual life occurs — Congress should enact a new 
program for flood loss relief that provides a better social safety net than the 
current NFIP. This Article suggests a mandatory social insurance plan that 
                                                                                                                                      
(2007) (“Too often, those who suffer most are the poorest members of society. . . 
.”). Cf. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insurance Against Terrorism—And 
Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 277 (2003) (predicting that “public and charitable 
relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be) less than 
full private insurance.”). 
5 Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, and the levees failed 
on August 30, 2005. See Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, Hurricane Katrina: 
The Overview; New Orleans Is Inundated As 2 Levees Fail; Much of Gulf Coast Is 
Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at A1, available at http://q 
uery.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE4DF1731F932A0575BC0A9639C
8B63&pagewanted=all; Joseph B. Treaster & Kate Zernike, Hurricane Katrina 
Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/national/30storm.html?pagewa 
nted=all. 
6 See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR 
WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISK IN A NEW ERA OF 
CATASTROPHES 4 (2009) (explaining that “development in hazard-prone areas and 
increased value at risk” are key factors and climate change is “of growing 
concern”); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market 
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 6 & n. 12 (2006) (describing 
how development has increased the cost of floods, though “global warming or 
cyclical climate changes may explain part of this increase”). 
7 Since the original draft of this article was written, near-record setting water 
levels along the Mississippi River have exacted their toll, including the opening of 
spillways to flood purposefully rural areas in order to avoid catastrophic losses in 
larger metropolitan areas. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Flooding Takes Vast 
Economic Toll, And It’s Hardly Done, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A11; 
Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/15spillway.html; A.G. 
Sulzberger, As Missouri River Rises, Control Efforts Take Shape, N.Y. TIMES, June 
3, 2011, at A14. See also CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI 
RIVER STORIES:  HOW THE ROAD TO UNNATURAL DISASTER IS PAVED WITH WELL-
INTENDED LAWS (forthcoming 2011), for more on the history of flooding along the 
Mississippi River. 
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would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority8 to provide basic 
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence.9 Any 
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing 
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets, 
environmental protection, and property rights. This Article argues that 
governmental intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the 
foreseeable future,10 and that the focus of that intervention should be on the 
ex ante provision of a social safety net. The program proposed in this 
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the 
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative 
environmental externalities,11 and to provide the impetus needed for 
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs. 
 Part II of this Article discusses the NFIP’s program for personal 
property12 and outlines problems associated with the program. Overall, the 
                                                                                                                                      
8 See Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy After Hurricane Katrina, 
in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 203, 217 (Ronald 
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (briefly raising the possibility of a premium tax 
approach and stating that it is a “potentially superior approach”). 
9 The business and investment property flood losses will be addressed in a 
future Article. 
10 See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of 
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST  L. REV. 835, 
875 (2006) (“Although the flood insurance program has serious deficiencies, no 
one seriously suggests that management of this market should revert to the 
states.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 509, 536-50 (1986) (discussing market versus government solutions in the 
presence of market failure); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4; George L. Priest, 
Government Insurances versus Market Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & 
INS. 71 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and 
Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 89 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 
2006). See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) for discussion of the more general 
question of when government intervention is appropriate. 
11 See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES   224, 231-32 (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (complete shift of risk to insurer “could lead the insured 
to be irresponsible because he or she bears no cost of a loss”). 
12 The NFIP also authorizes business coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012; 
Commercial Coverage: Business Property Risk, FLOODSMART.GOV, 
http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/commercial_coverage/business_prop
erty_risk.jsp (last updated Aug. 25, 2011, 4:18 PM) (overview of currently 
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NFIP fails to provide an adequate safety net as numerous individuals 
continue to fail to purchase flood insurance.13 If the NFIP were to charge 
actuarially fair premiums,14 the resulting increases would likely lead to 
even lower participation in the program among those least economically 
able to self-insure.15 At the same time, some individuals file repetitive loss 
claims, causing a significant financial drain on the program and potentially 
exacerbating environmental costs.16 The budget woes of the NFIP are 
compounded by the outsourcing of flood insurance sales and claims 
adjustments to private insurance companies.17 These private insurance 
companies charge the NFIP a flat rate for these services without having to 
account for actual costs.18 
 The NFIP’s problem areas are relatively easy to enumerate, but 
the path to crafting a better approach is more complex. Part III discusses 
some of the obstacles facing any plan designed to mitigate and compensate 
for flood loss. Flood losses are difficult to diversify; individuals have an 
incentive to purchase flood insurance only for their most at-risk property; 
and individuals may be motivated to take less care in their decisions with 
                                                                                                                                      
available business coverage). Discussion of NFIP business coverage as well as 
business-related tax provisions is outside the scope of this Article. 
13 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Has The Time Come for Comprehensive 
Natural Disaster Insurance, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 175 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (For Louisiana 
parishes hit by Katrina, “the percentages of homeowners with flood insurance 
ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to 7.3 percent. . . . Only 40 percent of the residents in 
Orleans parish had flood insurance.”). 
14 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS 
FINANCIAL & OPERATIONAL ISSUE, at 5-6 (2010) (finding that NFIP “is, by design, 
not actuarially sound”). 
15 See id. at 3 (explaining that taking steps to “make premium rates more 
reflective of long-term flood risks . . . . would raise rates and potentially reduce 
participation in NFIP.”). 
16 See id. at 1 (“Only 1 percent of policies . . . account for 25 to 30 percent of 
claims.”). 
17 Before the massive flooding of 2011, the NFIP was already deeply in debt, 
largely because of the catastrophic losses of the 2005 hurricane season. See id. 
(“As of August 2010, NFIP’s debt to Treasury stood at $18.8 billion.”). Before the 
2005 hurricane season, the program had generally balanced out. See KUNREUTHER 
& MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 110-11. 
18 See Aviva Abramovsky, Insurance and the Flood, in LAW AND RECOVERY 
FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 83, 97 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009); see 
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
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respect to flood costs because of the availability of coverage. These three 
difficulties — known respectively as correlation,19 adverse selection,20 and 
moral hazard21 — represent classic concerns in the formation of insurance 
markets. Part III also briefly considers possible cognitive obstacles to the 
provision of flood loss relief.22 For example, because flood risks are 
difficult to conceptualize, individuals will have problems taking the steps 
necessary to engage in adequate preparation, and government officials 
charged with aiding community preparation will be subject to the same 
challenges.23 
                                                                                                                                      
19 See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE 
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 262 (2002) (explaining that by 1928 “[h]aving learned 
that individual flood risks were often highly correlated . . . insurers had apparently 
decided that the prospect of catastrophic flooding rendered this particular risk 
uninsurable”); Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of 
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 820 (2005) (“Natural disasters are highly 
correlated, and difficult to ‘uncorrelate’ because those who are not at high risk do 
not seek to transfer their risk.”); see also infra Part III.A for discussion regarding 
why even national, private insurance companies face correlation difficulties with 
respect to flood loss. 
20 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 378 (2003) (arguing that “risk 
classification itself can create a kind of adverse selection” since insurers may 
“select risks in a manner that is adverse to the insurance pool”); Kaplow, supra 
note 10, at 543-44 (explaining that pricing to cover high-risk individuals will cause 
lower-risk individuals to drop out, which will cause insurance companies to 
increase rates again and so motivate even more lower-risk individuals to drop 
coverage, and so on until it is possible that “no insurance would be offered”). 
21 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 
239 (1996) (explaining that in economic literature the term “refers to the tendency 
for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of 
loss.”); Kaplow, supra note 10, at 537 (with insurance “actors have less incentive 
to avoid” losses); Kunreuther, supra note 13, at 183 (“[D]isaster assistance is 
purported to create a type of Samaritan’s dilemma: providing assistance after a 
catastrophe reduces the economic incentives of potential victims to invest in 
protective measures prior to a disaster.”). 
22 See infra Part III.B.  
23 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer 
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the 
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”); Kaplow, 
supra note 10, at 548 (stating that the “strongest case for some government 
response to risk is presented by situations in which certain actors underestimate the 
likelihood of loss”). 
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 Part IV argues that utilizing tax system components may provide 
a strong course for meeting the complexities of flood loss coverage and 
mitigation, though it also discusses the challenges that would face such an 
approach. Additionally, Part IV presents an outline of such a tax-system 
infused flood loss security program. The proposed program would be 
administered jointly by the Treasury (IRS) and Homeland Security 
(FEMA) and would mandate minimum coverage for all individuals as to 
the contents of their primary residences.24 Coverage for a home’s structure 
would also be mandatory but should be designed to limit repetitive loss 
claims. Rewards as well as penalties could be built into the system in order 
to better manage flood preparation and community participation. For 
example, the proposed flood security plan could charge rates that allow for 
tax refunds in the case of good results — e.g., no claim filed in a particular 
year.25 Income tax refunds appear to be highly satisfying given the amount 
of over-withholding that occurs in the income tax system.26   
 Part V explores the current patchwork of tax rules as they relate 
to post-disaster assistance, pre-disaster flood mitigation grant programs, 
and insurance payouts. Part V also recommends steps for harmonizing 
these rules with the proposed flood loss security program. Part VI is a brief 
conclusion.   
 
II. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)27 is administered by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),28 which is a part of 
the Department of Homeland Security. The NFIP has roots dating back to 
the early 1950s29 and the early legislation introduced structural components 
                                                                                                                                      
24 Mandates have long been recognized as a solution to the adverse selection 
problem. See infra Part III.A. If such a mandate is, however, politically 
unpalatable, coverage could be mandatory for high and moderate risk residences 
while opt-out coverage could be available for lower-risk residences. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
25 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238 (describing insureds’ 
preference for rebates over deductibles). 
26 See Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE 141, 148-52 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 4011-31 (2006). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a). 
29 See HOWARD KUNREUTHER & DOUGLAS C. DACY, THE ECONOMICS OF 
NATURAL DISASTERS 259 (1969), for more on the history behind the NFIP; MOSS, 
supra note 19, at 262-63; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92; David A. Grossman, 
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that, while well intentioned, contribute to the weakness of the NFIP today.  
This Part provides an overview of the current state of the program. 
 
A. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
 
Early flood insurance legislation attempted to motivate 
communities to take flood mitigation steps by tying the availability of 
insurance coverage to community adherence to floodplain management 
regulations.30 Even today, individuals are not able to participate in the 
NFIP unless their communities agree to abide by various regulations 
intended to mitigate flood loss.31 As to communities who fail to participate, 
federal grants, disaster relief, and federal mortgage insurance are 
“unavailable for the acquisition or construction of structures located or to 
be located” in high-risk areas.32 Currently, over twenty thousand 
                                                                                                                                      
Flood Insurance: Can a Feasible Program be Created?, 34 LAND ECON. 352 
(1958).   
30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102 (2006) (community participation 
requirements). The regulatory requirements are extensive. See 44 C.F.R. pts. 60, 
64; FEMA, Floodplain Management Requirements: A Study Guide and Desk 
Reference for Local Officials, FEMA (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.fema.go 
v/plan/prevent/floodplainfm_sg.shtm; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (2006); see Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood 
Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE 
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 131 (1998) (Howard 
Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr., eds.) (discussing responsibility of local 
community in “adopting and enforcing these floodplain management standards”). 
Relatively few individuals would be affected by the non-participation of the local 
community because “[m]ost flood-prone communities that have elected not to 
participate are communities whose areas of serious flood risk are either very small 
or have few if any structures.” Id. at 129; FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 2 (2007), 
available at www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2954 (“If a community 
does not participate in the program, property owners in that jurisdiction are not 
able to purchase federally backed flood insurance.”). Individuals living in non-
participating communities would have to rely on post-flood government assistance 
or on the virtually nonexistent private flood insurance market. Abramovsky, supra 
note 18, at 126 (“[P]rivate insurers do write limited amounts of flood coverage, 
usually for commercial insureds”).  
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (2006); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 2. A 1968 
Act did contain a short-lived penalty at the individual level that had community 
participation implications: if the individual’s community participated and the 
individual failed to purchase flood insurance coverage after one year, then such 
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communities participate.33 Since 1990 communities have also been able to 
elect to comply with stronger standards through the Community Rating 
System.34 Participation in the Community Rating System program yields 
credits that have the effect of reducing flood insurance premiums 
throughout the community.35 Currently, nearly twelve hundred 
communities participate in the Community Rating System program, which 
while representing only 5 percent of all NFIP communities includes 
approximately 67 percent of NFIP policyholders.36 In spite of widespread 
community participation, individual residents will not necessarily have 
flood insurance because, as will be discussed more fully in the next section, 
purchase of coverage is largely optional.37   
Participation by a community in the NFIP does not, of course, 
ensure that a local community is actually compliant.38 FEMA must 
determine whether local building codes and permitting processes on their 
face adhere to the federal guidelines and must also examine whether 
communities actually follow facially adequate ordinances.39 Communities 
may further complicate FEMA’s job by pushing back against guidelines 
                                                                                                                                      
individuals were to be denied post-flood federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4021 
(repealed); see also Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92-93. 
33 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135-36 
(describing system). 
35 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135. Credits are based on “estimated 
reduction in flood and erosion damage risks resulting from the measures adopted 
by the community under the program.” 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b)(3). 
36 Email from William L. Trakimas, Director of Natural Hazards (Sept. 8, 
2011) (on file with authors) (“Currently 1192 communities participate nationwide . 
. . receiv[ing] a discount which is about $292M annually.”). In 1998, roughly 900 
communities participated, which similarly represented 5 percent of NFIP 
communities but included over 63 percent of NFIP policyholders. Pasterick, supra 
note 31, at 137. 
37 See infra Part II.B. 
38 See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that 
“25 percent of the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 could have been 
prevented through better building code compliance and enforcement”); see also 
Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster 
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2006) (describing how many 
local governments fail to enforce the minimum building requirements need to 
participate in the NFIP). 
39 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131. 
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whose implementation they perceive to be too costly.40 New floodplain 
management regulations often contain transition rules or grandfather 
provisions,41 possibly in order to minimize political fallout. The political 
dimensions of putting a community on probation or pulling NFIP 
eligibility42 may also constrain enforcement.43     
Even assuming full compliance with floodplain regulations, the 
regulations, in conjunction with other flood loss mitigation programs, may 
have unintended consequences. Individuals may be overly confident in the 
ability of federal, state, and local authorities to manage flood loss through 
artificial containment and diversion projects and thus increase the direct 
and externalized costs of floods. That is, development may increase in 
areas that have been rendered “safe” through community planning.44 
(Alternatively, development may occur first under the assumption that with 
                                                                                                                                      
40 See Peter G. Gosselin, On Their Own in Battered New Orleans, in ON RISK 
AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 15, 22-23 (Ronald J. Daniels 
et al., eds., 2006) (describing among New Orleans residents that regulation changes 
would make it difficult to maintain flood insurance eligibility); see also DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 343-47, 473 (2003) (describing formation of interest 
groups and agency capture). 
41 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 14. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 4023 (2006) (disallowing flood insurance coverage for 
communities violating state and local land use law); 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (2010) 
(suspension regulations); 44 C.F.R. § 61.16 (2010) (additional premium charged in 
communities on probation); 44 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2010) (violations of state and local 
zoning law); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (describing probation and 
suspension process). 
43 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (“[T]here has never been a 
comprehensive assessment of the level of compliance nationwide or of the overall 
effect of program standards on local development patterns.”). 
44 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how 
government actions may make residents feel safe when in fact they remain 
vulnerable); Burby, supra note 38, at 176 (federal policy in New Orleans 
contributed “directly to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina” by encouraging 
development in hazardous areas and diverting resources away from areas that 
could have benefitted from improvements); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1518 
(describing the “foolhardiness of . . . attempting to keep the water away from the 
people through artificial flood control”); Scales, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing how 
“[f]lood control projects merely buy time” but also attract “[r]esidential and 
commercial development . . . often resting on long-term assumptions about the 
suitability of the area for development”).   
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increased development, loss mitigation will be undertaken.45) Individual 
homeowners and renters may then rely not only on visible governmental 
mitigation efforts but may be further reassured by the presence of 
developers. If, however, the safety measures fail (or fail to materialize) the 
flood costs will be even higher because of the increased development.46  
The failure of the levees in New Orleans is among the most vivid examples 
of the risk of relying on manmade structures to turn back nature.47  
Although individuals residing in New Orleans had the option to purchase 
flood insurance, the majority of residents did not do so and were not 
required to do so48 (the same would almost certainly hold true in any U.S. 
community49). Individuals may well not have understood that risk was still 
present in spite of (or because of) the levees.50   
                                                                                                                                      
45 Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLITICAL ECON. 473, 477 (1977) (“[T]he 
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain], 
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures. Consequently, in 
the absence of a law prohibiting the construction of houses in the flood plain, 
houses are built there, and the army corps of engineers subsequently builds the 
dams and levees.”); see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 
262 (describing Nobel Prize-winning work of Kydland and Prescott, including 
flood plain example showing “that a discretionary policy, which may be optimal 
given the current situation, may not necessarily result in a socially optimal policy 
in the longer run”).   
46 See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; Scales, supra note 6, at 13 
(“[F]loodplain management (rather than floodplain abandonment) encouraged 
development and, thus, concentrated rather than dispersed economic risks of 
flooding.”). 
47 The 2011 flooding along the Mississippi river is also illustrative of this 
lesson.  See Editorial, A New Flood, Some Old Truths: The Mississippi Tells Us, 
Again, To Change The Way We Manage Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, at A22 
(“Years of mismanagement of the vast Mississippi River ecosystem—the relentless 
and often inadvisable construction of levees and navigation channels, the paving 
over of wetlands, the commercial development of flood plains . . . have made the 
damage worse than it might otherwise have been. . . . Nobody ever beats the 
river.”). 
48 See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 877 (“[T]he percentage of homes 
with flood insurance policies in coastal parishes of Louisiana affected by Hurricane 
Katrina ranged from 7% in St. James Parish to 57.7% in St. Bernard Parish, with 
only 40% of homes in Orleans Parish having this coverage.”); Scales, supra note 6, 
at 15 (“[F]ewer than one-in-ten residents along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi are 
believed to have held flood insurance prior to Katrina.”). 
49 See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S 
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvi (2006) 
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While flood mitigation programs have unintended consequences, 
halting mitigation programs is likely to be even more problematic. First, 
mitigation does work51 albeit only up to a point — though often an 
unknown point at that. Second, outright prohibitions on development by the 
federal government are problematic,52 and once development has occurred, 
and if the potential disaster is big enough, the federal government will find 
it politically untenable to fail to provide any mitigation.53 Even assuming 
developers understand the riskiness of their building projects, they may be 
able to shift the flood risk to the ultimate owners and tenants,54 who are 
sure to elicit (and likely to deserve) a more sympathetic response than the 
original developers. Thus, continuance of flood mitigation programs, 
including community participation, appears to be an uneasy necessity, 
though steps could clearly be taken to use mitigation more judiciously and 
development prohibitions less sparingly.55 As will be discussed in Part IV, 
even though this Article does not directly address the role of developers 
                                                                                                                                      
(“Even though approximately one-third of NFIP policies are written outside 
SFHAs [high-risk areas], the market penetration rate outside SFHAs is only about 
1 percent.”). 
50 See infra Part III.B (discussing possible reasons, including cognitive 
shortcuts and biases, for low participation in flood insurance). 
51 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing how flood plain 
regulations have, at least in the Midwest, “discourage[d] floodplain development 
through the increased costs in meeting floodplain management requirements and 
the cost of an annual flood insurance premium”); David Welky, When the Levee 
Doesn’t Break, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at A25 (arguing that “the extent of the 
[2011 Mississippi flood] damage probably won’t come close to the losses of life 
and property seen in the historic flood of January 1937. . . .—proof that after nearly 
75 years, the federal government has finally gained the upper hand on a river 
system once thought uncontrollable.”). 
52 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (noting rejection by NFIP of federal 
override of local regulation because the NFIP “has consistently taken the position 
that federal land use regulation at the local level is illegal, and, in any case, would 
be unworkable”). 
53 See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (theorizing that the “the 
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain], 
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures”). 
54 Cf. Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing report in Midwest 
suggesting that “[d]evelopers have the added incentive of wanting to avoid 
marketing flood-prone property.”). 
55 See id. at 154 (noting “vital connection between the availability of flood 
insurance and the local community enforcement of floodplain management 
provisions”). 
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and other commercial enterprises, integrating residential flood loss 
coverage with the tax system could provide an opportunity to craft 
additional levers for balancing social safety net concerns with constraints 
on unwise development. 
 
B. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION 
 
 Individuals are required to purchase flood insurance only in a 
limited set of circumstances. Regulated lending institutions,56 government-
sponsored enterprises for housing (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and 
federal agency lenders57 must require flood insurance as a condition to 
closing on loans secured by property in high-risk flood zones.58 “High-risk” 
indicates that there is a 1% or greater chance of a flood in a particular 
year59 — that is, the property lies within the one-hundred year flood plain.  
                                                                                                                                      
56 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(10) (2006) (includes “any bank, savings and loan 
association, credit union, farm credit bank, Federal land bank association, 
production credit association, or similar institution subject to the supervision on a 
Federal entity for lending regulation”). The statute directs the federal entities for 
lending regulation to promulgate regulations applicable to these institutions. These 
federal entities have adopted such regulations. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 22 (2010) (by 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 208.25 (2010) (Federal 
Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. pt. 339 (2010) (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation); 12 C.F.R. pt. 572 (2010) (Office of Thrift Supervision); 12 C.F.R. § 
614.4920 (2010) (Farm Credit Administration); 12 C.F.R. pt. 760 (2010) (National 
Credit Union Administration). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(7) (2006) (defining these agencies as “Federal 
agenc[ies] that makes direct loans secured by improved real estate or a mobile 
home”). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 26 (entities include Federal Housing 
Administration, Small Business Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2006) (lender mandate); 42 U.S.C. § 4104a (2006) 
(notice requirements). See  FEMA, supra note 31, at 2-4 (the only lenders and 
services excluded are those “who are not federally regulated and that do not sell 
loans to . . . Fannie Mae . . . Freddie Mac,” or other government-sponsored 
entities.). 
59 FEMA literature often uses the term “special flood hazard area” but “High-
risk flood areas” and “special flood hazard areas” are synonymous. Compare U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 14, at 14 with FEMA, supra note 31, at 
GLS 9. 
 This is also called the 100-year flood plain.  See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2010) 
(defining “100-year flood” as “the flood having a one percent chance of being 
equaled or exceeded in any given year”); FEMA, supra note 31, at GLS 9. But 
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All mapped areas with lower than 1% chance per year of flooding are in 
low or moderate-risk zones;60 yet such zones historically lead to about 25 
percent of NFIP claims.61 Since relatively few individuals purchase 
insurance if they reside outside a high-risk zone, such policies constitute 
such a significant portion of NFIP claims suggests that the 1% benchmark 
is problematic.62 
 The lender mandate does not apply to properties outside of high-
risk flood zones. The requirement also does not apply to properties located 
in non-participating communities since individuals in those areas are not 
eligible to purchase flood insurance.63 Under the most recent changes to the 
                                                                                                                                      
such terminology can mislead individuals into thinking that a flood will only occur 
once in a hundred years and is downplayed (or eliminated) in public education 
information. See Pasterick, supra note 1, at 130 (“The term ‘100-year flood’ is 
problematic for the NFIP. It is a term of convenience intended to convey 
probability but has had the adverse effect of giving floodplain residents, who tend 
to interpret it in chronological terms, a false sense of security.”). 
 FEMA has attempted to help people understand the risk assessments by 
anchoring this to a more readily understood marker: the 30-year mortgage. Thus, 
its public education website explains that high-risk “equates to a 26% chance of 
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.” Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, 
FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 
4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/. 
60 Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 
NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floo 
dsmart. 
61 FEMA, supra note 31, at 5.   
62 This estimate may be too low. See Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (stating that 
“most flood losses in the United States stem from less frequent flood events” and 
citing studies suggesting a range of 66% to 83% of losses arising from areas 
outside the one-hundred-year flood zone). The Association of State Floodplain 
Managers has recommended that a five-hundred-year flood plain be used as the 
better benchmark for levees. ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, 
NATIONAL FLOOD POLICY CHALLENGES: LEVEES: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 3-5 
(2007), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_Levee_Policy_Challe 
nges_White_Paper.pdf.  See also Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (discussing proposal 
by Association of State Floodplain Managers). 
63 FEMA, supra note 31, at 5. In the case of a non-participating community, “a 
lender is still required to inspect any flood maps to determine flood hazard risk and 
provide notice of such risk.” Id. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. 4106(b) (2006) (requiring 
regulations on notice). Prior to 1977, regulated lending was prohibited in 
communities that did not participate. The change was implemented by statute. 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-128 § 703(a), 91 
Stat. 1144. See also FEMA, supra note 31, app. at 1-3. 
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NFIP in 2004, lender–mandated insurance must remain in force over the 
life of the loan64 and must be monitored by loan servicers for loans sold to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.65 Various specific rules have been enacted to 
facilitated compliance.66 For example, if the loan requires an escrow—for 
example, for real property taxes or homeowner’s insurance — flood 
insurance premiums are also required to be escrowed.67   
 FEMA has no statutory authority to enforce this lender mandate;68 
instead, each agency with direct oversight over the covered lender is to 
enforce the requirement.69 A 2006 study done by RAND estimated national 
compliance with the mandate at 75-80 percent, but with significant 
variation across regions.70 Given the recent turmoil in the lending and 
housing market, including problems with administrative agency oversight 
and complicated securitization structures, it seems fair to wonder about the 
extent to which these lender flood insurance mandates have been working 
in recent years.71 For high-risk properties not covered by the lender 
                                                                                                                                      
64 FEMA, supra note 31, at 5. 
65 Id. at 25. 
66 See generally id. at 23-60. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(d) (2006). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 39 (discussing 
requirement). 
68 FEMA, supra note 31, at vii.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2006). 
69 See supra note 56 (citing regulatory provisions and listing these agencies); 
FEMA, supra note 31, at 59-60 (Civil penalties may be assessed. “As of November 
30, 2006, a total of 119 banks had been assessed nearly $1.3 million in penalties, 
for various violations of the 1994 Reform Act.” Regulators may also impose other 
sanctions including “unsatisfactory bank ratings, memoranda of understanding, 
and, ultimately, cease and desist orders.” Private individuals, including borrowers, 
have no cause of action against lenders who have failed to enforce the mandate.). 
70 DIXON ET AL., supra note 49. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules 
Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK 
UNCERTAINTY 101, 107 (2006) (discussing evidence that suggesting “that some 
banks, which were expected to enforce the requirements that individuals in high-
hazard areas purchase flood coverage, looked the other way.”); Scales, supra note 
6, at 14-15 (discussing RAND study and other scholarship on takeup rates). The 
failure of lenders independently to require flood insurance is a mystery, 
particularly given their insistence on general casualty insurance. See also Scales, 
supra note 6, at 17-19 (discussing possible theories for lender behavior with 
respect to flood insurance). 
71 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Without Loan Giants, 30-Year Mortgage 
May Fade Away, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2 
011/03/04/business/04housing.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Without%20Loan%20giants
,%2030-year%20mortgage%20may%20may%20fade%20away&st+cse (discussing 
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mandate, the same RAND study estimated approximately a 50% take-up 
rate.72  
In addition to the lender mandate, the NFIP has only one additional 
means of applying legal pressure on an individual’s decision to purchase 
coverage. Under the current NFIP, individuals may receive government 
assistance after a disaster even if they were eligible for, but failed, to 
purchase flood insurance, but a condition of the assistance is that the 
individual purchase flood insurance in the future. Failure to purchase 
insurance then can be used to withhold assistance if flood loss help again 
becomes necessary.73 Whether this penalty is actively enforced is another 
question,74 particularly in the immediate aftermath of high-impact events.75 
 The NFIP has no ability to deny coverage if individuals are eligible 
to purchase the insurance.76 As a result of repetitive losses, the GAO 
                                                                                                                                      
possible demise of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac and resulting changes to the 
housing market). 
72 DIXON ET AL., supra note 49, at xvi. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 5154(b); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing 
requirement); Pasterick, supra note 31, at 153 (discussing history of this 
requirement and noting it “has its greatest potential impact on grant recipients, who 
are generally in lower-income categories than those receiving loans and thus less 
likely to be able to afford insurance. Whether the threat of denial of future federal 
assistance will have the intended effect of promoting insurance purchase among 
this segment of the population remains to be seen.”). 
74 See Scales, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he NFIP’s enforcement mechanisms are 
limited and not credibly invoked.”). 
75 See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 292-93 n.82 (predicting “that public 
sympathy and interest-group pressure would make enforcement of that restrictive 
very difficult”). 
76 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1. Contra Scales, 
supra note 6, at 33-34 (stating the NFIP does however, rigidly deny claims filed 
more than 60 days after a loss, even though the difficulties involved in a flood 
make filing the Paperwork difficult í perhaps especially for less sophisticated 
individuals). But see 16 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006) (establishing these systems); 42 
U.S.C. § 4028 (stating the NFIP is not available in certain zones designated as with 
the Coastal Barrier Resources System); Emergency Management and Assistance 
44 C.F.R. §§ 71.1, 71.3 (2010) (implementing regulations); Pasterick, supra note 
31, at 146-47 (discussing history of legislation); id. at 146 (stating the Legislation 
applies primarily to zones within barrier islands); id. at 146 (stating communities 
may have some areas within such zones and others outside, and “[c]onsistent 
enforcement . . . is difficult . . . [and] the NFIP must depend on the vigilance of 
insurance agents to distinguish which areas of a community are eligible for 
coverage and which are not.”) (alteration in the original); id. at 146-47 (“A review 
conducted in 1992 by the General Accounting [sic] Office (GAO) found not only 
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estimates one percent of policies “account for 25 to 30 percent of claims.”77  
The dollar amounts associated with repetitive loss claims are, of course, 
only part of the true cost of such claims since frequently such properties are 
built in environmentally fragile locations.78  
Although the NFIP covers a relatively low number of individuals, 
the 2005 hurricane season’s demands on the NFIP were staggering and 
overwhelmed the NFIP. FEMA had to invoke its authority to borrow funds 
from the U.S. Treasury and seek additional appropriations.79 As of August 
2010, FEMA’s debt stood at $18.8 billion;80 it remains unlikely that the 
program will be able to repay this amount.81 The billions in payouts made 
under the NFIP are still small, however, in comparison to the total cost to 
the government of the disaster.82   
   
C. COVERAGE LIMITS, FLOOD MAPS, AND RATES 
  
The maximum coverage currently available under the NFIP is 
$100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for residential real estate.83  
The premium rate structure varies with coverage, deductible, and, most 
importantly, the risks associated with the property to be insured.84 The 
highest sample premium ($5,903) listed on FEMA’s website is for a coastal 
area, high-risk residence and contents insured for the full available 
coverage with a $2,000 deductible.85 Individuals may purchase coverage 
                                                                                                                                      
that significant new development continued to occur in certain CBRS units after 
the law was enacted, but also that NFIP coverage was written on 9 percent of the 
residences in the units sampled.”). 
77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1. 
78 See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1508-10 (discussing the “value of 
healthy wetlands”). 
79  42 U.S.C. §§ 4016, 4017(b)(1), (b)(3), 4127; see Burby, supra note 38, at 
177 (discussing past history of operating losses and use of this authority); 
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 138-39 (discussing the same). 
80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5, 14. 
81 Id. at 5. 
82 See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 876-77 (“[T]otal government 
expenditures could eventually exceed $200 billion.”). 
83 42 U.S.C. §§ 4013-4015 (statutory authorization for setting various 
coverage terms and rates); see also Residential Coverage Policy Rates, 
FLOODSMART.GOV (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www/floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/r 
esidential_coverage/policy-rates.jsp. 
84 See Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 (2010) 
(coverage, rates & deductibles). 
85 See Residential Coverage Policy Rates, supra note 83. 
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only for residences and their contents.86 Thus, cars are not covered,87 but 
there is no limit to the number of residences for which an individual may 
purchase flood insurance.88 Special restrictions do apply to basements and 
lower-level crawlspaces.89 Further, “flood” under the NFIP generally does 
not cover subsidence90 (which, incidentally, leaves a gap in coverage 
availability since private insurers also generally exclude subsidence91). 
 Although individuals under-purchase flood insurance, possibly 
because of perceptions that the rates are too high,92 in fact even the full risk 
rates charged are not actuarially sound.93 FEMA is charged with 
maintaining flood risk maps,94 but such mapping is difficult given the 
contingencies that must be modeled and the costs involved in generating 
accurate assessments. Maps cannot remain static since flood risks will 
change over time both through natural occurrences and manmade 
development. Many FEMA maps are badly in need of updating and also 
often fail to take into account important risks.95 
 In addition to any scientific or budgetary difficulties surrounding 
the creation of accurate flood maps, after updates, if FEMA changes maps, 
                                                                                                                                      
86 See 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A (2)-(3) (stating that renters insurance is 
available as well as condo insurance). 
87 Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, FLOODSMART.GOV, http://www.floo 
dsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_coverage/whats_covered.jsp (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2011). 
88 Residential Coverage: Policy Rates, supra note 83 (“Single-family 
dwellings that are primary residences and insured to the maximum amount of 
insurance available under the program or no less than 80% of the replacement cost 
at the time of may qualify for replacement cost claim settlement. All other 
buildings and contents will be adjusted based on their Actual Cash Value 
(depreciated cost).”). 
89 Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, supra note 87. 
90 Contra 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A(1) § II(A) (Coverage is, however, available 
for “subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as a 
result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding 
anticipated cyclical levels that result in a flood . . . .”). 
91 See Scales, supra note 6, at 35. 
92 See infra Part III.B. 
93 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6.  
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 4101(a), (e)-(i) (2006) (requiring establishment and 
publication of information about flood risk zones); see also 44 C.F.R. § 64.3 
(description of flood insurance maps); 44 C.F.R. pt. 65 (special hazard mapping). 
95 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 7; see also 
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 144-46 (describing problem of erosion in general). 
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FEMA will often be viewed as the proverbial bearer of bad news.96 As 
discussed above, rate increases or more stringent floodplain management 
requirements may have political repercussions,97 and FEMA has generally 
adopted the administrative practice of grandfathering in current 
policyholders to the prior rate.98 In addition to administratively crafted 
grandfathering rules, subsidized rates are required by statute to apply to 
policyholders who own “structures that were built before floodplain 
management regulations were established.”99 These structures date to the 
origination of the NFIP, and even forty-plus years later, nearly 25 percent 
of NFIP policies receive these subsidized rates.100 These properties also 
“experience as much as five times more flood damage than compliant new 
structures that are charged full-risk rates.”101  
 
D. OUTSOURCING AND THE NFIP 
  
 The federal government sets the flood insurance terms and bears 
all of the risks associated with the program, marketing, sales, yet claims 
adjustments are increasingly handled by private insurers through the “Write 
Your Own” (WYO) Program.102 Under the program, for example, a 
policyholder could buy flood insurance from Allstate although the actual 
product is only available through the NFIP.103   
Utilization of private insurance companies to participate in the 
flood insurance program may have been intended to help market the 
                                                                                                                                      
96 NFIP statute and regulations require consultation with local officials and the 
regulations provide various procedures for appealing flood elevation and other 
flood map determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 4107; 44 C.F.R. pt.66 (consultation with 
local officials); 44 C.F.R. pt. 67 (flood elevation determination appeals); 44 C.F.R. 
pt. 68 (administrative hearing procedures); 44 C.F.R. pt. 70 (procedures for map 
correction); 44 C.F.R. pt. 72 (procedures and fees for processing map changes). 
97 See supra Part II.A. 
98 See supra Part II.A. 
99 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 6; see 42 U.S.C. § 
4015. 
100 Id. at 5-6; see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 132-34 (describing 
subsidized rates applicable to pre-flood-insurance-rate-map structures); Scales, 
supra note 6, at 16 (“As of this writing, 38 years have passed, and approximately 
28% [in 2006] of NFIP policies remain subsidized. This in fact reflects substantial 
progress, as the subsidization rate was originally 70%.”) (alteration in the original). 
101 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 4081; 44 C.F.R. § 62.23; see Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96 
(describing WYO program); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the same). 
103 Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96. 
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program and provide better information to individuals regarding their 
financial alternatives.104 WYO policies have increased dramatically as a 
percentage of flood insurance purchases.105 By September 2008, ninety 
WYO insurance companies administered almost ninety-seven percent of 
approximately 5.6 million policies in force.106 By comparison, in 1986, 
forty-eight WYO companies handled just under half of all policies.107  
While WYO policies may be a high percentage of the total outstanding 
policies, it is not clear whether the WYO has indeed helped increase total 
participation since participation in the NFIP remains low.108 
 In creating the WYO program, the federal government may also 
have been seeking to lower its administrative costs.109 But if so, the 
program is flawed.  The WYO companies are paid a flat rate  and are not 
required to account for actual costs incurred.110 The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) studied the difference between the fee 
received and actual costs for six WYO insurers from 2005 through 2007 
and found “that the payments exceeded actual expenses by $327.1 million, 
or 16.5 percent of total payments made.”111 The GAO has also determined 
that WYO insurers “did not strategically market the product” in spite of a 
                                                                                                                                      
104 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (explaining that 
WYO was supposed to be a win-win allowing the NFIP to benefit from marketing 
by private insurance); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (“The WYO program seemed an 
ideal way to remedy the NFIP’s persistent failure to sell many flood policies.”). 
105 Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97. 
106 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-455, FLOOD 
INSURANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE WYO 
PROGRAM 3 (2009) (Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate), available at http://www.gao.g 
ov/new.items/d09455.pdf. 
107 Id. at 3; see also Abramovsky , supra note 18, at 97. 
108 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (“Despite this 
potentially synergistic effort between the NFIP and private companies, take-up 
rates for flood insurance have historically been low.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 14-
15 (discussing participation rates and stating that “the inception of the WYO 
program had a very modest impact on flood insurance participation”). 
109 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 3-4. 
110 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (“More than 
thirty percent of each dollar paid for flood insurance coverage goes to private 
insurers . . . . Over the period of 1968 to 2005, these private insurers received over 
$7.4 billion (excluding the loss adjustment expenses for which we do not have 
data) in fees.”); Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97. 
111 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 9. 
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bonus structure that was added to the standard flat-rate compensation 
system.112 
 In addition to the problems that arise in having WYO insurers 
market both their own policies and government policies, WYO will also act 
as the adjusters for both their private policies and the government policies 
in the aftermath of a disaster.113 Thus, the same insurer will be deciding 
whether to categorize damage as flood damage (covered by the NFIP) or as 
wind damage (covered by private insurance).114 In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, press accounts reported that the WYO companies 
boosted flood claims in order to minimize wind damage payouts.115  
 
III. NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 
 
Currently, there is no private market in basic flood insurance as the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has preempted the field. Even if 
path dependence did not all but dictate continued government intervention, 
the development of a large market in unsubsidized, private flood insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
112 Id. (commenting that the bonus structure is not aligned with the NFIP goals 
of “increasing penetration in low-risk flood zones and among homeowners in all 
zones that do not have mortgages from federally regulated lenders”). 
113 See Scales, supra note 6, at 33-34 (describing “disappointing” quality of 
help by adjusters in completing NFIP claims, which must be filed within sixty days 
of the loss). 
114 See Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform after Katrina, 77 MISS. L.J. 
783, 786-87 (2008) (describing conflict and explaining that exacerbating the 
problem, at the instigation of the WYO companies, the NFIP implemented an 
expedited claims procedure after Katrina which allowed WYO companies to issue 
flood insurance checks “without apportioning the amount of wind and flood 
damage to structures with losses from both perils”). It also, however, became more 
difficult to obtain windstorm coverage in the aftermath of Katrina. Id. at 789-90. 
(Congressman Taylor did introduce legislation that would expand the NFIP to 
include windstorm.)  See also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 
41-43 (describing the “wind-water controversy” and the Katrina-related lawsuits); 
Scales, supra note 6, at 24-29 (describing Katrina cases, including insurance 
companies’ interpretation of contract provisions yielding non-coverage for losses 
partially caused by flood and partially by wind). 
115 See id. at 787-88 nn.14-15 (discussing press accounts in the Biloxi Sun 
Herald and Times Picayune); see also Scales, supra note 6, at 36-37 (describing an 
insurer’s “unusually attractive opportunity to recharacterize wind losses as flood 
losses as it is the very entity tasked with investigating flood claims for the 
government.”). 
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is in doubt.116 A private insurer would have to navigate multiple obstacles 
in setting a price that would be both actuarially sound and profitable 117  
That price would almost certainly be viewed as too expensive by many 
individuals,118 including those who would be most in need of assistance 
following a flood.119 The first section of this Part reviews those pricing 
obstacles, including the extent to which universal coverage could alleviate 
those pressures. In addition, the section discusses the concern that universal 
coverage could increase moral hazard problems, including negative 
environmental externalities. The second section of this Part focuses on the 
consumer side of flood insurance and explores the puzzling reality that, 
even at subsidized rates, many individuals fail to plan for flood loss by 
purchasing insurance. 
  
A. PROVIDER PERILS 
 
Three well-known obstacles complicate the provision of flood 
insurance: correlation, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Universal 
                                                                                                                                      
116 See MOSS, supra note 19, at 262 (describing failed private flood insurance 
experiments of the 1890s and 1920s); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 857 
(arguing that “major disasters . . . require significant federal involvement for 
response and recovery”). 
117 See Boardman, supra note 19, at 828 (“The primary problem for flood 
insurance is cost, not calculation.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that 
flood insurance “suffers from unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that 
make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have responded 
rationally by avoiding it”). 
118 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of possible explanations rooted in 
cognitive psychology; see also Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 239 (explaining 
that flood loss risks are “underestimated systematically by homeowners in hazard-
prone areas” and that residents will perceive “actuarially ‘fair’ coverage” as 
“overpriced, and will remain uninsured”). 
119 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Place, Disasters, and Disability, in LAW AND 
RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 51, 64-69 (Robin Paul Malloy 
ed., 2009) (discussing rural poverty, including the “vulnerability of the rural 
disabled”); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1473 (“Too often, those who suffer 
most are the poorest members of society.”); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 
317 (“Inner-city property owners, including businesses and homeowners, self-
insure far more than their counterparts in affluent areas, in part because of 
availability problems.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, Still Up on the Roof: Race, Victimology, 
and the Response to Hurricane Katrina, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S 
UNNATURAL DISASTER 183, 184-87 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker, eds., 
2009). 
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coverage should provide some relief as to the first and essentially sidestep 
the second. Moral hazard is more complicated, and expanded coverage 
would likely trigger concern that such coverage increases moral hazard 
problems, including environmental impacts. 
   
1. Correlation 
 
Flood losses are typically highly correlated.120 That is, they 
generally occur simultaneously for a large swath of individuals. Thus, even 
if it is scientifically well established that a particular area suffers from a 1 
in 100 chance of a flood in any particular year,121 if this year happens to be 
the year, all of the losses will occur at once. An insurance company may 
not yet have established sufficient reserves through receipt of premiums to 
cover the losses.122 Insurance companies operating within more limited 
geographic areas could face an even more concentrated correlation 
problem.123 
In order to deal with a correlation problem, a commercial insurance 
company would have to charge front-loaded premiums to create a large 
reserve in case the low probability event occurred early in the life of the 
                                                                                                                                      
120 See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 843 (explaining that flood risks are 
“difficult risks” because they are resistant to diversification and are highly 
correlated). 
121 Complete statistical accuracy is, in fact, unlikely given the state of current 
flood maps. See supra Part II.C. Such ambiguity would likely further increase the 
premium. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 72 (2003) (describing survey data revealing that 
ambiguity in either probability of a loss or amount of loss results in “recommended 
premiums” that are “considerably higher”); Scales, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing 
ambiguity premium). 
122 For-profit insurers will create insurance pools only if the contingencies are 
statistically predictable with respect to the pool as a whole but occur randomly 
with respect to any one contributor. The larger the pool of insureds, the more likely 
it is that the actuarial predictions will be sound and provide an adequate basis for 
calculating the premiums needed to cover the promised payouts and also yield a 
profit to the insurance company. See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 842-43 
(describing insurance pools). 
123 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 65; Scales, supra note 6, 
11 & n.30 (while cross-subsidization is possible, insurance companies oppose 
cross-subsidies whether between geographically distinct subsidiaries or between 
types of insurance (e.g., auto subsidizing casualty)); see Scales, supra note 6, at 11 
(even national insurance companies generally operate through separate subsidiary 
companies organized along state lines or even smaller geographic regions). 
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risk pool. For example, if a commercial insurance company sought to 
create a pool for a flood plain subject to a 1 in 500 chance of a flood in any 
particular year, the premiums to establish the reserve would have to be high 
even during the early years of the contract in case the current year 
happened to be the year in which such a flood occurred.124 Not only would 
individuals be unlikely to want to buy insurance requiring high up-front 
payments, they would also have such a low probability of receiving any 
payout during their lifetime that they would have a difficult time perceiving 
any benefit from the coverage.125 Self-insurance would be the general 
choice.126 
Federal, universal coverage does not, of course, change the pattern 
of flood loss. It does, however, allow for greater diversification across 
geographic regions and access to non-program resources in particularly 
turbulent years.  Even with a national program, flood losses can overtake 
capacity. This is essentially what happened to the NFIP during the 2005 
hurricane season.127 The NFIP met its obligations through its access to 
other resources — namely, its borrowing authority.128  
 
2. Adverse Selection 
 
In addition to the need to price for correlation, an insurance 
company issuing a hypothetical flood loss policy would also have to price 
for a significant adverse selection problem. Adverse selection occurs when 
too many of the individuals who purchase coverage do so with certain or 
                                                                                                                                      
124 With thanks to David Cay Johnston for this example. See Scales, supra 
note 6, at 11 (explaining that correlation “induces greater variability in losses, 
leading to significantly higher premiums” if an insurance company is even willing 
to underwrite such a risk). 
125 See infra Part III.B, for a fuller discussion of consumer choices regarding 
flood preparation; Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845 (explaining that “having 
no claim” is often viewed as “purchasing a product with little value, 
notwithstanding that the person received security against loss”). 
126 Proposals to subsidize self-insurance have also been made. For example, 
Congress has proposed the creation of catastrophe savings devices — similar to 
health savings devices. See Christine L. Agnew, Come Hell and High Water: Can 
the Tax Code Solve the Post-Katrina Insurance Crisis?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 701, 738-43 (2007), for a critique of such an approach. 
127 See supra Part II.C.  
128 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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near-certain knowledge that they will be filing an insurance claim.129 For 
example, individuals will be more likely to purchase flood insurance if they 
have knowledge that the risk of flood loss is already at the doorstep (or 
roof, as the case may be).130 Generally, the problem of adverse selection is 
one of information asymmetry.131 With respect to health and life insurance, 
this information asymmetry is fairly easy to conceptualize: the insurance 
company will not be privy to the private aches and pains of the insured and 
may under-price premiums as a result.132 In the case of floods, individuals 
would have particularized knowledge about the likelihood of flooding at a 
residence, and such knowledge would contribute to a classic adverse 
selection problem. 
Adverse selection is a common reason advanced for the failure of a 
private flood insurance market to develop.133 Universal or mandatory 
coverage is the classic solution to adverse selection.134 If everyone is in the 
insurance pool, it removes the question of whether some are in the pool 
because they have inside information about personal risk. The information 
on flood risk developed through the NFIP, however, complicates the 
adverse selection picture. As discussed in Part II, part of the NFIP’s 
mission is to assess flood risk and make those assessments available to the 
public. Thus, individuals can go to a FEMA website to look at flood risk 
maps.135 Many of these maps are, as discussed in Part II, incomplete, 
difficult to decipher, or out of date, but, presumably, some will be 
influenced to purchase flood insurance as a result. Further, the lender 
                                                                                                                                      
129 See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 19, at 822 (“Adverse selection typically 
occurs when insurers cannot distinguish between higher and lower risk 
policyholders . . . .”); see also Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543. 
130 A vivid example of such delayed response occurred during a flood in 
Chesterfield, Missouri, in 1993, when business property owners purchased flood 
insurance in response to a flood crest moving down the Missouri River. At the 
time, only a five-day waiting period was in place. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 
4, at 1493 (describing the event). Currently, a thirty-day waiting period applies. 42 
U.S.C. § 4013(c) (2004); 44 C.F.R. § 61.11(c) (2010). 
131 See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543. 
132 Id. at 545. 
133 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that private 
insurers argued that adverse selection required creation of the NFIP). 
134 See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50 (explaining that the ability of government to 
compel “broad participation” is “[p]erhaps the most widely recognized justification 
for public risk management”); Baker, supra note 20, at 380. 
135 Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 
NFIP, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17 
PM). 
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mandate applies only to high-risk property. Thus, the proportion of flood-
prone properties among all the properties covered by the NFIP is likely 
high.136 This result is not, however, readily ascribed to a classic adverse 
selection problem given that general flood risk information is primarily 
controlled and distributed by the government-insurer and is then used to 
enforce the lender mandate.137   
Private insurers would also have access to information about 
general flood risk and would, presumably, act in their own self-interest 
with two possible scenarios emerging. The first scenario assumes that 
demand is strongest among those with high-risk property and that as a 
result the insurance companies would have to charge higher premiums so 
as to account for high-risk property. Higher premiums could drive out 
lower-risk properties, necessitating premium increases, driving more lower-
risk properties out — i.e., the replication of an adverse selection death 
spiral.138 This cycle could prevent formation of a robust, private flood 
insurance option.139 A second, arguably more plausible, possibility is that 
insurance companies would use their superior ability to assess risk to limit 
coverage only to those at lower risk of suffering damage in what has 
become known as a reverse information asymmetry problem.140 As a result, 
higher-risk property would not be covered at all — a situation that would 
be incompatible with a goal of providing a stable flood loss safety net, 
                                                                                                                                      
136 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5. 
137 See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggerman, Catastrophic Risks and 
First-party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 27 (2008) (under adverse selection 
information asymmetry “insurers must be unable to identify high-risk buyers”). 
138 See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 544; Scales, supra note 6, at 9 (suggesting 
that adverse selection “death spirals” occurring in the flood area is a possibility 
with “unique plausibility”). Cf. Faure & Bruggerman, supra note 137, at 26-27 
(classic adverse selection “is not a serious problem” with respect to catastrophic 
losses); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (refuting the long-held notion that adverse 
selection within insurance markets will inevitably lead to a collapse). 
139 Baker, supra note 20, at 378 (pointing out that this cycle illustrates that 
both insurer-side and insured-side adverse selection are at work). 
140 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (describing that in 
the hurricane context, insurance companies may have the informational advantage 
“if insurance companies spend a lot of resources estimating the risk (which they do 
today)” and explaining that “[r]esearch . . . reveals that insurers might want to 
exploit this reverse information asymmetry, which results in low-risk individuals 
being optimally covered, while high-risk individuals are not”); see Baker, supra 
note 20, at 378. 
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though one that could lead to post-flood government intervention, at least 
as to dramatic flood events.141  
 
3. Moral Hazard  
 
Moral hazard is the term used for the notion that individuals will 
engage in cost-increasing behavior if they are able to shift some of the cost 
away from themselves.142 Since moral hazard is a potential side-effect of 
cost-shifting, moral hazard is a possible consequence of any opportunity for 
cost-shifting — whether insurance, post-disaster assistance, or even 
casualty loss tax deductions. While universal coverage helps solve the 
adverse selection problem, concerns about moral hazard could loom larger 
because of the increased opportunities for cost-shifting that would come 
with universal coverage. 
An important assumption underlying the moral hazard concept is 
that an individual has a consistent cost tolerance with respect to a particular 
risk. If part of the cost has been shifted to another party, the benefitted 
individual will rationally engage in less careful behavior up until the point 
that the expected, unshifted costs reach that individual’s tolerance 
threshold.143 For example, a person with auto insurance would drive 
incrementally more recklessly than someone without insurance and, in 
theory, would set the level of additional recklessness so that any resulting 
damage would be adequately compensated by the policy and would not 
result in unanticipated, irreparable damage to person or property.144 
Insurers use various mechanisms to limit moral hazard, but the two 
most common monetary methods are co-pays and deductibles.145 These 
                                                                                                                                      
141 See infra Part III.B. 
142 KENNETH BLACK, JR., & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE & HEALTH 
INSURANCE 11 (13th ed. 2000). 
143 See Baker, supra note 21, at 270. 
144 See id. at 276-78 (explaining that an assumption underlying the economics 
of moral hazard is that “money compensates for loss” when in fact “money cannot 
restore the sense of security lost when a storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed, 
much of what is important in life”). 
145 See Boardman, supra note 19, at 841 (noting that “moral hazard is always 
tempered by the extent to which the policyholder remains on the risk, through 
deductibles, caps, and the uncertainty of a compliant insurer”); Johnson et al., 
supra note 11, at 232 (“The most common mechanism for controlling moral hazard 
is a deductible . . . .”); KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 99 
(discussing NFIP deductibles and stating that “the majority of homeowners prefer a 
lower deductible”). The NFIP does use deductibles, but since the rates are not 
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devices are intended to shift just enough pain back to the individuals so that 
they are more reluctant to engage in the cost-increasing behavior. Even 
though co-pays and deductibles are usually quite small relative to the costs 
that are covered by the insurance policy, out-of-pocket costs are fixed, 
certain losses that individuals may be particularly prone to shun.146 Indeed, 
setting co-pays too high may increase rather than decrease moral hazard by 
over-deterring individuals from seeking benefits. For example, if an 
individual puts off medical care to avoid a co-payment, the cost of the later 
treatment may be much higher.147   
In addition to using the pain of out-of-pocket costs to control for 
moral hazard loss, insurers may also monitor the behavior of insured 
individuals and thereby require a particular level of care.148 Direct 
observation of the day-to-day behavior of individuals can be costly, but for 
many types of coverage, insurance companies have devised methods for 
indirect monitoring, including reliance on monitoring devices (e.g., fire 
alarms) or third parties (e.g., doctors).149 The NFIP requires community 
adherence to floodplain regulations to increase care and lower the costs of 
flood loss.150 Premium rebates or adjustments could be used as monetary 
rewards for easily measured good behavior — e.g., an absence of claims on 
the policy.151  
In the case of flood loss compensation for individuals, the primary 
moral hazard concerns arise with respect to how individuals store their 
personal possessions, how individuals construct and maintain their homes, 
                                                                                                                                      
actuarially sound, these deductibles may not have the desired effect. The NFIP also 
limits payouts to the value of the damaged property instead of allowing for 
payment tied to replacement cost, unless the damage is to a primary residence and 
its contents. See also supra Part II.C. 
146 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 33-34 (2008) (discussing 
loss aversion). See also infra Part III.B (discussing how consumer cognitive 
perceptions affect flood loss coverage). 
147 ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL 
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY (2011).   
148 Baker, supra note 21, at 280-81. 
149 Id.  
150 See supra Part II.A. 
151 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238; Baker, supra note 21, at 
270 (discussing that for some types of moral hazard, observational monitoring is 
more critical — for example, if the insurance reduces “the incentive to minimize 
the cost of recovering from a loss,” e.g., the “malingering aspect of the disability 
insurance temptation problem”). 
2011       MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE             29 
 
 
and where individuals choose to live. Coverage expansion would trigger 
concerns about exponentially increased moral hazard costs, particularly 
environmental costs associated with increased development. Expansion of 
social safety net coverage for individual homeowners and renters could, 
however, have less of an effect on moral hazard costs than may appear 
upon first consideration because the assumptions underlying moral hazard 
analysis are less likely to hold true as to social safety net coverage for 
primary residences. 152   
In his work excavating the historical and theoretical landscape of 
moral hazard, Professor Tom Baker outlined several assumptions behind 
classic moral hazard analysis.153 The realities of flood loss suggest that 
several of these assumptions do not hold true, particularly as to an 
individual’s primary residence. Moral hazard analysis assumes that “money 
compensates for loss.”154 While loss of a vacation home may come close to 
being compensable by money, the loss of a primary home and its contents 
is far less likely to satisfy this condition.155    
Another assumption underlying moral hazard is that “people with 
insurance have control over themselves and their property.”156 Of course, 
individuals have some choice over where to live, but, for many individuals, 
such choices will be constrained by many factors, including financial and 
social. Further, in the case of flood loss, any particular individual is likely 
to be far removed from decisions involving flood plain regulation and 
                                                                                                                                      
152 See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“By ‘proving’ that helping people has 
harmful consequences, the economics of moral hazard justify the abandonment of 
legal rules and social policies that try to help the less fortunate.”); Kunreuther & 
Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“If consumers generally ignore both loss probabilities 
and potential government assistance in deciding whether or not to buy insurance 
and how much insurance to purchase,  . . . [p]ublic intervention based on our 
concern for fellow citizens can be straightforward: provide as much assistance as 
our conscience dictates to fill in the observed gaps in coverage . . . If such choices 
represent outcomes that are incomplete or inefficient according to the ‘selfish’ 
expected utility model, it is irrelevant because people are not using this model of 
choice anyway.”). But see Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 10, at 104 (describing 
the “perverse incentive effects” of post-disaster relief as “severely exacerbating 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in locational decisions”). 
153 Baker, supra note 21, at 276. 
154 Id. 
155 See id. at 276-78 (“[Money cannot restore the sense of security lost when a 
storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed, much of what is important in life.”). 
156 Id. at 276. 
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development.157 Expansion of flood insurance to all primary residences 
would potentially affect the care taken by residential developers and 
landlords,158 but such effects could be handled directly rather than being 
used as a reason for denying social benefits to more vulnerable 
individuals.159   
Moral hazard analysis depends also on individuals being “rational 
loss minimizers.”160 As will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, there is reason to believe that a great many individuals fail to act 
rationally with respect to flood loss. If individuals have difficulty 
understanding and planning for flood risk, they may also have trouble 
engaging in the calculated, care reducing behavior assumed by moral 
hazard analysis. Of course, some individuals will strategically engage in 
less careful behavior.  For example, under the NFIP, the extent of repetitive 
loss, particularly for second homes,161 as well as the concentration of 
coverage in high-risk areas could suggest a moral hazard problem.162 But 
the concentration of policies in high-risk areas could also be attributable in 
part to the lender mandate163 or to adverse selection.164   
The moral hazard effects of flood insurance expansion also depend 
on the extent to which post-disaster relief already stands in for universal 
coverage.165 Post-disaster relief operates to shift risk and thus raises moral 
                                                                                                                                      
157 See id. at 279 (“If the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in 
control of the behavior that matters, then reducing the insurance incentive will 
impose a cost on those people while providing little benefit . . . .”). 
158 The problem of business flood loss coverage will be addressed in a 
subsequent article. 
159 See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“[C]onventional economic accounts of 
moral hazard exaggerate the incentive effects of real-world insurance and, at the 
same time, underestimate the social benefits of insurance.”). 
160 Id. at 276. 
161 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (The CBO 
“found that many subsidized properties in coastal areas (23 percent from their 
sample of 10,000 properties) were second homes, vacation homes, or rentals.”). 
162 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 93-94 (A study 
undertaken by Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan of the Florida market 
revealed that five counties in Florida accounted for two-thirds of the flood policies 
in Florida; these counties were coastal counties whereas the five counties with the 
lowest number of policies were located well inland.). 
163 See supra Part II.B. 
164 See supra Part III.A.2. 
165 See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 152 (“The prevailing public impression is 
that federal disaster assistance is generally equivalent to the financial protection 
provided by hazard insurance. In reality this is not the case.”). 
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hazard concerns similar to those of ex ante coverage.166 Post-disaster relief 
for large flood events is virtually guaranteed,167 and even for smaller scale 
events, various tax provisions operate to shift some of the risk.168 As with 
flood insurance coverage, the moral hazard story for post-disaster 
assistance also depends, however, on assumptions that may not hold true 
for flood loss.  For example, the patchwork nature169 of available post-
disaster relief may make being a “rational loss minimizer” even more 
difficult.170 
 Given the history of flood loss in the United States, there seems 
little doubt that more care should be taken in land use and development.171  
At the same time, however, it is less clear the extent to which classic moral 
hazard analysis satisfactorily explains the problem, particularly if the focus 
is on individual homeowners and renters. Even if flood loss protection does 
not fit neatly into a classic moral hazard frame, the problem of unwise, 
environmentally harmful development remains. The inability of individuals 
to plan carefully for flood loss suggests that steps for greater care, 
including not only mitigation but prohibitions, must be express and be 
backed by strong incentives or even mandates. Expansion of social safety 
net coverage could provide an opportunity to craft such incentives and to 
                                                                                                                                      
166 See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 281 (“[E]xpectation of federal 
relief has almost certainly increased the willingness of some individuals and 
businesses to locate or remain in disaster prone areas.”). 
167 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (“[T]he driving 
force in the provision of government assistance, is the occurrence of large-scale 
losses.”). 
168 See infra Part V. 
169 See infra Part III.B (discussion of problems associated with post-disaster 
relief). 
170 Baker, supra note 21, at 276; see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, 
supra note 6, at 122 (Empirical work on post-disaster relief suggests that 
“individuals or communities have not based their protective decisions in advance 
of a disaster by focusing on the expectation of government assistance.” Professors 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan cite studies suggesting that “most homeowners in 
earthquake- and hurricane-prone areas did not expect to receive aid from the 
federal government following a disaster” and that “local governments that received 
disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future disasters than 
those who did not.” Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan conclude “this 
behavior seems counterintuitive, and the reasons for it are not fully understood.”). 
171 See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra 
note 7. 
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enlist homeowners and renters in reducing harm caused by developers and 
other real property businesses, such as landlords.172  
 
B. DEMAND AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
 The central demand puzzle is why so many homeowners and 
renters fail to purchase or under-purchase flood insurance, even though it is 
a bargain. Examples of this puzzle can be gleaned from news accounts of 
recent flooding. In June 2011, the Souris River rose and caused massive 
flooding in Minot, North Dakota.173 The river had previously seemed 
nonthreatening after numerous public works initiatives had reduced flood 
risk.174 In 2000, the federal government had moved the flood risk 
assessment level outside the high risk category, which meant that lenders 
no longer had to enforce the mandate to purchase flood insurance.175  
Although residents remained eligible to participate in flood insurance and 
were counseled by federal officials to maintain their policies, a large 
number dropped coverage.176 At the time of the flooding, an estimated one 
in ten had flood insurance.177 In 2011, only 476 residents had flood 
insurance policies; just one year earlier, 959 residents had flood 
insurance.178 The combination of public works projects, lowered risk 
assessment, removal of the mandate, and financial pressures inexorably led 
individuals to stop worrying about floods.179 As one resident put it, “I 
didn’t have any concerns. . . . It was not going to happen to me.  I was in 
complete denial.”180 
                                                                                                                                      
172 See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50-51 (“[G]overnment enjoys a considerable 
advantage over private insurers when it comes to monitoring and controlling moral 
hazard directly.”). 
173 A.G. Sulzberger, They Dropped Their Flood Insurance, Then the ‘Mouse’ 
Roared, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A13. 
174 Id. (“[T]he once flood-prone river—known locally as the Mouse, after its 
French name—had seemingly been tamed by public works projects that reshaped 
the channel, raised the banks and controlled the flow of water . . . .”). 
175 Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing lender mandate). 
176 See Sulzberger, supra note 171. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (“[A]nother problem facing residents of Minot is a consequence not of 
failing to control the river but of decades of doing so successfully. . . . ‘Some 
citizens have been lulled into a false sense of security because we have had such 
good results,’ said . . . the City Council president.”). 
180 Id. (statement by a real estate agent married to a firefighter). 
2011       MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE             33 
 
 
This response to the possibility of flood loss is not unusual. Even 
though the NFIP provides flood insurance at low rates,181 many individuals 
still do not purchase it.182 The study of financial preparedness, including the 
problem of underinsurance,183 has increasingly become intertwined with 
cognitive considerations such as optimism bias, loss aversion, and time-
inconsistent preferences.184 This section briefly reviews some of the 
potential contributions of this research to the under-purchase of flood 
insurance. 
                                                                                                                                      
181 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer 
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the 
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”). 
182 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (noting that “coverage is 
underpurchased by consumers, even when it is heavily subsidized”); Kunreuther & 
Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (“The NFIP . . . provides highly subsidized rates for 
existing homes so that any risk-averse individual who made the appropriate 
calculations of the expected benefits and costs of purchasing such insurance should 
have wanted coverage. In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina the 
percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to 
7.3 percent. . . .”). 
183 Underinsurance is a problem for virtually all potentially financially 
devastating events — for example, death, disability, and casualty. See 
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that thirty-eight 
percent of “owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage” in the 2005 
hurricanes did not have insurance against wind loss); Levmore & Logue, supra 
note 4, at 273-74 (discussing problem of underinsurance for life insurance after the 
attacks of 9/11); Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal 
Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 972-73 (2005) (describing fire 
underinsurance in California).    
184 See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 101-56 (discussing 
cognitive glitches and financial decisions); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 
282-83 (stating that “simple underinsurance” may result from “myopia, 
overoptimism, bad planning, or passivity.”); Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral 
Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 336-40 (2011) 
(discussing the rational investor versus the real investor); Edward J. McCaffery & 
Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE 3,13 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006) 
(discussing application of “time-inconsistency models” to savings decisions); 
Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: 
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 154-68 (Ronald J. Daniels et al., eds., 
2006) (discussing inference bias, forecast bias, procrastination, status quo bias, and 
empathy gaps); Scales, supra note 6, at 9-10 (explaining individuals’ tendencies to 
respond differently to risks that they view as remote). 
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 Individuals appear to have difficulty conceptualizing 
probabilities.185 For low probability events that carry large costs, 
individuals often fail to take minimal, economically rational steps — 
purchasing flood insurance, for example. On the other hand, many 
individuals over-pay for insurance for events that have more salience — 
e.g., warranties for small electronics186 or flight insurance following acts of 
or warnings about terrorism.187 Using familiarity as a shortcut for 
understanding a given probability may work relatively well in a variety of 
situations188 but is problematic for flood events.189 Even individuals 
residing in a relatively hazardous area may never have personally 
experienced a flood event.190 
                                                                                                                                      
185 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 121 (discussing studies 
suggesting that people cannot “distinguish between probabilities that ranged from 
1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million” and that individuals also “did not respond to 
insurance premiums as a signal of risk”); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845 
(discussing lack of demand for coverage of difficult risks as relating to whether the 
individual has “past experience with it or know someone else who has endured it”); 
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225-26 (explaining that “consumers may have 
distorted perceptions of the size or probability of the risks they face.”). See also 
supra Part III.A.3 (discussing assumption of accurate risk assessment underlying 
moral hazard analysis). 
186 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 78-80 (discussing extended 
warranties on small devices and concluding “the extended warranty is a product 
that simply should not exist” given various market assumptions).  
187 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 226-31 (discussing “distorted beliefs 
concerning the probability and size of some potential losses” following from vivid 
and dramatic news events, including terrorism). See also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-
KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding that “local governments 
that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future 
disasters than those who did not”). 
188 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 24-26 (discussing cluster of related 
mental shortcuts tied to familiarity, including the availability heuristic, 
accessibility and salience). 
189 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106-07 (discussing how 
“[r]ather than using the expected utility model, many residents in hazard prone 
areas appear to follow a sequential model of choice” and “[f]or these individuals 
only after the occurrence of a disaster does this event assume sufficient salience”). 
For example, the purchase of NFIP policies increased dramatically following the 
2005 hurricane season. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 87 
(750,000 more policies at end of 2007 than in 2005).  
190 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105 (characterizing a “hazard-
prone area” as one where annual probability of damage “is within the range of 1 in 
50 to 1 in 500. So, while the financial losses should such an event occur can be 
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 Individuals may also be overly optimistic when faced with 
probabilistic information.191 Thus, even assuming individuals spend the 
time needed to understand flood risk,192 such information may still not be 
enough to overcome an optimistic feeling that the event will not actually 
happen. As discussed in Part II and also alluded to in the anecdote 
beginning this section, public works projects may further contribute to a 
false sense of security.193 Individuals who initially purchase a policy may 
later cancel because of difficulty in perceiving the benefits of a policy that 
has not produced a cash transfer to the insured.194 Flood insurance coverage 
may seem superfluous to an individual who has paid for the coverage for 
many years but who has yet to file a claim.195 Individuals already feeling 
budget constraints will be more prone to seeing the coverage as a luxury 
rather than necessity.196 Structuring insurance covering low probability 
                                                                                                                                      
significant, the great majority of people will not have observed an event close at 
hand recently.”). 
191 See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 32-33 (discussing 
“[u]nrealistic optimism” with respect to statistical risks “to life and health”); Lin, 
supra note 184, at 340 (“Despite facts to the contrary, individuals generally have 
an overabundance of confidence in their own abilities and an overabundance of 
optimism in their futures.”). 
192 As discussed supra even expert agencies have difficulty creating and 
maintaining accurate flood risk maps. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 
105 (“[M]any potential victims of disaster perceive the costs of getting information 
about the hazard and costs of protection to be so high relative to the expected 
benefits that they do not even consider purchasing insurance.”) (citation omitted). 
193 See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the unintended consequences 
public works projects may have). See also Sulzberger, supra note 173 (“Some 
residents said they had misinterpreted these revised flood estimates to mean that 
they were no longer at risk. Others said they had just used the lower odds as an 
opportunity to save some money.”). 
194 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 231-35 (discussing framing effects and 
the relative attractiveness of rebates over deductibles). See also THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 36-37 (discussing framing effects and “choice 
architects”).  
195 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 124 (“People often 
purchase flood insurance only after suffering damage in a flood, but many cancel 
their policies when several consecutive years pass with no flood.”); Kunreuther & 
Pauly, supra note 70, at 107 (stating that there is “empirical evidence that many 
homeowners who initially purchase insurance are likely to cancel policies if they 
have not made a claim over the course of the next few years”); Scales, supra note 
6, at 31 n.108 (“[U]nrealized insurance risks still have substantial value.”). 
196 Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105-06 (“[R]eluctance to invest in 
protection voluntarily is compounded by budget constraints. For some 
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events so that it pays an annual rebate to individuals who have not filed a 
claim may help increase policy retention.197 
 Even if individuals understand that buying insurance would be 
economically wise,198 they may decide to wait until tomorrow to make the 
purchase given the pain of parting with money today.199 Unfortunately, 
individuals tend to keep moving that “tomorrow” forward in time until it 
becomes too late.200 Possible contributors to the procrastination 
phenomenon include an aversion to parting with cash in exchange for 
uncertain benefits201 and a bias toward maintaining one’s current 
position.202  
                                                                                                                                      
homeowners with relatively low incomes, disaster insurance is considered a 
discretionary expense. . . . In contrast to the expected utility model where the 
demand for insurance depends on the premium relative to the expected loss, 
demand appears to depend only on the premium for a given amount of coverage.”). 
197 Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 233-35 (describing experiment suggesting 
that disability insurance structured to provide rebates would be more attractive than 
standard disability insurance). See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 62-
65 (describing how making transfers of small amounts of food supplies increased 
participation in vaccination program — a program that required multiple 
treatments and would yield protection benefits that would occur in the future and 
be difficult to perceive). 
198 The difficulty individuals have in understanding probabilities and coverage 
benefits will reinforce the desire to procrastinate. See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra 
note 147, at 154 (“[T]he [procrastination] problem is made even harder when the 
insurance is against a catastrophic event: The payout would take place . . . in a 
particularly unpleasant future that no one really wants to think about.”); Meyer, 
supra note 184, at 164 (“Decisions to invest in protection against low-probability 
events are particularly susceptible to procrastination . . . .”). 
199 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (explaining that 
“some homeowners with relatively low incomes” will perceive disaster insurance 
as a “discretionary expense that should be incurred only if residual funds are 
available after taking care of what individuals or families consider to be the 
necessities of life”). 
200 BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 147, at 65 (“Our natural inclination is to 
postpone small costs, so that they are borne not by our today self but by our 
tomorrow self instead.”); see also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save 
More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 
J. POL. ECON. S164, S167-68 (2004) (discussing the concepts of self-control and 
procrastination).  
201 See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 33-34 (describing loss 
aversion); Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 200, at S169-70 (describing loss aversion 
on savings behavior). 
202 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 34-35 (discussing status quo bias). 
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Pre-commitment devices may solve some types of procrastination 
problems.203 The tax system already yields examples of such devices.  
Congress codified204 an administrative position205 through which employers 
may enroll employees in section 401(k) deferred compensation plan by 
default; employees who do not want to participate must then complete an 
opt-out procedure. Although employees may fairly easily free themselves 
from their bindings, inertia will likely keep most from doing so and will 
thereby reduce future regrets over poor planning.206 In addition to this 
example of a congressionally crafted technique, numerous individuals save 
through the tax system by selecting or sticking with tax withholding rates 
                                                                                                                                      
203 See McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 184, at 13 (describing advantages of 
“self-commitment devices that limit future choices, like Ulysses did when he 
bound himself to the mast as his ship passed the Sirens’ sweet song.”). The extent 
to which government should act paternalistically to remedy cognitive flaws is 
strongly debated. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 4-11; see 
generally Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC 
FINANCE 355 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006); Jonathan Klick 
& Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive 
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain 
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).  
204 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 
1033. See also Automatic Contribution Arrangements, 74 Fed. Reg. 8200, 8200-02 
(Feb. 24, 2009); Notice 2009-65, 2009-39 I.R.B. 413 (Sept. 28, 2009) (sample plan 
amendments for adding § 401(k)(13) automatic enrollment features); see generally 
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH 329 (Jan. 17, 2007). 
205 Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-1 C.B. 617, amplifying & superseding Rev. Rul. 
98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273. 
206 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 107-09; James J. Choi et al., 
Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC 
FINANCE 304, 339 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006) (discussing 
evidence that employees make savings decisions passively and arguing that 
“employers should choose their plan defaults carefully, since these defaults will 
strongly influence the retirement preparation of their employees”). See also STAFF 
OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 51-52 (June 26, 2008). (“The theory is 
that to the extent that these employees are not saving for retirement due to inertia 
(simple failure to take initiative), that same failure to take initiative may prevent 
them from electing out of the contributions” and will thereby assist “employees 
who can and want to save for retirement.”). 
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that yield significant, lump sum refunds.207 Even though saving through 
withholding seems to make little economic sense because of the foregone 
interest, the technique helps individuals resist the temptation to spend the 
money elsewhere while providing an easy, virtually painless path to 
amassing a usefully large sum.208 
In the case of disaster insurance, devices for dealing with lack of 
preparation may need to be stronger given the difficulties associated with 
processing flood loss probabilities.209 The costs of failure to take mitigation 
steps may make a disaster more costly,210 yet the more costly the more 
likely it is that aftermath aid will be provided. As discussed in the previous 
section, adverse selection also presents a problem against which mandates 
provide significant protection. The adverse selection problem could be 
                                                                                                                                      
207 Fennell, supra note 26, at 148 (“About three-fourths of U.S. taxpayers have 
more income tax than necessary withheld . . . or make excess estimated payments. . 
. .”) (internal citation omitted). 
208 STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY 1-7 (2009) 
(discussing need and ways poor amass “usefully large lump sums”). See also 
Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52 (exploring explanations for over-withholding 
preference, including its use as a pre-commitment device). The allure of lump 
sums may inspire other techniques designed to combat under-saving. Recently, for 
example, some U.S. credit unions are attempting to correct savings myopia by 
adding a lottery hook. See Melissa Schettini Kearney et al., Making Savers 
Winners: An Overview of Prize-linked Savings Products 14-20 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16433) (2010), available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w16433 (discussing U.S. market potential and current 
offerings); Anne Stuhldreher, Credit Unions Launch a Savings Lottery, and 
Everyone Hits the Jackpot, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2010, at B4 (discussing savings 
lotteries). Such lottery-linked accounts have been utilized internationally for years. 
See Mauro F. Guillén & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: Banks and 
Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 219, 225-29 (overview 
of history, practice, and methods used in various countries); See generally Kearney 
et al., supra note 208, at 7-14 (discussing use of programs used internationally). 
209 Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (discussing evidence suggesting 
that people’s beliefs about flood loss cause them to “have no incentive to invest in 
protective measures voluntarily”). 
210 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262-63 (discussing 
“natural disaster syndrome” as increased vulnerability caused by “cost-effective 
loss-reduction measures” and reviewing “extensive evidence that residents in 
hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily”). 
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exacerbated by cognitive hurdles if flood loss is salient only for those most 
at risk.211   
 Local, state, and federal officials attempting to plan for over-
optimism and probability processing difficulty will themselves be subject 
to the same types of cognitive challenges.212 Prior to a flood, government 
actors may fail to take protective steps even though cost-benefit analysis 
strongly supports action.213 Political pressures to limit spending and keep 
taxes low may further dampen efforts to take precautionary measures.214  
Yet, in the aftermath of a flood, especially a large-scale event, officials will 
                                                                                                                                      
211 It is also possible, however, that the problem might be lessened if even 
individuals facing the highest risk fail to take action because of various cognitive 
hurdles. Further, if individuals only perceive flood loss as salient after an event 
occurs, adverse selection may be lower because another event in the near future 
may be less likely depending on community response. See KUNREUTHER & 
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding “that local 
governments that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses 
from future disasters than those who did not”). 
212 See Meyer, supra note 184, at 173 (“[B]enevolent central planning” is 
limited in “that it has legitimacy only to the degree that benevolent central 
planning is free of the decision biases that it is meant to cure.”); Scales, supra note 
6, at 12 (“Governments, like individuals, are subject to many of the cognitive 
biases that constrain the development of private catastrophe insurance.”). 
213 Burby, supra note 38, at 179 (providing three examples of how local 
government (in)action in New Orleans revealed a lack of concern about flooding 
hazards, including lobbying by the local government for levees built to resist a 
one-hundred-year flood rather than a two-hundred-year flood in order to reduce the 
local cost share); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 102 (“Public sector 
agencies may also behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimal social policy 
by not using the principles of benefit-cost analysis . . . as illustrated by the Corps 
of Engineers decision not to strengthen the New Orleans levees.”); Meyer, supra 
note 184, at 157 (discussing history of hurricanes in the greater New Orleans area 
and noting that “ironically, this success [with Hurricane Camille]—combined with 
the lack of storms in the years that followed—seemed to deflate rather than spur 
interest in completing the [flood-control] project.”); Nunn, supra note 119, at 186-
90 (detailing information available to public officials regarding the vulnerability of 
New Orleans). 
214 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how 
“given short-term reelection considerations, the representative is likely to vote for 
measures that allocate taxpayers’ money elsewhere that yield more political 
capital. . . . because they believe that their constituents are not worried about these 
events occurring”). 
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be required to do something215 and may reap political rewards for their 
public acts of generosity.216 Reliance on ex post relief may carry with it 
significant problems. Relief efforts will depend on the vividness of the 
event—and, with respect to government assistance, may also depend on the 
proximity of the event to an election.217 If the event is sufficiently large 
scale, aid may be relatively plentiful.218 On the other hand, even if a flood 
event is catastrophic in the life of a particular family, if the flood is an 
isolated occurrence, that family may have little access to outside sources of 
support.219 Even in cases of large-scale disasters where aftermath aid is 
relatively plentiful, access to the aid may be difficult for individuals to 
obtain because the path may not be clear having been put together in a 
patchy, ad hoc fashion in a stressful context.220 Lower-income individuals 
may suffer in particular. For example, an important post-disaster program 
is the availability of low-interest loans from the Small Business 
Administration for damaged property, including personal residences and 
                                                                                                                                      
215 Id. at 262 (“The magnitude of the destruction following a catastrophe often 
leads public sector agencies to provide disaster relief to victims even if the 
government claimed it had no intention of doing so prior to the event.”). See also, 
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 86-87 (1990) (discussing congressional “bias in favor of action over 
inaction”). 
216 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (“The fact that 
politicians can benefit from their generous actions following a disaster raises basic 
questions as to the capacity of elected representatives at the local, state, and federal 
levels to induce people to adopt protection measures before the next disaster.”). 
217 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 123 (describing 
research showing that “disaster assistance is more prevalent in presidential election 
years, all other things being equal”); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 
(“[T]he amount and terms of the disaster [relief] depend on random political 
influences including the proximity of the disaster to the date of the next national 
election.”). 
218 Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“What is well understood is 
that large-scale losses from disasters are a driving force with respect to the actual 
provision of government relief (citation omitted) . . . .”). 
219 See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: 
A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 61-62 (2006) (discussing 
horizontal inequity in comparing relief for large-scale disasters and that for 
disasters affecting fewer individuals). 
220 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“[T]he combination of low 
private insurance and haphazard public disaster relief may lead to inefficiency as 
well as high levels of government spending.”). 
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effects.221 Low-income individuals are often ineligible for these loans 
because of the default risk.222 
 Costs may be higher with post-disaster assistance—in part because 
the cost of administering and obtaining the aid may be more costly because 
of lack of pre-planning and in part because the costs may be higher than if 
adequate pre-disaster mitigation steps had occurred.223 In the aftermath of a 
disaster, the government may overreact by enacting rules that are 
inconsistent with other policy goals — tax changes, for example, that have 
far larger effects than may have been intended.224 Of course, ex ante 
provisions are unlikely to bring the need for aftermath aid down to zero.  
Unanticipated problems may emerge and some coverage gaps may remain.  
                                                                                                                                      
221 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19 (describing 
program). 
222 Id. at 19. See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 151-52 
(discussing government intervention in international context and noting “[t]he 
government intervenes only in cases of large-scale disasters, not when a buffalo 
dies or someone is hit by a car. And even disaster relief is, in most cases, vastly 
insufficient by the time it gets to the poor.”). 
223 KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262 (noting that the 
“combination of underinvestment in protection prior to the event leading to large 
disaster losses, together with the general taxpayer financing some of the recovery, 
can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds”). 
224 See Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief: 
Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 
434 (2008) (concluding that “Congress should avoid post-disaster temporary tax 
legislation as a means to aid disaster relief efforts”); Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra 
note 219, at 53-54 (discussing Congressional overreaction and the “legislative 
imperative” to act following a disaster and concluding that the results have “been 
disappointing, and largely inconsistent with sound tax policy”). 
 Professors Ellen Aprill and Richard Schmalbeck, for example, have 
recommended having Congress adopt joint resolutions declaring a disaster instead 
of delegating to the executive branch the responsibility of designating federally 
declared disasters because “Congress will likely always feel that it needs to act 
when disaster strikes.” Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 95. They have also 
recommended creation of a panel to identify categories of relief provisions—some 
of which would be available widely and other that should rarely be used. Id. at 97-
99. Such “[g]uidelines . . . would establish presumptions, obligating a member of 
Congress who proposes to disregard them to offer compelling explanations of why 
it would be appropriate to do so.” Id.  
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In addition, government officials, charities, and individuals will likely still 
want to do something to show altruism and support.225 
 No simple solution exists to deal with the difficulties inherent in 
flood loss and floodplain management. The approach proposed in this 
Article is one that relies on having multiple pressure points for action and 
needed adjustment with respect to flood loss. 
 
IV. NATIONAL FLOOD LOSS SECURITY PROGRAM 
 
 The previous two parts outlined some of the reasons supporting the 
case for continued government intervention in flood loss relief and for 
structuring such intervention to be widely available and focused on limiting 
ad hoc, post-disaster decisions. Much more could (and has) been written on 
these issues. This section will, however, take as a working assumption that 
the benefits of a broad, ex ante approach outweigh its costs and will turn to 
discussing the potential benefits of structuring a national flood loss security 
program using the powerful tools available through the tax system. This 
Part also outlines one possible structure for such an approach.226 Part V 
                                                                                                                                      
225 Cf. Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 277 (predicting that “public and 
charitable relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be) 
less than full private insurance”). 
226 The mechanisms proposed in this Article are aimed directly at individuals 
instead of being designed to have an effect on institutions potentially involved in 
managing flood risk — e.g., insurance companies and charitable organizations 
providing aftermath aid. Thus, for example, this Article does not include 
discussion of possible subsidies for insurance companies to aid in the creation of a 
commercial flood insurance market. See Agnew, supra note 124 (discussing 
proposed legislation aimed at providing tax relief to insurance companies for 
catastrophe reserves). Nor does it include discussion of some type of 
“supercharged subsidy for charitable gifts”. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, 
at 308-09 (discussing such a proposal in the context of terrorism insurance). 
 The money to fund flood loss coverage could also be raised through a 
consumption tax model. State sales taxes are examples of a consumption tax; 
excise taxes on alcohol and cigarettes are federal examples of consumption taxes. 
See JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 231-68 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing consumption taxes).  
The rate of a consumption tax would, however, be much more difficult, if not 
impossible, to tie to a particular individual’s flood risk. It would also be more 
difficult to adjust consumption tax rates to take into account an individual’s ability 
to pay. For example, imagine that a flood tax were imposed as a national sales tax; 
to adjust for flood risk and ability to pay, at each point of sale, a questionnaire 
regarding one’s income and location of principal residence would need to be 
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discusses how current tax law on disaster relief should be adjusted so as to 
harmonize with the creation of a broad flood loss security program. 
 
A. LEVERS OF TAX SYSTEM POWER 
  
Flood loss protection is highly complex and requires attention to 
both social safety net concerns and concerns regarding unsafe or unwise 
development and construction. Utilizing tax system components to 
implement flood loss protection could provide multiple avenues for 
addressing this complexity. Use of the tax system would facilitate 
implementation of mandates and universal coverage, thus ensuring a 
minimum level of coverage for all citizens. Universal coverage would also 
help to alleviate adverse selection problems and to resolve the difficulty 
individuals have in committing to flood loss prevention. Other tax system 
components — refunds and rate adjustments, for example — could be 
utilized to make the benefits of having coverage more salient and to 
incentivize individuals to engage in mitigation efforts. The tax system 
could also be structured so as to harmonize with and reinforce other flood-
cost reduction programs, including relocation programs. 
 The strength of the withholding mechanism would facilitate the 
collection of premiums.227 Other tax return items — gross income, for 
example — could be readily utilized to adjust premiums so as to take into 
account an individual’s ability-to-pay. As was discussed in Part II, 
premium collection is currently outsourced to private insurance businesses 
with highly problematic results. The IRS, in contrast, has a strong record of 
enforcement competence and general efficiency.228 Further, the IRS and 
                                                                                                                                      
completed. While the process could be streamlined through technology — e.g., a 
smart card — the administrative and compliance problems of using a sales tax for 
such a purpose loom large.  
 A more realistic consumption tax approach would utilize a low-rate 
consumption tax to support a supplemental general catastrophe fund for dealing 
with unexpected costs. Such a fund could also provide a focal point for political 
involvement in the aftermath of the disaster. See Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 
219, at 93.  
227 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 226, at 181 (discussing how withholding 
technique is a “major enforcement tool”). But see Richard L. Doernberg, The Case 
Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) (discussing history of 
withholding system and providing a critique of the system). 
228 John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 
System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 162 (2003) (“Efficiency pressures are so 
embedded in the organizational culture of the IRS that even strong external 
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Treasury already have experience dealing with flood events as it must 
enforce several tax rules relating to natural disasters.229  
 Of course, bringing in the IRS and Treasury will also raise new 
concerns. Utilizing these governmental units to implement a social program 
could further dilute their mission, particularly revenue collection under the 
income tax system.230 The IRS and Treasury already play a significant role 
in other social programs, such as retirement planning and health care. In 
addition, the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous tax expenditures 
and other indirect social programs, such as the earned income tax credit.  
The detrimental effects of the addition of one more social program to be 
administered in part by the IRS and Treasury is hard to know in advance.  
Certainly, implementation of the proposed flood loss security program 
would require expansion of the IRS budget, something that is politically 
difficult even in less partisan times. On the other hand, if the goal is 
universal coverage through a federal program, it is difficult to envision a 
government agency or private organization better equipped to handle the 
collection of premiums. 
 The IRS and Treasury would not be the only administrative 
agencies tasked with overseeing the proposed program. Flood risk 
assessment and oversight of community regulations would still belong to 
the agency that currently handles those assessments — i.e., FEMA.231 In 
addition, FEMA’s role would need to expand to include claims adjustment, 
a function which is currently almost entirely outsourced to private 
insurance companies through the WYO program.232 The proposed 
program’s heavy reliance on administrative agencies raises concerns 
                                                                                                                                      
pressures have limited ability to change them.”); John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood, 
Efficiency, Equity, and Politics: Democratic Controls Over the Tax Collector, 43 
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1166, 1184-85 (1999) (finding that “efficiency consistently 
provides the dominant influence on audit allocation decisions”). Complaints about 
the IRS being too driven by collection may, however, arise as they have in the past.  
Scholz, supra at 164-65 (discussing efforts by Congress to discourage “unduly 
zealous enforcement”). 
229 See infra Part V. 
230 For general discussion of IRS mission and history, see Alan H. Plumley & 
C. Eugene Steuerle, Ultimate Objectives for the IRS: Balancing Revenue and 
Service, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 311 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel 
Slemrod, eds., 2004). 
231 See supra Part II.C (discussing problems with current FEMA maps). 
232 See supra Part II.D. 
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regarding agency capture and other agency shortcomings.233 As discussed 
in Part II, a case can already be made based on the history of the NFIP that 
communities exert too much influence over the updating and enforcement 
of new flood maps, and FEMA’s approach to Hurricane Katrina can be 
cited as a textbook example of regulatory failure.234 While an in-depth 
discussion of agency capture and other potential agency flaws is beyond the 
scope of this Article, the proposed system arguably should not be any more 
problematic than that under the current NFIP and may even be less 
susceptible to such pressures. 
Moving to a mandatory, universally applicable system may make 
interest group formation more difficult.235 Under the NFIP, communities 
opt in to the program, and the availability of flood insurance to individuals 
depends on communities agreeing to participate in the NFIP. FEMA 
appears to have as an internal goal a focus on individual access and 
purchase of flood insurance.236 If that is the case, FEMA may be more 
inclined to agree to community demands in order to facilitate that mission 
since individual access is available only if the community qualifies as an 
NFIP participant.237 If flood insurance purchase is mandatory for 
individuals, access to coverage would not be held hostage by community 
demands. The rates charged to individuals under the system proposed in 
this Article would, however, be adjusted through community adherence to 
regulations. Thus, pressure from communities on agencies would continue 
to be a factor, but the issue of rate rather than access may be less likely to 
                                                                                                                                      
233 See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 343-47 (discussing phenomenon of rent-
seeking through regulation).  
234 See supra Parts II.A and C. See also Russell S. Sobel & Pater T Leeson, 
Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 
PUBLIC CHOICE 55 (2006). 
235 See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 475 (“One of the most counterintuitive 
predictions of Olson’s theory is that small interest groups are much more effective 
at obtaining favors from government than large groups are. . . . In poor countries, 
where the agricultural sector is large and the group of middle-class urban dwellers 
is small, farmers receive small or even negative subsidies for their products . . . 
[but if] farmers make up a tiny fraction of the total workforce, they often receive 
giant subsidies.”). 
236 See The Official Site of the National Flood Insurance Program, 
FLOODSMART.GOV, www.floodsmart.gov. 
237 See Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the 
Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service, 
13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 236 (2003) (discussing the “goal-seeking nature of 
bureaucracy”). 
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induce capitulation to community pressures. (Of course, communities may 
themselves be under greater pressure from their residents as a mandate may 
mean that more individuals would take an interest in assuring community 
compliance so as to receive the best premium rates possible.) 
The involvement of the IRS and Treasury may act as a 
counterweight to community pressure and provide monitoring of FEMA.238  
Some scholarship suggests that the IRS and Treasury are less susceptible to 
capture than other agencies because of the diverse range of interests in the 
charge of these agencies.239 In addition, empirical research on IRS 
enforcement patterns suggests that the IRS is more influenced by national 
trends than by localized politics.240 
                                                                                                                                      
238 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 49-58 (2010) (exploring how “shared 
responsibilities” among agencies “can either foster or frustrate” agency 
independence). 
239 Scholz, supra note 228, at 158-59 (“Of all of the specialized enforcement 
agencies, the IRS is arguably the most sheltered from direct political influence at 
all levels.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci 
Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102  YALE 
L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1993) (“Tax institutions, because of their greater visibility and 
more competitive nature, are less susceptible to interest group capture and possess 
greater legitimacy under pluralist criteria than their direct expenditure 
equivalents.”). 
240 Howard & Nixon, supra note 237, at 233 (“Examining cross-sectional time 
series data from 1960 until 1988, we found that the IRS shifts the number of audits 
it conducts of businesses versus individuals in response to the prevailing median 
ideology of the federal courts of appeals, and in response to the prevailing 
ideological framework of the President and Congress.”); Scholz & Wood, supra 
note 228, at 1185 (“Partisan responsiveness exerts a somewhat less consistent 
influence on audit allocations. State-level partisanship consistently shifts audit 
resources away from taxpayers with business income in Republican states, but the 
results are less supportive of the partisanship hypothesis for nonbusiness taxpayers.  
On the national level, both presidents and Congressional committees influence the 
tradeoff between equity and efficiency, with presidential influence being 
significant for more categories of taxpayers than committee influence.”); John T. 
Scholz & Dan Wood, Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public 
Administration, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 141, 160 (1998) (“Consistent with past 
research on other agencies, the mix of IRS audits also responds to changes in the 
presidency as well as changes in the leadership and ideology of members of 
congressional oversight committees. On the other hand, the mix of corporate 
versus individual audits does not respond to state-level variations in partisanship of 
the state’s congressional delegation, governor, presidential vote, or legislature . . . . 
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Given the recent series of congressional showdowns over deficits, 
social programs, and taxes, enactment of such an expansion over the 
current NFIP would face its own hurdles.  During the last several years, 
Congress has put off dealing with the shortcomings of the NFIP by 
enacting short-term extensions of the program.241 Admittedly, the prospects 
of a more complete overhaul of the program are relatively dim given the 
current political climate. Of particular concern may be the mandatory 
aspect of the proposed expansion,242 especially given the litigation 
surrounding the mandate contained in the health care legislation.243  
Discussion of the constitutionality of the health care mandate is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but there is reason to think that the structure proposed 
in this Article is less susceptible to such arguments.  
The federal government already has a well-established commercial 
interest in flood loss protection as evidenced by the NFIP, Army Corps of 
Engineers flood mitigation projects, and the provision of aftermath 
protection.244 The formation and presence of commercial special interest 
groups should also be much lower than was the case with health insurance 
given that private insurers have not underwritten flood insurance for 
decades, although removal of the WYO payments may cause some 
consternation.245 The collection of premiums would be somewhat similar to 
that utilized for social security, a program whose constitutionality has been 
                                                                                                                                      
The picture suggests that earlier reforms have succeeded in insulating field offices 
from local influences.”). 
241 See supra Part I. 
242 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 114 (discussing the prospects of 
flood insurance mandate and suggesting “Lower income people will have the 
increases cushioned (though not taken away entirely) by subsidies, but the middle 
class especially may object to being charged for insurance which they think they 
do not need and will never use. How to assemble at least a minimal winning 
coalition of citizens to make mandated coverage feasible is a crucial research 
topic.”). 
243 See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 
2010), aff’d 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-5007 (6th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel Bondi vs. 
Health & Human Services, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-724 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. 2011). 
244 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001-4002 (2006) (congressional findings regarding 
economic burdens caused by flood loss). For discussion of the commerce clause as 
it relates to the healthcare legislation, compare Thomas More Law Center 108 
A.F.T.R. 2d 2011-5007 at 14-15, with Florida ex rel Bondi, 2011 WL 3519178 at 
*24-38. 
245 See supra Part II.D (discussion of WYO program). 
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upheld.246 The premiums would be paid in substantial part as an exchange 
for direct coverage rather than being a penalty related to a decision to self-
insure (which has been characterized by critics of the health care mandate 
as a tax on doing nothing rather than an income or excise tax).247 The 
vividness of recent flood events and the feelings of altruism triggered by 
such events may also ease the path to enactment.248 Finally, it may be 
possible to invest a portion of the collected revenues (in years of lower 
flooding costs) to spur development of private catastrophe coverage — for 
example, stimulation of the catastrophe bond market.249 
                                                                                                                                      
246 See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (employer 
portion). For an overview of the current state of the social security system, see 
Patricia Dilley, Through the Doughnut Hole: Reimagining the Social Security 
Contribution & Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. LAW REV. 367 (2010). 
Although the proposed plan uses the term “premium,” the payments could also 
be characterized as a form of income tax under an analysis applied to social 
security as well as to the “shared responsibility payment” of the health care 
legislation. See Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of 
Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010) (responsibility payment is a 
constitutional income tax); Edward Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, TAX 
NOTES 755, 761-62 (Aug. 16, 2010) (the healthcare penalty is a constitutional 
income tax and one tied to self-insurance). But see Steven J. Willis & Nakku 
Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, TAX NOTES 169 (July 12, 
2010) (arguing that penalty is an unconstitutional, unapportioned direct tax — 
assuming it is a tax). 
Individuals may feel less favorably towards taxes and penalties and more 
favorably toward rewards, even if the two structures are economically identical.  
Individuals also appear to prefer hidden taxes to obvious taxes. See George 
Lowenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE 32, 38-39 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds. 2006) 
(discussing the appeal of hidden taxes). In the case of the health care legislation, 
using a term that avoided the word “tax” was viewed as disingenuous and 
backfired. Use of the term premium should be less problematic in the case of flood 
loss protection given that it is paid in exchange for coverage.   
247 See Willis & Chung, supra note 246, at 185 (“Congress could require 
everyone to purchase flood insurance from the government and charge 
appropriately for it.”).  See also Kleinbard, supra note 246, at 759 (explaining that 
“[T]he Supreme Court has rejected any invitation to distinguish between taxes 
designed to influence behavior and taxes designed to raise revenue.”).  
248 See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“Concern for our fellow 
citizens as well as our own needs should disaster strike home makes us want our 
government to help out, and in a democracy the public sector responds.”). 
249 With thanks to Yariv Brauner & Tom Lin for this suggestion. For 
discussion of catastrophe bonds and other alternative risk transfer instruments, see 
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While the costs and hurdles to enactment of universal flood loss 
will remain largely unknown until such a program is put into place, the 
costs to individuals and communities of continuing with the NFIP and the 
ad hoc post-disaster relief are relatively well understood. While this Article 
advocates a universal system, if such a system were politically impossible a 
scaled-back version of the system proposed herein could still be a 
significant improvement over the current approach to flood loss. 
 
B. PROGRAM OUTLINE 
  
Payment into the proposed flood loss security program would be 
mandatory for individuals,250 and premium collection would be handled as 
much as possible through withholding, with adjustments as necessary 
through an individual’s annual income tax return. Calculating the 
withholding rate could be simplified by making various default 
assumptions, which could be then be adjusted through worksheets 
completed with the annual income tax return.251 Preferably, the default 
withholding rates should be set so that is more likely that individual 
adjustments lead to a refund rather than to the requirement of additional 
                                                                                                                                      
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 174-90; see also Scales, supra 
note 6, at 46. 
250 As discussed supra Part IV.B, for individuals at low risk, the tax could be 
made an opt-out program if universal coverage were too politically difficult to 
enact.  Supra note 24. Using an opt-out regime rather than opt-in would allow for 
the strategic use of the status quo bias, as has been allowed for 401(k) plans. See 
supra Part III.B. Such opting out could come at the price of losing certain other tax 
benefits, such as the casualty loss deduction. See infra Part V.C. 
251 Complicated details relating to filing status—e.g., married filing jointly—
would have to be worked out, and that level of detail is beyond the scope of this 
project.  Working out those details may, however, be smoothed by similarities to 
other withholding programs. For example, the flood security tax system would 
share similarities with the current system for withholding regular income taxes and 
the requirement for estimated payments. See Doernberg, supra note 227, at 595 
(discussing history of withholding system and providing a critique of the system).   
Self-employed individuals are also required to remit self-employment tax with 
their tax form each year. See Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper: 
Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, n.6 (2000). For a 
discussion of the conceptual flaws surrounding the self-employment tax, see 
Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper: Reflections on the Self-Employment 
Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000). 
50 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.1 
payments.252 The premium rate would depend on the flood risk loss, the 
amount of coverage purchased, and ability to pay. 
The flood risk assessment would be tied to the location of the 
principal residence.253 Second homes would not be covered, which should 
help curb repetitive loss problems and is also in keeping with an approach 
focused on provision of a safety net.254 Thus, it will be critical to define 
principal residence carefully.255 The tax code already uses this term in other 
contexts,256 and the same basic approach as contained in those sections 
could be utilized. Thus, an individual’s principal residence would depend 
on various factors, including place of employment, length of abode, and 
residence of family members. Ownership would not be required,257 though 
coverage would then, of course, be limited to possessions. Some 
individuals may have difficulty pointing to a principal residence — either 
                                                                                                                                      
252 See supra Part III.B (discussion of individual preferences for tax refunds). 
253 A rate that varies with location raises the question whether the Uniformity 
Clause would present an obstacle to enactment of such a program. The Uniformity 
Clause is contained in Article I, section 8, which provides “The Congress shall 
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all 
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” See 
Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 78-84 (discussing the uniformity clause); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax 
Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563, 588-601 (1989). This Article’s 
proposals should pass muster under the Ptasynski case.  United States v. Ptasynski, 
462 U.S. 74 (1983). In that case, Congress imposed an excise tax on crude oil that 
varied according to three tiers and that also exempted “Alaskan oil,” which was 
defined in terms of a well’s proximity to the Arctic Circle or Alaska-Aleutian 
Range and Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Id. at 77-78. The Court explained in dictum, 
“[h]ad Congress described this class of oil in nongeographic terms, there would be 
no question as to the Act’s constitutionality.” Id. at 86. See Zelenak, supra at 591-
94 (explaining significance of this dictum and arguing that Supreme Court is likely 
to apply it in future cases).  The Court upheld the exemption even though it was 
framed in geographic terms because “Congress has exercised its considered 
judgment with respect to an enormously complex problem.”  Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 
86.   
254 As will be discussed in greater detail infra, coverage could also be designed 
so as to limit repetitive claims with respect to the same structure. See infra notes 
277-79 and accompanying text. 
255 A procedure for changing the primary residence would have to be put in 
place as well. 
256 I.R.C. §§ 121, 123, 1033(h) (2006). 
257 The regulations promulgated under Code section 123 have a similar 
provision.  Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c) (as amended in 1980). 
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because they have two or more regular residences or because they have no 
residence at all. Regulations issued under an unrelated provision provide 
that taxpayers with more than one residence are generally treated as having 
their primary residence as the place where they spend the most time.258 In 
the case of flood coverage, in limited circumstances,259 it may make sense 
to allow taxpayers to designate a principal residence.260 
 Once the principal residence has been identified, the flood risk 
associated with the principal residence would have to be determined. This 
determination clearly presents an administrative burden, but it is one that is 
already present even if the current system takes a less visible approach 
through the WYO program261 and the lender mandate.262  Risk rate brackets 
would be created, and these brackets could be narrowly or loosely tailored.  
One possibility is to mimic the current approach under the NFIP and use 
broad designations. For example, three brackets — high risk, moderate 
risk, and low risk — could be used as an initial matter. The high-risk 
category would apply to homes in one- hundred year flood plains or greater 
risk, which corresponds to the current high-risk designation in the NFIP.263  
The moderate risk category could apply to homes facing a five- hundred 
year flood plain risk or greater (but less than the one- hundred year flood 
risk).264 All other homes would be low risk. 
 As discussed in Part II, flood risk assessments have not been 
completed (or are badly in need of updating) for many communities.  
Individuals with principal residences in such areas would still need to be 
assigned to a risk category. Default assignment to the high-risk category 
could maximize the possibility that flood risk assessment would be 
completed since the individual would have an incentive to pursue 
completion of the assessment. It could also forestall complaints about being 
                                                                                                                                      
258 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (as amended in 2002). 
259 For example, designation could be freely allowed for high-risk residences 
but subject to much greater scrutiny if the designation relates to a home in a lower-
risk area. 
260 It would be possible for each spouse in a marriage to have a separate 
principal residence if, for example, each spouse has a different home for purposes 
of the “away from home” requirement of section 162. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006). 
Care would be required to keep such an allowance from becoming a means to 
circumvent the principal residence requirement. 
261 See supra Part II.D. 
262 See supra Part I.B. 
263 See supra note 59 (discussion of term).  
264 See supra note 62 (describing recommendation for 500-year flood plain). 
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moved from moderate-risk to high-risk.265 At the same time, individuals 
may view an assignment to such a category would undoubtedly be viewed 
as punitive by many individuals; thus, it may be politically prudent to set 
the default for unmapped areas to moderate risk. 
 Use of risk rate brackets could function as an incentive for 
individuals to lower their risk rate by engaging in less risky behavior (or by 
influencing their communities to meet guidelines that would also move the 
flood plain risk). In theory, if individuals have a choice of moving to a 
high-risk or moderate-risk primary residence, all other things being equal, 
they should choose the moderate-risk home to lower the taxes. The 
brackets could be used in other ways to minimize costly behavior. For 
example, an individual who experiences a flood loss and receives a 
payment under the program could automatically be moved into a higher 
risk category until the individual shows proof of taking adequate 
mitigation266 or relocation to a less risky principal residence. 
 Rebates could be used to reward individuals who engage in hazard 
mitigation or have multiple years without a claim. As discussed in Part III, 
individuals appear to prefer to have taxes over-withheld so as to receive the 
lump-sum tax rebate payment,267 and individuals may also prefer insurance 
rebates (coupled with higher base insurance rates) to deductibles.268  
Because flood loss is relatively unlikely even for individuals residing in 
high-risk zones,269 interim rewards through refunds may help ease the 
psychic difficulty of contributing to a system that in most years may be 
perceived as not providing a benefit.270 With a national, mandatory 
program, individuals may be more likely to understand the probability of 
flood loss because flood losses, if looked at using a national perspective, 
may appear more salient.271   
                                                                                                                                      
265 See supra Part II.C (discussing how FEMA has adopted a grandfathering 
approach in response to such complaints). 
266 Of course, mitigation devices are themselves not without risk. See supra 
Part II.A. See also Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1486-89 (discussing the 
inadequacies of “engineered flood control”). 
267 Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52. 
268 Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238. 
269 See supra Part III.B. 
270 See supra Part III.B. 
271 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 352 (“[W]hen one 
expands the lens to include a state or country or the global community, 
catastrophic risks have a much higher likelihood of occurring.”). 
2011       MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE             53 
 
 
Community involvement in flood mitigation would remain a part 
of the proposal as mitigation does reduce flood losses (within limits).272  
Homes in nonparticipating communities could automatically be treated as 
being in a high-risk area, while communities that receive high mitigation 
ratings could trigger rate reductions for their residents. Thus, the 
Community Rating System, described in Part II, would remain an 
important feature of the flood loss landscape. 
 Risk would not be the only item to affecting rate, and adjustments 
would also be made for coverage and income. In order for the program to 
function as a social safety net, minimum coverage levels as well as 
maximum coverage levels would need to be set. The minimum coverage 
level should be tied to local cost of living measures. The maximum 
coverage limits under the current NFIP appear generally adequate.273  
These limits are $100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for 
residential real estate.274 The coverage would apply per residence, so a 
married couple sharing the same principal residence would have the same 
coverage limits as a single individual residing alone in one principal 
residence. Above the minimum coverage level, individuals would be 
required to demonstrate actual loss rather than receiving the replacement 
value amount.275 A side effect of the proposed flood security plan may be a 
decrease in the aftermath relief provided by private sources and through 
special legislation.276 Thus, minimum coverage should include payments 
for temporary living expense grants. 
                                                                                                                                      
272 See supra Part II.A. See also Burby, supra note 38, at 182 (“The number of 
NFIP insurance claims per capita for compensation of flood damages and the per 
capita dollar amount of payments made to settle claims were highest in states that 
did not require responsible behavior—neither building code enforcement nor 
comprehensive plans—from their local governments. . . .”). 
273 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (describing study 
of years 2000-2005 suggesting that “almost three-quarters were still below the 
$250,000 maximum coverage limit. One reason for this large percentage is that 
many homes had property values below this limit.”).  
274 See supra Part II.C. This coverage will not, of course, provide a full 
recovery for many residences.  Individuals with residences worth in excess of the 
maximum coverage would be left to seek excess coverage in the private market, to 
the extent available. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 41 (noting 
that in Katrina some homes covered by flood insurance still suffered large 
uninsured losses because of the $250,000 NFIP cap and failure to obtain “excess 
coverage from private carriers”). Such a result is, however, consistent with the 
safety-net focus of the proposed program. 
275 See supra note 75. 
276 See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4. 
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 One possibility for further tamping down repetitive loss would be 
to have structural coverage run with the property rather than with the 
individual277 and limit the recovery per property to a particular number of 
times, through a declining coverage regime, or through a combination of 
the two. For example, maximum structural coverage could be reduced in 
half to $125,000 for a second occurrence, halved again for a third 
occurrence, with coverage disappearing entirely for a fourth occurrence.278  
Such a system would add some further complication to the collection 
system, and notations would also need to be added to deeds so that 
purchasers would not be caught unawares. The threat of coverage removal 
would also have to be credible.279 Coupling coverage reductions with 
relocation grants may be advisable as may be providing some type of reset 
mechanism in the event of community changes. 
 The amount of tax owed would also be adjusted for income level 
— with “income” tied to gross income rather than to “wages”.280 Tax-
exempt interest should be added back in for a more accurate snapshot of an 
individual’s ability to pay.281   
Because adjusting for income levels would further complicate the 
proposed withholding system, it may be advisable to have fairly broad 
categories and then create credits for the poorest individuals. For example, 
the withholding rate could remain unchanged from $1 to $250,000, from 
$250,000 to $999,999, and finally from $1 million and up.282 Lower income 
                                                                                                                                      
277 With thanks to Marty McMahon for this suggestion. See also Scales, supra 
note 6, at 20 n. 70 (noting that “insurance does not ‘run with the land’” in 
discussing lender mandate since “mortgage obligations have a life of their own”). 
278 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264-65 (“In areas 
that have suffered multiple catastrophes—say, three or more—nature may be 
telling us something: that these locations are naturally much more likely to be 
damaged than others.”).   
279 See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (“But the rational agent 
knows that, if he and others build houses there, the government will take the 
necessary flood-control measures.”). 
280 The definition of “wage” may be quite complex. I.R.C. § 3401 (2006). 
281 A similar rule applies to the taxation of Social Security benefits. I.R.C. § 
86(b)(2)(B) (2006). See Goldin v. Baker, 809 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(upholding constitutionality of § 86(b)(2)(B)). 
282 By comparison, the rate brackets in the general income tax system are more 
compressed and the highest rate bracket begins at a fairly low level. See Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993 
(2004) (discussing distribution of income tax system brackets). 
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individuals could then receive credits to further assist them in participating 
in the system.  
 Adjusting the premium for wealth rather than for gross income 
would arguably provide a more accurate picture of an individual’s ability to 
pay the tax, particularly since the coverage would be for a wealth loss, but 
measuring wealth would be far more difficult than measuring income given 
that there is no annually assessed U.S. wealth tax.283 Coverage levels may, 
in any case, be a rough proxy for wealth. That is, wealthier individuals may 
be more likely to seek to cover the maximum amount of property damage, 
and the rate can be increased for larger coverage amounts. As will be 
discussed in the next Part, coverage limitations should be enforced directly 
but also indirectly through, for example, limitations on the casualty loss 
deduction.  
 
V. CHANGES TO THE CODE 
 
Various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code provide 
additional risk-shifting from individuals to the government (and then out to 
other citizens).284 This section outlines the current tax treatment of: non-
insurance benefits received from government or private actors; insurance 
proceeds for property loss and for temporary assistance; and losses not 
reimbursed by insurance, government, or other private actors.285  As to each 
                                                                                                                                      
283 For a discussion of wealth taxes, see Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal 
Taxes Aare Subject to the Rule of Apportionment under the Constitution?, 11  U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 839 (2009); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive 
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000). 
284 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19-20 (explaining 
that federal tax policy on catastrophe losses “affect the risk mitigation incentives of 
property owners and insurers’ ability to finance catastrophe losses”); MOSS, supra 
note 19 (describing various ways governments intervene in regulating risk). 
285 The discussion in the Article centers on those Code provisions aimed most 
directly at individuals and their personal property losses, but Congress has in the 
past enacted and may again enact other special relief rules in the event of a 
disaster, including provisions aimed at business losses. See generally, James 
Edward Maule, Tax Incentives for Economically Distressed Areas, in BNA TAX 
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO no.597 (2007). Congress may enact business-related 
provisions—e.g., enhanced expensing or net operating loss treatment. State and 
local governments’ ability to issue bonds may be increased and restrictions on 
certain credits, such as the low income housing credit, may be lifted. See I.R.C. §§ 
1400L-1400Q (2006). Further, charities and charitable deductions may receive 
favorable treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 1400L-1400Q. Penalties on retirement account 
withdrawals may be lifted and deadlines extended for various tax items. See I.R.C. 
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group, this section also discusses changes that may be recommended so as 
to harmonize these provisions with the proposed flood loss security 
program.286 Such harmonization is achieved through favorable tax 
treatment for benefits received under the proposed program and supporting 
mitigation grant programs while placing some limits the tax benefits to be 
obtained for non-program assistance and strongly limiting the deductibility 
of uncompensated flood losses. 
 
A. NON-INSURANCE ASSISTANCE 
 
In the immediate aftermath of a flood, government agencies, 
charitable organizations, commercial businesses and individuals frequently 
provide temporary aid to the victims. This aid is likely to include fresh 
water, meals, hygiene supplies, clothing, transportation, and shelter.287  
From a traditional, economic approach to defining income, such items are 
arguably taxable increases to the recipients. Not surprisingly given the 
circumstances in which these transfers occur, the value of temporary aid for 
disaster victims is generally excluded from taxable income, though until 
about ten years ago, the path for exclusion depended in large part on 
Service rulings288 and was sometimes arguably inconsistent with the 
Internal Revenue Code.289  
                                                                                                                                      
§§ 1400L-1400Q. See also Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219 (providing 
overview of relief enacted in response to 2005 hurricane season and attacks of 
September 11, 2001); Lipman, supra note 183, at 976-1018 (describing Code 
sections aimed at disaster relief). 
286 Even in the absence of enactment of the proposed expansion of flood 
insurance, these tax sections could be better aligned with the goals of the NFIP and 
other flood-related programs. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, 
at 20 (“[C]urrent tax policy with respect to uninsured disaster losses has received 
little attention to date, as it creates disincentives for efficient disaster risk 
management.”). 
287 Disaster relief grants made to businesses are not addressed in this Article.  
For background on such grants, see Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699 (grants to 
businesses affected by World Trade Center attacks not excludable as gifts or as 
general welfare payments). 
288 For example, under these older authorities, if temporary assistance came 
from government, it would be treated as a nontaxable, general welfare distribution.  
Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17,18. Not all 
governmental transfers are excluded from gross income. For example, 
unemployment is included because it is substitute for wages. I.R.C. § 85 (2006).  
See also Rev. Rul. 85-29 (Alaska dividend payments are income); J. MARTIN 
BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME (9th ed. 2010), at 
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225-26 (discussing general welfare rulings). In some cases, use of the general 
welfare exclusion was technically problematic. For example, in the aftermath of a 
fire caused by the National Park Service, the Service had difficulty determining 
whether relief payments that were also a settlement of any claims against the 
federal government could qualify under the general welfare exclusion and whether 
a distinction should be drawn between insured and uninsured individuals. See infra 
Part V.B.1 (discussing Code section 123 which provides a limited exclusion for 
payments under insurance contracts for temporary living expense assistance). The 
Chief Counsel’s office recommended not taxing any of the payments even though 
it could not fully support this administrative position under then-current law. I.R.S. 
CCA 200114044; I.R.S. CCA 200114045. A limited exception was made for 
amounts “received for luxuries or for living expenses of an individual who has 
abandoned efforts to re-occupy a dwelling comparable to the one whose occupancy 
or use was denied by the fire.”  I.R.S. CCA 200114045. 
 Individuals would be able to exclude assistance from a charitable 
organization or another individual as gifts, so long as the transfer proceeded out of 
charitable impulses and without the imposition of quid pro quo conditions. See 
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
289 In particular, a revenue ruling permitting employees to exclude disaster 
relief from employers was particularly problematic because it took the position that 
such transfers were not income because “[t]he objective of the corporation is to try 
to place the employees in the same economic position, or as near to it as possible, 
which they had before the casualty.” Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 C.B. 112, 113 (1953), 
made obsolete by I.R.C. § 102(c) & I.R.C. § 139. The ruling did not, however, 
allow the employees to increase basis in damaged property. Id. at 113-14. The 
revenue ruling was issued prior to the Supreme Court’s determination that income 
consisted of “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 
431 (1955). But how casualty events should be treated even given an expansive 
definition of income remains a matter of debate.  See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal 
Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-
D.C.L. 1, 37-40 (2002) (arguing that casualty and theft loss deductions should not 
be treated as departures from economic income and should not be treated as tax 
expenditures by the Joint Committee on Taxation). See also Boris I. Bittker, 
Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. 
& ECON. 193, 198 (1973) (arguing that an insistence that there is only one way to 
view casualty losses in terms of an income definition is “sheer dogmatism”).   
 More problematic for the validity of the ruling was the 1986 enactment of 
a rule prohibiting an exclusion from gross income for “any amount transferred by 
or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” I.R.C. § 102(c) (2006); 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2110 § 122(b) (1986). See 
also Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (“[T]he payments made by the employer 
described in Rev. Rul. 131 do not qualify as gifts under § 102 and are not excluded 
from the employees’ gross income under the general welfare exclusion.”). 
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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code290  to codify partially the Service’s administrative 
positions with respect to non-insurance disaster transfers without 
supplanting the exclusion for governmental general welfare transfers.291  
Currently, the Code provides an exclusion from gross income for a 
“qualified disaster relief payment”292 (relief payment) and a “qualified 
disaster mitigation payment”293 (mitigation payment). Relief payments are 
tied to the immediate aftermath of a disaster while mitigation payments are 
grants to be used for improvements that will lessen the extent of future 
losses.294 With respect to either type of payment, the Code provides that if 
an excludible payment is received, the individual may not use the excluded 
funds to take a further deduction or credit.295 In other words, taxpayers may 
not obtain two tax benefits for the same dollars. 
 
1. Qualified Disaster Relief Payments 
 
In order to be excluded from income as a qualified disaster relief 
payment, the payment must be for “reasonable and necessary personal, 
family, living, or funeral expenses” or “reasonable and necessary expenses 
                                                                                                                                      
Legislation enacted in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, clarifies that payments 
made in connection with certain types of disasters are not gross income, regardless 
of source of payment (other than insurance payments). I.R.C. § 139. See also 
Cords, supra note 224, at 442 (discussing difficulty of excluding payments from 
employer to victim-employee “because they did not easily fit within the definition 
of a gift”). 
290 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134 § 111, 
115 Stat. 2427, 2432 (2001). 
291 Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (explaining that § 139(b)(4) “codifies 
(but does not supplant) the administrative general welfare exclusion”). 
292 I.R.C. § 139(b) (2006). 
293 I.R.C. § 139(g). 
294 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07, at 6 Report JCS-1-07 
(explaining that mitigation payments are “grant[ed] to mitigate potential damage 
from future hazards” whereas relief payments ally to “certain amounts received by 
individuals as a result of a disaster that has occurred”); see 42 U.S.C. § 
4011(b)(4)(listing mitigation programs and including properties covered by such 
programs in the NFIP); 44 C.F.R. Parts 78-80 (flood mitigation assistance & 
grants; property acquisition & relocation for open space). 
295 I.R.C. § 139(h) (“[N]o deduction or credit shall be allowed . . . for, or by 
reason of, any expenditure to the extent of the amount excluded under [section 
139] with respect to such expenditure.”). 
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incurred for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal residence or repair or 
replacement of its contents.”296 FEMA temporary assistance grants would 
be excludible under this authority.297 A qualifying relief payment does not, 
however, include payments received under an insurance contract or 
compensation for costs that have already been covered by an insurance 
contract.298 Payments made under a flood insurance contract are, of course, 
                                                                                                                                      
296 I.R.C. §§ 139(c)(1)-(2) (2006). In addition, non-governmental payment 
must be made in connection with a qualified disaster, which includes a disaster 
resulting from a “terroristic or military action” or a federally declared disaster. 
These items “terroristic or military action” are in turn defined in Code § 692(c)(2) 
and includes “any terroristic activity which a preponderance of the evidence 
indicates was directed against the United States or any of its allies” and “any 
military action involving the Armed Forces of the United States and resulting from 
violence or aggression against the United States or any of its allies (or threat 
thereof).” I.R.C. § 692(c)(2).  Code section 692(c)(2) goes on to specify that 
“’military action’ does not include training exercises.” Id. Code section 139 also 
has provisions relating to common carrier disasters (e.g., airline crashes). See 
I.R.C. §§ 139(b)(3), 139(c)(3). 
A federally declared disaster “means any disaster subsequently determined by 
the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government 
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” 
I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(C). The definition of “federally declared disaster” is in a Code 
section whose primary effect (an increase in the standard deduction) only applies 
to disasters occurring before January 1, 2010.  Nevertheless, the definition itself 
has not expired. In any case, prior to 2008, section 139 was tied instead to a 
“Presidentially declared disaster,” which had virtually the same meaning as the 
current “federally declared disaster.” Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax 
Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3922 Division C, § 
706(a)(2)(D)(iv) (2008). In order for a disaster to be considered presidentially 
declared, the disaster, “with respect to the area in which the property is located, 
resulted in a subsequent determination by the President that such area warrants 
assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act.” I.R.C. § 1033(h)(3) (2006). 
Payments from government sources, whether federal, state, or local, are 
excluded if made “in connection with a qualified disaster in order to promote the 
general welfare.” IRC 139(b)(4). With respect to governmental payments, qualified 
disaster is defined more broadly to include “a disaster which is determined by an 
applicable Federal, State, or local authority . . . to warrant assistance from the 
Federal, State, or local government or agency or instrumentality thereof.” I.R.C. § 
139(c)(4).   
297 See Lipman, supra note 183, at 962-71. 
298 Other than these restrictions related to insurance coverage, the statute does 
not require that non-governmental payments must be from a particular source.  For 
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ultimately made by the federal government, but the statute does not contain 
an exception for flood insurance in its requirement that the provision only 
applies to payments “not otherwise compensated by insurance.” Since the 
NFIP is generally treated as insurance for other purposes,299 and since the 
Service has apparently not issued guidance on this issue,300 payouts under 
the NFIP should be handled under the tax provisions relating to insurance 
recoveries rather than under the exclusion for governmental disaster relief 
payments. 
For flood losses that occur outside the context of a federally 
declared disaster, individuals would be able to exclude transfers from 
individuals, charitable organizations, and government by arguing that these 
transfers are gifts (if from individuals or charities) or are general welfare 
transfers (if from government).301 Thus, the main difference between 
treatment of flood losses occurring in federally declared disasters and other 
flood losses is that transfers by employers and employer-operated 
foundations would be subject to much greater scrutiny and would most 
likely be taxable as a matter of positive law (whether the Service would 
                                                                                                                                      
example, the Service has confirmed that transfers from employers to employees 
may be excluded from income by the employees, so long as the requirements of the 
Code are met. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (holding that even though 
employer transfers to employees do not qualify as gifts or as excludible general 
welfare, they may qualify for the section 139 exclusion if the other conditions are 
met). See supra note 158 (discussing the problem of employer temporary 
assistance payments). 
299 See supra Part II. 
300 In 2000, the National Park Service caused a fire that destroyed more than 
200 residences in New Mexico. The Service’s Office of Chief Counsel issued 
informal letters advising the exclusion of the FEMA payments made both to 
provide relief for the disaster and to settle any claims an individual might have 
against the federal government for the disaster. I.R.S. CCA 200114044; CCA 
200114045. In addition, the Office of Chief Counsel further advised that FEMA 
reimbursements for NFIP premiums were excludible to the extent the fire caused 
taxpayers to need to purchase flood insurance as a result of the fire. I.R.S. CCA 
200114046.  The Chief Counsel’s Office provided little analysis to support its 
“belie[f] that under the unique circumstances . . . the government’s reimbursements 
of flood insurance premiums need not be treated as gain.” I.R.S. CCA 200114046. 
In any case, none of the Chief Counsel Advice memoranda dealt with flood 
insurance contract payments made to compensate for flood loss, and the letters also 
pre-date Section 139’s exclusion for qualified relief payments.   
301 See Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (discussing treatment of 
government, charitable, and employer transfers in context of presidentially 
declared disaster). 
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pursue such transfers at the individual flood victim level is a different 
matter).  
The proposed flood loss security program with its mandate may 
decrease the extent to which individuals receive aftermath aid from other 
sources.302 Post-disaster assistance seems unlikely, however, to dwindle 
altogether, and in the case of high-profile events is still likely to be 
significant. This Article proposes that the exclusion for post-disaster 
assistance should continue given the possibility of unexpected needs and 
the administrative difficulty of enforcing an inclusion at a time of crisis.  
The exclusion should, however, be made more generous so as to apply with 
respect to any flood loss without the need for a federally declared disaster.   
The current exclusion is allowed only to the extent amounts are not 
already covered by insurance.303 As an enhancement to the social safety net 
aspects of the proposed program and for administrative convenience, this 
provision could be lifted to the extent of the minimum required coverage 
for personal property.304 For example, if the minimum required coverage 
for personal possessions were $15,000, individuals could receive a 
matching amount from non-insurance sources income-tax free even if there 
is some coverage duplication. It would, however, also be advisable to put a 
cap on the amount that could be excluded if received from non-government 
sources, especially employers. This cap could be set to match the personal 
property coverage maximum and would be added to prevent the problem of 
disguised compensation but also to avoid the possible creation of a shadow, 
government-subsidized system for higher income individuals.305 Of course, 
transfers from family and friends that exceed such a maximum amount 
would still potentially be excluded from income under the general 
provision for gifts.306  
 
                                                                                                                                      
302 See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 280 (speculating that if private 
insurance covers disaster losses “there is apt to be less sympathy and therefore a 
lower probability of public or charitable relief”). 
303 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
304 This assumes that the proposed program is mandatory at all risk levels. See 
supra Part IV.B. If the program is made opt-out for certain categories of risks, the 
exclusion for non-insurance assistance should be largely disallowed as to those 
who choose to opt-out. This disallowance could help discourage individuals from 
opting out. The general gift provision of Code section 102 would still be available. 
305 To the extent high-end private flood insurance is (or becomes) available, 
payments under the contract would be governed by general provisions applicable 
to insurance reimbursements. See infra Part V.B. 
306 I.R.C. § 102 (2006). 
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2. Qualified Disaster Mitigation Payments.   
 
In addition to aftermath aid, Congress has instituted grant programs 
aimed at lessening future flood damage.307 For example, homeowners may 
apply for grants to elevate a home.308 In an informal memorandum, the 
Service’s Office of the Chief Counsel advised that such payments were 
taxable because they were for the mitigation of future disasters and thus 
were not the type of relief payments excluded by either the Code or the 
administrative general welfare exclusion.309 Congress acted in 2005 to 
change this result and provided a retroactive exclusion for these types of 
payments.310 In order to qualify for the statutory exclusion, however, the 
payments may not be for the sale of the property.311 If the grant is in 
substance the purchase of a property, then payments are not excluded and 
would instead generate gain or loss according to the difference between the 
payment and the individual’s tax investment (i.e., the individual’s adjusted 
basis) in her property.312 Taxpayers would be able to defer recognition of 
any resulting gain through purchase of qualifying replacement property,313 
                                                                                                                                      
307 See I.R.S. CCA 200431012, 2004 WL 1701305 (IRC CCA) (describing 
mitigation grants authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act and The National Flood Insurance Act);  JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION 
ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07.  
 NFIP flood insurance contract payments would not be excluded as 
qualified disaster mitigation payments since the contract payments are 
reimbursements for losses that have already occurred and are not made to lessen 
future losses. 
308 See supra note 292 (mitigation programs). 
309 I.R.S. CCA 200431012 (advising that the mitigation payments were not 
excludable under Code sections 102, 139, or 1033 or through administrative 
practice regarding general welfare or government-created property rights). 
310 I.R.C. § 139(g)(3) (2006); Public Law 109-7, § 1(a)(1) (2005). Any hazard 
mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also increase the basis in 
that property. I.R.C. § 139(g)(3); Pub. L. No. 109-7, 119 Stat. 21 § 1(a)(1) (2005).  
Any hazard mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also 
increase the basis in that property. 
311 I.R.C. § 139(g)(2). 
312 I.R.C. § 1001. 
313 Code section 1033(k) provides that section 1033 is available for these types 
of sales even though these programs are voluntary. I.R.C. § 1033(k). See infra Part 
IV.B.2 (describing Code section 1033). 
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but any loss would apparently be nondeductible if the payment related to a 
residence or other personal-use property.314 
The exclusion for hazard mitigation payments should remain in 
place315 in order to continue to encourage steps that lessen the costs of 
flood loss. Expansion of the benefits of such steps should also be explored.  
For example, relocation programs that are the equivalent of a sale could 
provide for a loss deduction, if any tax loss results.316   
                                                                                                                                      
314 If the sale relates to a personal residence, the loss would be a nondeductible 
personal loss under the Code. Individuals may deduct casualty and theft losses 
even if the underlying asset is a personal-use asset, but any loss generated by the 
type of sale described in Code section 139(g) would not qualify. The programs 
described in Code section 139(g) are voluntary hazard mitigation programs, so 
there is no involuntary taking. See CCA 200431012; Joint Committee Report, 
JCA-1-07.   
Code section 165(k) does allow taxpayers to take a casualty loss deduction if a 
taxpayer is ordered by a governmental entity to demolish or relocate a residence 
because it has been rendered unsafe as the result of a federally declared disaster 
and the order to demolish occurs not later than the 120th day after the federal 
disaster declaration. I.R.C. § 165(k) (2006). Section 165(k) would not apply with 
respect to the voluntary hazard mitigation programs currently offered under the 
Stafford Act and the Flood Insurance Act. In the absence of section 165(k), it is 
less clear whether a government action such as an ordered demolition of an unsafe 
building would qualify as a casualty event. See, e.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 36 
T.C. 1191 (1961) (no casualty loss deduction allowed for impounding of car by 
East Berlin authorities); Washington v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1990-386 (losses 
arising out of a court-ordered eviction were not casualty losses).  Compare I.R.C. § 
280B (disallowing deduction for demolition costs). Eminent domain actions by 
federal, state, or local government require, of course, payment of just 
compensation. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fl. Dept. Environment’l 
Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (2010) (general discussion of Takings Clause 
of U.S. Constitution). Because of the compensation element, section 1033 rather 
than section 165 would almost certainly be the applicable provision. Section 1033 
is discussed infra Part V.B.2. 
315 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
316 This could be accomplished either by treating the loss as a casualty loss or 
as an investment loss. If treated as a casualty loss, some of the current limitations 
on deductibility could be relaxed, as has been done in the past for certain types of 
casualty losses. See infra Part V.C. Because the sale would be of a personal 
residence, any loss would be nondeductible under current law, so legislation would 
also be required for such a loss to qualify as an investment loss. If treated as an 
investment loss, the loss would be capital and subject to various timing constraints 
on deductibility, which could also be relaxed. See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 1212(b) 
(limiting capital loss deduction to amount of capital gains plus $3,000, with excess 
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Such tax enhancements should, however, require that the 
individual move to a low risk home and also require evidence that the home 
had a prior history of flooding. Such tax enhancements should, however, 
require that the individual move to a low risk home and also require 
evidence that the home had a prior history of flooding. A more generous 
tax treatment for sale-equivalent relocation may particularly be needed if 
coverage of structural components is structured to decrease and eventually 
disappear for repetitive loss to the same structure.317 Hazard mitigation 
grants could also be used to support adjustments to the premium charged 
individuals. In addition to direct grant programs, tax credit programs could 
also be enacted to encourage home improvements that would decrease 
flood loss.318 
 
B. INSURANCE PROCEEDS 
 
Current tax law divides casualty insurance payouts into two basic 
categories: payments for temporary living expenses and payments for 
property damage.     
 
1. Temporary Assistance  
 
A limited tax exclusion applies to insurance payments for 
temporary living expenses.319 The Code exempts from tax insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
carried forward). For individuals without capital gains, casualty loss treatment 
would provide the lower tax result because casualty losses yield an offset against 
ordinary income. 
317 See supra Part IV.B. 
318 Similar tax credit programs have been enacted with respect to energy 
efficient improvements. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25D (2006). See also KUNREUTHER & 
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264 (suggesting tax incentives as a way “to 
encourage residents to pursue mitigation measures is to provide tax incentives” and 
describing success of an earthquake loss mitigation program established by the city 
of Berkeley, California). 
319 I.R.C. § 123 (2006). In the absence of Code section 123, such temporary 
assistance transfers would be taxable. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(5) (insurance 
payments for living expenses are includible in gross income except to the extent 
provided for in Code section 123). First, payments for temporary assistance made 
by an insurance company to an insured would never qualify as a tax-exempt gift 
since such temporary assistance would occur by operation of the insurance contract 
instead of out of charitable impulses. Second, since individuals have no deduction 
for personal consumption, a non-statutory exclusion of the insurance proceeds for 
such consumption would be problematic. I.R.C. § 262. At the same time, the 
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reimbursements for “living expenses incurred during such period for 
himself and members of his household resulting from the loss of use or 
occupancy” if the individual’s principal residence is damaged by casualty 
or if the individual is not able to enter his principal residence on 
government orders because of the threat of a casualty.320 “Principal 
residence” in this context “depends upon all the facts and circumstances in 
each case,” and includes also rented residences.321  The exclusion applies 
only to living expenses and not to payments made for loss of income or for 
lost or damaged property.322 A federally declared disaster is not a 
requirement, so this exclusion applies to any casualty event causing 
displacement from the principal residence. A taxpayer may exclude the 
insurance payment only to the extent the actual expenses incurred during 
the displacement exceed the normal expenses that would have been 
incurred but were avoided as a result of the casualty.323 As a result, the 
exclusion applies only to duplicative and increased living expenses.324   
                                                                                                                                      
dividing line between insurance premiums and pre-payments for services is not 
always clear. For example, purchasers of AAA undoubtedly view roadside 
assistance as services for which they have already made payments.  Cf. Am. Auto. 
Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r, 
353 U.S. 180, 180 (1957) (membership dues included in income upon receipt). 
Discussion of the line between prepayment for services and insurance is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
320 I.R.C. § 123(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a). 
321 Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c). Omitted from this definition of “principal 
residence” is a link to Code section 121, which provides an exclusion for gains 
realized on the sale of a principal residence. In any case, the principal residence 
definition in the section 123 regulations is consistent with, if not as nuanced as, 
that contained in the section 121 regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b). See 
supra Part IV.B (discussing principal residence concept). 
322 Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(3). 
323 Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(1). The regulations also require that payments 
must be traceable to reimbursement for living expenses under the insurance 
contract. Thus, if an insured receives a payment on account of lost rental income 
and uses it for duplicative living expenses, the payment will not be excluded under 
this provision.  The regulations contain ratios for determining the extent to which 
an insurance reimbursement is for living expenses if there is blanket coverage 
rather than identifiable living expense coverage.  Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(4). 
324 For example, if a family spends $800 per month normally on food cooked 
in the residence but is now forced to spend $1,200 on restaurant meals but spends 
nothing on cooking food, only a maximum of $400 could be excluded for 
increased food costs. All the living expenses are considered in the aggregate, so 
this $400 increase might be offset by decreases elsewhere—for example, by a 
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This limitation is not lifted even if the triggering event is a 
federally declared disaster. In at least one instance, the Service’s Office of 
Chief Counsel has, however, advised against implementing the limitation 
and instead advised field agents to apply a blanket exclusion for all living 
expense reimbursements other than those for “luxuries or for living 
expenses of an individual who has abandoned efforts to re-occupy a 
[comparable] dwelling.”325 The Chief Counsel Advice memorandum may 
not be used as precedent and was given in response to a disaster triggered 
by the actions of the National Park Service.326 Still, the memorandum 
perhaps provides some indication of the relative zeal with which the 
Service will audit those claiming exclusions for insurance coverage of 
temporary living expenses — particularly if the displacement occurs in the 
context of a large-scale disaster.   
Coverage under the NFIP does not currently cover temporary 
living expenses,327 but the proposed program would provide such coverage 
and the current exclusion would thereby become applicable. The limitation 
relating to the need for duplicative costs should be lifted with respect to 
flood program payments for the same reasons that non-insurance amounts 
should be excluded up to a certain point: to further safety net goals and to 
reduce administrative complexity.328 An exception for luxuries, as 
suggested in the Chief Counsel Advice described above, should not be 
necessary because the amount of coverage for temporary living expenses 
would be statutorily capped at an amount tied to meeting basic needs. 
 
2. Property Loss Reimbursement 
 
It may seem counterintuitive that a catastrophe could give rise to a 
tax liability, but such is the case if reimbursements for property exceed the 
taxpayer’s investment in the property. For example, if an individual 
purchased a painting for $100,000 many years ago and receives $300,000 
                                                                                                                                      
reduction in commuting costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(4) Ex. 1. Professor Lipman 
has noted that even though these provisions are strict on their face “in practice they 
may have little application. Homeowner’s insurance coverage generally only 
reimburses a homeowner for additional living expenses, which is defined 
consistently with the exclusion provision.” Lipman, supra note 181, at 984-85. 
325 I.R.S. TECH. ADV. MEM. 200114045 (Mar. 29, 2001). 
326 Id. 
327 See NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, National Flood Insurance Program 
Summary of Coverage, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_co 
verage/whats_covered.jsp. 
328 See supra Part V.A.1. 
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in insurance proceeds for the painting, the individual would recognize 
$200,000 of casualty gain. The Code permits taxpayers to elect to defer 
paying taxes on such casualty gains by purchasing replacement property.329  
The replacement property must be “similar or related in service or use” to 
the original, destroyed property.330 The gain is deferred rather than 
completely excluded by treating the taxpayer as though his investment in 
the replacement property is carried over from the destroyed property.331 
As discussed above, property purchased as part of a hazard 
mitigation program is eligible for deferral of any gain on the sale.332 A 
special rule also applies to principal residences that are “compulsorily or 
involuntarily converted as a result of a Presidentially declared disaster”333: 
taxpayers receive a full exclusion for insurance proceeds received for 
unscheduled property without the need to purchase replacement property.334  
The extent to which household contents are treated as unscheduled property 
will depend on the particular insurance contract. In general, only assets of 
relatively high value (e.g., jewelry, artwork) will be separately scheduled, 
and all other household property will be treated as a single asset.335 The 
                                                                                                                                      
329 I.R.C. § 1033 (2006). 
330 I.R.C. §§ 1033(a)(1)-(2). See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 30.03[3]-[5] (3d ed. & 2010 cumulative supplement) 
(discussing this requirement). 
331 I.R.C. § 1033(b). 
332 See supra Part V.A.2. 
333 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1) (2006). The definition for principal residence is tied to 
section 121 through a cross-reference, although a home may qualify even if rented 
rather than owned.  I.R.C. § 1033(h)(4). See supra Part IV.B. 
Section 121, which provides a generous exclusion for gain on the sale of a 
principal residence if various eligibility requirements are met, may also be 
available. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5) (amount realized on involuntary conversion of 
principal residence is reduced by amount of section 121 exclusion). 
Because sales pursuant to a hazard mitigation program are not in response to a 
federally declared disaster but are instead aimed at lessening future losses, 
presumably Code section 1033(h)(1) does not apply to mitigation sales. A special 
rule expanding the scope of qualifying replacement property also applies to trade, 
business, or investment property converted as a result of a federally declared 
disaster. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(2). 
334 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006). See also Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-1 C.B. 
145. 
335 See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145(containing example situation in 
which general household furnishings were unscheduled while jewelry and sterling 
silverware were separately scheduled). The IRS Chief Counsel has advised in an 
informal memorandum that the exclusion will apply even to property not kept at 
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principal residence (if owned) and any separately scheduled contents are 
treated as a single asset for purposes of calculating gain and applying the 
deferral provision.336 In addition, the replacement property may be anything 
“which is similar or related in service or use to the residence so 
converted”— or its contents.337 
Thus, for example, consider a taxpayer whose rented residence and 
its contents are destroyed in a federally declared disaster and who receives 
$40,000 of insurance proceeds for unscheduled household items and 
$10,000 for scheduled jewelry. All $40,000 of the proceeds received for the 
unscheduled household items will be excluded from income even if no 
replacement property is purchased.338 If the taxpayer originally purchased 
the jewelry for $8,000, the $2,000 gain arising from the $10,000 insurance 
payment can be deferred through purchase of $10,000 of replacement 
property. The replacement property may be jewelry but it may also be any 
household-related item — e.g., linens, dishes, furniture.339 
These provisions should be expanded to cover all flood-related 
reimbursement received under the proposed program. Coverage for 
personal possessions would be treated as payment for unscheduled property 
and thus any gain would be excluded from income. The exclusion for gain 
resulting from reimbursement for unscheduled property is not, however, as 
generous as it appears on its face. That is because it will be relatively rare 
for a taxpayer to have a gain for typical, unscheduled household 
furnishings, which generally go down in value after purchase. If insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
the principal residence so long as the property was covered by the contract and was 
lost in the federally declared disaster (e.g., property in a car). I.R.S. TECH. ADV. 
MEM. 200114046 (Apr. 2, 2001). 
336 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). Presumably the section 121 
adjustment would apply to this aggregated asset, assuming the other qualifications 
of section 121 are met. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5). The adjustment reduces the amount 
realized from insurance by the amount excluded under section 121. Thus, for 
example, if $700,000 is received under an insurance contract for a qualifying 
principal residence by a couple filing a joint return, section 1033 is applied as 
though only $200,000 of insurance proceeds were received.  I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b), 
(d)(5). 
337 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(II). The time for purchasing the replacement 
property is also increased from two to four years. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B). 
338 Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (no gain recognized “upon the receipt of 
insurance proceeds for unscheduled contents destroyed in such a disaster, 
regardless of the use to which the taxpayer puts those proceeds”). 
339 See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (“[A]ny type of replacement contents 
(whether separately scheduled or unscheduled)” qualifies as replacement property 
for separately scheduled contents). 
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proceeds are insufficient to reimburse a taxpayer for his investment in the 
property, the taxpayer will have a loss. For example, if a taxpayer 
purchased an asset for $10,000 but receives only a $6,000 insurance 
recovery, the taxpayer has $4,000 tax loss.  Whether such a loss is or 
should be deductible is considered below. 
 
C. UNREIMBURSED LOSSES 
 
Losses that arise from the disposition of personal-use assets are 
generally nondeductible.340 Taxpayers may, however, take a limited 
deduction if the loss is caused by a casualty event or theft and is not 
compensated for by insurance or through some other means.341 The 
calculation of the casualty loss deduction is complex and requires a series 
of steps, each of which potentially serves to limit the size of a deduction.342  
                                                                                                                                      
340 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2006).   
341 Whether an event constitutes a casualty event or theft loss is itself a 
difficult issue to resolve. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 330, at ¶¶ 24.02-.03; 
BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 288, at 530-33.  
342 First, the amount of the loss is limited to the lesser of the taxpayer’s 
investment in the asset or the decline in value of the asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-
7(b)(1). Thus, for example, if a taxpayer spent $10,000 for an asset but the asset 
was worth only $7,000 when it was destroyed in a flood, the amount of the 
potential casualty loss would be limited to $7,000. Second, the loss is reduced by 
the extent to which an individual receives compensation for the loss (whether 
through insurance or otherwise). I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d). 
If the taxpayer received $6,000 in insurance proceeds, his potential casualty loss 
deduction would be further reduced to $1,000. 
Third, the Code disallows the first $100 of casualty loss stemming from a 
casualty event or theft. In the case of the example, the taxpayer’s potential casualty 
loss deduction would be reduced to $900. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1). This $100 amount 
was temporarily raised to $500 during 2009. Tax Extenders and Alternative 
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706(c), 122 Stat. 
3921-3923.  
 Fourth, the sustained casualty losses for the year are aggregated and applied 
first against the aggregate of any casualty gains for the year. I.R.C. § 
165(h)(2)(A)(i). For example, if the taxpayer has a $400 gain resulting from an 
unrelated theft, only $500 would remain as the net casualty loss. If the taxpayer 
elects to defer the gain under section 1033, then the casualty gain is not included in 
this netting calculation.   
Finally, once the net casualty loss amount is determined, casualty losses are 
only deductible to the extent they exceed 10% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, if a taxpayer has a $500 potential casualty 
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For example, losses are only deductible to the extent they exceed ten 
percent of adjusted gross income; thus, only relatively large casualty losses 
are deductible as a practical matter. In addition, because the casualty loss 
deduction is an itemized deduction, the value of the deduction will increase 
with higher rate brackets and also will not be available to those who use the 
standard deduction rather than itemize.343 The ten-percent-of-adjusted-
gross-income threshold may, however, still place the deduction out of reach 
for individuals with high taxable income. During 2008 and 2009,344 
casualty losses caused by a federally declared disaster were less limited as 
to amount345 and could also be used without the need to itemize.346  
The deduction for casualty losses should be significantly limited, if 
not eliminated, for flood losses.347 The deduction creates a shadow system 
                                                                                                                                      
loss deduction, and the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $5,000 or more, no 
casualty loss deduction will be permitted.   
Even if an amount of net casualty loss remained over the 10% floor, the 
taxpayer would only get the benefit of the deduction by electing to itemize his 
deductions rather than taking the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c) (2006). In 
2011, the standard deduction for a taxpayer filing as single will be $5,800; for head 
of household, $8,500; and for married filing joint, $11,600.   
343 For example, at the margin, a $1,000 deduction is worth $350 to someone 
in a 35% rate bracket but only $200 to someone in a 20% bracket.   
344 I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B)(i)(I); Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax 
Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706122 Stat. 3921-3923. A similar 
measure was also in place in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-73, § 402. See Aprill 
& Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 59-60 (discussing temporary change to section 
165 for 2005 hurricane season losses). 
Legislative proposals have been made to extend or make permanent the 
standard deduction increase for net disaster losses. See H.R. 5273, 111th Cong. 
(2010); H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010); and H.R. 4052, 111th Cong. (2009). 
345 They were not limited by the ten-percent floor. I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(A) 
(2006).  Currently, a taxpayer who experiences casualty losses as the result of a 
federally declared disaster may elect to deduct the casualty losses on the tax return 
for the year preceding the disaster. I.R.C. § 165(i). See also supra note 314 
(discussing § 165(k)). Personal casualty losses are not carried forward so if there is 
not enough income to soak up the casualty loss, any tax benefit to be obtained from 
the deduction would be lost. A taxpayer whose income fell as a result of the 
federally declared disaster could use the election to move the deduction to a year in 
which the taxpayer had income against which to offset the deduction. 
346 The Code section did so by increasing the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 
63(c)(2) (2006). 
347 Sorting costs would need to be taken into account. See Levmore & Logue, 
supra note 4, at 321-22 (discussing sorting costs that would result from 
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of government reimbursement for flood loss, but one that offers patchy, 
difficult-to-understand coverage.348 Individuals may overestimate its 
benefits, which may in turn contribute to less care with respect to purchase 
decisions.349 For example, a relatively wealthy individual may purchase a 
$400,000 beach house, purchase the maximum NFIP policy on the home, 
and assume that the remaining $150,000 loss would be deductible should 
the home be destroyed in a flood. But if the individual’s adjusted gross 
income were $750,000, only approximately half of the $150,000 loss would 
be deductible.350 As discussed in Part III, flood loss is difficult for 
individuals to conceptualize, so the effect of this shadow system may be 
relatively small. At the same time, individuals who itemize and who have 
the ability to purchase that second vacation home may be particularly 
tempted to believe that there is little personal downside to such a purchase 
given the combination of the NFIP and the casualty loss deduction. 
Eliminating the casualty loss deduction for flood-related costs 
altogether would, however, likely be politically impractical. One possible 
compromise would be to allow the loss deduction but only for flood losses 
occurring at the principal residence and only for a limited dollar amount.  
The deduction should be accessible even those who do not itemize, and the 
ten-percent floor and other limitations should be lifted to provide greater 
certainty about the amount to be deducted. For example, the deduction 
could be limited to the loss in excess of the purchased coverage and up to 
an additional $50,000 for personal property and $125,000 for structural 
damage (these amounts are one-half the proposed coverage maximums).   
If, however, eligible coverage has been phased out for a structure because 
of repetitive claims, the loss deduction should be commensurately reduced.  
Elimination of the casualty loss deduction as to second homes and to a 
portion of the cost of more expensive homes would still be controversial, 
                                                                                                                                      
government-sponsored crime insurance that did not cover terrorism). The same 
casualty may trigger flood loss, windstorm loss, or possibly even fire loss. In many 
cases, the presence of private insurance could simplify the inquiry. For example, 
the Code could treat private insurance recoveries as being for losses other than 
flood and assigning any residual loss as flood loss.  
348 See Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and 
Medical Expense Deductions and The Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 
79 CAL. L.R. 1485 (1991). See also supra Part III.B (discussing difficulties 
individuals face in processing flood loss probability and calculating assistance).   
349 See Kaplow, supra note 10. 
350 Ten percent of $750,000 is $75,000. The deductible amount would be 
$74,900 -- $150,000 minus $100 minus $75,000. 
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but the program goals of providing a social safety net while limiting 
repetitive loss would be better served. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Use of tax system components to implement social programs 
should not be lightly undertaken. In the case of flood loss mitigation, the 
government already plays a central function through both the NFIP and 
various tax provisions already in place. Moving flood loss coverage under 
the umbrella of the tax law could yield significant benefits, including 
increased program efficiencies and better tools for balancing competing 
land use goals. Most importantly, a national flood security system would be 
a means of providing the least fortunate with a safety net when (not if) the 
next unimaginable flood occurs. 
 
 
A CONCURRENT MESS AND A CALL FOR CLARITY IN 
FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE 
ANALYSIS 
 
MARK M. BELL* 
 
*** 
 
This article clearly and plainly describes the genesis and history of 
the doctrine of "concurrent causation" and the development of anti-
concurrent policy exclusions in first-party property insurance coverage 
cases. After describing this unique history, the article argues that it is time 
to create a new lexicon for "concurrent causation" issues and advocates for 
a new deliberate, categorical approach for addressing "concurrent 
causation" questions. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Insurance coverage questions for “all-risk” policies are 
conceptually simple.  If a peril is excluded, there is no coverage; if a peril is 
not excluded, there is coverage.1 While this analysis seems conceptually 
simple, it becomes complicated in practice when multiple perils combine to 
cause a loss.   
The complications are most acute when non-excluded, covered 
perils combine or operate in conjunction with excluded, non-covered perils 
to cause a loss. When covered and non-covered perils are connected to a 
                                                                                               
* Attorney with Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, Tennessee 
practicing  complex commercial litigation with a focus on insurance and 
construction matters. I would like to thank one of the all-time property insurance 
greats, James Costner, for numerous discussions and feedback related to property 
insurance and concurrent causation. He has provided a lifetime worth of insights 
and his desire to retire will leave a notable absence in the insurance world. I would 
also like to thank David Rossmiller for thoughtful comments and feedback.   
 
1 This central tenant of insurance, however, is slowly being eroded as well. 
Mold exclusions are beginning to deny the result—mold—irrespective of what 
caused the mold.  Historically, insurers excluded perils, but it seems that insurers 
are slowly beginning to exclude results. See J. Kent Holland Jr., Mold from a 
Covered Concurrent Cause Still Excluded, IRMI.COM (Nov. 2010), http://www.i 
rmi.com/expert/articles/2010/holland11-insurance-law-environmental.aspx.  
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loss, it may be unclear from the policy whether the entire loss should be 
covered, whether the entire loss should be excluded, or whether the loss 
and resultant damages should be bifurcated to indemnify the insured for 
losses caused by covered perils while denying indemnity for losses caused 
by excluded perils.   
Many courts and commentators refer to the process of multiple 
covered and excluded perils combining to cause a loss as “concurrent 
causation”.2 It goes without saying, but nevertheless needs to be said, that 
the phrase “concurrent causation” presents a definitional problem. While 
the common definition of “concurrent” implies a degree of temporal 
simultaneity,3 courts and commentators have routinely used the term 
“concurrent” to refer to sequential chains of events;4 independent, unrelated 
events acting in conjunction;5 and even events that undoubtedly operated in 
succession.6 These types of events patently contradict the term 
“concurrent”; thereby turning “concurrent causation” into a definitional 
misnomer.  
In addition to these definitional inconsistencies, courts have 
complicated the issues by developing a patchwork of interpretations of 
concurrent causation and relevant anti-concurrent causation policy 
exclusions.7 This resultant patchwork has operated to deprive policyholders 
                                                                                               
2 William Conant Brewer, Jr., Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 
59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1961). As will be discussed infra, the term 
“concurrent” has become imprecise, but it is used here as background. The term 
“concurrent” can have two distinct meanings. Today, concurrent either describes 
multi-cause losses operating or occurring at the same time or refers generically to a 
web of events having some interrelation among them.    
3 See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
383 (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) (“adj. Happening at the same time 
as something else.”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 239 
(Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 2001) (“adj. operating or occurring at the 
same time.”); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 303 (Michael 
Agnes et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) (“occurring at the same time; existing together.”). 
4 Churchill v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (W.D. Wash. 
2002).  
5 David P. Rossmiller, Katrina in the Fifth Dimension: Hurricane Katrina 
Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: 
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 71, 77 (2008).   
6 Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law 
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles,” 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 1, 4 (2007).  
7 Douglas G. Houser, The Rise and Fall of Concurrent Causation: 
Background and Current Trends Affecting Property Insurance Coverage, 44 FED. 
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of their reasonable expectations and has prevented insurers from 
maintaining contract certainty when drafting insurance policies.8   
Analyzing this patchwork of interpretations has left one 
commentator to explain, “[b]ecause causation as a theory or doctrine is so 
elusive, inconsistent outcomes must be tolerated.”9 As stated by this 
commentator, “[s]ometimes the different outcomes will turn on subtle 
factual distinctions, but sometimes the different outcomes will be based on 
an utterly irreconcilable view of policy text and principles of 
interpretation.”10  
This article argues that inconsistent outcomes need not be 
tolerated, provides definitional clarification for the relevant elements of the 
concurrent causation phenomenon, and proposes a revised analytical 
framework to minimize the inconsistent outcomes. The article provides 
both a history of concurrent causation and a history of anti-concurrent 
policy exclusions. Using that history, the article proffers new definitions to 
address multi-cause losses,11 and advocates for a more methodical, 
categorical analysis for addressing “concurrent causation” questions.12   
 
II. BACKGROUND OF CONCURRENT CAUSATION 
 
Courts have struggled with the question raised in the introduction 
on the best way to deal with losses caused by multiple perils. To address 
the issue, courts have typically employed one of four approaches to 
“concurrent” losses:13 the pro-policyholder approach, the pro-insurer 
approach, the dominant-cause approach, and the apportionment approach.14 
                                                                                               
OF INS. & CORP. COUNSEL Q. 3, 3 (1993).  
8 See Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: 
New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 387-88 n.8 and accompanying 
text (1985). 
9 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 560 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).    
10 Id.  
11 As discussed infra p. 21-22, this article advocates that the phrase concurrent 
causation should be replaced with the more accurate term “multi-cause loss”.  
12 A flow chart setting out the interpretive mechanism is attached as Appendix 
A.   
13 Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351, 366-68 (2002). 
14 Conventional scholarship does not typically refer to them by these names, 
but the names provided herein more adequately and easily describe the relevant 
categories. For the traditional names, see JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 
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Interestingly, and generating further confusion, courts routinely refer to 
each approach as the “concurrent cause doctrine.”15 
 
A. PRO-POLICYHOLDER APPROACH16 
 
Under the pro-policyholder approach, if multiple perils combine to 
create a loss, the full amount of the loss is covered, so long as part of the 
loss was caused, even if insignificantly, by a covered cause of loss.17 This 
approach has also been referred to by courts as the “concurrent causation” 
doctrine or approach.18 
The California Supreme Court in State Farm v. Partridge was one 
of the first courts to adopt this approach for liability policies.19 The 
                                                                                               
560-61. 
15 See e.g., Wallis v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 2 S.W.3d 300, 302-03 (Tex. 
App. 1999) (applying the “concurrent cause doctrine” to the apportionment 
approach: “Texas recognizes the doctrine of concurrent causes. This doctrine 
provides that when, as in the instant case, covered and non-covered perils combine 
to create a loss, the insured is entitled to recover only that portion of the damage 
caused solely by the covered peril(s).”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 
883, 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (a third-party case applying the “concurrent cause 
doctrine” to the dominant cause approach: “The Court also opined that insurer was 
liable under ‘the concurrent cause doctrine’ which provides that coverage under a 
liability policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk 
constitutes a concurrent proximate cause of the injury.”); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. 
Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (applying the “concurrent cause 
doctrine” to the pro-policyholder approach); Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So.2d 
1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same result in first-party context); Phillips & 
Coplin, infra note 87, at 33 (“A minority follows the doctrine of concurrent 
causation where coverage is afforded as long as a covered cause of loss contributes 
in a meaningful way to the insured’s damages.”). In this author’s opinion, the pro-
policyholder use is the most accurate explanation of the “concurrent causation 
doctrine” because it was first and it spawned the anti-concurrent causation clauses 
proliferating property insurance policies today. See infra Part IV.  
16 Throughout this article, when the term “post-Partridge” is used, it is in 
reference to the proliferation of the pro-policyholder approach.    
17 For further discussion of the policy rationales supporting this approach, see 
infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
18 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. 1991) 
(“[T]he ‘concurrent causation doctrine’ . . . provides that coverage under a liability 
policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes a 
concurrent proximate cause of the injury.”). 
19 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973). For 
further discussion, see infra Part III.B.  
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California Court of Appeals attempted to also adopt this approach for 
property policies in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Adams.20 In Adams, 
the court held that if third-party negligence (a covered loss) contributes in 
any respect to the loss, the entire loss is covered even if the efficient 
proximate cause of the loss would be excluded.21  While Adams was later 
overruled by the California Supreme Court, it demonstrates how courts 
analyze cases under the pro-policyholder approach.  
In arguing for the pro-policyholder approach, courts reason that 
public policy militates in favor of the pro-policyholder approach.22 For 
instance, because ambiguities in insurance contracts of adhesion are 
generally interpreted strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured, 
courts reason that when the loss is caused at least in part by a covered peril, 
the exclusion should be interpreted against the insurer.23 Accordingly, 
under the pro-policyholder approach, when non-excluded perils and 
covered perils act in conjunction to cause the loss, the loss is covered.24  
 
B. PRO-INSURER APPROACH 
 
The pro-insurer approach applies the opposite view of the pro-
policyholder approach. Under the pro-insurer approach, if one of the causes 
of loss is excluded, the entire loss is excluded. While no domestic 
jurisdictions have entirely adopted this approach, British courts apply the 
pro-insurer approach with some uniformity.25  
                                                                                               
20 170 Cal. App. 3d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).   
21 Id. This case was later expressly rejected by the California Supreme Court 
in Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989). 
22 Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
23 This is generally referred to as contra proferentem and applies in contracts 
of adhesion.  For large commercial entities creating and negotiating manuscript 
policies, the same application may not apply. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL 
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.11[F] (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“If the 
[manuscript policy] is essentially drafted by the policyholder, a weak version of 
contra proferentem should apply in reverse.”).  
24 This can also be attributed, at least in part, to California’s Insurance Code, 
which provides additional protections to policyholders.  CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 
532 (West 2011). 
25 See Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 972-73 (2010). Some may argue that 
Lydick v. Insurance Co. of North America, 187 N.W.2d 602 (Neb. 1971) stands for 
the proposition that Nebraska follows this approach, but that case, and more recent 
cases in Nebraska indicate that the court was actually applying the dominant-cause 
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The British case, Wayne Tank, provides the quintessential example 
of this approach.26 The Wayne Tank factory suffered a fire caused by two 
concurrent perils: “[F]ailure to install proper equipment (an excluded 
cause) and employee negligence in leaving the factory unattended (a 
covered cause).”27 The Wayne Tank court held that even if the employee 
negligence was the predominant factor in the loss, the loss would still be 
excluded because the failure to install the proper equipment concurrently 
acted to cause the loss.28 Thus, the entire loss was excluded because at least 
part of the loss was excluded.   
It is unclear exactly why British courts have taken this approach, 
but perhaps it can be explained, at least in part, by the history of insurance 
in the United Kingdom and the remnants of a time when the insurer had 
less influence and control over the policy-making process. The roots of 
modern insurance date back to the United Kingdom and the shipping 
industry.29 One of the first insurers, Lloyd’s of London, insured ships and 
their cargo and provides a fundamental building block for insurance 
interpretation in the United Kingdom.30   
In these pre-modern transactions, the insurer was at an information 
disadvantage to the shipper. The shipper had a better understanding of his 
skills and the unique challenges presented by his specific cargo, and also 
had significant control over his risks and potential losses. The insurer, 
conversely, was often at the mercy of the shipper and had to rely on the 
shipper providing truthful and accurate information to make its 
underwriting determinations. Because of this information asymmetry in 
favor of the shipper, Lloyd’s policies were often interpreted strictly against 
the shipper.31 For instance, if the shipper issued a warranty and that 
warranty was even partially breached, the entire loss was excluded.32 
Accordingly, the British courts’ comparatively stern treatment of the 
policyholder may be rooted in this specific anachronism.   
In the United States today, unlike the United Kingdom hundreds of 
years ago, insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and the justification 
                                                                                               
approach to the loss.  
26 Id. at 973 (citing Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. v. Empr’r’s Liab. 
Assurance Co., Ltd., [1973] 3 W.L.R. 843 (Eng.)). 
27 Id. at 973.  
28 Id. 
29 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 560-61 (citing Shinrone Inc. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 570 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978)). 
30 Id. at 561.  
31 Id. at 749-50. 
32 Id.  
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for strict interpretation of insurance policies against the insured no longer 
remains an attractive option. Today, insurers have the negotiating leverage, 
which is why United States’ jurisdictions read ambiguities broadly against 
the insurer and read exclusions narrowly.33 For this reason, American 
courts have been reluctant to follow the British, pro-insurer approach.  
 
C. THE EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE RULE OR DOMINANT-CAUSE 
APPROACH 
 
The dominant-cause approach attempts to strike a balance between 
the pro-policyholder and pro-insurer approaches and relies on equitable 
principles of fairness and the parties’ reasonable expectations.34 Under this 
approach, the court attempts to ascertain which cause, among the various 
concurrent causes of loss—or which link in the chain of events—was the 
most important, substantial, or responsible factor in the loss. This approach 
is also commonly referred to as the efficient proximate cause approach.35 
Shinrone Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America demonstrates how 
courts apply the dominant-cause approach.36 Shinrone involved a coverage 
dispute when cattle were killed during a storm with intense winds, damp 
snow, muddy land, and extremely cold temperatures.37 The policy in 
question provided coverage for death by windstorm, but excluded death 
caused by “dampness of the atmosphere or extremes of temperature”.38 The 
testimony in the case conflicted and experts concluded that the cattle died 
due to a combination of factors including wind, cold temperatures, snow, 
the size and age of the cattle, conditions of the land, and the lack of 
adequate wind protection.39 Analyzing these factors, the jury determined 
that the windstorm was the most important or “efficient proximate cause” 
of the loss.40 The jury reasoned that “extreme temperature” could not be the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss because without the wind, the cattle 
                                                                                               
33 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tenn. 
1973). 
34 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886-88 (1991).  
35 Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 974-75 (2010).   
36 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 561 (citing Shinrone Inc. v. Ins. Co. of 
N. Am., 570 F.2d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1978)). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
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may have survived the extreme cold.41  
The dominant cause approach has been adopted by the majority of 
U.S. jurisdictions because many consider it intuitively fair: decisions 
whether coverage should be afforded depend on which cause most 
significantly contributed to the loss.   
 
D. THE APPORTIONMENT APPROACH 
 
The final available approach is the apportionment approach, which 
Texas has adopted.42 Under the apportionment approach, the “insured must 
attempt to segregate the loss caused by the covered peril from the loss 
caused by the uncovered peril and secure a jury finding on the amount of 
damage attributable to the different causes.”43 The approach follows 
traditional tort apportionment doctrines. As is the case with comparative 
negligence, there are two potential sub-approaches to the apportionment 
approach: pure apportionment and modified comparative apportionment.44    
Under a pure apportionment approach, the policyholder would 
receive the apportioned percentage of the damages caused by the covered 
losses. For instance, if 30% of the loss was caused by a covered peril, then 
the insured would receive 30% of the total value of the loss—or 30% of the 
policy limit if the limits were an issue.45   
Under a modified apportionment approach, the policyholder would 
receive the percentage of the loss so long as the efficient proximate cause 
was a covered peril.46 Thus, if only 30% of the loss were caused by a 
covered cause of loss, the insured would not receive any recovery since the 
efficient proximate cause would have presumably been some other cause.   
This approach inevitably leads to greater litigation and provides an 
                                                                                               
41 Id. This does impliedly reject the converse—that without the cold the wind 
could not have killed the cattle—but the jury did not address that issue.  
42 Wallis v. United Serv.s Auto Ass’n, 2 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(requiring insured to carry burden of proof for what portion of loss is covered). For 
an interesting discussion of Texas’s approach to anti-concurrent exclusions, see 
Comment, Amber L. Altemose, The Anti-Concurrent Clause and its Impact on 
Texas Residents after Hurricane Ike, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 201 (2010).  
43 Id. (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 
1971)). 
44 Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 977-78 (2010).   
45 See Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law, 48 
S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 322 (2006).  
46 Id. 
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incredibly complex method for analysis. Rare is the case when it is clear 
the precise percent of the loss attributable to a particular peril. For this 
reason, and others, courts are reluctant to adopt this approach.   
 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPROACHES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
In many ways, California is the grandfather of concurrent causation 
jurisprudence.47 A trilogy of California Supreme Court cases has spawned 
and inspired the jurisprudence throughout the country. Sabella v. Wisler, 
State Farm v. Partridge, and Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty form 
the California trilogy.  While California would certainly like to disclaim 
paternity status, the fact remains that other jurisdictions have followed 
California’s lead on many concurrent causation issues.48  
 
A. SABELLA V. WISLER (EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE/ DOMINANT 
CAUSE APPROACH) 
 
In much the same way that California is the grandfather of 
concurrent causation analysis, Sabella v. Wisler is the grandfather of first-
party property coverage analysis.49 In Sabella, a home was damaged by 
extensive settling, and the settling was caused by a leak in a sewer pipe.50 
The leaking pipe saturated the fill material surrounding the foundation.51 
The leak was caused by contractor negligence, and more specifically, 
caused by the contractor inadequately compacting fill material and 
improperly sealing the sewer pipe joints.52 Under the policy, settling was 
excluded but contractor negligence was covered, and the court was faced 
with the classic “concurrent causation” question.53 The court reviewed the 
                                                                                               
47 California has certainly tried—and justifiably so—to distance itself as the 
genesis of concurrent causation. See Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient 
Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third 
Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) 
(citing Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 906 (Cal. 2005)). 
See also Mark D. Wuerfel & Mark Koop, Efficient Proximate Causation in the 
Context of Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 400, 401 (1998)).    
48 Lavitt, supra note 47, at 7. 
49 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).  
50 Id. at 892. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 890. 
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causes of loss and held that the leaking pipe was the efficient proximate 
cause of the loss because it set the other events in motion.54 The court 
reasoned that because the efficient proximate cause of the loss was a 
covered peril, the entire loss was covered.   
 
B. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE V. PARTRIDGE (PRO-
POLICYHOLDER/CONCURRENT CAUSATION APPROACH) 
 
The second case in the trilogy is not a property-insurance case, but 
a liability case.55 While it is plainly not a property case, it is included in this 
discussion because of the confusion generated by the case.56    
In Partridge, the insured was covered by separate automobile and 
homeowner’s insurance policies.57 The homeowner’s policy provided a 
much larger coverage amount but excluded losses “arising out of the use” 
of an automobile.58 The facts in Partridge were unique: the insured had 
filed a hair-trigger on a rifle allowing the rifle to be discharged at the 
slightest touch of the trigger.59 The insured and some friends were off-
roading hunting jackrabbits when the insured hit a bump; causing the hair-
trigger rifle to fire.60 The shot hit one of the passengers and caused 
significant injuries.61 The trial court found that the insured had committed 
two negligent acts: the negligent act of filing the hair trigger and the 
negligent act of driving off-road.62 The homeowner’s policy covered 
                                                                                               
54 It is important to note the proximate causation issue here and how tort and 
insurance proximate causation apply. Under tort theories, the loss was proximately 
caused by the contractor’s negligence. This differs under the scope of insurance 
law, where the goal is to determine the proximate cause of the loss, rather than 
which culpable party proximately caused the injury.   
55 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).   
56 The confusion stems from the misapplication of third-party insurance 
principles to first-party claims. This is not the only time this issue has confounded 
courts. See, e.g., Ernest Martin, Jr. & Britton D. Douglas, The Montrose Case—A 
Model Loss in Progress Rule Analysis, available at http://165.97.89.22/files/Uplo 
ads/Documents/Attorney%20Publications/Montrose_Case_Progress_Rule_Analysi
s.pdf (describing the misapplication of the loss in progress rule to first-party 
losses).   
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 125. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Martin & Douglas, supra note 56, at 127. 
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general negligence but excluded damages arising out of the use of the 
automobile.63   
Faced with these multiple perils, the California Supreme Court was 
again faced with a classic concurrent causation question. The court elected 
not to follow the precedent in Sabella because “the ‘efficient cause’ 
language is not very helpful, for here both causes were independent of each 
other: the filing of the trigger did not ‘cause’ the careless driving, nor vice 
versa.”64 Recognizing Sabella’s inapplicability to the question at issue, the 
court developed a new standard for liability losses independent of an 
analysis of efficient causation. The court held that the fact that “coverage 
under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured 
whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause 
of the injuries.”65 Thus, under Partridge, so long as a covered peril 
substantially contributed to the loss, coverage would be afforded.  
While the plain language of Partridge clearly limits the case to 
third-party liability claims, courts began to extend the “concurrent 
causation” approach to property insurance losses.66 For instance, in Safeco 
v. Guyton, the Ninth Circuit analyzed concurrent causation questions after 
Hurricane Kathleen using the pro-policyholder approach.67 The court found 
that there were two concurrent causes of loss: (a) third-party negligence (a 
covered loss) in maintaining flood control plans and (b) flood loss (an 
excluded loss).68 The court held that because third-party negligence 
contributed to the loss, the entire loss was covered, even though the loss 
was unequivocally caused by flood.69   
 
C. GARVEY V. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
 
Sixteen years, and a mountain of confusion later, the California 
                                                                                               
63 Id. at 126. 
64 Id. at 130 n.10.  
65 Partridge, 514 P.2d at 130 (emphasis added). 
66 Douglas G. Houser & Christopher H. Kent, Concurrent Causation in First-
Party Insurance Claims: Consumers Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 
TORT & INS. L.J. 573, 573 (1986).  
67 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982). 
68 Id. at 554. For a reincarnation of the Guyton case post-Hurricane Katrina, 
see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2007 WL 496856, at 
*2 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2007) (holding that losses post-Katrina were not flood losses 
within the meaning of the water exclusion but, rather, losses resulting from 
negligence and the breach of the levies).   
69 These cases were compiled in Houser & Kent, supra note 66, at 577-78. 
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Supreme Court eventually revisited the pro-policyholder concurrent 
causation approach developed in Partridge and rebuked the lower courts 
for misapplying Partridge to property insurance coverage litigation.70   
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty involved facts eerily similar 
to Sabella. In the late 1970s the Garveys noticed that an addition to their 
house was beginning to separate from the main property.71 The Garveys 
alleged that the contractor’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss 
and the loss should be covered.72 State Farm responded that settling was the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss and that any negligence by the 
contractor was negligible and should not affect coverage.73 Even though the 
facts were entirely analogous to Sabella, the trial court relied on 
Partridge—rather than Sabella—and held that the contractor’s negligence 
was a contributing cause, but settling was the dominant cause.74 The court 
held even though negligence was a minor cause and not the efficient 
proximate cause, the policy should cover the loss because the policy 
covered negligence.75    
The California Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s application 
of Partridge to property insurance questions.76 In first-party property 
losses, a loss is not necessarily covered just because a covered peril 
contributes to the loss. Rather, first-party insurance coverage questions 
require the reviewing court to look at the facts of the case and determine 
which among the various contributing perils is the “efficient proximate 
cause” of the loss. The efficient proximate cause has been referred to as 
“the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may 
follow it, and operate more immediately in producing the disaster.”77  
Under the efficient proximate cause analysis, if the predominant factor in 
the loss is covered, the loss is covered even if excluded perils also 
contribute to the loss.  Similarly, if the predominant factor in the loss is 
excluded, the loss is excluded even if covered perils contribute to the loss.   
 
 
 
                                                                                               
70 Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989). 
71 Id. at 705. 
72 Id. at 706. 
73 Id. at 705-06. 
74 Id. at 704.  
75 Id. 
76 Garvey, 70 P.2d at 713. 
77 Id. at 707 (quoting Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963) 
(quoting 6 COUCH ON INS. § 1463 (1930))). 
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D. SPAWN OF THE TRILOGY AND RAMIFICATIONS 
 
Before Garvey could clarify concurrent causation principles, the 
insurance industry became fearful of the impending onslaught of claims 
that could be brought as a result of the Partridge decision. As discussed 
above, under some jurisdictions’ reading of the policies, if 99.9% of the 
loss was excluded but 0.01% of the loss was covered, the entire loss could 
be covered.78 Indeed, the insurance industry was justifiably concerned as a 
broad reading of Partridge would prevent insurers from ever excluding 
certain perils.  
As a result of the insurance industry’s fears, the industry modified 
its standard policies in the mid-1980s.79 The industry offered revamped 
standard commercial general liability and commercial property policies, at 
least in part, to address the concurrent causation decisions spawned by 
courts applying Partridge to property policies.80 In order to avoid future 
Partridge-like decisions, the insurance industry included a new exclusion 
in its standard form contracts.81  Policies began excluding “loss or damage 
caused directly or indirectly by any of the following [exclusions]. Such loss 
or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that 
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”82  This language 
has been referred to generally as the “anti-concurrent” policy exclusion.83 
 
IV. COURTS INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-CONCURRENT POLICY 
EXCLUSIONS 
 
Even though Garvey presumably would have corrected the 
Partridge-progeny problems, the anti-concurrent causation exclusions have 
been interpreted broader than even the insurance industry could have 
initially imagined.84 The development of anti-concurrent causation 
                                                                                               
78 See supra Part III.C.  
79 See Bragg, supra note 8, at 392. 
80 Id. at 394. 
81 See id. 
82 See, e.g., Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. 
Co., 207 P.3d 839, 841 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing standard ISO policy language). 
83 Again, there is a definitional problem here. The clauses are colloquially 
referred to as anti-concurrent causation clauses, yet they refer to both simultaneous 
and subsequent causes of loss. See supra Part II for further discussion.   
84 Mark M. Bell, Christopher S. Dunn & James C. Costner, Confronting 
Conventional Wisdom on Builders Risk: From Named Insured Status to 
Concurrent Causation, 31-Fall CONSTRUCTION LAW 15, 20-21 (2011). 
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exclusions has proved an especially powerful device for claims denials.85 In 
dealing with anti-concurrent causation exclusions, courts have typically 
followed one of three approaches: (1) the “freedom of contract” approach, 
(2) the substantial factor approach, or (3) the Rossmiller/Blue-Pencil 
approach.86 
 
A. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT APPROACH  
 
The freedom of contract approach is probably the most prevalent of 
the approaches to anti-concurrent causation clauses.87 Although many 
courts have followed this approach, one of the earliest adopters, and one of 
the clearest analyses on point is found in Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. 
Co.88 
Alf presented the classic chain-of-events concurrent causation 
question.89  The parties agreed that the loss was caused when a pipe on the 
Alfs’ property ruptured due to unusually low temperatures.90 Water then 
escaped from the ruptured pipe and caused extensive flooding and soil 
erosion.91 
If Alf were decided prior to the 1980s-insurance policy revisions, 
the policy would have clearly provided coverage. Utah follows the 
dominant approach to concurrent causation issues, which seeks to find the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss.92 Here, the parties agreed that the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss was the ruptured pipe—just as in the 
case of Sabella.93 Under the Dominant Cause analysis, which seeks to 
determine the cause that set the others in motion, the policy would clearly 
provide coverage.   
                                                                                               
85 Cases expanding on Partridge and applying Partridge to property insurance 
questions are colloquially referred to herein as post-Partridge decisions.  
86 No court has actually referred to its approaches by any of these names. But, 
for clarification and categorization purposes, these names accurately reflect the 
various approaches taken by U.S. jurisdictions.   
87 See Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation versus 
Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 
36 BRIEF 32, 35 (2007) (compiling cases throughout the United States).  
88 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993); see also Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 
P.2d 678 (Colo. 1989).   
89 Alf, 850 P.2d at 1272. 
90 Id. at 1273. 
91 Id. 
92 See supra Part II.   
93 See supra Part III.A.  
2011       A CONCURRENT MESS             87 
Alf, however, was not decided under the pre-1980s insurance 
policy revisions, and the Utah Supreme Court was faced with the question 
of whether an insurer could contractually avoid the efficient proximate 
cause rule. The court held that the efficient proximate cause rule is not an 
immutable rule of insurance in Utah, but rather, operates as a default rule 
“only when the parties have not chosen freely to contract out of it.”94  
The court held that the parties had chosen to contract around the 
efficient proximate cause rule and that the parties were entitled to do so.95 
The court reasoned that the anti-concurrent causation language in the 
policy did not upset norms of reasonable expectations of insureds, and 
therefore, the contractual modification was permissible.96   
It is interesting to note that under this interpretation, insurers have 
essentially turned the tables of Partridge on insureds. Courts used 
Partridge as a shield to protect policyholders by granting coverage when 
there was an argument that the policy should cover the loss.97 The freedom 
of contract approach, conversely, denies coverage when there is an 
argument that the policy should not cover the loss. This expansion goes far 
above and beyond the intent of the insurers when they instituted anti-
concurrent exclusions.98 
Today, if the insurer can point to some event in the chain of events 
that was excluded, the insurer can deny coverage in freedom-of-contract-
approach jurisdictions like Utah.99 As currently applied, if the insured could 
argue that 99% of the loss was caused by covered losses, but 1% of the 
losses was excluded, then the entire loss will be excluded.100 Additionally, 
the possibility exists that insurers can modify policies and begin excluding 
Negligent Acts and Decisions, as an example, in all-risk policies, and 
thereby effectively prevent coverage for all losses where the loss can be at 
least partially attributed to someone’s negligence.   
In addition to exceeding the insurance industry’s original intent in 
authoring the exclusions, the expansive scope of the anti-concurrent 
exclusions is also problematic when considering the nature of the insurance 
industry. Most insurance policies are contracts of adhesion incapable of 
                                                                                               
94 Alf, 850 P.2d at 1277.   
95 Id. at 1272.  
96 Id. at 1278. 
97 Houser & Kent, supra note 66, at 575-77. 
98 See supra note 79-83 and accompanying text.  
99 Davidson Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 
901 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).  
100 See Chattanooga Bank Assoc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 774 
(E.D. Tenn. 2004).   
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modification by individual policyholders. These disperse policyholders do 
not possess the lobbying powers or the contractual capacity or influence to 
cause ubiquitous changes across all policy lines of insurance, which is why 
the policies remain as they are today.  The insurance industry can 
effectively modify the policy in response to negative precedent; whereas 
the diverse policyholders do not possess similar power.  Accordingly it 
should be incumbent on either the courts or legislature to prevent over-
expansive use of the anti-concurrent exclusions—especially when the 
interpretations exceed the intended purpose of the exclusions. 
 
B. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR APPROACH  
 
Recognizing the various problems associated with the freedom-of-
contract approach, some courts have held that in order for anti-concurrent 
exclusions to apply, the excluded loss must be a substantial factor or the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss.101 There are four states that have 
followed this approach and expressly rejected the freedom of contract 
approach. California102 and North Dakota103 have done so by code and 
Washington and West Virginia have done so by case law.104   
The first case to reject the freedom-of-contract approach without 
relying on insurance code regulations was Safeco Insurance Co. v. 
Hirschmann.105 In Hirschmann, severe winds were followed by heavy rains 
                                                                                               
101 Phillips & Coplen, supra note 87, at 35 (compiling cases throughout the 
United States). 
102 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 2005) (“An insurer is liable for a loss of 
which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although a peril not 
contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is 
not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.”). 
103 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2010) (“An insurer is liable for a loss 
proximately caused by a peril insured against even though a peril not contemplated 
by the insurance contract may have been a remote cause of the loss. An insurer is 
not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause. The 
efficient proximate cause doctrine applies only if separate, distinct, and totally 
unrelated causes contribute to the loss.”).   
104 At the time of this writing, the Colorado Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari to determine whether a loss is covered where 90% of the loss was 
covered and 10% was excluded. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. 
Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. granted, No. 08SC907, 
2009 WL 1485804 (Colo. May 26, 2009).   
105 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989). For a recent example, see Sprague v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Am., 241 P.3d 1276, 1278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“In analyzing 
coverage, Washington follows the efficient proximate cause rule. Under this rule, 
2011       A CONCURRENT MESS             89 
and landslides.106 The Hirschmanns’ home was pushed from its foundation 
and completely destroyed because of strong winds and water saturation of 
the soil.107 According to one expert, the primary cause of the hillside’s 
collapse was the heavy rainfall.108   
Safeco denied coverage and conceded during the proceedings that 
if the policy had been interpreted prior to the 1980 policy revisions, then 
the loss would have been covered in Washington.109 Safeco argued that 
even though Washington adheres to the dominant-cause approach, the post-
1980s policy revisions overcome the dominant-cause approach.110 Safeco 
argued that it should be able to exclude coverage since at least part of the 
loss was excluded.111   
The court in Hirschmann rejected Safeco’s argument and held that 
the efficient proximate cause rule represents an immutable principle of 
Washington insurance law, and that the parties cannot contract around it.112 
The court held that because the primary causes of the loss included the 
covered perils of wind and rain, the entire loss was covered.113      
Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. provides a thorough primer 
on concurrent causation including a description of the resulting 
disproportionate forfeiture if the efficient proximate cause rule is 
ignored.114 In Murray, State Farm argued that its anti-concurrent clause 
“operates to defeat the efficient proximate cause doctrine.”115 Further, State 
Farm “argue[d] that if earth movement in any way contribute[d] to a loss, 
regardless of the proximate cause, then under the lead-in [anti-concurrent] 
clause the entire loss is excluded from coverage.”116   
The court in Murray rejected State Farm’s contention and captured 
the essence of potential problems associated with abandoning the efficient 
                                                                                               
the predominant cause of the loss determines coverage.”) (footnotes omitted); but 
cf. City of Everett v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 823 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that insurance policies that use the phrase “arising 
out of” do not warrant efficient proximate cause analysis). 
106 Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 413. 
107 Id. at 414. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 413-14. 
112 See Hirschmann, 773 P.2d at 415-16. 
113 Id. at 417-18. 
114 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998). 
115 Id. at 14.   
116 Id. (emphasis added). 
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proximate cause rule in the face of anti-concurrent causation clauses:  
 
Indeed if we were to give full effect to the State Farm 
policy language excluding coverage whenever an excluded 
peril is a contributing or aggravating factor in the loss, we 
would be giving insurance companies carte blanche to 
deny coverage in nearly all cases.117 
 
Applying these principles, the West Virginia court rejected a broad 
reading of anti-concurrent clauses and held that the efficient proximate 
cause rule cannot be modified to abandon the reasonable expectations of 
the insured.118 The court held that the reasonable insurer expects to have 
losses covered where the predominant cause of the loss is covered.119    
One could certainly criticize the substantial factor approach 
because it essentially ignores the 1980s revisions to insurance policies and 
renders the anti-concurrent policy ineffective. As demonstrated by the 
Washington and West Virginia cases, these courts essentially apply the 
same analysis that they applied before the introduction of anti-concurrent 
causation clauses. Opponents to the approach, including insurers in general, 
argue that courts applying the substantial factor approach make anti-
concurrent clauses superfluous and meaningless.   
In this author’s opinion, the criticism is unproblematic. Insurers 
introduced the anti-concurrent causation clauses to combat post-Partridge 
expansion of concurrent causation. Michael E. Bragg, assistant counsel for 
State Farm Insurance, wrote an article in the 1980s that discussed State 
Farm’s specific attempts to draft policy language to avoid post-Partridge 
concurrent causation interpretations.120     
 
The difficulty of the industry’s task in combating 
concurrent causation embraces two distinct but related 
issues intertwined in the court decisions. First, the courts 
are creating new “causes” of loss never contemplated by 
property insurance policy drafters. Most important of these 
causes are negligence and other human conduct. Such 
                                                                                               
117 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 
Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1456 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). 
118 Id. at 14-15. 
119 Id. 
120 Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: 
New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985). 
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conduct may be active, passive, willful, negligent, 
imprudent, untimely, or any other word which describes 
how people act or fail to act. Second, the courts are telling 
us that the proper causation standard is no longer to 
attribute the loss to a single proximate cause, but rather to 
grant coverage if any of the causes of the loss has not been 
specifically excluded.121 
 
As demonstrated by this influential article, anti-concurrent 
causation clauses were not intended to impact the efficient proximate 
causation standard employed by post-Sabella interpretations. The Sabella 
analysis seems to offer a fair and reasonable interpretation from both the 
insurer and policyholder perspectives. Insurers intended to prevent post-
Partridge interpretations where the loss was covered if the insured could 
point to a single factor that contributed to the loss. While the case has not 
yet arisen in any jurisdictions following the pro-policyholder approach, the 
case can be made that the anti-concurrent exclusions would be effective in 
those jurisdictions and would move those jurisdictions from a post-
Partridge analysis to a post-Sabella analysis.   
Accordingly, by applying the substantial factor approach, as 
Washington and West Virginia courts have, insurers are adequately 
safeguarded against post-Partridge interpretations. Additionally, the 
approach mitigates the potential for insurers to deny losses when the loss 
was proximately caused by a covered cause.   
 
C. THE ROSSMILLER/BLUE PENCIL APPROACH  
 
The third approach that courts have used employs a much more 
involved and detailed analysis of concurrent causation. It seems that 
Corban v. USAA is the only court to have used this approach to date, but I 
have included it as its own approach, because it is quite likely another court 
will follow Mississippi’s lead.  This approach has largely evolved from the 
work of concurrent causation scholar/practitioner David Rossmiller.122   
                                                                                               
121 Id. at 389. 
122 David P. Rossmiller, Katrina in the Fifth Dimension: Hurricane Katrina 
Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: 
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 71, 86 (Matthew Bender ed., 2008) 
[hereinafter “Rossmiller, Katrina”]; David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and 
Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Policy Language in Hurricane Katrina Cases and 
Beyond, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
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Rossmiller published two influential articles in 2007 and 2008, 
which cogently argue for a particular interpretation of “concurrent” when 
used in relation to concurrent causation.123 Under Rossmiller’s view, 
concurrent should either refer to perils (a) acting in coordination or (b) 
acting in sequence.124 For instance, assume that a fire and earthquake both 
operated to cause a loss: (a) acting in coordination would occur if the 
earthquake worked in conjunction with the fire to cause the same damage; 
(b) acting in sequence would occur if the fire resulted from the earthquake; 
and (c) a non-concurrent result would occur if the fire merely occurred at 
the same time as the earthquake but was not brought about by the 
earthquake.125   
According to Rossmiller, Hurricane Katrina did not actually 
involve concurrent causes of loss “not because they came at different times, 
but because each force acted separately to create unique damage”126 – as in 
the third earthquake/fire example described above. Under Rossmiller’s 
view, the fact that both wind and flood were “products of the same larger 
phenomenon, a hurricane, is irrelevant.”127 The argument follows that 
losses are concurrent only where multiple causes produce the same 
damage, and losses are not concurrent when multiple causes result in 
multiple losses.   
While Rossmiller’s articles have been cited by other courts,128 the 
first court to adopt his approach was the Mississippi Supreme Court. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the concurrent causation question for 
the first time in Corban v. USAA129 after several federal courts had 
provided Erie-guesses as to how Mississippi would analyze concurrent 
                                                                                               
INSURANCE LAW 43, 65 (Matthew Bender ed., 2007) [hereinafter “Rossmiller, 
Interpretation”].   
123 See generally Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; Rossmiller, 
Interpretation, supra note 122. 
124 See generally Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; Rossmiller, 
Interpretation, supra note 122. 
125 The earthquake/fire analogy is used throughout this article. For references 
to insurance/earthquakes, the reader should ignore any potential differing results 
that would occur under an analysis of the New York Standard Fire Policy. For 
purpose of the analogy, assume that neither New York’s nor any other state’s 
standard fire policies apply. 
126 Rossmiller, Interpretation, supra note 122, at 65. 
127 Id. 
128 Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 
P.3d 839, 842 (Colo. App. 2008). 
129 Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 2009). 
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causation questions.130 
The Corbans owned a two-story home that was damaged—but not 
destroyed—by Hurricane Katrina.131 USAA inspected the home and 
determined that although the wind caused some damage to the roof and 
second floor, the majority of damage to the first floor was caused by 
flooding.132 Accordingly, USAA paid the portion of damages to the roof 
and second floor related to the wind damage and denied coverage for the 
first floor because of the anti-concurrent flood exclusion.133  
In order to determine whether the denial was proper, the court in 
Corban narrowly defined concurrent.134 Although there are numerous 
definitions that the court could have used to define concurrent, Corban 
used the following narrow definition: the “exclusion applies only in the 
event that the perils [1] act in conjunction, [2] as an indivisible force, [3] 
occurring at the same time, [4] to cause direct physical damage resulting in 
loss.”135  
Additionally, the court held that the provision “in any sequence” 
irreconcilably conflicts with Mississippi law and is void and 
unenforceable.136 By rejecting the “in any sequence language” in the anti-
concurrent exclusion, the court also addressed questions brought up by 
federal courts and held that “[a]n insurer cannot avoid its obligation to 
indemnify the insured based upon an event which occurs subsequent to the 
covered loss.”137 
Under the narrow definition of concurrent, the insurer has the 
                                                                                               
130 For a fascinating history of the chronology of the federal courts Erie-guess 
analogies, see Rossmiller, Katrina, supra note 122; see also Bell et al., supra note 
84, at 21-23.  
131 See Corban, 20 So. 3d at 605-06. 
132 Id. at 606. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 614. 
135 Id. (brackets added for clarity). 
136 Id. at 615. The court presumably could have declared the entire exclusion 
void as a result of this provision, but for reasons unexplained by the court, the 
court seems to have severed this provision from the rest of the exclusion.  
137 Corban, 20 So. 3d at 613. Indeed, USAA also rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
analogy when pressed during trial. According to USAA, “if an insured’s roof is 
breached and rainwater comes in, damaging a carpet, USAA pays for rainwater 
damage to the carpet . . . even if storm surge subsequently. . . destroy[s] the 
carpet.” Id. at 610; for additional discussion on indemnification and subrogation, 
see Jay S. Bybee, Profits in Subrogation: An Insurer’s Claim to be More than 
Indemnified, 1979 BYU L. REV. 145 (1979). 
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burden of proving that two perils operate in conjunction and that the perils 
operated contemporaneously. In Corban, and likely the majority of Katrina 
claims, the wind and the flood did not operate contemporaneously or in 
conjunction because most experts estimate that the wind preceded the 
flooding by up to four hours. 
Corban also established the relevant burdens of proof for insurance 
claims.  Under an all risk policy, the insured has the burden to prove that a 
loss occurred. After proving that a loss occurred, the burden shifts to the 
insurer to prove an affirmative defense—for example, demonstrating that 
the peril is excluded under the policy. In Corban, it was clear that a loss 
occurred; therefore USAA had the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of evidence that the damages were caused by the excluded peril of 
flooding.138  
I refer to this approach as the “blue pencil” approach because it 
strikes a portion of the anti-concurrent exclusion, but does not invalidate 
the entire clause.  As stated previously, anti-concurrent exclusions 
generally exclude losses caused concurrently and “in any sequence.” 
Corban held that the “in any sequence” language was unenforceable, but 
held that anti-concurrent clauses are enforceable.  While this represents a 
more policyholder-friendly approach than the courts that simply enforce 
anti-concurrent causation clauses wholesale, it still leaves open the 
possibility that anti-concurrent causation exclusions can exclude losses 
where 99% of the loss is covered but 1% of the loss is excluded.   
 
V. A CALL FOR CLARITY AND A REVISION OF THE TERMS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
 
As stated at the outset, and as evidenced by the approaches to 
concurrent causation and anti-concurrent causation exclusions, the 
nomenclature of concurrent causation has become so bastardized that the 
concurrent and efficient proximate cause issues have become an 
untraceable mess.   
To correct this mess, courts and commentators should re-visit 
concurrent causation to redefine the terms to more accurately reflect the 
underlying policies and provide additional clarity. In addition to redefining 
the relevant concurrent causation terms, courts, insurers, and policyholders, 
should take a new approach to analyzing concurrent causation questions.  
 
 
                                                                                               
138 Corban, 20 So. 3d at 618-19. 
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A. DEFINITIONAL CLARITY 
 
There are two terms that proliferate “concurrent causation” 
analyses and courts continuously apply these definitions inappropriately: 
“concurrent causation” and “efficient proximate cause.”  
As currently defined, these terms are inexact and create confusion 
and result in inconsistent application. “Concurrent” is used (1) to refer to 
any multi-factor causation analysis,139 (2) to refer to a particular type of 
multi-factor causation analysis,140 and (3) as a method or approach to multi-
cause losses.141  Similarly, “efficient proximate cause” is used (1) as a 
method or approach to multi-cause losses,142 (2) as the “moving cause of 
loss” when there is a chain-of-events preceding a loss,143 and (3) as the 
“predominant” factor in non-chain-of-event losses when multiple perils 
combine to cause a loss.144  
Given the conflation of terms, it is time to redefine these terms to 
allow greater accuracy and precision. Additionally, given the current 
confusion generated by the term “concurrent”, courts, commentators, and 
insurers should drop the term “concurrent” from the insurance lexicon.145   
In order to provide clarity on “concurrent causation” questions, the 
term concurrent causation must be addressed first. Although by definition 
concurrent requires temporal proximity,146 the term has been eviscerated to 
the point that concurrent no longer has any definitional meaning. To 
demonstrate this point, Rossmiller, one of the most well-versed and 
persuasive writers on the subject, argues that temporal proximity—the 
essence of concurrence—is “irrelevant” to the question of whether a loss is 
concurrent.147 If “concurrent” does not relate to temporal proximity, then 
no concurrent causation analysis can truly be said to be necessarily related 
to concurrence. Correspondingly, when courts attempt to define the term, 
                                                                                               
139 See, e.g., Bragg, supra note 120, at 285. 
140 See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, 770 P.2d 704, 709 (Cal. 
1989). 
141 See supra Part II. 
142 See, e.g., Lavitt, supra note 47, at 2. 
143 See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963). 
144 See, e.g., Shinrone, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 570 F.2d 715, 718-19 (8th 
Cir. 1978).  
145 Perhaps the word need not be dropped permanently, but certainly a long 
hiatus would be beneficial to avoid the current conflation of terms currently 
applied to “concurrent.”  
146 See sources cited supra note 3. 
147 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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they are unable to appropriately define concurrent while maintaining some 
semblance of the term as defined by dictionaries or as originally intended 
by courts and insurers.    
For that reason, courts and commentators should avoid using the 
term “concurrent” to refer to a loss caused by more than one cause. Instead, 
courts and commentators should use “multi-cause” in its place. Either a 
loss is caused by one cause, or the loss is caused by multi-causes.  If the 
loss is caused by one cause, the analysis is simple and the court determines 
whether that loss is covered. If, however, the loss is caused by multi-
causes, then courts should engage a new approach to the multi-cause loss 
analysis.   
This presents a simple remedy to an unnecessarily complicated 
problem.  There is no reason that multi-cause losses should be referred to 
as concurrent, but that is what has been done for years. If there were some 
reason to use the term concurrent, I would refrain from suggesting a 
replacement. However, there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to refer to 
a loss caused by multiple causes as a “concurrent” loss.   
Second, the term efficient proximate cause has been used in so 
many different ways that there is confusion about its definition as well. As 
originally envisioned, efficient proximate cause related to chain-of-event 
questions.148  Originally, courts would attempt to determine the efficient 
proximate cause to decide which event set the other events in motion.149 
Thus, the precise definition for efficient proximate cause is the cause that 
sets the others in motion and relates expressly to chain-of-event losses. 
This is the only place where the term efficient proximate cause should be 
used.   
Over time, courts and commentators began to use efficient 
proximate cause more loosely and applied the term to non-chain-of-event 
multi-cause losses.  Efficient proximate started being defined as the 
“predominant factor” in a loss and has been used to refer to the dominant-
cause approach.150 This has generated confusion because courts now 
attempt to look for the “moving” cause of loss even when there is not a 
chain-of-events preceding the loss. For non-chain-of-event losses, however, 
there is no “moving” cause of loss and courts must look to the predominant 
or substantial cause of the loss.   
 
                                                                                               
148 Lavitt, supra note 47. 
149 Vintila v. Drassen, 52 S.W.3d 28, 41-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
150 Elizabeth L. Perry, Why Fear the Fungus? Why Toxic Mold is and is not 
the Next Big Toxic Tort, BUFF. L. REV. 257, 280 (2004). 
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B. NEW ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-CAUSE LOSSES 
 
Rather than having courts attempt to analyze insurance policies in a 
vacuum, I would propose that courts and commentators address concurrent 
causation issues using a more methodical, categorical approach.   
In insurance coverage, categorization is often essential to 
understanding the issues. Indeed, the proliferation of confusion concerning 
multi-cause losses can be traced to deficiencies in categorization. For 
instance, the post-Partridge proliferation largely occurred because courts 
failed to appropriately categorize the losses. Different concerns arise in 
property and liability disputes and courts should treat the disputes 
differently.151 In the post-Partridge era, courts failed to properly distinguish 
property from liability cases and inappropriately applied liability standards 
to property cases.   
To avoid these types of categorical problems, this article advocates 
a more methodical approach and recommends that courts engage in an 
analysis using a number of discreet, step-by-step questions. The discreet 
questions would encourage courts to appropriately categorize the loss and 
subsequently apply the proper means of analysis to that particular category 
of loss. This approach would more uniformly address multi-cause losses 
and would lead to improved consistency and efficiency throughout 
jurisdictions, would avoid inequitable results, and would lead to greater 
contract certainty.152   
When addressing insurance coverage questions, the key concern is 
causation and whether the peril causing the loss is covered or excluded. 
The approach advocated in this article presents a more direct-line, causal, 
approach to causation questions than the piecemeal approach currently 
employed by the courts.   
 Obviously the threshold question in a coverage dispute concerns 
the determination of what specific peril or perils contributed to the loss. 
When losses only involve one peril, the analysis is straightforward: was the 
peril covered or excluded? Conversely, when losses involve multiple 
                                                                                               
151 Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989) 
(“Liability and corresponding coverage under a third-party insurance policy must 
be carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis applied in a first-party 
property contract.  Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned 
with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability.”) (citing Michael 
E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for 
Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 386 (1985)).    
152 As with most insurance questions, these issues are often best addressed by 
a flowchart and I have attached the flowchart to the appendix for review.  
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causes, the analysis becomes far more complicated. Accordingly, once the 
stakeholders recognize that the loss involves multiple causes, it would 
behoove the courts to address a series of questions before opining on the 
resulting coverage question: (1) did the causes operate in an unbroken 
chain of events or did the causes operate independently?; (2) if the losses 
operated independently, did they act simultaneously or sequentially?; (2a) 
if the losses were simultaneous, were the various causes independently 
sufficient or independently insufficient to cause the loss?; (2b) if the losses 
were sequential, what cause and resultant loss came first and did the second 
cause exacerbate the preceding loss?153   
 
1. Did the Causes Operate in an Unbroken Chain or did the 
Causes Operate Independently? 
 
Different analyses are required when dealing with losses caused by 
an unbroken chain-of-events and losses caused by independent perils. For 
unbroken chains-of-events, courts typically try to determine what was the 
“moving” cause of the loss, or stated in other terms, “if the immediate 
cause of the loss was dependent on other forces or events, then the trier of 
fact [is] required to engage in a process of selection to determine the 
‘efficient’ cause of the loss.”154        
If there is a chain-of-events, the court should look to the “efficient 
proximate cause of the loss.” In typical chain-of-event scenarios, the event 
that sets the others in motion is well established and easily ascertainable. 
For instance, in a relatively recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the 
parties unequivocally agreed on the efficient proximate cause of the loss 
stemming from an unbroken chain of events.155 In Terminal Freezers, the 
policyholder had built a commercial freezer facility.156 Eventually, the 
policyholder discovered that ice was accumulating in the ceilings and 
walls.157 The parties unanimously agreed that the ice was caused due to an 
unbroken chain-of-events.158 During construction, the contractor had 
                                                                                               
153 See flowchart attached to appendix for clarity on the steps.  
154 Lavitt, supra note 47, at 9 (citing Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 55 U.S. 
351, 366-67 (1852)). California has certainly tried—and justifiably so—to distance 
itself as the genesis of concurrent causation. Id. at 7. 
155 See Terminal Freezers Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins., No. 08-35623, No. 08-35656, 
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20321 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2009). 
156 Terminal Freezers Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins., No. C07-0090BHS, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 48280, at *3  (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008). 
157 Id. at *20. 
158 Id. at *20-21. 
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defectively installed a vapor barrier, the defective vapor barrier allowed 
water vapor to enter the facility, the water vapor infiltrated ceiling tiles and 
insulation, and the water vapor then froze in the ceiling tiles and insulation; 
thereby destroying the interior of the facility and causing significant 
damage.159 In Terminal Freezers, the immediate cause of the loss was water 
vapor freezing; however, there was no doubt between the parties that the 
real “cause”, or the “efficient” cause of the loss, was the defectively 
installed vapor barrier: but-for the defectively installed vapor barrier, the 
ice would not have accumulated in the building.160 Like Terminal Freezers, 
most chain-of-event cases provide a relatively straightforward question that 
is often capable of agreement between the parties.   
Accordingly, for chain-of-event cases, the court should continue to 
seek to determine the efficient proximate cause of the loss and determine 
whether the efficient proximate cause is covered or excluded. If the cause is 
covered, the entire loss should be covered; conversely if the efficient 
proximate cause is excluded, then the entire loss should be excluded.  
In non-chain-of-event cases, however, there is no “efficient 
proximate cause” setting in motion an unbroken chain of events. 
Accordingly, the efficient proximate cause analysis is inappropriate for 
independent cause cases, which helps to explain why courts have had such 
difficulty attempting to fit the efficient proximate cause framework into 
independent causation analyses. Thus, courts should employ an entirely 
different analysis when evaluating these types of losses.  In these cases, 
courts should determine whether the causes operated simultaneously or 
sequentially.  
 
2. Did the Causes in the Multi-Cause Loss operate 
Simultaneously or Sequentially  
 
Simultaneity is important in the insurance context. Modern 
“concurrent causation”—multi-cause—jurisprudence arose when 
California addressed a loss where simultaneous causes operated to create 
the loss.161   
In this author’s view, perils operating simultaneously should be 
                                                                                               
159 Id. at *4. 
160 Terminal Freezers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48280 (the parties did dispute, 
however, whether the resultant ice formations should be covered or excluded, but 
the case is illustrative of how courts employ the chain-of-events analysis works). 
161 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).  
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analyzed separately from independent perils operating sequentially.162 The 
temporal differences raise independent questions. Just as in the case of 
conflating chain-of-event and independent losses, when courts and 
commentators begin classifying simultaneous and sequential losses 
together, confusion results because the concerns and the issues in both 
cases are separate and distinct.   
 
a. Simultaneous Losses 
 
For perils operating simultaneously, courts should first determine 
whether the various perils were independently sufficient or independently 
insufficient to cause the loss. By way of analogy, the quintessential 
independent-simultaneous-multi-cause loss would present itself if an 
earthquake (excluded peril) occurred at the exact same time as a fire 
(covered peril). For this analogy, the two events are entirely unrelated, and 
the property was completely destroyed as a result of the loss.  
In this analogy, the court would determine whether a covered peril 
was independently sufficient to cause the entire loss. If a covered peril is 
sufficient to cause the entire loss, then the entire loss should be covered. 
For example, in this analogy, if the fire could have caused the entire loss, 
then the loss should be covered, even if the earthquake could also have 
caused the entire loss.  
If the covered peril was not sufficient to cause the entire loss, and 
the excluded peril could have independently caused the loss, then the entire 
loss should be excluded. Continuing the analogy, if the fire could not have 
caused the entire loss, but the earthquake could have caused the entire loss, 
then the entire loss should be excluded.   
If, however, neither the fire nor the earthquake could have 
independently caused the loss, then the court should determine which of the 
two perils was the “predominant” cause of loss.163 If the court determines 
that the fire is the predominant cause of loss, then the entire loss should be 
                                                                                               
162 It is important to note that once we are in step 2, sequential losses do not 
refer to sequential unbroken chain-of-events. Rather, sequential refers solely to 
independent perils occurring sequentially. For chain-of-event losses, courts should 
continue applying the efficient proximate cause analysis as discussed supra Part 
V.B.1.  
163 It is important to note the definitional consistency that needs to be 
employed in this category. This analysis should be referred to as seeking the 
“predominant” cause of the loss. This should not be referred to as the “efficient 
proximate cause” of the loss because that term is limited to chain-of-event 
situations, which are not present in this example.  
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covered. If however, the court determines that the earthquake is the 
predominant cause of the loss, then the entire loss should be excluded.   
The rationales for this approach relate to reasonableness and 
notions of fairness. If one covered cause of loss was sufficient to cause the 
entire loss, then the insurer should not benefit from the fortuitous 
circumstance that an excluded loss operated at the same time. The insurer 
underwrites the policy and intends to provide insurance for certain events. 
Once that event is triggered, the insurer should not be able to benefit 
because an additional cause occurred at the same time. The policyholder 
pays a premium for particular coverages, and once those coverages are 
triggered, the insurer is obligated to pay. Conversely, if an excluded peril 
could have caused the entire loss, then the policyholder should not be able 
to benefit when the property would have been completely destroyed and the 
damages caused by the covered perils were less than the damages caused 
by the excluded perils. Similarly, if neither peril could have independently 
caused the loss, fairness dictates that the court should attempt to determine 
which cause was the predominant cause of the loss. If the predominant 
factor in the loss was excluded, the policyholder should not be able to 
receive coverage when the bulk of the damage is caused by excluded 
causes. By that same token, the insurer should not be able to avoid 
coverage when covered losses predominate.   
 
b. Sequential Losses  
 
For independent causes occurring in sequence, the threshold 
question should attempt to determine which cause and resultant loss came 
first. The second question would ask whether the subsequent loss 
exacerbated the damage or created new damage.   
While some courts have ignored the sequence of losses, 
fundamental notions of insurance dictate that the sequence is essential to 
determine whether there should be coverage. As prudently stated by the 
Mississippi Supreme Court: 
 
No reasonable person can seriously dispute that if a loss 
occurs, caused by either a covered peril (wind) or an 
excluded peril (water), that particular loss is not changed 
by any subsequent cause or event. Nor can the loss be 
excluded after it has been suffered, as the right to be 
indemnified for a loss caused by a covered peril attaches at 
that point in time when the insured suffers deprivation of, 
physical damage to, or destruction of the property insured. 
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An insurer cannot avoid its obligation to indemnify the 
insured based upon an event which occurs subsequent to 
the covered loss.164  
 
In Corban, the court addressed immutable principles of insurance 
coverage. Covered losses do not become excluded merely because a 
subsequent cause operates on the loss.165 Similarly, excluded losses do not 
become covered merely because subsequent covered perils happen to 
impact the loss. Thus, the key question should center on which peril came 
first and whether that peril is covered or excluded: If the peril is covered, 
the loss should be covered, and the reverse holds true as well.  
 After determining which loss came first, the court should 
determine whether the subsequent peril exacerbated the loss or created new 
damage. If the subsequent cause exacerbated the loss, then the exacerbated 
damages should be categorized according to the prior loss. If, however, the 
subsequent cause creates new damage, then the court should re-analyze 
whether that cause is covered or excluded and provide coverage for the 
new loss accordingly.   
For example, if an earthquake (excluded) damaged a property and 
two hours later a fire (covered) came and merely exacerbated the 
earthquake damage, the entire loss would be excluded. If, however, the 
earthquake damaged the foundation of the property causing distinct 
damages, and the fire later damaged the roof and framing, then the fire 
damage should not be excluded merely because an earthquake caused some 
damage to the property.        
The rationale for this approach relates to reasonableness and 
doctrines of fairness. It should be an immutable doctrine of insurance 
coverage that covered losses do not become uncovered merely because the 
insurer has not had yet paid the claim.   
By way of analogy, suppose a policyholder suffered a loss on the 
1st of the month, and the insurer acknowledged the loss was covered and 
payment should be made on the policy. No reasonable insurer would argue 
that the covered loss on the 1st of the month becomes excluded simply 
because the policyholder suffers a subsequent loss caused by an excluded 
peril on the 31st of that month. Although that analogy seems absurd, that is 
essentially the argument that insurers make during sequential multi-cause 
                                                                                               
164 Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601, 613 (Miss. 2009) 
(footnotes omitted). 
165 Id.  
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losses.166 These arguments should be rejected when an excluded peril 
merely subsequently impacts the property and causes the same damage or 
merely exacerbates the previous loss. Just as the argument is rejected for 
losses occurring 30 days later, so too should they be rejected when 
occurring 30 minutes later. 
Similarly, the policyholder should not be able to receive an undue 
benefit.  By analogy, if an automobile is in an accident and the hood is 
mangled and unfit for daily use, no reasonable policyholder would argue 
that the policyholder should be able to recover for an unrelated key-scratch 
on the same hood. The same analogy applies. The fact that a covered event 
occurs after an excluded event should not morph the excluded loss into a 
covered one.  
The area for potential pushback in this approach concerns the 
exacerbation/new loss distinction. If the subsequent loss significantly 
exacerbates the loss, the stakeholders may have a claim that there should be 
some offset.  However, experience indicates that bifurcating losses is 
extremely difficult, and apportionment is inexact and difficult to prove. The 
problem only becomes more complicated in cases of total losses. Thus, for 
clarity and policy consistency, a subsequent exacerbation of a previous loss 
should not affect the prior loss determination.  
In cases where the losses and subsequent causes can be clearly 
bifurcated, the subsequent loss should be analyzed under general principles 
of insurance interpretation.   
Revisiting the earthquake-fire analogy, if an earthquake were to 
damage the foundation and then an unrelated fire were to strike the 
property, the damage from the earthquake would clearly be excluded since 
it occurred first. If the earthquake caused the total loss of the property, then 
the loss would be excluded, even if a subsequent unrelated fire struck the 
location and would have assuredly burned the building to the ground. If the 
earthquake did not cause a total loss of the property, and an unrelated fire 
later struck the same property, then the court would look to the impact on 
the property and the nature of the fire damage. If the fire damage 
exacerbated structural problems caused by the earthquake, then the 
resultant fire-structural damage would be excluded. Conversely, if the fire 
damaged property was undamaged by the earthquake, then the policy 
would cover the resultant unrelated fire damage. 
                                                                                               
166 The ISO policy exclusions exclude losses caused “in any sequence” by 
excluded perils.  Tim Ryles, Rethinking Concurrent Causation and the Flood 
Exclusion: Further Comments on Katrina-Related Coverage Disputes, IRMI.COM, 
Sept. 2007, http://www.irmi.com/exp ert/articles/2007/ryles09.aspx. 
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C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE REVISED APPROACH 
 
As for my proposal calling for definitional clarity, most courts and 
commentators would probably agree that the current definitional landmine 
is unworkable and that it is time to revisit the terms relating to these issues. 
While some may disagree with the terms used in this article, most 
commentators will probably agree that the current lexicon is unworkable.   
As for the approach this article takes with respect to jurisprudential 
analysis, there are probably two main areas for attack: (1) the article 
essentially adopts the dominant cause approach in most circumstances and 
would result in a pro-policyholder jurisprudential shift and (2) the revised 
approach could create additional confusion. 
 
1. The Dominant-Cause or Efficient Proximate Cause Critique 
 
In many ways, the approach advocated for in this article does adopt 
some iterations of the dominant-cause approach. However, this 
incorporation is intentional: (1) when insurers began inserting anti-
concurrent causation clauses into insurance policies, the insurers were 
trying to combat post-Partridge analyses to multi-cause losses; and (2) 
policyholders do not possess the same negotiating leverage or coordination 
of effort to institute the reasonable changes proffered in this article.   
First, insurers sought to avoid situations where a minor covered 
cause in a chain-of-events operated to cover the entire loss.167 By applying 
the approach advocated in this article, the insurer is back in the pre-
Partridge analysis of multi-cause losses. In the perfect world, there would 
be much greater uniformity across jurisdictions, which would allow 
insurers to be able to maintain some sense of contractual certainty. Insurers 
would know ex ante how courts would address multi-cause losses, and 
insurers and policyholders alike would have a better understanding of the 
scope of insurance policies. In a recent conversation with one of the 
nation’s premier property insurance coverage experts, James Costner 
indicated that it is virtually impossible to maintain contract certainty in the 
current state of multi-cause loss jurisprudence.168 Adopting the approach 
advocated in this article would undoubtedly improve contract certainty.  
Second, most policyholders—personal lines and small commercial 
accounts—do not possess the power or capacity to unilaterally alter 
                                                                                               
167 Bragg, supra note 120.  
168 Interview with James Costner, Former Senior Vice President, Property 
Practice, Willis North America (Feb. 9, 2011). 
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Insurance Services Office policies.169 While courts often discuss the 
freedom to contract and reason that policyholders could have bargained to 
avoid the “anti-concurrent exclusions,” these courts fail to acknowledge 
that insurance contracts are pure contracts of adhesion, meaning that the 
contracts are presented on a take-it-or leave it basis. Additionally, the 
policyholder generally has no idea that anti-concurrent exclusions exist, 
much less any clue as to how the policies will be interpreted.  Accordingly, 
the approach advocated in this article attempts to align doctrines of 
reasonableness with policyholder expectations. It should be unconscionable 
for a loss that is 99% covered to be excluded merely because 1% of the loss 
was excluded.   
The unconscionability extends even further when the potential for a 
99%-covered loss is excluded under an “all risk” policy. Policyholders 
understandably overestimate what is included in an “all risk” policy, but no 
reasonable policyholder would expect the disproportionate forfeiture that 
would result when a 99%-covered loss is excluded simply because a crafty 
adjuster is able to find some small amount of the loss that is excluded.170  
Also, if these types of exclusions are included, they should come with a 
disclaimer specifically alerting the policyholder of the nature of the 
potential exclusion.  
Thus, while the approach advocated in this article does follow 
some elements of the dominant-cause approach, it is a deliberate choice, 
which more accurately reflects what should be the default position between 
insurer and policyholder.   
This approach also limits the dominant-cause approach analysis to 
chain-of-event losses, and parts ways with the dominant-cause approach for 
independently caused losses. As advocated in this article, independent 
losses should be analyzed separately and distinctly from chain-of-event 
losses.171  Accordingly, the approach advocated in this article, attempts to 
provide a new method of analysis for independent losses.  
 
 
                                                                                               
169 To be sure, large commercial entities can dictate terms of insurance and can 
negotiate, draft, and use manuscript policies.   
170 The policies themselves can also be drafted to ensure that some portion of 
the loss will be excluded. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair 
Oaks, Ltd., No. CIV.A. 399CV1623D, 2002 WL 356756, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 
5, 2002) (denying coverage for improper “property maintenance” as a concurrent 
cause).  
171 This idea is not novel and was discussed by the California Supreme Court 
in Garvey. 
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2. Confusion About How to Approach the Analysis  
 
Because this approach recommends a series of questions relating to 
categorization, some may argue that the categorization itself could prove 
more problematic than the original problem. For instance, questions may 
arise as to how a court should determine whether causes harmonized to 
create a clear chain-of-events or whether the causes operated 
independently.   
There certainly exists an element of discretion in this approach. 
There will invariably be close cases in determining whether a loss was 
caused by a chain-of-events or independent causes. Similarly, it may not 
always be easy to determine whether causes operated simultaneously or 
sequentially.   
This approach addresses those concerns by making those close 
calls fact issues. The fact-finder will determine whether the causes operated 
sequentially or simultaneously. The approach is not designed to remove 
fact finding from the calculus. Rather, the approach attempts to clearly 
delineate fact questions from legal questions. Once the fact-finder 
determines the relevant facts, the law is more easily applied.   
Certainly, there will be results where parties disagree with courts’ 
conclusions respecting whether the losses were harmonious or independent.  
However, the facts will be uniformly applied and will generate some 
consistency in the muddled “concurrent causation” web. Further, the 
approach will allow courts to look to other jurisdictions and clearly 
understand how a court ruled and why the court ruled as it did.  
Creating clear legal guidelines will allow parties to understand ex 
ante the types of issues that will be addressed. Policyholders will have a 
clearer understanding of perils that are covered and excluded and will not 
have to play the concurrent-causation-roulette currently employed across 
jurisdictions. Similarly, insurers will understand how courts interpret their 
policies, which will create greater contract certainty and more accurate 
underwriting determinations.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
“Current causation” has evolved into an unworkable mess. The 
concurrent causation lexicon has become so muddled and amalgamated that 
it is impossible to forecast how a court, insurer, or policyholder will 
interpret “concurrent causation” questions. For these reasons, this article 
concludes that the “concurrent causation” lexicon should be revised and 
recommends that courts analyze multi-cause losses according to a 
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formulaic, categorical approach. By applying more precise and accurate 
language to multi-cause losses, courts and commentators will avoid 
unnecessary confusion and potential conflation of terms; thereby assuring 
contract certainty and ensuring that reasonable expectations are maintained. 
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APPENDIX 
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This article examines rate regulation in the property and casualty 
insurance market in the United States. While rate regulation serves, in 
particular, the purpose of promoting insurer solvency and preventing 
oligopolistic pricing, it can also lead to market inefficiencies. The article 
argues for rate deregulation as a superior alternative to the current 
regulation model. 
During the nineteenth century the property and casualty insurance 
market was highly competitive, featuring periods of low losses and large 
profits that attracted new market entrants. This competition caused 
insurance companies to set rates that were inadequate, thus leading to 
thousands of insolvencies. One method to solve the problem was the 
compact, an agreement among insurers to have a manager set rates. This 
solution often failed because members of the compact often cheated and 
there was no way to make every insurer in the market join. By the end of 
the nineteenth century several states had passed anti-compact law 
prohibiting the practice. 
States in the early twentieth century started passing rate regulation 
laws in the fire insurance market. These laws subjected rate setting to state 
control. These laws were prevalent in the fire insurance market by the 
1940’s, but were not widespread in the casualty insurance market. With the 
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, insurance regulation was 
made the primary purview of the several states, with federal intervention 
allowable only where states failed to legislate. Soon after, the AIC and 
NAIC crafted model laws that became the basis for much state legislation. 
While state laws started out with an emphasis on cooperative rate setting 
by rate bureaus, gradually the laws were changed to facilitate independent 
rate filing by insurers directly to state insurance regulators, thus 
increasing rate competition. Today, the trend is toward less restrictive 
systems of rate regulation in most property lines: gradually away from 
“prior approval” towards “file and use,” “use and file,” “flex rating,” 
“modified prior approval,” or no file systems. 
The rationales for rate regulation include consumer protection, the 
prevention of insurer insolvency and unfair pricing, and the promotion of 
actuarial accuracy. The rationales against rate regulation are mainly that 
cartel pricing and destructive competition are not a threat today, that the 
market is the appropriate price setting mechanism in insurance markets, 
deregulation promotes competition, and that rate deregulation would take 
the politics out of rate setting. 
Examining the structure of the American property and casualty 
insurance market is necessary to determine how successful a policy of 
deregulation will be. The U.S. property and casualty insurance market 
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presents the structural features of a competitive market because it is 
characterized by a large number of firms selling products with identical 
features. Evaluation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for industry 
concentration in conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Merger 
Guidelines indicates that the property and casualty insurance market is not 
concentrated. Furthermore, the trend toward an increase in the level of 
market concentration is oftentimes the result of market competition since it 
leads to low-cost, efficient firms replacing high-cost firms. The property 
and casualty insurance market is also widely regarded as having low 
barriers to entry for new firms. Thus the market does not have monopolistic 
or oligopolistic characteristics that would justify rate regulation. 
Nevertheless, purely competitive rate setting systems are seldom used 
throughout the United States. 
The European Union can provide a helpful case study in 
considering rate setting deregulation because EU member states do not 
have the right to regulate insurance prices, after the European Parliament 
passed the third non-life insurance Directive in 1992. Previously, EU 
member states exercised considerable rate setting power. The experience 
has been a positive one. Competition increased, especially in heavily 
regulated markets, and premium rates decreased. Market concentration, 
however, did not decrease, though this could be attributed to an increase in 
mergers and acquisitions. The number of insolvencies decreased as prices 
were better aligned with costs.  
Rate regulation in the United States may be adversely impacting insurer 
profitably, as rate changes are impeded as market conditions change. 
There is empirical evidence that property and casualty insurance 
companies have experienced a lower rate of return than other industries. 
These artificially low returns may have led to many insurers’ exits from the 
market. In particular, with regard to some lines, over the 2000-2009 
period, more insurers exited the market than entered it. Deregulation 
would eliminate compliance costs and allow rate changes. Even if rate 
deregulation lead to higher rates, in the long run this would be offset by 
greater market availability and consumer choice. Rate regulation has the 
tendency to force stricter underwriting that limits market availability. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that rate regulation has eliminated the 
possibility of insurer insolvency. It is more likely that allowing insurance 
companies to set rates commensurate with their costs will enhance their 
financial strength. Therefore policy makers should seriously consider 
greater insurance rate deregulation. 
 
*** 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The traditional justification for economic regulation is to protect 
the public interest by correcting market failures and improving economic 
efficiency and equity.1 In particular, with regard to insurance, regulation 
aims to protect policyholders by ensuring the solvency of the insurance 
companies. In light of the peculiar nature of an insurance contract, in which 
the policyholder pays an upfront premium in exchange for the insurer’s 
promise to pay in case a loss occurs, the need is clear to assure the financial 
solidity of the insurance companies and their ability to pay possible future 
claims. 
In this context, by the first half of the twentieth century individual 
states within the United States enacted rate regulatory laws to ensure that 
rates were “adequate, not excessive and not unfairly discriminatory.” One 
objective of rate regulation is to prevent insolvencies by avoiding a sort of 
ruinous competition in which insurers, in order to strengthen their market 
position, charge rates not sufficient to cover their costs. Another is to avoid 
oligopolistic pricing. 
This study will focus on the regulation of rates in the U.S. property 
and casualty insurance market, highlighting the inefficiencies caused by the 
system. The aim of the paper is to examine the advisability of replacing 
rate regulation with rate deregulation. In this regard, although some states 
have rating methods less restrictive than prior approval, like file and use, 
use and file, flex rating and modified prior approval, it must be emphasized 
that none of these methods fully rely on competition since the insurance 
commissioner basically still retains the right to direct the insurers’ setting 
of rates. The analysis supports the conclusion that rate deregulation should 
be introduced. 
Part I will provide the historical background of rate regulation, 
discussing the developments from the nineteenth century, when rate 
regulation was introduced in order to prevent insurers’ insolvencies, to the 
more recent trend toward less restrictive rating laws. 
Part II will set out the purposes of rate regulation to ensure, as 
stated above, that insurance rates are “adequate, not excessive and not 
                                                                                                                 
1 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-16 (1982); SCOTT E. 
HARRINGTON, INSURANCE DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15 (2000); 2 
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 11 
(1988). 
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unfairly discriminatory.” Further, the arguments adduced for and against 
rate regulation will be presented. 
Part III will make the case for rate deregulation. In particular, the 
analysis will consider the U.S. property and casualty insurance market 
structure, the performance of the industry, market growth, market entries 
and exits and the effects of rate regulation on insurance availability. The 
analysis also considers the experience of the European Union, where state 
supervisory authorities have been prevented from exerting control over 
insurance premiums prices.  
 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RATE REGULATION 
 
A. PRIVATE CONTROLS OVER INSURANCE RATES AND THE 
ENACTMENT OF ANTI-COMPACT LAWS 
 
During the nineteenth century, the property and casualty insurance 
market was distinguished by a high level of competition. Indeed, since 
historically the fire insurance business was highly cyclical, in periods when 
losses were low and profits high new insurance companies entered the 
market aiming to make large profits.2 Neither barriers to entry nor 
significant economies of scale hindered the entrance into the market.3 The 
strong competition in the market in the 1800’s led insurers to set 
inadequate rates and thus, by 1877, around 3000 companies had become 
insolvent.4 
In response, in 1866 insurers instituted a national organization, the 
National Board of Fire Underwriters, in order to “establish and maintain, as 
far as practicable, a system of uniform rates of premium.”5 However, the 
fact that, in profitable periods, insurance companies violated the 
agreements concerning the rates established by the Board, made the Board 
                                                                                                                 
2 1 JON S. HANSON ET AL., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS, MONITORING COMPETITION: A MEANS OF REGULATING THE 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE BUSINESS 9 (1974); Spencer L. Kimball & 
Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 547 
(1958); Michael D. Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance 
Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 677 (1967).  
3 Rose, supra note 2, at 677. 
4 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 9; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 547-
48; Rose, supra note 2, at 677. 
5 Rose, supra note 2, at 677 (quoting Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 548). 
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ineffective in controlling rates.6 Nevertheless, after the fire losses that 
occurred in Chicago and Boston respectively in 1871 and 1872, it appeared 
inevitable that insurance companies had to cooperate in order to set 
adequate rates.7 In 1877, the National Board of Fire Underwriters 
abandoned its function of rate control – addressing itself only to fire 
prevention and the maintenance of statistics – and in the 1880s, regional 
associations of companies assumed the task of rate stabilization.8 Among 
the techniques implemented by the regional associations in order to control 
rates was the compact, an agreement according to which the compact 
manager set the rates and usually enforced them in compliance with the 
compact’s conditions.9 
However, the problem any cartel faces is that each cartel member 
has incentives to raise its profits by cheating the cartel: bringing down the 
cartel’s price and increasing its output.10 In the same way, these regional 
associations did not effectively stabilize insurance rates.11 Indeed, the 
insurer members of the association did not always honor the agreements 
made in good faith since they used to cut rates.12 Further, the agreements 
were often undermined by insurers that were not members of the 
association.13 
Toward the end of the 1800’s, many states responded to the 
insurers’ efforts to fix rates by passing anti-compact laws.14 The first anti-
compact laws were passed by Ohio and New Hampshire in 188515 and by 
1912 twenty-three states had passed such type of legislation.16 
                                                                                                                 
6 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 10-11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 
548; Rose, supra note 2, at 677. 
7 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 548. 
8 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549; 
Kent H, Parker, Ratemaking in Fire Insurance, in PROPERTY AND LIABILITY 
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 169, 170 (John D. Long & Davis W. Gregg eds., 1965); 
Rose, supra note 2, at 677-78. 
9 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549. 
The first compact was the St. Louis Compact, concluded in 1879. 
10 LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 668 
(2002); DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 495 
(2002); see generally D. K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835-44 
(1976). 
11 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-13. 
12 Id. at 12. 
13 Id. 
14 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 549; Rose, supra note 2, at 678. 
15 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.  
16 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 550. 
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Nevertheless, the anti-compact laws were often evaded. In cases where the 
law expressly prohibited agreements between insurance companies, like in 
Ohio and Wisconsin, insurers concluded that agreements between agents 
were not prohibited. So, the insurance companies relied on their agents to 
fix rates.17 Elsewhere, where the law prohibited all agreements relating to 
the establishment of rates, insurance companies formed “independent” 
bureaus to make advisory rates.18 
 
B. BEGINNING OF RATE REGULATION 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century, states became aware 
of the risks that ruinous competition posed to policyholders and began to 
enact legislation to regulate fire insurance rates.19 The first rate regulatory 
law, passed in Kansas in 1909, required fire insurers to file their rates and 
their rating plans with the superintendent of insurance and prohibited rate 
discrimination among insureds.20 It also required insurance companies to 
give the insurance commissioner ten days’ notice in order to change rates 
and authorized the commissioner to adjust rates that were excessive or 
inadequate.21 In 1914, the German Alliance Insurance Company challenged 
the Kansas law as unconstitutional.22 The company argued that insurance is 
a private contract and that the state has no power to interfere by regulating 
insurance rates; otherwise, such regulation would be a deprivation of the 
insurer’s property without due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.23 The Supreme Court rejected 
the complaint, stating that insurance was affected with a public interest and, 
for this reason, the insurance premium could be fixed by law.24 
After the San Francisco fire of 1909, the New York legislature 
conducted an investigation on fire insurance rating practices.25 To this end 
a Joint Legislative Committee, known as the Merritt Committee, was 
                                                                                                                 
17 Rose, supra note 2, at 678. 
18 Rose, supra note 2, at 678; Richard A. Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package 
Policies – or the Insurance Antitrust Exemption Re-Examined, 6 VILL. L. REV. 
281, 312-14 (1961). 
19 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679. 
20 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679. 
21 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 551; Rose, supra note 2, at 679. 
22 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 389 (1914). 
23 Id. at 397. 
24 Id. at 414-18. See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71, 
75 (1922) (holding that insurance is a business affected with a public interest).  
25 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; Rose, supra note 2, at 679-80. 
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established.26 The Committee did not view the results of the anti-compact 
laws positively since they led to destructive competition and rate 
discrimination.27 It instead recommended the passage of a statute providing 
for the filing by rate bureaus of fire insurance rates with the Insurance 
Department and subjecting those bureaus to the Insurance Department’s 
control.28 In accordance with these recommendations, the New York 
legislature enacted a law allowing fire insurers to fix rates in concert.29 
Rate bureaus were authorized and had to set the rates; the rates had to be 
filed with the insurance superintendent, who had to approve them before 
they could be used.30 
Afterwards other states, acknowledging the inefficiency of the anti-
compact laws, passed similar rate regulatory laws.31 States no longer relied 
on competition as a means for rate-setting; instead, they authorized rating 
bureaus to set fire insurance rates. Rate bureaus evolved from both the 
public and the industry interest in rate setting; they were privately operated 
except in Texas.32 Some states required companies “to become a member 
of or subscriber to a rating organization.”33 Rates were, however, subject to 
the public control by state insurance departments, which usually had to 
approve them. By 1944, there were only three states with no public control 
of rate-setting.34 
Up to 1945 states did not regulate rates for the casualty insurance 
industry to the same extent as in fire insurance.35 Except for workmen’s 
compensation insurance, most regulation aimed at avoiding rate 
discrimination.36 Further, only a small number of states required filing and 
approval of automobile insurance rates.37 In general, rate competition was 
prevalent in the casualty insurance market.38 
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30 Rose, supra note 2, at 680. 
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C. U.S. V. SOUTH-EASTERN UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION AND THE 
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
 
Until 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1868 holding in Paul v. 
Virginia exempted rate-setting agreements from federal antitrust law.39 The 
case involved an 1866 Virginia statute that prohibited insurers who were 
not incorporated in Virginia and their local agents from doing business in 
the state without first obtaining a license. The statute was challenged on the 
ground, inter alia, that it conflicted with the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution,40 which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several States.”41 The Court, 
upholding the Virginia statute, held that insurance was not commerce, 
interstate or otherwise.42 From then on, insurance contracts were not 
subject to federal antitrust law.43 
In 1944, however, in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association,44 the Supreme Court reversed Paul v. Virginia. In that case, 
198 member companies of the South-Eastern Underwriters Association and 
twenty-seven individuals were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia.45 The indictment alleged two conspiracies in 
violation of the Sherman Act.46 The first was a conspiracy to restrain 
interstate commerce by fixing insurance premiums.47 The second was a 
conspiracy to monopolize trade and commerce in the fire insurance sector 
and in allied lines in the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.48 The District Court dismissed the 
indictment and, relying on Paul v. Virginia, held that insurance was not 
commerce and therefore price-fixing in the business of insurance did not 
violate the Sherman Act.49 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Sherman Act did apply to the fire insurance business since any business 
conducted across state lines was “commerce among the several States.”50 In 
                                                                                                                 
39 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). 
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41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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that regard, the Court specified that all commercial activities conducted 
across state lines fell within Congress’ regulatory power under the 
Commerce Clause and no exception could be made for the business of 
insurance.51  
Following this decision, insurance companies and states lobbied 
Congress to avoid federal regulation of the insurance sector.52 In particular, 
states were afraid to lose their regulatory power and the power to tax 
insurance companies.53 In 1945 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act to preserve the states’ control over insurance regulation.54 Congress 
was concerned about the uncertainty that might ensue from a change in 
regulatory authority and also believed that states could regulate insurance 
better than the federal government, because of their relationship with the 
insurance companies and their experience with regulating insurance.55  
In the preamble McCarran-Ferguson states that “the continued 
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is 
in the public interest.”56 To that end, Section 1012(b) of McCarran-
Ferguson provides that no “Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair or supersede” any state law enacted in order to regulate 
or tax the business of insurance.57 By virtue of this provision, state law 
supplanted federal antitrust regulation of the insurance industry. 
Conversely, the Act provides that the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade 
Commission Acts apply to “the business of insurance to the extent that 
such business is not regulated by State law,”58 except for agreements or 
acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.59 This aspect of the act was 
considered a compromise between those in Congress who favored an 
antitrust exemption and those who favored federal supervision of the 
insurance industry.60 In this way the act permits states the opportunity to 
continue to regulate insurance, while retaining the right for federal 
intervention in case the states failed to intervene.61 As a consequence of 
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McCarran-Ferguson most states enacted laws regulating insurance and, in 
particular, rate-setting.62 
 
D. THE NAIC-AIC MODEL RATE REGULATORY BILLS AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 
Section 1012(b) of McCarran-Ferguson encouraged the states to 
regulate insurance in order to avoid federal intervention.63 Soon, uniform 
legislation was introduced in the states under the auspices of the NAIC and 
the All-Industry Committee (AIC).64 The AIC, representing nineteen 
insurer associations, was formed to cooperate with the NAIC to develop 
model legislation designed to reinforce state control of insurance in 
accordance with section 1012(b).65 In 1946, two model laws, one for fire, 
marine and inland marine insurance and the other for casualty and surety 
insurance, were submitted to individual states for passage.66  
The two model laws, which were similar in content, proposed 
proscriptions on excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory rates and 
advocated supervision of rate-setting among insurers.67 The bills provided 
that in setting rates, consideration should be given, inter alia, to past and 
prospective loss experience in the state and elsewhere.68 Further, insurers 
had to file any rating plan and any modification to that plan with state 
insurance commissioners.69 Under the model laws, such information would 
become public after the filing became effective.70  
The model laws also addressed rate-setting by insurers. Insurers 
were allowed to benefit from the services of rating organizations or of 
advisory organizations.71 Rating organizations made rates for their 
members and subscribers, while advisory organizations assisted insurers 
which filed their own rates or rating organizations in rate making by 
                                                                                                                 
62 Rose, supra note 2, at 696. 
63 Id. (quoting Patrick A. McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: 
Moratorium under Public Law 15 Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A. J. 539, 540 (1948)). 
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65 Rose, supra note 2, at 697. 
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71 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 31-32; Rose, supra note 2, at 699-700. 
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collecting and furnishing loss and expense data or by providing 
recommendations concerning rates.72 Both rating organizations and 
advisory organizations were subject to state requirements.73 Insurers could 
file independent rates or those made by a licensed rating organization. 
Insurers were also allowed to seek permission from commissioners to file 
deviations from rates set by a rating organization.74 Lastly, under the so-
called “deemer clause”, rate filings were considered approved unless 
disapproved within fifteen days, or thirty days if the commissioner decided 
to extend the period for approval.75 
The model bills, which favored the interests of the rate bureaus,76 
were introduced with amendments in some states.77 In particular, the 
amendments concerned the deemer clause since states had different 
interpretations about how rates should be filed with commissioners in order 
to meet the state regulation requirement of section 1012(b) of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.78 Some states, like California, Missouri and 
Idaho, did not require rate filings for fire or casualty lines (although the 
insurance commissioner had discretionary authority to request such filings), 
while other states, like Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Ohio 
and District of Columbia, provided that the rates once filed became 
effective, subject to subsequent disapproval.79 The model laws assumed 
that the requirements for reverse preemption found in section 1012(b) of 
McCarran-Ferguson were met by the mere existence of state legislation.80 
 
E. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE RATE REGULATORY 
BILLS 
 
With the enactment of state rate regulatory laws based on the 
NAIC-AIC model bills, several controversies about competitive versus 
cooperative rate making arose.81 Between 1947 and 1957 the rate bureaus 
                                                                                                                 
72 HANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 31-32; Rose, supra note 2, at 700. 
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put up strong resistance to rate deviations.82 Insurers seeking to file 
deviations experienced obstacles because the NAIC-AIC model laws 
required commissioners to notify the rate bureaus before approving a rate 
deviation.83 The rate bureaus could then testify in opposition to the 
deviation.84 Further, since the deviation filing was valid for only one year, 
insurers had to, at considerable cost, justify their request annually.85 This 
led many insurers to resign from the bureaus in order to make independent 
filings.86 For example, in 1954 the Insurance Company of North America 
(INA) resigned from the New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization 
(NYFIRO) and made independent rate filings for most dwelling classes 
while remaining a subscriber for other dwelling classes and commercial 
lines.87 The NYFIRO challenged the New York department’s approval, 
arguing that INA could not independently file for some risks and subscribe 
to the bureau for others and that INA violated NYFIRO’s property rights 
by using bureau data in its filings.88 The New York Insurance Department 
rejected the NYFIRO’s petition and authorized independent filing and the 
right of partial subscribership.89  
In 1955 the Pacific Fire Rate Bureau adopted a rule that companies 
that made independent filings could no longer benefit from bureau 
scheduled-rating services.90 The rule was challenged in several states since 
insurers valued the scheduled-rating services and did not want to lose their 
right to subscribe to them.91 The Arizona Supreme Court held the rule 
invalid in 1958.92  
The partial subscribership system that resulted permitted the setting 
of more independent rates since insurance companies with sufficient loss 
experience in certain lines of insurance could make independent filings.93 
In doing so, insurers had to confront the attempts by the bureaus to 
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intervene in the hearings and oppose the deviations as aggrieved parties, 
subjecting insurers to delays and expenses.94 To remedy this situation, 
insurance commissioners and courts95 ruled that rate bureaus could not 
appear as aggrieved parties because they acted not to benefit the public but 
rather to protect their own interests.96 In the process, a more flexible rate 
setting system emerged that permitted price competition to a certain extent 
through deviations from the bureau rates, aided by provisions in the NAIC-
AIC model laws that did not make membership in rate bureaus mandatory, 
allowing insurers to make independent filings. 
 
F. REVISION OF THE RATING LAWS 
 
The trend toward less regulated rates was also reflected in a study 
conducted by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee in 1958. 
The Senate appointed the Subcommittee to conduct a study on insurance 
and antitrust laws. The Subcommittee recommended denying rate bureaus 
the status of aggrieved parties, eliminating the requirement of the annual 
filings of deviations and, lastly, adopting file-and-use rating systems.97 
Similar recommendations were also provided by the subcommittee 
appointed by the NAIC Rates and Rating Organization Committee in 1960 
in order to review the insurance state regulation system.98 The 
subcommittee recommended that no rate bureau should have the status of 
aggrieved party because the bureaus had no interest in decisions on rate 
filings. Rate bureaus, according to the subcommittee, should have been 
denied status to apply for a hearing on insurers’ independent filings and the 
one-year limitation on deviation should have been eliminated. The 
subcommittee also recommended continuing the deemer clause and the 
right of partial subscribership to bureaus and to consolidate the fire and 
casualty rating bills in order to permit the development of multi-line 
package policies.99  
In 1962 the NAIC approved amendments to the model rating laws, 
adopting the recommendations of its subcommittee.100 In 1964 the NAIC 
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Rates and Rating Organizations Committee appointed another 
subcommittee to inquire into the rate regulation system.101 The 
subcommittee found that competition had increased in the insurance market 
since the 1940s.102 In particular, it noted that price competition had become 
more widespread due to independent rate filings and decreased influence 
by rate bureaus in setting rates.103 The Subcommittee recommended placing 
more reliance on fair competition to set insurance prices104 and suggested 
the suspension where possible of the prior approval system and its 
replacement with no prior approval rate regulation.105 In states where local 
market characteristics did not permit such a change, the subcommittee 
recommended continuing the deemer provision to assure prompt responses 
to rate filings.106   
In a file and use system a rate filing becomes effective once the 
rate is filed with the insurance commissioner. Soon, the insurance industry 
embraced no prior rate approval and file and use provisions to permit 
insurers to respond immediately to market changes.107 By 1985, 24 states 
adopted such changes in their rating laws.108 
California, for example, adopted a competitive rate setting system 
that incorporated a no filing provision and abolished any requirement to 
belong to a rate bureau.109 Under California law, rates could be used 
immediately without having to be filed or approved by the commissioner. 
Illinois, which had originally enacted a prior approval law, enacted an open 
competition law in 1970.110 The open competition rating law was 
distinguished by the lack of advance approval or disapproval by the 
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regulator and the prohibition of any agreement to adhere to bureau rates.111 
In August 1971112 the law was allowed to sunset and Illinois became the 
only state without a rating law for property and casualty insurance.113  
However, there has been no attempt at federal antitrust enforcement in 
Illinois since the two largest personal lines insurers domiciled there, State 
Farm and Allstate, make their rates independently.114 In June 1972 the state 
enacted a law limited to regulating advisory organizations which were 
defined to mean every person, other than an insurer, who compiles 
insurance statistics, prepares insurance policies and underwriting rules, 
makes surveys and insurance research and furnishes that material to 
insurance companies.115 Insurers were prohibited from agreeing with each 
other or the advisory organization to adhere to the use of any statistics, 
policy forms or underwriting rules.116 
 
G. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Between 1985 and 1988 several states adopted flex-rating systems, 
seeking to establish caps on price increases.117 Indeed, especially in the area 
of auto insurance, regulators started focusing on affordability of coverage 
and suppression of rates despite increasing claim costs.118 In this 
connection, an important regulatory development occurred in California on 
November 8, 1988 with the passage of Proposition 103.119 Proposition 103 
required a rollback of rates for automobile insurance to 20 percent below 
the rates in effect on November 8, 1987120 unless the downturn in rates 
would have led to the insolvency of the insurer.121 In addition, a prior 
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approval system was introduced for most casualty insurance rates.  
Beginning on November 8, 1989, property and casualty insurance rates in 
California had to be approved by the commissioner prior to use.122 Finally, 
Proposition 103 provided that personal automobile insurance rates must be 
determined taking into account, in decreasing order of importance, the 
insured’s driving safety record, the number of miles driven annually by the 
insured, the number of years of driving experience of the insured and any 
other rating factors that the commissioner specified had a substantial 
relationship to the risk of loss.123 A mandatory 20 percent discount for good 
drivers was also established.124 Thus, Proposition 103 replaced the open 
competition system in force until then in California.  
In 1994, in 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed the Insurance Commissioner’s authority to adopt a 
ratemaking formula implementing the rate rollback provision of 
Proposition 103.125 The court held that the rate making formula was not 
confiscatory since it did not preclude the setting of a just and reasonable 
rate.126 According to the court, the rates set under the formula did not inflict 
“deep financial hardship” on insurers and therefore did not prevent them 
from operating successfully.127 Going forward, California’s system of rate 
regulation mainly aimed to avoid excessive rates by determining maximum 
rate levels.128  
In 1980 the NAIC adopted model laws for less restrictive rating 
systems introducing the “file and use” and “use and file” types of rate 
regulation.129 In the 1990s, catastrophic losses increased the level of state 
intervention in the pricing and underwriting of homeowners’ insurance.130 
A tendency towards less restrictive rate regulation emerged with regard to 
other property lines, in particular automobile insurance.131 Favorable loss 
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trends led insurers to reduce their rates and consequently the need to use 
regulation to suppress rates declined.132 
Toward the end of the 1990s, many states passed laws deregulating 
the price and policy forms of commercial insurance.133 Commercial 
deregulation laws were enacted in 1998 in Arizona, Georgia, Illinois and 
New Hampshire and in 1999 in Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Indiana, Maine, Louisiana, Virginia and Rhode 
Island.134 New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts have also adopted 
similar legislation.135 These laws exempt insurance companies that sell 
their products to large specialized commercial insurance buyers from rate 
and policy form requirements.136  The hope was that if insurers did not have 
to comply with state control, they would be able to diversify both their 
rates and types of policies, thereby expanding the range of products they 
could offer.137  
Currently, there are six different types of rate regulation systems.138 
Rate regulation varies from the most restrictive type, the prior approval 
method, to the no-filing method, the least restrictive. The six systems are 
the prior approval, file and use, use and file, flex rating, modified prior 
approval, and no file methods.139 The prior approval system requires 
insurers to file the rates and wait for the approval by the insurance 
commissioner before using them. Approval is presumed if rates are not 
denied within a specified number of days, in case there is a deemer clause. 
In the file and use system, rates become effective immediately upon filing. 
The insurance commissioner, however, may subsequently disapprove the 
rates. A use and file system provides that rates must be filed with the 
insurance commissioner within a specified period of time after their first 
use. In the flex rating system insurers may increase or decrease rates within 
a certain percentage range. Prior approval is required only if the rate 
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change is larger than the specified percentage. The modified prior approval 
system provides that rate revisions based only on a change in loss 
experience are subject to file and use regulation. However, rate revisions 
based on a change in expense ratio or rate classifications are subject to 
prior approval. Lastly, under the no-filing system rates do not need to be 
filed with or approved by the state insurance commissioner.  The table in 
Appendix 1 identifies the types of rate regulation systems according to 
state. 
Recent changes in state rating laws confirm the trend towards less 
restrictive systems of rate regulation. As of April 2008 rates in 
Massachusetts were determined according to what the insurance 
commissioner at the time, Nonnie Burns, called “managed competition”.140 
Previously Massachusetts had been the only state where the insurance 
commissioner set rates for auto insurance.  Now, insurance companies 
submit their rates to the state insurance commissioner, who has power to 
disapprove them if they are excessive or unfairly discriminatory.141 In May 
2008 the Georgia legislature passed legislation142 permitting auto insurance 
companies to set rates above the mandatory minimum limits without prior 
approval from the insurance commissioner.143 Finally, in June 2008 the 
New York legislature approved an auto insurance flex rating bill144 that 
allows auto insurance companies to adjust their rates twice annually within 
a 5 percent band without seeking prior regulatory approval.145 
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II. RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST RATE REGULATION 
 
A. PURPOSES OF RATE REGULATION 
 
In the 1914 landmark case, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of the states to regulate rates on 
grounds that insurance is affected by the public interest.146 According to the 
public interest theory and normative economic theory, insurance rate 
regulation is intended to correct market failures that would otherwise cause 
inefficiency and inequity in the insurance market and harm the interest of 
the general public.147  
In particular, rate regulation primarily aims to remedy two opposite 
problems: one, the tendency of insurance companies to engage in 
destructive competition and two, the formation of price cartels by insurance 
companies that could set excessive rates.148 These aims were clearly 
defined by the subcommittee appointed by the NAIC Rates and Rating 
Organization Committee in 1960 to review the status of insurance rate 
regulation.149 In a report dated November 28, 1960, the subcommittee 
stated that rate regulation is intended to assure that insurance coverages 
desired by the public are offered to the public by licensed insurers, that the 
cost of these coverages is reasonable and not excessive, that insureds bear a 
fair share of the cost of insurance and that insurers remain solvent to 
protect their policyholders.150 In accordance with those objectives, states 
seek to promote the public welfare by ensuring that premiums are 
“adequate, not excessive and not unfairly discriminatory.” Although these 
three rate standards are interpreted differently in the different states, they 
have basic common features that the following analysis will describe.  
The first aim of insurance rate regulation, to ensure adequate rates, 
stems from past experience with unregulated rates and the consequent 
destructive competition that led to several insurers’ insolvencies.151 One of 
the principal aims of rate regulation is to maintain the solvency of 
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insurance companies and to prevent rates from being set too low.152 The 
importance of this goal results from the unique nature of the insurance 
contract. An insurance contract, indeed, is an aleatory contract in which the 
policyholder pays up-front premiums in exchange for the insurer’s promise 
to indemnify in case a future loss occurs. This gives policyholders an 
interest in the financial solidity of their insurance companies and in the 
companies’ ability to pay future claims. Given the function of insurance in 
satisfying society’s need for security, the financial solvency of insurance 
companies is the principal purpose of insurance regulation.153 For this 
reason, “the principle of solidity is pervasive” in insurance regulation.154  
Rate regulation, like capital adequacy, is considered a means to ensure the 
solidity of the insurance industry.155 The self-interest of insurance 
companies in remaining solvent has not always been reckoned sufficient.156 
Rate regulation, instead, is believed to assure insurers’ solvency by keeping 
rates above a certain minimum level of adequacy so that adequate reserves 
can be maintained.157 
As for the second purpose of insurance rate regulation, the concern 
for making rates not excessive was not one of the original reasons for 
regulating prices. Initially, regulators and insurance companies were 
concerned about ruinous competition that could threaten solvency.158 The 
NAIC-AIC model laws introduced the “not excessive” standard due to the 
drafters’ belief that cooperation among insurers in setting rates created a 
need to prevent excessive rates.159  
The “not excessive” standard seeks to make the cost of insurance 
affordable.160 In the process, the standard promotes the availability of 
insurance.161 At the same time, this standard may be in tension with the first 
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standard, which requires insurance rates to be adequate in order to assure 
the solvency of the insurance companies.162  
Finally, rate insurance regulation seeks to avoid rates that unfairly 
discriminate among insureds. This third goal reflects regulators’ concerns 
about price discrimination among consumers when such discrimination is 
not related to differences in the risks underwritten.163 Objectionable forms 
of discrimination include: (i) unfair individual discrimination, such as 
rebates, credits and misclassifications that favor one insured over another 
when the risk underwritten is the same,164 (ii) unfair group rate 
discrimination that usually involves rating plans that arbitrarily 
differentiate among the insureds without taking into account their risk165 
and (iii) unfair product discrimination that results in unreasonable 
overpricing or under pricing of one product compared to another.166 In this 
regard, insurance regulators aim to ensure that rates are fair for every class 
of insured and that the classes are fair and nondiscriminatory.167 Therefore, 
while the standard of “not excessive” rates seeks to accomplish 
reasonableness between insurance companies and policyholders, the 
standard of “not unfairly discriminatory” rates seeks to accomplish 
“equity” by ensuring that policyholders are not unfairly discriminated 
against.168 In order to achieve this objective, fair classifications of 
policyholders for premium calculation are necessary so that every insured 
will bear the cost of his or her own insurance.169 It is difficult to make fair 
classifications, however, since every risk is unique and theoretically could 
be uniquely rated.170 
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B. ARGUMENTS FOR RATE REGULATION 
 
Having analyzed the goals of rate regulation, now the article turns 
to the arguments in favor of state regulation of insurance rates. 
According to the traditional rationale for regulation of insurance 
rates, states can protect policyholders by controlling rates.171 The argument 
is based on the fact that policyholders and insurance companies do not deal 
at arm’s length and that insurance companies are likely to overcharge 
policyholders in the absence of rate regulation.172 When competition results 
in a variety of rates, some argue that policyholders do not benefit from that 
variety because they may not have the ability to compare the rates.173 
Policyholders have difficulty in fully understanding the insurance contract 
and in establishing a connection between the price and the quality of the 
coverage.  In these circumstances, rate regulation and standardization are 
said to be appropriate.174 In an un-regulated system, some insurers may cut 
rates by providing low-quality insurance products that policyholders might 
not recognize as poor quality due to imperfect information about the 
characteristics of the coverage offered and the financial solidity of the 
insurer.175 Rate regulation would counteract deception by insurers and 
assist consumers in comparing different insurance policies.176 
Rate regulation also helps to prevent ruinous price competition 
with a subsequent increase in insurers’ insolvencies.177 Advocates for rate 
regulation argue that insurance companies will respond to the danger of 
destructive competition, by conspiring to set rates.178 This raises concerns 
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about anti-competitive conduct and the converse danger of excessive 
rates.179 
Predatory pricing concerns are another reason to favor of rate 
regulation. The concern is that rate deregulation might induce stronger 
insurers to use their greater financial resources to temporarily cut rates to 
increase their market share and force weaker insurers out of the insurance 
market.180  
Rate regulation is also urged in the interest of actuarial accuracy, 
because regulators must rely on wide loss experience in setting rates that 
even larger insurance companies may lack.181 Moreover, unregulated rates 
might lead to underwriting restrictions because some insurers might decide 
to write only low-risk insureds in order to minimize their costs and charge 
lower premiums.182 Insurers that continued to write higher-risk insureds 
would bear a greater proportion of such risks and be forced to increase their 
rates in order to cover possible losses.183 This would create problems of 
insurance affordability and has the potential to result in insolvency of the 
higher-risk insurers.184 
 
C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATE REGULATION 
 
This article will now examine the arguments in favor of 
deregulating rates.  The principal rationale for insurance rate regulation is 
that it is needed to correct market failures.185 Opponents of rate regulation, 
however, argue that the insurance market is competitive186 since it is 
characterized by a large number of firms doing business with a low level of 
concentration and selling similar products.187 They agree that there are 
modest barriers to entry and that profits are not excessive compared with 
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other industries.188 Thus, they conclude there is no evidence of market 
failure that may justify insurance rate regulation.189 
Further, with regard to the two opposite concerns that, in the 
absence of rate regulation, insurers would engage in destructive 
competition or form cartels that would lead to excessive rates,190 
proponents of rate deregulation note that these concerns are outdated.191  
The concept of destructive competition dates back to the nineteenth 
century192 and is no longer well founded since more recently there has been 
no evidence of dangerous price cutting; rather prices in insurance markets 
reflect expected claim costs and reasonable profits for insurance 
companies.193 Those who favor deregulated rates stress that insurance 
companies, like all other enterprises, aim to conduct a financially 
successful business and to avoid charging rates that are too low to cover 
their costs.194 Under this view, rate deregulation is not likely to cause 
ruinous competition because, even assuming that a big insurer reduces its 
rates in order to eliminate possible competitors, in the long run it will have 
to raise its rates to cover its costs.195 In that event, new competitors, 
attracted by the possibility of making profit, will enter the market.196  
The cartel pricing concern originated from the initial bureau rate-
making activities and the regulatory restrictions on deviations from the 
bureau rates in the 1950s and early 1960s.197 Effective cartel pricing is now 
unlikely given the large number of insurers, ease of entry into the market 
and the decreased influence by rate bureaus in setting rates.198 
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Advocates of rate deregulation maintain that the free market is just 
as appropriate for the insurance sector as it is for other businesses.199 
Although insurance regulation is considered important to ensure the 
protection of policyholders, proponents of deregulation agree that state 
control of the insurance market impedes competition.200 In this connection, 
rate regulation may lead to both inadequate and excessive rates.201 In the 
latter case, rate regulation might cause levels of premiums so high that even 
the most inefficient insurance companies would make profits.202 Regulators 
should not intervene in rate setting and insurance companies should be 
permitted to make rates so that policyholders can benefit from lower-cost 
insurance.203 
Further, advocates point out that determining a proper rate is not 
feasible since rate setting is “not an inevitably accurate and scientific 
calculation.”204 They observe that rate-setting is a subjective activity and 
because there can be more than one reasonable decision in making rates, 
there is no reason to regard a commissioner’s decision as the most 
reasonable.205 Indeed, the setting of rates by competently managed 
insurance companies is arguably as reasonable as the setting of rates by the 
commissioners.206 It is also emphasized that a rate proper for one insurer 
might not be proper for another one.207 
In addition, proponents argue that unregulated rates will avoid 
commission wars.208 When price uniformity prevails, insurers are more 
likely to have to pay agents higher commissions in order to obtain 
business.209 Conversely, they say, the problem of commission wars can be 
overcome when rates are deregulated since insurers can obtain business by 
competing on the price of the products offered.210 Another disadvantage is 
that restrictions on price competition limit product differentiation because 
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comparable rates must be charged for comparable products in order to 
implement a uniform pricing system.211 Moreover, rate regulation requires 
even more resources and efforts by the insurance departments in order to 
examine insurance rates. Deregulation of rates would permit regulators to 
fully devote themselves to other more important supervisory activities such 
as solvency supervision.212 
Another reason advanced in favor of rate deregulation is that it 
would take politics out of rate-setting.213 Rate regulation often involves 
political pressure on insurance commissioners by insurers demanding rate 
increases and consumers that look unfavorably on those increases.214 In 
particular, advocates of rate deregulation observe that the political pressure 
by policyholders may lead to inadequate rates since regulators will be 
influenced to approve rate increases that “may be either too little and/or too 
late.”215 Ironically, even though rate regulation is aimed at avoiding 
inadequate rates, it may actually lead to inadequate rates.216 This is 
especially true in prior-approval systems, because of delays in obtaining 
approval cost insurers, especially after taking inflation into account.217 
Insurance companies react to inadequate rates by restricting underwriting 
or by cancelling and refusing to renew insurance policies creating 
subsequent possible problems of unavailable coverage.218 This result 
undermines one of the purposes of insurance rate regulation, to promote 
insurance availability. Consequently, reduced rate regulation will give 
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insurers the flexibility to adjust rates, ensure adequate rates and make 
insurance available.219 
Finally, advocates of deregulation note that the prior approval 
system can cause rates to remain at a higher level than appropriate.220 Due 
to the time necessary to approve a new rate, a cost decline does not 
automatically translate into a lower rate.221 Moreover, insurers may not 
apply for lower rates based on improvement in their underwriting 
experience if they expect to have difficulty in later obtaining a needed 
increase.222 
 
III. THE EFFECTS OF OPEN COMPETITION 
 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE MARKET 
 
The economic justification for rate regulation is that it protects the 
public interest by avoiding inefficiency that would otherwise result from 
monopolistic or oligopolistic conduct. Under this logic, in order to assess 
whether the property and casualty industry is likely to achieve benefits 
from rate deregulation, market structure and easy of entry should be 
examined.223 The principal characteristic of monopoly is the presence of a 
single seller of a product for which there are no alternatives.224 However, 
economists have demonstrated that oligopoly power may also exist if there 
are few sellers and they act in concert.225 Entry by competitors is the main 
limitation on monopoly power in a market economy.226 
The U.S. property and casualty insurance market has the structural 
characteristics of a competitive market.227 The market is characterized by a 
large number of firms operating with low levels of concentration and 
selling products with identical features.228 The competitive structure of the 
market is apparent from the fact that in 2009 there were 2,737 property and 
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casualty insurance companies operating in the United States.229 This 
number has increased since 1971, when there were 1,206 companies 
operating in the U.S. property and casualty insurance market.230 
That said, the presence of a large number of insurers offering 
basically the same product is not by itself indicative of competition since a 
small number of companies could write a majority of the premiums and by 
virtue of their market share be able to fix prices.231 It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider the relative market share of insurance companies in 
order to determine whether the market is competitive. The following table 
presents the 2009 nationwide market share of the top twenty-five U.S. 
property and casualty insurance groups. The market share of different 
corporate groups as a whole is a more accurate indicator than market share 
of their individual insurance subsidiaries. While individual subsidiaries are 
separate legal entities, they are not economically independent and are 
subject to the group’s management decisions. 
 
Table 1 – Property and Casualty Insurance Industry 2009 Market 
Share Nationwide by Group 
 
                                                                                                                 
229 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011 V 
(2011) [hereinafter THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011]. 
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GROUP 
NAME 
DIRECT  
PREMIUMS 
WRITTEN 
MARKET
SHARE 
 percent 
CUMULATIVE 
MARKET 
SHARE  
percent 
1 State Farm Grp 51,063,110,761 10.50 10.50 
2 Zurich Ins Grp  28,979,691,684 5.96 16.46 
3 Allstate Ins Grp 26,153,440,231 5.38 21.84 
4 American Intl Grp 26,140,201,178 5.38 27.22 
5 Liberty Mut Grp  24,772,894,328 5.10 32.32 
6 Travelers Grp 21,409,548,242 4.40 36.72 
7 Berkshire Hathaway Grp  16,054,658,656 3.30 40.02 
8 Nationwide Corp Grp 15,405,561,636 3.17 43.19 
9 Progressive Grp 14,200,294,349 2.92 46.11 
10 Hartford Fire & Cas Grp  10,473,026,375 2.15 48.26 
11 United Serv Automobile Ass’n Grp 10,439,501,509 2.15 50.41 
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Source: NAIC, 2009 Market Share Reports for the Top 25 
Property/Casualty Insurers Over 25 Years 39 (2010), reprinted with 
permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or conclusions based 
on use of its data. 
 
Although table 1 suggests that the market is concentrated since 
twenty-five insurance groups control 64.40 percent of the market, with 
State Farm Group controlling a market share of 10.50 percent,232 evaluation 
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) leads to a different conclusion. 
The HHI is a commonly used measure of industry concentration and is 
calculated by summing the squares of the market share percentage of all 
companies in the market. For example, if a market had only one seller, its 
market share would be 100 percent and its HHI would be 10,000. If a 
market had five sellers, each with an equal 20 percent of the market, the 
HHI would be 2000. The HHI tends to zero when a market consists of a 
large number of firms of relatively equal size. Increases in the value of the 
HHI indicate higher concentration in the market, either due to a decrease in 
the number of firms or an increase in the disparity in size between these 
firms. Although there is no precise point at which the HHI indicates market 
concentration sufficient to restrict competition, the Department of Justice 
                                                                                                                 
232 See James Barrese, Gene Lai & Nicos Scordis, Ownership Concentration 
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12 Chubb & Son Ins Grp 9,419,255,363 1.94 52.35 
13 Cna Ins Grp  8,131,205,861 1.67 54.02 
14 Ace Ltd Grp 7,780,534,083 1.60 55.62 
15 Allianz Ins Grp 5,764,589,841 1.19 56.81 
16 American Family Ins Grp 5,681,564,588 1.17 57.98 
17 Auto Owners Grp 4,451,729,312 0.92 58.90 
18 Erie Ins Grp  3,860,839,234 0.79 59.69 
19 Assurant Inc Grp 3,735,278,486 0.77 60.46 
20 American Financial Grp 3,565,868,308 0.73 61.19 
21 Wr Berkley Corp Grp 3,255,838,299 0.67 61.86 
22 Fm Global Grp 3,199,857,312 0.66 62.52 
23 Qbe Ins Grp  3,128,630,118 0.64 63.16 
24 Cincinnati Fin Grp 3,071,344,125 0.63 63.79 
25 Metropolitan Grp 2,984,332,558 0.61 64.40 
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has developed Merger Guidelines under which an HHI of less than 1000 
means the market is not concentrated, an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 
points means the market is moderately concentrated and an HHI over 1,800 
points means the market is concentrated.233 According to the ISO, the HHI 
for the property and casualty insurance market in 2009 was 351 points.234 
This indicates that the market was not concentrated. Further, the trend 
toward an increase in the level of market concentration indicates a decline 
in high-cost companies in favor of more efficient and lower-cost 
companies.235 Therefore, higher market concentration may be the result of 
increased market competition and a subsequent improvement in 
policyholders’ welfare.236  
With respect to possible barriers to entry, it is generally 
acknowledged that insurers can easily enter the property and casualty 
insurance market.237 The ability of new insurers to enter into the business 
assures efficiency and competition. When there are excessive profits in the 
market, new firms are induced to enter and the quantity of products offered 
is increased. Consequently, excess profits decrease until reaching a price 
level where zero excess profits exist. In this way a competitive market is 
achieved. The following table shows, inter alia, the number of entries in 
the markets for commercial property and casualty insurance products from 
2004 to 2009. 
 
Table 2 – 2009 Commercial Lines Data – Nationwide 
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t 
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Commerci
al 
Auto 
Physical 
5,792,918,
385 
25.21 
percent 266 119 32 24
-20.16 
percent
-4.67 
percent 
13.36 
percen
t 
Commerci
al 
Auto 
Total 
24,781,244
,787 
27.77 
percent 297 115 33 25
-15.50 
percent
16.56 
percent 
8.49 
percen
t 
Commerci
al 
Multiple 
Peril 
34,034,902
,544 
27.80 
percent 338 104 25 27
-5.82 
percent
50.34 
percent 
8.03 
percen
t 
Fire 
12,861,192
,843 
38.65 
percent 554 99 33 33
5.11 
percent
138.66 
percent 
19.77 
percen
t 
Allied 
Lines 
11,249,248
,316 
38.47 
percent 499 84 28 43
-1.31 
percent
186.42 
percent 
-3.92 
percen
t 
Inland 
Marine 
13,434,863
,829 
35.08 
percent 495 76 25 32
-12.81 
percent
61.49 
percent 
19.07 
percen
t 
Mortgage 
Guaranty 
5,449,184,
963 
69.45 
percent 1,594 8 1 1
-11.43 
percent
46.31 
percent 
-33.39 
percen
t* 
Financial 
Guaranty 
1,922,896,
601 
89.54 
percent 2,985 9 5 5
-45.91 
percent
22.40 
percent 
-15.44 
percen
t* 
Medical 
Profession
al 
Liability 
10,817,257
,976 
24.28 
percent 288 98 27 25
-7.42 
percent
67.72 
percent 
7.40 
percen
t 
Other 
Liability 
47,489,981
,386 
33.13 
percent 451 88 23 21
-13.41 
percent
82.38 
percent 
4.66 
percen
t 
Workers 
Compensa
tion 
41,287,350
,051 
33.34 
percent 395 110 39 31
-20.98 
percent
19.64 
percent 
6.35 
percen
t 
Products 
Liability 
2,895,299,
149 
30.42 
percent 404 66 19 16
-28.72 
percent
47.40 
percent 
0.43 
percen
t* 
* Denotes Return on Net Worth for 2009 data year only. 
Source: NAIC, 2009 Competition Database Report 10 (2010), reprinted 
with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or conclusions 
based on use of its data. 
 
In particular, it can be seen that the number of insurance groups 
with affiliated insurers which have entered the markets for commercial 
property and casualty insurance products between 2004 and 2009 is 
substantial. For example, thirty-nine insurers entered the workers 
compensation market, thirty entered the commercial auto insurance market, 
twenty-seven entered the medical professional liability market and twenty-
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five entered the commercial multiple peril market. This, along with the fact 
that the level of concentration in the U.S. property and casualty insurance 
market is low, leads to the conclusion that insurance companies are unable 
to charge excessive prices by attempting to act in concert since, in the 
absence of substantial barriers to entry, new insurers will prevent existing 
companies from fixing prices. 
As this shows, the U.S. property and casualty insurance market is 
competitive because it is characterized by a large number of insurance 
companies operating with low concentration levels. Prof. Paul Joskow 
called the insurance market one of the markets that conform more closely 
to the ideal model of perfect competition.238 The insurance market, 
therefore, does not present characteristics of a monopoly or an oligopoly 
that may justify rate regulation. 
In recognition of the wisdom of rate deregulation, there has been a 
gradual movement away from prior-approval systems toward less 
restrictive systems such as: file and use, use and file, flex rating, modified 
prior approval and, in particular, no file systems.239 Further, the NAIC File 
and Use Model Act introduced a presumption in favor of the existence of a 
competitive market unless the commissioner, after a hearing, determines 
that the market is not competitive.240 The Model Act also established a 
standard which provides that a rate in a competitive market is not 
excessive.241 
Nevertheless, prior-approval laws are still enforced in many 
states.242 For example, prior approval systems are used in Mississippi with 
regard to all insurance lines, in California with regard to all lines except 
title insurance, in Alabama for medical malpractice, property and inland 
marine, workers’ compensation and personal lines, in Alaska with regard to 
medical malpractice, workers’ compensation and assigned risk rates, in 
Connecticut with regard to medical malpractice (for rate increases of 7.5 
                                                                                                                 
238 Joskow, supra note 187, at 391. 
239 See supra pp. 125-26. 
240 E.g., PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (FILE AND USE 
VERSION) § 4 (NAIC 2010) [hereinafter FILE AND USE MODEL LAW] (providing 
that the insurance commissioner in determining whether a reasonable degree of 
competition exists in the market shall consider market structure, market 
performance, market conduct, the consumers’ practical opportunities to acquire 
pricing and other information and to compare and purchase insurance from 
competing insurers). 
241 See, e.g., FILE AND USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 5(A)(1)(a). 
242 See Appendix 1. 
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percent or more over the last rates filed) and title insurance.243 It is also 
worth mentioning that, except for the no-file systems, all the other systems 
mentioned above retain some form of regulatory control over insurance 
rates. Although rating laws in the different states vary to some extent, 
insurance commissioners retain the right to disapprove rates in file and use 
and use and file systems, while in flex rating and in modified prior 
approval systems insurers may be required to obtain prior approval from a 
commissioner if an increase is larger than the percentage rate established or 
the rate revision is based on a change in expense ratio or rate 
classifications.244 With a few rare exceptions, purely competitive rating 
models are not used in the United States. No-file systems are limited to just 
a few lines in some states.245 This stands in contrast with the fact that the 
competitive structure of the property and casualty insurance market in the 
U.S. does not justify the regulation of rates. 
 
B. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE WITH REGARD TO REGULATION OF 
INSURANCE TARIFFS 
 
European Member States’ regulators do not have the right to 
regulate insurance prices. It is worthwhile, therefore, to analyze the EU 
experience in order to draw possible conclusions that could be valuable in 
considering rate deregulation. 
Insurance regulation in Europe aims to create an integrated 
insurance market so that insurers can better diversify their risks and attain 
more economies of scale, while allowing policyholders to benefit from 
increased competition and a wider choice of insurance products. 
To this end, the EU legislature has attempted to remove regulatory 
barriers between Member States by introducing the principles of freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide services.246 In order to foster 
                                                                                                                 
243 See Appendix 1. 
244 See supra p. 126. 
245 See Appendix 1. 
246 The third non-life Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 228) and the 
third life Council Directive 92/96/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 360) established a single 
system for the authorization and financial supervision of insurance companies by 
the Member State in which an insurer has its head office (the home Member State). 
The authorization issued by the home Member State allows an insurance company 
to conduct its business in the other European Member States, either by opening 
agencies or branches (freedom of establishment) or by offering services on a 
temporary basis (freedom to provide services). In general, the principle of freedom 
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competition in the single insurance market, the third non-life insurance 
Directive prevented insurance supervisory authorities from regulating 
insurance premium prices and policy conditions.247  
Previously, most EU Member States had exercised considerable 
control over premiums by setting minimum or maximum prices or fixing 
price scales for some lines of insurance or even for all insurance lines.248 In 
the Italian insurance market, for example, before the enactment of the 
“third generation” of Directives the principles of “authorization of 
admission” and of “control on tariffs” were well established in the 
industry.249 Before deregulation, potential competition in the European 
insurance market was impeded by regulated tariffs that hampered insurance 
companies from competing on price.250 
With the removal of national control over insurance tariffs, new 
insurance products can be introduced into the market without prior 
regulatory approval. In this way, insurers’ efficiency increased and 
consumers benefited from lower prices.251 Article 29 of the third non-life 
insurance Directive of 1992 provides that Member States cannot maintain 
or introduce systems of prior notification or approval of insurers’ proposed 
increases in premium rates except as a part of general systems aimed at 
controlling prices.252 Insurance companies in Europe are now free to set 
their rates without any state interference and to write insurance contracts on 
any terms they agree to with their policyholders. Efforts by Member States 
to control insurance prices have been censured by the European 
Commission. In 2000 the Italian government, due to the effects of motor 
insurance prices on inflation, imposed a one-year ban on any increase in 
premiums for certain policyholders whose rates were calculated on the 
                                                                                                                 
of establishment and freedom to provide services are set out, respectively, in article 
49 and article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
247 Council Directive 92/49/EEC, art. 29, 1992 O.J. (L 228). 
248 European Commission, Business Insurance Sector Inquiry 20 (2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/interim_report_
24012007.pdf. 
249 Giuseppe Turchetti & Cinzia Daraio, How Deregulation Shapes Market 
Structure and Industry Efficiency: The Case of the Italian Motor Insurance 
Industry, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 202 (2004). 
250 European Commission, supra note 248, at 36. 
251 Id. at 45. 
252 See also Council Directive 92/49/EEC, art. 29, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 16-17. 
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basis of accidents.253 Additionally, the Italian government imposed a one-
year freezing on all new policies that were calculated on the same basis.254 
The European Commission censured the measure.255 According to the 
Commission, the price freeze was incompatible with the freedom to market 
insurance products within the European Union under the third non-life 
insurance Directive and was neither part of a general price-control system 
nor was it justified by the public interest.256  
There is a legitimate concern that deregulation will obstruct setting 
accurate rates in the short run because insurers may not have sufficient loss 
experience on which to rely.257 The European Union addressed this 
problem within the framework of the insurance Block Exemption 
Regulations. The first Block Exemption Regulation, Regulation 3932/92, 
was adopted by the Commission in 1992.258 When this Regulation expired 
on March 31, 2003, the Commission replaced it with Regulation 
358/2003.259 Afterwards, when also this second Regulation expired, on  
March 31, 2010, the Commission adopted a new insurance block 
exemption Regulation, Regulation 267/2010.260 The first Block Exemption 
Regulation was introduced following the Verband der Sachversicherer 
case, in which the European Court of Justice rejected arguments that full 
competition would cause more insurers’ insolvencies and that, since 
cooperation between insurance companies was necessary to avoid such a 
risk, the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (formerly Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community)261 should be limited.262 Article 101(1) of the Treaty 
                                                                                                                 
253 If no accidents caused by the policyholders had occurred during a recent 
observation period. See art. 2, Legge 26 maggio 2000, n. 137, in G.U. 27 maggio 
2000, n. 122 (It.). 
254 Id.  
255 See Press Release, Motor Insurance: The Commission Decides to Ask Italy 
to End Its Price Freeze (Oct. 25, 2000), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesA 
ction.do?reference=IP/00/1210&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en. 
256 Id. 
257 See supra p. 132. 
258 See Commission Regulation 3932/92, art. 1, 1992 O.J. (L 398) 9 (EC). 
259 See Commission Regulation 358/2003, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 53) 11-12 (EC). 
260 See Commission Regulation 267/2010 2010, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 5 
(EU). This Regulation will expire on 31 March 2017. See Commission Regulation 
267/2010 2010, art. 9, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 7 (EU). 
261 With effect from 1 December 2009, Article 81 of the EC Treaty has 
become Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  The 
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prohibits, inter alia, agreements between undertakings that prevent, restrict 
or distort competition within the EU common market by fixing prices and 
other trading conditions either directly or indirectly prices.263 
The Commission, recognizing the importance of cooperation 
among insurance companies to produce pool data concerning the 
calculation of the average cost of covering a specified risk in the past, the 
frequency and the size of past insurance claims, exempted the joint 
compilation and distribution of calculations and studies from the 
application of article 101(1) of the Treaty.264 The Commission also 
exempted other agreements in the insurance sector concerning the setting 
up and operation of industry (re)insurance pools for the common coverage 
of certain risks in the form of co-(re)insurance.265  
                                                                                                                 
two articles are substantially the same.  See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art. 
1, fn. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1 (EU). Article 101(1) prohibits “all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.” See Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101(1), Mar. 
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83), 88. As an exception to this rule, Article 101(3) 
provides that the provisions contained in Article 101(1) may be declared 
inapplicable in case of agreements “which contribut[e] to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit[s]”, and which do not 
impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives and do not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
101(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83), 88-89. 
262 See Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v. Comm’n of the 
European Communities, 1987 E.C.R. 405. 
263 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 101(1), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88. 
264 See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 5 (EU). 
According to paragraph 9 of the Preamble, access to past statistical data is essential 
in order to facilitate the pricing of risks and therefore the Commission considered 
cooperation in this area necessary. This can in turn facilitate market entry and 
benefit consumers. It is specified, however, that agreements on commercial 
premiums are not exempted. See also Commission Regulation 267/2010, pmbl.  ¶ 
9, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 2 (EU). 
265 See Commission Regulation 267/2010, art. 5, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 6 (EU). 
Commission Regulation 267/2010 did not renew the exemption granted by the 
previous Block Exemption Regulation for agreements on standard policy 
conditions and security devices. In particular, according to paragraph 3 of the 
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Unlike the old system where regulated tariffs prevented price 
competition, liberalization following the third non-life insurance Directive 
led to increased competition, particularly in formerly heavily-regulated 
markets such as Italy, Germany, Belgium and Portugal.266 After price 
controls were abolished, premium rates decreased.267 In particular, in 
countries such as Germany, Austria and Spain that used to have minimum 
premium regulation, price competition increased considerably.268 In 
Germany, due to discounts and price reductions, premium income from 
motor insurance decreased from DEM 44 billion in 1995 to DEM 39 billion 
in 1998.269 On the other hand, in countries such as Italy, Portugal and 
Greece, deregulation led to tariff increases in the motor liability sector in 
order to cover actual claim costs.270 Deregulation permitted insurance 
companies in those countries to reach a balance between the risks 
underwritten and the premiums charged to cover potential losses. 
Previously, in those countries premiums had been artificially low in order 
to prevent inflationary pressure.271 
The experience in countries like the United Kingdom and France, 
countries that had not regulated insurance prices and contractual terms 
before the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive confirms the benefits of rate 
deregulation.272 In the United Kingdom, for example, market concentration 
has decreased as an immediate effect of deregulation. In 1981, the fifteen 
largest insurers operating in that country underwrote almost 80 percent of 
                                                                                                                 
Preamble, the new Regulation does not grant an exemption for the establishment of 
standard policy conditions and the testing and acceptance of security devices 
because the Commission’s review of the functioning of Regulation 358/2003 
revealed that it was no longer necessary to include such agreements in a sector 
specific block exemption regulation. The Commission considered more appropriate 
that they be subject to self-assessment. See also Commission Regulation 267/2010, 
pmbl.  ¶ 3, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1 (EU). 
266 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Gli Effetti Attesi della 
Liberalizzazione 15-16 (2001), http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_downloa 
d/163-parte-i.html. 
267 Swiss Re, Sigma: Europe in Focus: Non-Life Markets Undergoing 
Structure Change, 3 (2000). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Il Mercato, 17 (2001), 
www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/164-parte-ii.html (also stating that 
more recently the concentration ratios has increased due to insurance companies’ 
reorganizations that have occurred recently). 
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the total premiums while in 1994, they underwrote about 65 percent of the 
total premiums.273 Moreover, as a consequence of market liberalization, 
even more foreign insurance companies set up business in the United 
Kingdom.274 
Following the deregulation of insurance prices and conditions, 
concentration, however, did not decrease.  After deregulation in 1992, the 
largest insurers consolidated their positions in their national markets. 
Between 1990 and 1998 the combined market share of European 
multinational insurers (Allianz, Axa, Cgu, Generali, Royal & Sun Alliance, 
Winterthur and Zurich) in the six largest national markets (United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) increased from 18 
to 39 percent.275 In France in 1990, the combined market share of the five 
biggest insurance companies was about 40 percent, while in the second half 
of the nineties their market share increased to 57 percent.276 The same trend 
appeared in Italy. In 1990, the top five insurers controlled almost half of the 
Italian market, while in 1999 they had a market share of 60 percent.277  In 
Germany, the top five insurers had a market share of almost 32 percent in 
1990 and 40 percent in 1999.278 In the United Kingdom, the top five 
insurers controlled 32 percent of the market in 1994 and 55 percent in 
1999.279 
It is difficult to know whether deregulation accounts for that higher 
concentration.  More likely, the reduction in the number of insurers in the 
European market resulted from the increasing number of mergers and 
acquisitions at the end of the 1990s.280 For example, higher concentration 
ratios in Italy were due to the fact that Generali bought out INA in 1999, 
while in Germany they ensued from Generali’s acquisition of AMB and 
AXA’s takeover of Albingia.281 Thus, it is unlikely that the increase in 
concentration ratios of the non-life European market resulted from 
deregulation.  A case history of the motor insurance industry in Italy 
                                                                                                                 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Swiss Re, supra note 267, at 17. 
276 Id. at 22. 
277 Id. at 23-24. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. at 24. 
280 See European Insurance in Figures, CEA STATISTICS N° 36 (CEA Insurers 
of Europe, Brussels, Belgium available at http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Mod 
ules/Publications/1224519688_eif.pdf), Oct. 2008, at 25 [hereinafter 2008 CEA 
Statistics]. 
281 Swiss Re, supra note 267, at 23-24. 
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following deregulation is also illustrative. The Italian auto insurance sector, 
which had been highly regulated by the government, was considerably 
affected by the change introduced by the third non-life Directive.282 The 
same trend seen in the general European non-life insurance market 
appeared in the Italian auto insurance market. Between 1982 and 1991, the 
number of insurance companies grew from 97 to 113, but then dropped to 
80 between 1991 and 2000.283 The peak of the reduction occurred in the 
period after 1994, when the number of insurers declined from 105 to 80.284 
Entries in the market rose in the second half of the 1980s and decreased in 
the 1990s.285 Conversely, the number of exits from the market decreased in 
the second half of the 1980s and increased in the 1990s.286 The net entry in 
the market between 1994 and 2002 was -28.287 The combined market share 
of the top 20 insurers also increased from 63.63 percent in 1982 to 79.87 
percent in 2000.288 From this, one might infer that deregulation in the 
Italian auto insurance market had a negative effect on competition. 
However, in a study conducted in 2001, the Italian Antitrust Authority 
concluded that net exits from the market were not due to deregulation 
because only some of the insurance companies that exited the market had 
financial problems.289 Rather, the exits occurred because insurance 
companies were acquired by other companies and some insurers voluntarily 
ceased trading.290 The number of insurers’ insolvencies decreased with the 
deregulation of insurance tariffs. In 1993-1994 around ten companies were 
insolvent, but in 1995 that number dropped to six.291 The reduction in the 
number of insurers’ insolvencies might be a result of the fact that insurers 
were free to set the price of premiums at an adequate level to cover their 
costs. Indeed, one adverse effect of rate regulation is to weaken the 
relationship between premiums and expected loss costs;292 deregulation, on 
the contrary, permits a better alignment of prices with costs.293 Premiums 
rates went up and down until the first half of 1990s, while after tariffs 
                                                                                                                 
282 See Turchetti & Daraio, supra note 249, at 202. 
283 Id. at 203-04. 
284 Id. at 204. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 205. 
287 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, supra note 272, at 35. 
288 Id. at 26. 
289 Id. at 36. 
290 Id. at 36-37. 
291 Id. at 36. 
292 Cummins, supra note 147, at 12; see Tennyson, supra note 177, at 14. 
293 See Cummins, supra note 147, at 2, 11. 
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deregulation they tended to increase.294 Among the causes adduced to 
explain rates increase are (1) the rise in the average cost of compensation 
for damage that changed from € 1,923 to € 3,830 between 1994 and 2001; 
(2) the increase in cost of repairs; (3) the frequency of fraud and the 
considerable frequency of cervical spine lesions reported in around 66 
percent of the claims.295 Moreover, an efficiency analysis of forty-five 
Italian insurers in the motor insurance sector showed that the cost 
efficiency and the total productivity of these companies increased between 
1982 and 2000, particularly in the second half of the 1990s after adoption 
of the third non-life Directive.296  
Motor insurance aside, the other non-life lines in Italy experienced 
a decrease in rates from 1993 to 1996.297 This trend toward lower rates was 
common throughout Europe as a consequence of increased competition.298 
For example, in Germany in 1997, strong competition among insurance 
companies resulted in falling rates.299 
As for more general European insurance rate trends, total 
premiums for the overall countries represented by the European insurance 
and reinsurance federation (CEA)300 grew in real terms by 1.2 percent in 
2007, compared to an annual increase of 6.5 percent in the two previous 
years.301 The slowdown in the rate of total premium increase was due to 
                                                                                                                 
294 Turchetti & Daraio, supra note 249, at 205. 
295 Id. at 207-08. 
296 Id. at 217. 
297 5 SWISS RE, Sigma, Upheaval in Insurance Markets – Results Still Good 
Despite Increased Competition, Forecast for the Biggest non-Life Markets in 1998 
and 1999, at 19 (1998), media.swissre.com/documents/1b477a804659d8e893f8df 
4ba16c05ab-17 Aug 1998_Upheaval in insurance.pdf. 
298 Id. at 4. 
299 Id. at 14. 
300 The CEA (Comité Européen des Assurances) is the European insurance and 
reinsurance federation; its members are the national insurance associations in 32 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and 
United Kingdom). The statistical data presented in the text refer to the above-
mentioned 32 countries beside Lithuania. COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES, 
http://www.cea.eu/. 
301 2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 280, at 11. This part of the article 
considers 2007 data since 2008 and 2009 insurance premium data are affected by 
the impact of the financial crisis. Due to the financial crisis, gross written 
premiums declined by 6% in 2008. See CEA Statistics No. 37: European Insurance 
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strong competition between insurance companies in the non-life sector.302 
In the non-life sector premium growth in 2007 slowed down to 0.4 percent 
in real terms.303 In Western Europe, eight out of fifteen markets 
experienced a decrease in premium volumes.304 For example, in Germany 
and in the United Kingdom, which are the two largest European non-life 
markets, premium volume fell respectively 1.4 percent and 0.7 percent 
respectively.305 The link between the general slowdown in total European 
non-life premiums and lower insurance rates could also be seen in the 
motor vehicle insurance line, which is the biggest line of non-life insurance 
in Europe, accounting for 31 percent of total premiums in 2007.306 Motor 
insurance premiums declined by 0.4 percent in real terms in 2007 and by 2 
percent in 2006.307 This reduction was caused by lower rates due to strong 
competition between insurance companies.308 
Thus, deregulation and the establishment of a single insurance 
market in Europe had positive effects by intensifying competition among 
                                                                                                                 
in Figures, COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES 9 (Oct., 2009), 
http://www.cea.eu/upl oads/Modules/Publications/eif-2009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 
CEA Statistics]. In 2009 the European insurance industry weathered the crisis 
better as to premium growth and total European premiums increased by 2.9%. See 
CEA Statistics No. 42: European Insurance in Figures, COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES 
ASSURANCES 10 (Nov., 2010), http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publicatio 
ns/1290503264_european-nsurance-in-figures.pdf [hereinafter 2010 CEA 
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302 2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 302, at 11. 
303 Id. at 14. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 See id. at 15. See also 2009 CEA Statistics, supra note 301, at 14 (showing 
a decline in European motor insurance premiums in 2008 due to insurers’ efforts to 
improve the value for money of products sold, the strong competition in the market 
and the decline in new car sales because of the economic crisis); 2010 CEA 
Statistics, supra note 301, at 15 (showing a decline in European motor insurance 
premiums in 2009 mainly due to the competitiveness of the market and the 
economic crisis); Retail Insurance Market Study, EUROPE ECONOMICS 100, 104-05 
(Nov. 26, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/motor/201 
00302rim_en.pdf (stating that Europe has the largest motor insurance market in the 
world, with almost € 119 billion motor insurance premiums in the EU27 in 2008) 
[hereinafter Retail Insurance Market Study]. 
307 2008 CEA Statistics, supra note 280, at 15. 
308 Id. 
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insurers.309 Insurance companies were able to adjust their rates following 
deregulation, and there were not substantial rate increases.310  
 
C. THE CASE FOR RATE DEREGULATION 
 
The concern that deregulation could lead to monopolistic or 
oligopolistic pricing is controverted by the fact that the U.S. insurance 
market is competitive and does not require regulation of insurance rates.311 
Table 2 above, for example, shows no evidence of excessive profits by 
insurers.  
Indeed, rate regulation in the U.S. may result in artificially low 
returns.  According to an ISO analysis, the profitability of property and 
casualty insurers measured under generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP)312 is lower than other industries.313 The return on net worth of both 
large property and casualty insurance companies and the entire property 
and casualty insurance industry for the period 1983 to 2009 was lower than 
the return on net worth for the Fortune 500 combined companies except in 
1986 and in 1987.314 Other industries also had higher rates of return 
compared to the property and casualty insurance industry over that period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
309 See Retail Insurance Market Study, supra note 306, at xxi, 89-90 
(analyzing the European motor insurance market). 
310 See Id. 
311 See supra pp. 134-39. 
312 The data reported in the annual statement filed by insurance companies 
with state Insurance Departments and the Internal Revenue Service are on a 
statutory accounting principles (SAP) basis, that tends to be more conservative 
than GAAP. Therefore, in order to make comparisons with other industries it is 
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basis. See THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2011, supra note 229, at 39. 
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314 See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 
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152         CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL          Vol. 18.1 
Table 3 – 2000-2009 Annual Rate of Return: Net Income After Taxes 
as a Percent of Equity 
 
  Property and Casualty Insurance Selected Other Industries   
Year 
Statutory 
Accounting 
GAAP 
Accounting 
Commercial 
banks 
Electric and
gas utilities 
Fortune 500 
combined 
industrials 
and service 
2000 6.2 percent 5.9 percent 16.7 percent 11.8 percent 14.6 percent 
2001 -2.0 percent -1.2 percent 14.0 percent 10.5 percent 10.4 percent 
2002 3.0 percent 2.1 percent 17.3 percent 7.9 percent 10.2 percent 
2003 8.3 percent 8.8 percent 14.9 percent 10.5 percent 12.6 percent 
2004 9.7 percent 9.4 percent 15.5 percent 10.5 percent 13.9 percent 
2005 10.9 percent 9.6 percent 16.0 percent 10.0 percent 14.9 percent 
2006 14.2 percent 12.7 percent 15.0 percent 11.0 percent 15.4 percent 
2007 12.0 percent 10.9 percent 11.0 percent 11.0 percent 15.2 percent 
2008 0.8 percent 0.1 percent 3.0 percent 13.0 percent 13.1 percent 
2009 6.2 percent 4.7 percent 4.0 percent 9.0 percent 10.5 percent 
Source: INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT 
BOOK 2011 39 (2011), reprinted with permission. (Source: SNL Financial 
LC; ISO; Fortune).  
 
Calculating, from data in Table 3, the average rate of return on a 
GAAP basis for the property casualty insurance industry and the average 
rate of return for the Fortune 500 combined companies for the period 2000-
2009, the return on average for the property and casualty insurers was 6.3 
percent and 13.08 percent for the Fortune 500 combined companies. 
Table 2 also raises questions about insurers’ low profitability.315  
Although the market growth for commercial lines over the 2000-2009 
period indicated that new insurers had incentives to enter the business,316 
nevertheless many insurers exited the market.317 For example, 29 insurers 
exited the commercial auto liability market, 31 exited the workers’ 
                                                                                                                 
315 See supra Table 2. 
316 It is more appropriate to consider the market growth over the period 2000-
2009 than just over the period 2007-2009 since 2007-2009 data may be affected by 
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. As to the data for commercial property and 
casualty insurance before the financial crisis, see infra Appendix 2. 
317 See supra Table 2. 
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compensation market, 32 left the market for inland marine and 43 exited 
the allied lines market.318 The fact that those insurers exited the market may 
suggest that they did not consider the market profitable enough to remain in 
business.319 
It is difficult to establish for certain a direct causal link between 
this data and insurance rate regulation. At a minimum, rate regulation could 
be one of the causes depressing insurers’ profitability.320  
Rate regulation may affect insurers’ profitability since it may limit 
insurers’ ability to adjust their rates according to changes in market 
conditions.  Insurers might need to raise rates when investment income dips 
or premiums are too low to absorb losses. Yet in prior approval systems 
insurers may experience delays or denials in getting approval for rate 
increases. There could also be political pressure on insurance 
commissioners to keep rates low.321 A commissioner might grant approval 
for a rate increase lower than that requested by the insurer, either to attain 
the rate increase over a longer period of time or not at all. This can have 
adverse effects on insurance companies. Similar concerns surround file and 
use, use and file, flex rating and modified prior approval systems. With 
regard to the first two systems, the commissioner retains the right to 
disapprove the rates filed, while, with regard to the flex rating and modified 
prior approval system, both require prior approval if the rate change is 
larger than the specified percentage rate, or if the rate revision is based on a 
change in expense ratio or rate classifications. Because of the time and 
expense to meet the rate-filing requirements, insurance companies may 
have less-than-optimal opportunity to adjust their rates to changes in the 
                                                                                                                 
318 See id. 
319 In particular, with regard to commercial multiple peril insurance, inland 
marine and allied lines, more insurers exited the market than entered it (a net loss 
of 2 in the commercial multiple peril market, of 7 in the inland marine market and 
of 15 in the market for allied lines). See supra Table 2. 
320 See Cummins et al., supra note 215, at 42-44 (demonstrating by statistical 
regression analysis that insurance regulation led to significantly lower prices in the 
majority of states that were regulated during the sample period 1980-1996); 
Cummins & Harrington, supra note 215, at 60 (showing by multiple regression 
analysis that in competitive rating states loss ratios are significantly lower and 
average prices significantly higher); Scott E. Harrington, A Note on the Impact of 
Auto Insurance Rate Regulation, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 166, 169 (1987) (finding 
that auto insurance rate regulation increased average loss ratios during the sample 
period 1976-1981). 
321 See supra p. 135. 
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market.322 While deregulating might result in higher rate volatility, it would 
permit insurance companies to set appropriate rates in response to changes 
in market conditions. 
Deregulation would also allow insurers to eliminate the costs of 
complying with rate regulation and prior approval systems. Under the 
NAIC Property and Casualty Model Law, an insurer has to file with the 
insurance commissioners “every manual, minimum premium, class rate, 
rating schedule or rating plan and every other rating rule, and every 
modification of any of the foregoing which it proposes to use.”323 Further, 
insurers have to submit or incorporate by reference “all supplementary 
rating and supporting information to be used in support of or in conjunction 
with a rate,” such as the insurers’ interpretation of statistical data on which 
they relied, the experience of other insurance companies, and any other 
relevant information.324 The commissioner, after reviewing the insurer’s 
filing, may require that “the insurer’s rates be based upon the insurer’s own 
loss, special assessment and expense information,” where the insurer’s loss 
is not actuarially credible, the insurer “may use or supplement its 
experience with information filed with the commissioner by an advisory 
organization or statistical agent.”325 For insurers using the services of an 
advisory organization, the commissioner may require them to provide “a 
description of the rationale for such use, including its own information and 
method of utilization of the advisory organization’s information.”326  
Rate filings, therefore, are a drain on insurers’ time and resources.  
The process to approve rates can be invasive, lengthy, inaccurate and 
disputed.327 Further, a commissioner’s analysis of whether the rates are 
“excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory” requires a considerable 
outlay of effort and resources by insurance department staff in order to 
consider past and prospective loss experience and expenses.328 The same is 
                                                                                                                 
322 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 33. 
323 PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (PRIOR APPROVAL 
VERSION) § 5(A)(1) (2009) [hereinafter PRIOR APPROVAL MODEL LAW]; FILE AND 
USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(1). 
324 PRIOR APPROVAL MODEL LAW, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(2); FILE AND USE 
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(2). 
325 Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(4); FILE AND USE 
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(4). 
326 Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 5(A)(5); FILE AND USE 
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 6(A)(5). 
327 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 31. 
328 Prior Approval Model Law, supra note 323, at § 4(B); FILE AND USE 
MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 5(A)(4). 
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true for a commissioner’s determination of whether there is competition in 
the market.329 Rate deregulation could allow insurance departments to fully 
devote themselves to other more important supervisory activities such as 
solvency supervision.330 
In addition, the effect of rate regulation on the availability of 
insurance can be seen by analyzing the residual market. Generally, a 
declining residual market means that insurance is relatively more available 
in the voluntary market, and vice versa.  Thus, it is of concern that residual 
market shares increase along with the degree of rate regulation. Table 4 
compares the size of the voluntary market and the residual market by state 
for private passenger car insurance for the year 2008. 
 
Table 4 – Private Passenger Cars Insured in the Voluntary and 
Residual Market, 2008 
 
State 
Voluntary 
Market 
Residual 
Market Total 
Residual market 
as a percentage 
of total 
Alabama 3,384,021 6 3,384,027 < 0.001 percent 
Alaska 437,274 122 437,396 0.028 percent 
Arizona 4,130,900 20 4,130,920 < 0.001 percent 
Arkansas 2,069,310 0 2,069,310 < 0.001 percent 
California 24,127,758 5,941 24,133,699 0.025 percent 
Colorado 3,667,061 0 3,667,061 < 0.001 percent 
Connecticut 2,442,996 487 2,443,483 0.020 percent 
Delaware 608,459 25 608,484 0.004 percent 
D.C. 221,678 457 222,135 0.206 percent 
Florida 11,288,408 6 11,288,414 < 0.001 percent 
Georgia 6,789,526 3 6,789,529 < 0.001 percent 
Hawaii 796,742 5,188 801,930 0.647 percent 
Idaho 1,068,562 38 1,068,600 0.004 percent 
Illinois 7,936,919 1,153 7,938,072 0.015 percent 
Indiana 4,578,960 6 4,578,966 < 0.001 percent 
Iowa 2,398,138 9 2,398,147 < 0.001 percent 
                                                                                                                 
329 FILE AND USE MODEL LAW, supra note 240, at § 4, 8. 
330 See supra p. 135.  
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Kansas 2,349,365 1,327 2,350,692 0.056 percent 
Kentucky 3,013,470 64 3,013,534 0.002 percent 
Louisiana 2,834,988 7 2,834,995 < 0.001 percent 
Maine 1,022,278 28 1,022,306 0.003 percent 
Maryland 3,792,401 73,328 3,865,729 1.897 percent 
Massachusetts 3,955,971 112,891 4,068,862 2.775 percent 
Michigan 6,164,846 1,297 6,166,143 0.021 percent 
Minnesota 3,746,861 5 3,746,866 < 0.001 percent 
Mississippi 2,076,581 76 2,076,657 0.004 percent 
Missouri 4,195,783 41 4,195,824 0.001 percent 
Montana 775,934 230 776,164 0.030 percent 
Nebraska 1,501,473 4 1,501,477 < 0.001 percent 
Nevada 1,793,132 23 1,793,155 0.001 percent 
New 
Hampshire 904,727 710 905,437 0.078 percent 
New Jersey 5,290,260 15,048 5,305,308 0.284 percent 
New Mexico 1,455,016 24 1,455,040 0.002 percent 
New York 9,233,103 92,283 9,325,386 0.990 percent 
North 
Carolina 5,607,617 1,442,470 7,050,087 20.460 percent 
North Dakota 592,814 4 592,818 0.001 percent 
Ohio 8,029,756 0 8,029,756 < 0.001 percent 
Oklahoma 2,719,636 52 2,719,688 0.002 percent 
Oregon 2,724,683 9 2,724,692 < 0.001 percent 
Pennsylvania 8,483,438 19,151 8,502,589 0.225 percent 
Rhode Island 663,890 9,335 673,225 1.387 percent 
South 
Carolina 3,294,512 1 3,294,513 < 0.001 percent 
South Dakota 681,839 0 681,839 < 0.001 percent 
Tennessee 4,187,461 24 4,187,485 0.001 percent 
Texas 
Data 
not available 
Data 
not available 
Data 
not available 
Data 
not available 
Utah 1,808,234 2 1,808,236 < 0.001 percent 
Vermont 474,881 450 475,331 0.095 percent 
Virginia 6,023,910 1,460 6,025,370 0.024 percent 
Washington 4,513,296 0 4,513,296 < 0.001 percent 
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West Virginia 1,305,657 39 1,305,696 0.003 percent 
Wisconsin 3,674,130 0 3,674,130 < 0.001 percent 
Wyoming 503,741 1 503,742 < 0.001 percent 
Nationwide 185,342,396 1,783,845 187,126,241 0.953 percent 
Source: INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT 
BOOK 2011 71-72 (2011), reprinted with permission. (Source: Automobile 
Insurance Plans Service Office). 
 
Of the states with a higher residual market share relative to the total 
private passenger cars insured in 2008, North Carolina (20.460 percent), 
Massachusetts (2.775 percent), and New York (0.990 percent) had strict 
rate regulation systems for automobile insurance.331 North Carolina and 
New York had prior-approval rating laws with regard to auto-insurance,332 
while in Massachusetts until April 2008 auto insurance rates were set by 
the commissioner.333 Conversely, some of the states with a lower residual 
market share were states with less restrictive rating systems like file and 
use or use and file: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Nebraska (less than 0.001 percent), Delaware (0.004 percent), 
Idaho (0.004 percent), Illinois (0.015 percent).334  
This suggests that rate regulation may have negative effects on 
insurance availability. Rate suppression, especially, may force insurers to 
tighten underwriting, forcing consumers to turn to the residual markets for 
coverage.335 Understandably, insurers will not underwrite higher risk 
consumers if rates are too low to cover their possible costs. In the worst 
                                                                                                                 
331 But see the cases of Maryland and Rhode Island having a quite high 
residual market share (1.897 percent and 1.387 percent respectively) even though 
they adopt less restrictive rating systems: file-and-use the former and flex-rating 
the latter. 
332 See NAIC, Auto Insurance Database Report 2005/2006 231, (2008) 
[hereinafter Auto Insurance Database Report]. In June 2008 the New York 
legislature approved flex-rating legislation for auto insurance providing that, 
subject to some conditions, overall average rate level increases or decreases of 5 
percent above or below the previously filed rates may take effect without obtaining 
prior regulatory approval. 
333 See supra pp. 126-27. 
334 With regard to the rating systems for auto insurance adopted in the states, 
see Auto Insurance Database Report, supra note 332, at 231. 
335 Residual market mechanisms are statutory arrangements that permit to 
provide insurance to people considered ineligible for coverage in the voluntary 
market. 
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case rate suppression could cause insurers who cannot offset low rates with 
decreased costs to exit the market.336 Consider, for example, the number of 
insurers who exited California following the introduction of Proposition 
103337 and Massachusetts, New Jersey and South Carolina because of strict 
rate regulation in the auto insurance market.338 In particular, New Jersey, 
before 2003, had had a highly regulated automobile insurance market that 
prompted over 20 insurers to exit over a period of 10 years.339 After the 
state enacted reforms in 2003 increasing competition in the market,340 the 
number of insurance companies changed from 17 to 39, the availability of 
insurance increased, and insurance prices fell for most policyholders.341 
The same occurred in South Carolina where a less restrictive rating law 
was passed in 1999. Afterwards, the number of insurers offering 
automobile insurance almost doubled and the residual market share and 
rate levels fell.342 
Deregulation of rates, therefore, would avoid problems with the 
availability of insurance by allowing insurers to charge an appropriate price 
to cover their costs and earn a reasonable profit. Although deregulation 
might lead to higher rates, the benefits of rate suppression are not worth the 
cost of restricted availability. While rate suppression may make insurance 
affordable in the short run, in the long run it will cause insurers to exit from 
the market with consequent problems for consumers and the social welfare. 
Instead, rate deregulation will result in appropriate prices for insurance 
                                                                                                                 
336 Harrington, supra note 118, at 189. 
337 Editorial, California Smashup, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1988, at A22 
(discussing the exit of forty insurance companies from California due to the 
enforcement of Proposition 103 rate rollback). 
338 Harrington, supra note 118, at 189. 
339 Tennyson, supra note 179, at 16. 
340 The Auto Insurance Reform Act approved in June 2003 (P.L. 2003, c. 89), 
introduced inter alia (i) the phase-out and final elimination of the “take-all-
comers” provisions of the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990 (P.L. 
1990, c. 8); (ii) amendments to the prior approval rate filing provision to establish 
a time-line for regulatory action; (iii) changes in the expedited rate filing procedure 
by raising the ceiling for rate increases; (iv) provisions that simplify the procedures 
to be used by insurers to withdraw from selling a particular type of insurance or to 
withdraw from the state; (v) measures to combat insurance fraud and provide for 
consumer protection and education. Further, the 2003 Act also amended the New 
Jersey’s excess profits law, according to which insurers were prohibited from 
earning more than 6 percent in profits from the sales of auto insurance policies 
over a three-year period. The Act extended that period from three to seven years. 
341 Tenyson, supra note 179, at 16. 
342 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 22; Tenyson, supra note 179, at 16. 
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because insurance companies in a competitive market will supply products 
in the long run at prices equaling their average costs plus a reasonable 
profit. 
Rate deregulation will also lead to more consumer choices because, 
by increasing the range of prices that insurers can charge, the range of 
products offered to policyholders should increase as well. Rate regulation 
limits consumer choice since, to implement a uniform price system, 
comparable rates must be charged for comparable products. Any effects on 
the ability of consumers to compare insurance rates can be addressed by 
increasing disclosure and enhancing regulation of insurance advertising and 
marketing.343 In addition, standard policy conditions may also facilitate 
consumers in comparing insurance policies offered by different insurers.344 
This way, policyholders may acquire the knowledge they need to properly 
compare rates and make informed decisions, taking into account the price, 
the quality of the policy and the insurer’s financial strength. Comparison 
shopping can be enhanced by the on-line availability of insurance 
quotations345 and help of independent agents and brokers in assisting 
policyholders with price comparisons.346  
One of the main objectives of rate regulation is to prevent 
insurance insolvencies that could result from ruinous competition. In the 
long term a competitive market should reach equilibrium where insurers 
charge premiums that equal their average costs. Insurance companies like 
all other enterprises strive to conduct a financially successful business so 
that they are most unlikely to charge rates not sufficient to cover incurred 
losses and expenses. 
Even if that is not always the case, rate regulation has not avoided 
insurers’ insolvencies. In the United States, around 340 property and 
                                                                                                                 
343 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 26. 
344 Id. at 44-45. 
345 See, e.g., the Massachusetts Division of Insurance’s website on auto 
insurance premium comparison, http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocatermina 
l&L=4&L0=Home&L1=Consumer&L2=Insurance&L3=Automobile+Insurance&s
id=Eoca&b=terminalcontent&f=doi_AutorateCompare_autoratecompare&csid=Eo
ca. The website gives information on how to contact insurance companies and 
agents directly for quotes and allows consumers to compare premiums for new 
private passenger auto insurance across companies for seven policy examples by 
showing the range of prices and discounts they may qualify for.  
346 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
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casualty insurance companies became insolvent from 1986 to 2006.347 
Furthermore, there have been relatively fewer insolvencies in states with 
less restrictive rating laws than in those that highly regulate rates.348 Of 79 
insolvent insurance companies subject to rate regulation in the period 1946 
to 1959, 26 were based in Texas, a state which used to have rate uniformity 
enforced by law.349 California and Missouri that did not then regulate rates 
at all had only 3 insolvencies each.350 Similar considerations can be 
inferred from the data concerning the number of insolvencies in the Italian 
auto insurance market for the period immediately following deregulation of 
tariffs.351 Rate deregulation, therefore, is consistent with a financially 
healthy insurance industry. It permits flexibility in the price of insurance 
and allows insurers to charge appropriate rates in connection with possible 
market changes and, ultimately, to set rates more aligned with costs, 
thereby enhancing insurers’ financial strength. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Rate regulation seems to be based more on an historical tradition 
than on solid economic arguments. Although deregulation might seem bold 
in the current financial crisis, it is important to distinguish between the 
need for rate regulation and the desirability of more effective solvency 
regulation. Solvency concerns can be addressed by focusing on insurers’ 
reserves and increasing the monitoring of the financial conditions of 
insurers. For these reasons rate freedom should replace regulation of rates. 
                                                                                                                 
347 American Academy of Actuaries, Risk Focused Surveillance Framework 
14 (2006), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_catf_aaa_risk_focus 
ed_surveillance.doc. 
348 CRANE, supra note 189, at 95. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 See supra p. 148. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Rate Filing Methods 
 
STATE FILING METHOD LINES 
Alabama file and use 
 
prior approval 
commercial lines, title 
medical malpractice, 
 
personal lines, property and inland 
marine, casualty and surety, 
workers' compensation 
Alaska 
  
prior approval 
 
flex rating on rate 
changes 
medical malpractice, title 
workers’ compensation, 
assigned risk rates 
 
all property and casualty lines 
except workers’ compensation, 
medical malpractice, assigned risk 
  file and use 
rate changes 
all property and casualty lines 
except workers' compensation, 
medical malpractice, assigned risk 
Arizona file and use workers' compensation, title 
  use and file other property and casualty lines 
Arkansas file and use  
(competitive market); 
prior approval 
(non-competitive market) 
personal lines and small 
commercial risks 
  no filing large commercial risks 
  prior approval workers' compensation 
California prior approval all property and casualty lines 
  file and use Title 
Colorado prior approval workers’ compensation loss cost 
filing by a rating organization; 
auto assigned risk 
  file and use all other property and casualty lines, 
except exempt commercial 
policyholders, title 
  
no file; must maintain 
documentation exempt commercial policyholders 
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Connecticut file and use commercial lines (exception), personal 
lines 
  prior approval medical malpractice (for rate increasing 
7.5 percent or more over last rates filed), 
title 
Delaware file and use all lines except title 
District of 
Columbia 
file and use all lines 
prior approval workers’ compensation and  medical 
malpractice 
Florida file and use or 
use and file 
all lines except title and workers' 
compensation 
  prior approval workers’ compensation 
  rate set by the Commissioner title 
   
Georgia prior approval 
file and use 
personal private passenger auto 
other property and casualty lines 
  no file large commercial risks 
Hawaii prior approval property and casualty lines 
Idaho prior approval workers’ compensation, title 
  use and file other property and casualty lines 
Illinois use and file private passenger auto, 
taxicabs,motorcycles, 
homeowners,allied lines, dwelling fire, 
liquor liability, workers’ compensation 
  file and use medical malpractice, group inland 
marine 
   
Indiana file and use property and casualty lines 
  modified file and use workers’ compensation 
Iowa prior approval workers’ compensation, other 
property and casualty lines, 
title 
  use and file  homeowners, private passenger 
auto 
Kansas prior approval  workers’ compensation 
  file and use personal and commercial lines 
  no file large commercial insured, medical 
malpractice 
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Kentucky use and file (competitive 
market); prior approval (non-
competitive market); 
prior approval of any rates which 
when combined with any rating 
factors effectively change pre-tax 
premium of any particular policy 
by more than +/- 25 percent in any 
12-month period of time 
personal lines, auto guaranty, 
credit, medical malpractice, 
workers' compensation 
  no file other commercial lines 
  file and use title 
Louisiana prior approval  
 
all property and casualty lines 
 no file workers’ compensation (competitive 
market) 
Maine * modified file and use property and casualty lines, title 
  no filing large commercial risks 
  prior approval workers’ compensation 
Maryland file and use lines designated by the commissioner 
as competitive 
  prior approval property and casualty lines, title 
Massachusetts file and use or set by the commissioner motor vehicle (filing method based on 
finding of existence of competitive 
market by commissioner) 
  file and use all other lines 
Michigan file and use auto, homeowners, 
workers' compensation, 
inland marine, title 
  prior approval  property excluding auto and 
homeowners 
Minnesota file and use all lines except workers’ 
compensation 
  prior approval workers' compensation 
Mississippi prior approval property and casualty lines 
Missouri informational filing only commercial property and casualty 
lines 
  use and file other property and casualty lines, 
workers' compensation 
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Montana file and use property and casualty lines, title 
Nebraska file and use personal lines, workers’ compensation, 
most commercial lines, 
crop, professional liability, excess and 
large deductible workers’ compensation 
  prior approval medical professional liability, title 
Nevada prior approval all personal lines, medical professional 
liability rates, except surety 
 
  prior approval workers’ compensation loss costs and 
assigned risk rates  
 file and use  workers’ compensation loss cost 
multipliers and supplementary rate 
information 
  file and use title 
New Hampshire file and use (competitive market);  
prior approval (non-competitive 
market) 
personal lines (competitive market) 
  use and file  
 
commercial lines (competitive market), 
workers’ compensation 
  prior approval commercial lines (non-competitive 
market) 
  no filing ocean marine, aircraft, financial 
guaranty, boiler and machinery 
  use and file title 
  prior approval workers’ compensation 
  no filing required ocean marine, aircraft, financial 
guaranty, boiler and machinery 
New Jersey use and file commercial lines 
  prior approval other property and casualty lines, 
workers’ compensation, title 
New Mexico prior approval  property and casualty lines (non-
competitive markets, reverse competitive 
and  residual markets), workers’ 
compensation 
 no file property and casualty lines ( competitive 
markets except workers’ compensation 
and medical professional liability) 
  commissioner-set rates title 
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New York prior approval workers’ compensation, title, 
medical malpractice, personal and 
commercial lines 
 flex rating auto 
  file and use other property and casualty lines 
North Carolina prior approval personal auto, homeowners 
  modified file and use commercial property and casualty 
lines 
  file and use workers’ compensation, title 
North Dakota prior approval all lines except workers’ compensation 
and aircraft 
Ohio file and use all other lines 
  file and use (competitive market) 
prior approval (non-competitive 
market) 
commercial casualty 
  file and use medical malpractice 
Oklahoma use and file property and casualty lines (competitive 
market)  
  file and use property and casualty lines (non-
competitive market), medical 
malpractice 
Oregon flex rating commercial casualty 
  prior approval workers’ compensation, title 
  file and use other property and casualty lines 
Pennsylvania prior approval property and casualty lines 
  exempt from filing large commercial risks 
  file and use small commercial risks 
Rhode Island file and use casualty, property, title 
  prior approval workers’ compensation 
  no file large commercial risks 
  flex rating casualty insurance, fire and marine 
South Carolina prior approval all lines 
  prior approval or file and use commercial auto rate changes of 
7 percent or less 
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South Dakota no file large commercial risks 
  file and use all lines except title 
  prior approval title 
Tennessee  prior approval  
 
use and file 
personal lines, workers 
compensation  
 
commercial lines, workers compensation 
loss cost multipliers 
   
file and use 
 
title 
Texas file and use all lines 
 commissioner sets rates title 
Utah use and file property and casualty lines 
  file and use title, workers’ compensation 
Vermont prior approval workers’ compensation, auto (assigned 
risk), property and casualty lines ( non-
competitive market) 
  use and file property and casualty lines (except 
claims made and assigned risk), title 
and other types of workers’  
compensation (voluntary market) 
Virginia prior approval residual market for workers’ 
compensation and automobile; home 
protection, credit property, credit 
involuntary unemployment 
  no file large commercial risks, title 
  file and use (competitive market) general liability, homeowners, fire, 
miscellaneous property and casualty, 
boiler and machinery, surety, credit,  
inland marine, farm owners’, mortgage 
guaranty 
commercial multi-peril; 
professional liability and legal services 
  60 days prior filing requirement for 
non-competitive lines 
property and casualty lines identified 
by commissioner after hearing 
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Washington prior approval property and casualty (except 
commercial lines), 
medical malpractice, 
workers' compensation 
  use and file commercial lines 
  file and use title 
West Virginia prior approval other  property and casualy lines, 
excluding workers’ compensation 
  file and use commercial lines 
Wisconsin use and file property and casualty, title 
  prior approval workers’ compensation 
Wyoming prior approval title, medical malpractice 
  no filing (competitive market); 
prior approval 
(non-competitive market) 
property and casualty 
SOURCE: NAIC, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS ON INSURANCE TOPICS, 
HEALTH/LIFE/PROPERTY/CASUALTY II-PA-10-1–II-PA-10-20 (2010), 
reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis or 
conclusions based on use of its data; NAIC, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STATE 
LAWS ON INSURANCE TOPICS, HEALTH/LIFE/PROPERTY/CASUALTY II-PA-
10-9 (2008), reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any 
analysis or conclusions based on use of its data. 
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Appendix 2 
 
2007 Commercial Lines Data – Countrywide 
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N 
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al 
Auto 
Liability 
22,071,57
7,526 
27.64 
percent 308.6 103 28 35
3.50 
percent
62.76 
percen
t 
6.45 
perce
nt 
Commerci
al 
Auto 
Physical 
7,255,767
,155 
24.45 
percent 260 114 24 29
6.44 
percent
34.54 
percen
t 
11.72 
perce
nt 
Commerci
al 
Auto 
Total 
29,327,34
4,681 
25.89 
percent 281.5 109 27 33
4.24 
percent
54.73 
percen
t 
7.39 
perce
nt 
Commerci
al 
Multiple 
Peril 
36,138,79
9,711 
26.75 
percent 327.8 105 36 34
4.52 
percent
68.36 
percen
t 
7.00 
perce
nt 
Fire 
12,235,77
5,465 
38.74 
percent 579.2 95 32 29
26.33 
percent
152.40 
percen
t 
17.39 
perce
nt 
Allied 
Lines 
11,399,11
0,261 
42.38 
percent 621.6 85 29 37
48.72 
percent
242.60 
percen
t 
8.41 
perce
nt 
Inland 
Marine 
15,408,76
3,035 
33.44 
percent 450 78 25 30
21.02 
percent
111.90 
percen
t 
18.46 
perce
nt 
Medical 
Malpracti
ce 
11,684,42
5,721 
25.27 
percent 289.9 99 41 25
4.24 
percent
87.39 
percen
t 
6.15 
perce
nt 
Other 
Liability 
54,845,52
8,333 
38.39 
percent 627.9 88 36 25
1.28 
percent
126.30 
percen
t 
5.28 
perce
nt 
Workers 
Compensa
tion 
52,247,49
8,240 
34.20 
percent 425.5 104 35 37
5.77 
percent
71.94 
percen
t 
6.76 
perce
nt 
SOURCE: NAIC, 2007 Commercial Lines Competition Database Report 13 
(2008), reprinted with permission. The NAIC does not endorse any analysis 
or conclusions based on use of its data. 
 
ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION AND THE  
NEED FOR MORE STATE REGULATORY  
OVERSIGHT 
 
JILLIAN REDDING, ESQ.* 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the current state of ERISA law and its effects 
concerning good faith, fiduciary breaches, and the remedies available 
under ERISA. Recent case law provides that the duty of good faith applies 
in an ERISA context; however, any breaches result in recovery to the 
employee benefit plan and not usually to the injured victim. According to 
case law, ERISA precludes state remedies, even laws specific to insurance.  
In part one, this paper provides an overview of ERISA and why state 
remedies or more state oversight are necessary to protect beneficiaries. 
Section two discusses the legislative background of ERISA. Section three 
discusses several cases that illustrate ERISA’s lack of appropriate 
remedies for fiduciary breaches. Section four provides a case study of 
Unum Provident, a disability insurer that made such egregious breaches 
that it was required to have long-term, strict oversight by the state 
departments of insurance. The last section compares several theories by 
other authors on how to improve ERISA’s remedies, along with this 
author’s argument that the most appropriate and efficient way to remedy 
breaches is to require strict oversight by the state departments of 
insurance, which has proved to be most successful in the Unum Provident 
case.  
   
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In March 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, a health care bill that expands health care to a greater 
portion of Americans and prohibits insurers from rejecting applicants based 
on, among other things, pre-existing conditions.1 This law was passed in 
                                                                                                                 
* LLM., Insurance Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, May 2010;  
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, January 2010; B.A., University of 
Massachusetts, June 2006. Sincere thanks to Professor Kochenburger for his 
mentoring for this article. I owe a debt of gratitude to Jared Cantor for repeatedly 
reading this article and for listening to me talk about insurance law when no one 
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part because of the severe ongoing crises in healthcare. In 2009 alone, the 
U.S. is estimated to have spent 17.3% of the gross domestic product on 
healthcare.2 This notable day will go down in history along with days that 
other great social welfare bills were passed, such as Social Security and 
Medicare. One glaring oversight, however, is that the bill fails to correct an 
erroneous interpretation by the courts that has been ongoing for decades: 
the remedies available under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA).3   
 This paper concerns ERISA, the statutory remedies available to 
participants and beneficiaries, and a way to protect insureds from egregious 
insurer behavior. ERISA law governs the benefit plans offered by 
employers, such as pension and healthcare plans (called “welfare benefit 
plans”). The Supreme Court has held that the remedies specifically 
enumerated in section 502 of ERISA are the exclusive remedies available 
to participants and beneficiaries in any claims relating to ERISA, and has 
interpreted the “other appropriate equitable relief” provision to preclude 
make-whole relief, such as money damages, for serious fiduciary breaches.  
The Supreme Court interprets ERISA’s remedies section narrowly instead 
of following the true intent of ERISA: protecting the benefits of 
participants and beneficiaries of such plans balanced against the need to 
encourage employers to offer such plans. Most courts have decided that, in 
the competing interests of protecting the participants versus less regulation 
for employers, Congress intended for less regulation to encourage 
employers to offer plans. This results in less protection for breaches of 
fiduciary duties. In doing so, the courts reject that any state tort claims may 
                                                                                                                 
else found it interesting, and for being a fantastic fiancée.  I am also grateful to my 
family and friends for their unending support, especially my parents, Lorraine and 
Lawrence Redding, and my grandparents, Bill and Sandy Watson.  
 
1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010).   
2 NHE Fact Sheet, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS FOR 2009-2010, http://www.cms. 
gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp (last visited May 16, 
2010); see also Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, The Kaiser Family 
Foundation Report on Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending (March 2009), 
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf (estimating that the 
U.S. spent 17.6% of GDP on healthcare) (last visited May 10, 2010).  
3 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)). 
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apply to breaches of fiduciary duties in employee benefit health plans, such 
as insurance unfair trade practices, bad faith, or negligence.4   
 Section two of this paper discusses the history and Congressional 
intent in passing ERISA. Section three illustrates the problems of ERISA’s 
lack of remedies for beneficiaries by summarizing major case law, legal 
articles, and investigative journalism by the popular show Good Morning 
America. Section four is a case study of a major disability insurer, Unum 
Group,5 and the litigation and ultimate regulatory oversight due to 
egregious bad faith on the part of the company. Section five argues for 
more regulatory oversight for ERISA insurers, which has proved successful 
in the Unum example and arguably changed the company into a possible 
model of the industry.   
 Ultimately, this paper supports the viewpoints of several writers, 
namely that trust law supports consequential relief in certain instances and 
state insurance unfair practices statutes should be saved from preemption 
under the savings clause, including its remedies, as Congress expressly 
stated that such insurance laws must apply to employee benefit plans.6  
However, as Congress and the courts are unlikely to change, it is up to the 
regulators – the state departments of insurance – to effect this protection of 
                                                                                                                 
4 It is of note that penalties for violations of such claims are what keep 
insurance companies in check: a fear of large monetary penalties by the courts. 
This check is completely lacking in the ERISA context because of ERISA’s 
conflict preemption in section 514, which requires ERISA’s regulations to 
“supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan.”  See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2007). 
5 Unum Group is the parent company of Unum Life Insurance Company, the 
Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, Provident Life and Accident Insurance 
Company, Provident Life and Casualty Insurance Company, and First Unum Life 
Insurance Company. 
6 See Donald Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, 
Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 
115 (2001); John H. Langbein, Trust Law As Regulatory Law: The 
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1340-41 (2007); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means 
by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and 
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1338, 1362 (2003); Charlotte Johnson, 
Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ 
Impenetrable ERISA Shield, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1591 (2006); Susan Harthill, 
A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” 
Relief is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 722-24 
(2008). 
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its citizens from bad faith practices by ERISA insurers. The purpose of this 
paper is to encourage the state departments of insurance to promulgate, 
enact, and enforce regulations for practices and procedures for ERISA 
insurers to follow, as they did for Unum in the Regulatory Settlement 
Agreements. The regulations should focus on the duties of good faith and 
fair dealing that insurers owe insureds, but is currently lacking in the 
ERISA landscape.  
 
II. THE HISTORY OF ERISA 
 
 ERISA was passed in 1974 with the intent to protect “millions of 
employees and their dependents” in their retirement benefits, as stated in 
the Congressional findings and declaration of policy.7 This law established 
a regulatory and guaranty system designed to ensure that employees 
received the retirement benefits promised. However, some note that the 
health insurance provisions were hastily added last minute.8    
 ERISA was a reaction to the previously enacted Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA), which sought to provide some 
federal oversight of retirement benefits.9 WPPDA failed to provide the 
necessary mechanisms to adequately protect employee retirement benefits, 
as it lacked a method to control administration of the plans or a way to 
remedy abuses in plan administration, and retired workers lost anticipated 
benefits promised by employers.10 Recognizing this failure, the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare appointed a subcommittee to 
investigate the problem, concluded that WPPDA lacked the necessary 
substantive regulatory controls, and suggested a that new “comprehensive 
and reticulated statute” be enacted to correctly regulate the pension 
industry.11 This new regulation was to protect against, as one writer termed 
                                                                                                                 
7 29 U.S.C. § 1001; ERISA § 2. 
8 TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 130 (2d ed. Aspen Publishers 
2008).  
9 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, 
repealed by ERISA § 111(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1974).  
10 Bogan, supra note 6. Notably, the WPPDA preserved state remedies to 
supplement its regulation. See Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 
35 (repealed 1974); Bogan, supra note 6. 
11 Bogan, supra note 6, at 115-16 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4, reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4841, and 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON 
LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EMPLOYEE RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974 at 590 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 
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it, default risk and administration risk.12 Default risk pertains to the danger 
that an employer may dishonor the promised pension, and applies mainly to 
defined benefit pension plans.13 Administration risk is the danger that the 
fiduciary (person responsible for managing and investing plan assets and/or 
paying claims) may abuse his or her authority by performing 
inappropriately, misusing plan assets, or improperly refusing to pay 
promised benefits.14 The health care and disability insurance issue concerns 
this latter risk because it is where the least protection is provided to 
claimants. 
  
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
 
 In passing ERISA, Congress noted that there was a lack of 
transparency to employees and adequate safeguards concerning plan 
operation, thus “it is desirable in the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of 
commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with 
respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans.”15  
Congress was very specific in its intentions when passing ERISA and 
intended “to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the 
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans”; further “provide 
reasonable protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of 
financially distressed multiemployer pension plans”16 and “encourage the 
maintenance and growth of single-employer defined benefit pension 
plans.”17 This encouragement illustrates Congress’ intent to provide a 
uniform framework of regulation for employee benefit plans to lessen the 
burden of compliance on employers and entice them to offer such plans.18  
Congress also sought to protect the plan participants’ interests by 
“providing . . . appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to Federal 
courts.”19   
 
                                                                                                                 
“Legislative History”]; H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N.  4642, and in 2 Legislative History at 2351)).  
12 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1323. 
13 Id.   
14 Id.  
15 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).  
16 Id. §§ 1001a(c)(2)-(3).  
17 Id. § 1001b(c)(2).  
18 See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).  
19 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
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B. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND PREEMPTION  
 
 ERISA is frustrating to insureds and claimants attempting to utilize 
state insurance bad faith laws because of its strict preemption laws, which 
provide an easy out for plan fiduciaries: removal to federal court, thereby 
preempting all state laws. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal laws may 
preempt or take precedence over state laws by express provision, 
implication, or when there is a conflict between federal and state law.20  
ERISA has three main provisions that control the preemption of state laws.  
 The first, the “preemption clause”, in section 514(a), states: 
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) [the “savings clause”] of this 
section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter 
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”21 The next provision, “the 
savings clause”, in section 514(b)(2)(A) provides: “[e]xcept as provided in 
subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be 
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”22 The last clause, called the 
“deemer clause”, in section 514(b)(2)(B), has been held only to apply to 
self-insured plans, and states:  
 
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust 
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an 
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, 
or investment company or to be engaged in the business of 
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State 
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance 
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment 
companies.23 
 
                                                                                                                 
20 See U.S. CONST. art IV; N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (stating the supremacy of 
federal laws over state laws due to the Supremacy Clause, and its effect on 
ERISA).  
21 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a)).  
22 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)). 
23 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)). In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 
52, 61 (1990), the Court held that the deemer clause exempts self-funded ERISA 
plans from state laws that “regulate insurance” within the meaning of the savings 
clause. 
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 To put it more clearly, the preemption clause holds that all state 
insurance laws that apply an ERISA plan are preempted because they 
“relate” to an ERISA plan. “Relates to” has been an issue much discussed 
in case law, and in 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court applied a narrower 
reading than before in determining what exactly “relates to” means.24 In 
essence, the Court held that if the state law references or targets an ERISA 
plan, or has a connection to or directly affects the ERISA plan, it is 
preempted.25 However, the savings clause will “save” state laws that 
specifically pertain to insurance, banking, or securities, and those laws will 
still apply to ERISA plans. An example of this is when an employer 
purchases insurance for group coverage of its employees under a plan, thus 
uses an insurer, and the plan is subject to state regulation because the 
employer is using direct insurance and there is an insurance contract. 
 Under the deemer clause, self-funded plans are not subject to state 
insurance laws. A plan is self-funded when the employer completely funds 
the plan, or creates a trust for the employee health plans and deposits 
money for the claims into the trust. It is not considered insurance because 
there is no actual insurance contract that is transacted by the employer with 
regards to the plan, and the state law cannot regulate it via its power to 
regulate insurance contracts.26 Common sense dictates that, due to 
numerous state insurance regulation laws which are expensive to comply 
with, employers are more likely to avoid the costs of complying with the 
insurance state regulations by creating a trust.   
 When presenting the bills for ERISA, the preemption provisions 
were described as a “reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to 
regulate the field of employee benefit plans as ERISA’s crowning 
achievement” by Representative Dent.27 Another politician, Senator 
Harrison Williams, provided that this provision “and its narrow exceptions, 
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating 
                                                                                                                 
24 See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 
656-57. 
25 Id.  
26 See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 64-65 (stating that “[o]ur interpretation of the 
deemer clause makes clear that if a plan in insured, a State may regulate it 
indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts; if 
the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it”). The Court also noted that it 
realized it was making a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, thus 
“leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter is not.” Id. at 62 
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)). 
27 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 482 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (citing 120 Cong. 
Rec. 29197 (1974)).  
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the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of 
employee benefit plans. “This principle is intended to apply in its broadest 
sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality 
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.”28 The result: this legislation 
effectively deregulated employee health and disability benefits by allowing 
employee benefit plans to largely be exempt from state insurance 
regulation. While the insurance forms must still be approved by the state 
department of insurance and the insurer must abide by the funding 
requirements, the insurer is completely exempt from state unfair insurance 
practices statutes.  
 
C. REMEDIES UNDER ERISA 
 
 Section 502 provides the civil enforcement language for suits 
brought against plan fiduciaries. It allows participants and beneficiaries to 
bring suit to: (1) recover benefits due under the plan; (2) enforce his or her 
rights under the terms of the plan; (3) clarify his or her rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan; or (4) to enjoin fiduciaries from acts or 
practices that violate ERISA.29 It also allows for “appropriate relief”, which 
includes language from section 1109, which gives the court discretion to 
order “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate” for fiduciary breaches.30 It also allows the Secretary of Health 
to assess and collect civil penalties for certain violations.31 This section 
applies to both employee insurance benefit plans and trusts. Section 502, 
which carves out jurisdiction for federal district courts in ERISA-related 
claims, also allows for concurrent jurisdiction (i.e., plaintiff can bring the 
suit in either state or federal court) to recover plan benefits, enforce benefit 
rights, or clarify future benefits.32 However, a cause of action will always 
be subject to removal to federal court. 
 There is a lack of state remedies and compensatory remedies 
afforded to plan participants and beneficiaries when an administrator 
violates the fiduciary duties. As noted above, section 502(a) establishes the 
remedies a participant or beneficiary may seek when a violation of 
fiduciary obligation under ERISA occurs, and the remedies are largely 
remedial in nature. Notably, courts have held that no remedies are available 
                                                                                                                 
28 Id. (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (1974)).  
29 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).  
30 Id. (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)).  
31 Id.  
32 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (e).  
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to plan participants or beneficiaries unless it is enumerated in this section, 
because “Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement 
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions by 
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of 
a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims 
within the scope of § 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”33 There is no ability to bring a bad faith claim 
against a plan or its fiduciary or be awarded punitive damages.34 This 
leaves plan participants and beneficiaries in the untenable condition of 
fighting with the plan’s administrators over benefits, with little to no 
recourse from the courts, especially if the plan language affords the 
administrator with discretionary authority to interpret the plan, raising the 
level of review by a court to arbitrary and capricious.35   
 In short, if a plaintiff brings suit because of a mishandled benefit 
claim and suffers health damages due to the denied treatment, all he may 
receive from the court is (1) an injunction to stop the insurer from 
wrongfully denying benefits in the future and (2) “other equitable relief.”36  
The courts have interpreted the “equitable remedy” to mean that the 
plaintiff must receive the benefit that was wrongfully denied. However, this 
does not allow the plaintiff to receive any damages for his suffering, the 
delay, or for the consequential further treatment required from the wrongful 
benefit refusal. As one writer states, “The courts have . . . interpreted 
ERISA’s ‘equitable relief’ provision to prevent an insured from obtaining 
‘make-whole relief.’ Make-whole relief includes expenses that an insured 
may have incurred due to the wrongful denial of benefits, such as physical 
harm or suffering.”37 The Court’s interpretation of “other equitable relief” 
defies insurance principles. Under traditional insurance law, plaintiffs are 
usually entitled to damages for insurer breaches under the notion that the 
insurance contract is one of adhesion, the insured is not sophisticated and is 
unable to negotiate in any way with the insurer, and to oppose insurer 
                                                                                                                 
33 See Aetna Health Ins. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004); Pilot Life Ins. 
Co., 481 U.S. at 52.  
34 Davila, 542 U.S. at 214; Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52-53; Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985).  
35 Discretionary authority in plan documents was highlighted and basically 
approved by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101 (1989).  
36 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
37 Elizabeth Khoury, HMO Liability After Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila: Are 
Patients’ Rights At Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2006) (footnotes and 
citations omitted).  
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opportunism.38 Courts utilize contract law, essentially the principles of 
reasonable expectations and unjust enrichment, to remedy plaintiffs.  
 
D. ERISA, TRUST LAW, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
 
 An administrator of an employee benefit plan or trust is considered 
a fiduciary and manages the assets within the plan or trust for the claims of 
the participants or beneficiaries. ERISA states the fiduciary duties owed by 
those who have control over the assets, management and administration of 
a plan in ERISA sections 404 and 405. First, fiduciaries have the duty of 
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries, and must always discharge his 
or her duties solely in the interest of those participants and beneficiaries.39 
Next, the fiduciary must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use . . . .”40 Further, the 
fiduciary must reasonably divest the investment of assets and follow the 
terms of the ERISA plan, unless it violates ERISA.41 
 The duties of loyalty and prudence have the most teeth, as they 
require the fiduciary to solely act for the participants in a prudent manner – 
thus the fiduciary must “deal fairly and honestly with beneficiaries”.42  
Congress based ERISA plan administrators’ fiduciary obligations on trust 
law.43 This “fiduciary law of plan administration governs claims 
administration as well as the administration of plan assets.”44   
                                                                                                                 
38 See C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa 
1975).  Opportunism is described as the insurer’s ability to refuse to pay claims 
after the insured has faithfully paid all premiums, and it is too late for the insured 
to switch insurers. See supra note 10.  
39 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
40 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
41 Id. §§ 1104(a)(1)(C)-(D).  
42 Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (citing GEORGE GLEASON 
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, p. 
218-19 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959)). 
43 Varity, 516 U.S. at 506; see also Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, 
supra note 6, at 1316 (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 115 (1989)); John A. Pereira, A Fiduciary’s Right to Contribution or 
Indemnity Under ERISA, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507, 518 (1996) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4869).  
44 Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1326. 
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 ERISA subjects the administrators of the plan to a modified and 
constricted version of the “core substantive rules of trust fiduciary law”.45  
The plan administrator or fiduciary is expected to primarily focus on 
ensuring that the benefit recipient's expectations are fulfilled; they should 
not be primarily focused on protecting the plan’s assets.46 ERISA allows a 
fiduciary to be personally liable for a breach of duties, responsibilities, or 
obligations.47 ERISA provides that the fiduciary must “make good to such 
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore 
to such plan any profits of such fiduciary” made through the use of plan 
assets.48 Importantly, the statute gives the court discretion to order “such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate” for 
fiduciary breaches.49 
 Under traditional trust law, the trustee is the guardian of the trust’s 
assets.50 Trust law recognizes the need to preserve the assets in the trust to 
satisfy future and present claims, and requires the trustee to “take an 
impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries.”51 When a trustee is 
given discretion as to his exercise of power, the court may only intercede 
when there is an abuse of that discretion.52 Further, one treatise suggests 
that a court may remove a trustee’s power of discretion when there is a 
reason to believe that he will not act fairly, such as by showing that the 
trustee has already acted in bad faith.53 Another source indicates that the 
                                                                                                                 
45 Id. at 1326 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (2006), § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)).  
46 Pereira, supra note 43, at 518 (citing Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & 
Sons, 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that fiduciary’s duty is to insure the 
honest administration of financially sounds plans); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 21-22 
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4659-60 (noting that it is not the 
fiduciary’s duty to primarily focus on the protection of assets)).  
47 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1957). 
51 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1957)).  
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1957). 
53 Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1647 (2010) (“If the trustee’s 
failure to pay a reasonable amount [to the beneficiary of the trust] is due to a 
failure to exercise [the trustee's] discretion honestly and fairly, the court may well 
fix the amount [to be paid] itself. On the other hand, if the trustee's failure to 
provide reasonably for the beneficiary is due to a mistake as to the trustee's duties 
or powers, and there is no reason to believe the trustee will not fairly exercise the 
discretion once the court has determined the extent of the trustee's duties and 
powers, the court ordinarily will not fix the amount but will instead direct the 
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court may intercede when the trustee acts “beyond the bounds of 
reasonable judgment.”54 Yet another treatise states that, after a trustee has 
abused his discretion, the court may decide “for the trustee how he should 
act, either by stating the exact result it desires to achieve, or by fixing some 
limits on the trustee's action and giving him leeway within those limits.”55  
Further, when there is a conflict, trust law allows a court to scrutinize 
conflicted discretionary acts.56  
 Notably, trust law allows make-whole relief, including 
consequential relief, for acts of “negligence or misconduct in the making or 
retaining of investments.”57 The make-whole standard under trust law 
restores the victim to the position he would have been in had no breach 
occurred, and includes an award of monetary damages.58 
 Appearing to neglect the trust law precedent, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted “other appropriate equitable relief” to be similar to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and declared that ERISA 
                                                                                                                 
trustee to make reasonable provision for the beneficiary's support.”) (citing 3 A. 
SCOTT, W. FRATCHER, & M. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.2.1, at 
1348-49 (5th ed. 2007)) (footnotes omitted).  
54 Id. at 1648 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. i, at 406 
(1957)).  
55 Id. at 1648 (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 223 (2d rev. ed. 1980)). 
56 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2008) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107, cmt.  f (1957) (discretionary acts of 
trustee with settlor-approved conflict subject to “careful scrutiny”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107, illus. 1 (1957) (conflict is “a factor to be considered 
by the court in determining later whether” there has been an “abuse of discretion”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 187, cmt. d (1957); 3 A. SCOTT, W. 
FRATCHER & M. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.2, at 1342-43 (5th 
ed. 2007) (hereinafter SCOTT) (same). See also, e.g., BOGERT § 543, at 264 (rev. 2d 
ed. 1992) (settlor approval simply permits conflicted individual to act as a trustee); 
BOGERT § 543(U), at 422-31 (same); SCOTT § 17.2.11, at 1136-39 (same)). 
57 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1337 
(quoting BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 at 38-39 (rev. 2d ed. 
1995)).  
58 Id. at 1335 (quoting 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)); Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002) (citing RESTATEMENT OF 
RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. a (1936); GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 
1.4, at 17, § 3.7, at 262 (1978)).  
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precludes “awards for compensatory or punitive damages.”59 The Court 
reasoned that such relief must be limited to the scope of appropriate relief 
typically available in equity.60 However, in an amicus brief submitted by 
the Solicitor General, the argument was made that “equitable relief” 
included damages claims, because traditionally money damages were 
available in equity courts against trustees for breaches of fiduciary trust.61  
Interestingly, even one of the drafters of ERISA disagrees with the Court’s 
interpretation of “equitable relief”, stating that it is “preposterous to think 
that the ERISA conferees or the ERISA Congress intended to repudiate the 
law-equity fusion in an ERISA context, and yet would never say a word 
about it.”62 
  
III. PROBLEMS WITH ERISA AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 
 
 The majority of courts interpret ERISA to preempt all state remedy 
laws, both statutory and common law. These courts are incorrect for several 
reasons: first, Congress’s original intent in passing ERISA; second, the 
equitable principles of justice in the law; and third, principles of statutory 
construction. All three reasons support interpreting ERISA to allow at least 
some state law remedies, particularly those which apply specifically to 
insurance companies, to apply to certain fiduciary claims in order to protect 
plan participants and beneficiaries, and ensure that plan fiduciaries exercise 
the utmost care and diligence in plan decisions, thereby always placing the 
participants’ needs first.63   
 
A. CASE LAW 
 
 Lack of fiduciary loyalty leads to the majority of lawsuits and is a 
major problem in employee welfare benefit law. Plan fiduciaries must be 
                                                                                                                 
59 Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (citing United States v. 
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)).  
60 Id. at 262-63.  
61 Id. at 255-56.  
62 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1333 (citing 
Letter from Michael S. Gordon to John Langbein (June 14, 2002)).  
63 It is of note that these duties are what fiduciaries are supposed to be held to 
and follow: the duty of loyalty (to discharge duties solely in the interest of 
participants and beneficiaries, see 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (2006)) and the duty of 
prudence (to act with the skill and diligence of a prudent person in that position); 
26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(B) (2006)). 
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held to a higher standard, and Congress intended for the courts to hold 
fiduciaries to this higher standard by incorporating the fiduciaries’ duties in 
section 404(a). Courts have, for the most part, failed to do so (and in some 
circumstances, specifically excused those fiduciary duties as not applying 
for HMOs – a real travesty of justice),64 and have failed in their 
administration of justice, as it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to 
leave participants – the very people sought to be protected – without 
equitable redress for serious harms committed under ERISA plans.   
 In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, the employee-
beneficiary, Doris Russell, received her health insurance through an 
employee benefit plan funded by her employer, Mass. Mutual.65 She 
became disabled due to a back ailment and received benefits for about five 
months, when the disability committee terminated her benefits based on an 
orthopedic surgeon’s report. She requested an internal review and 
submitted a report from her psychiatrist indicating that she suffered from a 
psychosomatic disability, rather than an orthopedic illness. Her benefits 
were reinstated about five months later, after an examination by another 
psychiatrist.66   
 She claimed to have been injured from the improper refusal to pay 
benefits because it forced her disabled husband to cash out his retirement 
savings, which in turn aggravated the psychological condition that caused 
her back ailment. Her complaint was based on both state law and on 
ERISA.67 The case was removed to federal court, and the court granted 
Mass. Mutual’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the state law 
claims were pre-empted by ERISA and the claims for extra-contractual 
damages and punitive damages were barred under ERISA.68 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state law claims were preempted, 
but held that she alleged a cause of action under ERISA, as taking 132 days 
to process her claim violated a fiduciary’s obligation to process claims in 
                                                                                                                 
64 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-35 (2000) (holding that HMOs 
are not meant to be fiduciaries and held to fiduciary duties under ERISA when 
making mixed eligibility decisions for participants and beneficiaries; holding the 
HMOs to such a standard would “in effect . . . be nothing less than elimination of 
the for-profit HMO” as the court must allow the HMO to make decisions 
influenced by financial incentives, even if it to the detriment of the participant or 
beneficiary). 
65 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 137. 
68 Id.  
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good faith and in a diligent manner.69 Thus, the appeals court reasoned, this 
violation gave rise to a cause of action under § 409(a) that could be 
asserted by a plan beneficiary pursuant to § 502(a)(2); and under § 409(a), 
the court has discretion to award  “such other equitable or remedial relief as 
the court may deem appropriate.”70 The appeals court believed it had “wide 
discretion as to the damages to be awarded”, including compensatory and 
punitive damages.71 The Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages are 
recoverable under § 409(a) if the fiduciary “acted with actual malice or 
wanton indifference to the rights of a participant or beneficiary”, and the 
court believed this result was supported by the text of § 409(a) and the 
congressional purpose of providing broad remedies to prevent violations of 
the Act.72 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under § 409, the remedy 
of “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate” is only available to the plan, not to an individual.73 The Court 
decided that, since Congress’ focus was on protecting mismanagement of 
pension plans, the intent was to exclude individual recovery to beneficiaries 
for fiduciary breaches.74 The Court stated that a “fair contextual reading of 
the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily 
concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that 
would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual 
beneficiary”, thus eliminating any hope for emotional compensatory 
damages to the plaintiff, based on a whim of the Court.75 The Court 
candidly and unabashedly wrote off the need to protect the beneficiaries’ 
interests in a single paragraph.76 Conclusively, the court held that plaintiffs 
may not recover extra-contractual damages, stating it was “reluctant to 
tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the 
                                                                                                                 
69 Id. at 137-38. 
70 Id. at 138. 
71 Russell, 473 U.S. at 138. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 140. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 142.  
76 Id. at 142-43 (the Court states: “It is of course true that the fiduciary 
obligations of plan administrators are to serve the interest of participants and 
beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits authorized by the 
plan. But the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper 
management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the maintenance of 
proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest.”).  
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one in ERISA.”77 In a subsequent case, the Court noted that this plaintiff 
had ultimately received all the benefits owed to her, albeit late. Her 
additional claim for consequential damages was for the delay in processing 
her claim, and ERISA, the Court concluded, “does not provide a remedy 
for this type of injury.”78   
 In Pilot Life, Dedeaux, the plaintiff-employee, sustained back 
injuries at work and brought a claim under his employer’s long-term 
disability plan. The insurer, Pilot Life, processed disability claims and 
determined who received disability benefits.79 Pilot Life initially approved 
his benefits, and then cancelled them after two years, followed by a three-
year period of several benefit reinstatements and terminations by Pilot 
Life.80 Dedeaux brought suit in federal court, citing tortuous breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud.81 He sought damages for 
mental and emotional distress, along with punitive and exemplary damages, 
totaling $750,000.82 All of his claims were under state tort law, and not 
ERISA.83   
 The district court granted Pilot Life’s motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that all of the claims were preempted under ERISA.84 The 
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the law was saved under the savings 
clause because it affected the “relationship between the insurer and the 
insured,” thus placing it within the ‘business of insurance’ under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and therefore qualifying as a law which regulates 
insurance.85   
 The Supreme Court reversed. First, it noted that Dedeaux’s claims 
clearly ‘related to’ the ERISA plan were preempted under section 514(a).86  
Second, the Court rejected that the Mississippi law of bad faith is saved by 
the savings clause, because it is a general tort law that did not specifically 
                                                                                                                 
77 Russell, 473 U.S. at 147.  
78 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008).  
79 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 43-44. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 44.  
85 Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2391 (1985)).  
86 Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48.  
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apply to insurance companies, and thus did not regulate insurance.87 The 
Court distinguished this case from Metropolitan Life Ins., stating: 
 
Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan 
Life, the Mississippi common law of bad faith does not 
effect a spreading of policyholder risk. The state common 
law of bad faith may be said to concern “the policy 
relationship between the insurer and the insured.” The 
connection to the insurer-insured relationship is attenuated 
at best, however. In contrast to the mandated-benefits law 
in Metropolitan Life, the common law of bad faith does 
not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer 
and the insured; it declares only that, whatever terms have 
been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a breach of 
that contract may in certain circumstances allow the 
policyholder to obtain punitive damages. The state 
common law of bad faith is therefore no more “integral” to 
the insurer-insured relationship than any State's general 
contract law is integral to a contract made in that State. 
Finally, as we have just noted, Mississippi's law of bad 
faith, even if associated with the insurance industry, has 
developed from general principles of tort and contract law 
available in any Mississippi breach of contract case.88 
 
The Court held that in order to be saved under the savings clause the state 
law must specifically regulate insurance. 
 In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the employer, Varity Corporation, owned 
a subsidiary, Massey-Ferguson (“MF”), which employed the plaintiffs and 
provided a self-funded employee welfare plan.89 Varity determined that 
                                                                                                                 
87 Id. at 50 (“A common-sense view of the word ‘regulates’ would lead to the 
conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact 
on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. 
Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identified its law of bad faith with 
the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general 
principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of contract, and not 
merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages 
under Mississippi law.”).  
88 Id. at 50-51.  
89 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492 (1996). (Note that under the 
ERISA deemer clause, a self-funded plan is exempt from compliance with state 
insurance regulations and statutes.)  
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several MF divisions were losing too much money, and concocted a plan to 
place all of the unstable divisions and debt, and the employees, into another 
subsidiary, Massey Combines (MC”).90 The makers of the plan 
acknowledged the possibility that MC would fail, but saw that outcome as a 
victory because it would eliminate the unstable divisions and the debt 
transferred to MC.91 If Varity did not form the separately incorporated 
subsidiary, then Varity itself would have to pay for the debt and the ERISA 
plan benefits for the unstable divisions.92  Instead of terminating the plan, 
which would have likely resulted in the employees leaving to find new 
employment (and “voluntarily release[ing] Massey-Ferguson from its 
obligation to provide them benefits”), Varity essentially made MC the new 
employer and switched the employees to a new plan that was funded by 
MC.93 However, the employees had to elect to switch employers and thus 
to switch plans. To persuade them, Varity held a meeting and presented the 
plan, passed out documents which represented that the benefits would 
remain the same and were safe, but noted that employment conditions in 
the future depended on MC’s success.94 Unfortunately, all the employees 
agreed to Varity’s plan, and Varity also took the liberty of assigning the 
benefit obligations to 4,000 retired workers to MC.95   
 The lower court found that MC was insolvent from its very first 
day. It ended its first year with an $88 million loss and its second year in 
receivership, thus terminating the employees’ non-pension benefits.96 The 
Supreme Court held that Varity was a fiduciary of the plan, as it was both 
the employer and administrator of the plan and was acting in a fiduciary 
capacity during the meeting with employees.97 The specific context of the 
events supported that Varity was exercising discretionary authority on the 
plan’s management or administration when it made the benefit 
representations to the employees.98 The main message represented to the 
employees at the meeting, by designated fiduciaries in the plan documents, 
was that transferring to MC would not undermine their benefits. This 
constituted conveying benefit information to participants.99 Such 
                                                                                                                 
90 Id. at 492-93.  
91 See id. at 493.  
92 Id.  
93 See id. at 493-94. 
94 Id. at 494, 500-01. 
95 Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 494. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 498.  
98 Id. at 498-99.  
99 Id. at 502-03. 
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information is specifically required under ERISA to allow participants the 
ability to make an informed choice about continued participation in a new 
benefit plan.100 The district court concluded that since the fiduciaries knew 
that there was a high likelihood that the employees’ plans were not safe and 
would not remain the same, their statements were materially misleading.101  
The Supreme Court held that knowingly deceiving plan participants and 
beneficiaries violates the duty of loyalty: “lying is inconsistent with the 
duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of 
ERISA.”102 The Court further noted that trust law requires trustees to deal 
“fairly and honestly with beneficiaries.”103 
 In determining the relief warranted under ERISA, the Court held 
that individual relief was appropriate under section 502(a)(3), which 
provides that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit “(A) to 
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the 
terms of the plan.”104 The Court stated that individual relief is authorized 
under ERISA section 502(l) for violations of section 502(a)(5), and that 
section 502(a)(3) is identical to 502(a)(5), except that it allows suit to be 
brought by the Secretary of Labor.105 Further, the legislative history 
supported a broad reading of section 502 to permit broad remedies for 
redressing or preventing violations of ERISA.106 The Court further noted 
that it would be “hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize 
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured 
                                                                                                                 
100 Id. at 502, 505 (citing ERISA §§ 102, 104(b)(1), 105(a)). The Court 
rejected that these statements were made as the employer in a plan sponsor (thus in 
a manner similar to amending a plan, which is not a fiduciary act) because the 
statements were about the future of benefits, which is something that plan 
administrators regularly communicate to participants and beneficiaries. Id. at 505.  
101 Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 505.  
102 Id. (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 
F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
103 Id. (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 218-19 (2d. ed. 1993); 2A AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170, 
at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987)).  
104 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006).  
105 Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510. 
106 Id. at 512 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838). 
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beneficiaries a remedy.”107 Therefore, individual relief is allowed under 
ERISA for fiduciary breaches.  
 In Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance, arguably one of the 
most108 egregious abuses of fiduciary conduct, the plaintiff obtained health 
insurance through her employer, AT&T, and her children and husband 
were beneficiaries of the policy.109 Her husband had a drinking problem 
and was admitted to a hospital for alcohol detoxification and medical 
evaluation. The hospital notified Greenspring, the review provider who, 
under the plan, must pre-approve treatment. Greenspring refused to 
approve the treatment even though the insurance policy specifically entitled 
the insured and beneficiaries to “at least one thirty-day inpatient 
rehabilitation program per year.”110 Greenspring approved only a five-day 
stay, and he was discharged after five days, “with a diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence, alcohol withdrawal symptoms [and] elevated liver 
function.”111 Twenty-five days later, he resumed drinking and admitted 
himself to another hospital. Despite the terms of the insurance plan, 
Greenspring approved only an eight-day stay.112 After being discharged, he 
consumed a large amount of alcohol, cocaine, prescription drugs, and 
attempted to commit suicide. After a commitment hearing, the court clinic 
requested Greenspring’s approval for a thirty-day treatment at a private 
hospital, which it declined. Mr. Clarke was committed to Southeastern 
Correctional Center at Bridgewater for his detoxification and rehabilitation, 
where he received “little in the way of therapy or treatment” and was 
forcibly raped by a fellow inmate.113 Upon release, he resumed drinking 
and committed suicide.114 
 Mrs. Andrews-Clarke brought suit against Travelers and 
Greenspring, claiming Clarke’s death was the direct and foreseeable result 
of the improper refusal of Travelers and its agent Greenspring to authorize 
appropriate medical and psychiatric treatment during Clarke's repeated 
hospitalizations for alcoholism in 1994. Her claims included breach of 
contract, medical malpractice, wrongful death, loss of parental and spousal 
                                                                                                                 
107 Id. at 513.  
108 Although certainly not the most egregious. See infra Part IV. 
109 Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
110 Id. at 50-51. 
111 Id. at 51. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 52.  
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consortium, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
specific violations of the Massachusetts consumer protection laws.115   
 The district court spoke on the importance of breach of contract 
claims, noting that such causes of action “pre-date [the] Magna Carta” and 
“[are] the very bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property 
rights”, arguing that “[o]ur entire capitalist structure depends on it.”116  
Clearly regretting what it understood the law to be, the court granted 
Travelers’ motion to dismiss, effectively “slam[ming] the courthouse doors 
in [Andrews-Clarke’s] face and leav[ing] her without any remedy.”117 The 
court noted that it was just another example of “the glaring need for 
Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the 
modern health care system” because ERISA had “evolved into a shield of 
immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review providers, and 
other managed care entities from potential liability for the consequences of 
their wrongful denial of health benefits.”118 The judge acknowledged that 
the plaintiff’s claims would be cognizable if not controlled by ERISA. The 
federal judge concluded in a candid statement: 
 
Employee health benefit plans lack security because of the 
de facto immunity that the law now confers upon insurers 
and utilization review providers associated with such 
plans. Unfortunately, to date, “ERISA [has proven an 
excellent example of the classic observation that it is a 
                                                                                                                 
115 Andrews-Clark, 984 F. Supp. at 52.  
116 Id. at 52-53 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 1.4-1.6 (2d ed. 
1990)). 
117 Id. at 53.  
118 Id. (citing Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(“One consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is that plan beneficiaries or 
participants bringing certain types of state actions - such as wrongful death - may 
be left without a meaningful remedy.”); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 
F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The result ERISA compels us to reach means 
the [Plaintiff has] no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious 
mistake.”); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D. 
Mass. 1997) (Gorton, J.) (“An unfortunate consequence of ERISA preemption is, 
therefore, that plan beneficiaries or participants who bring certain kinds of state 
actions, e.g., wrongful death, may be left without a meaningful remedy. . . . Sadly, 
the case at bar compels a like result. Plaintiff's state common law claims are 
preempted by the broadly sweeping arm of ERISA. Plaintiff is left without any 
meaningful remedy even if he were to establish that [the insurer] wrongfully 
refused to provide the [bone marrow transplant] his wife urgently sought.”), aff'd, 
127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
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great deal more difficult for Congress to correct flawed 
statutes than it is to enact them in the first place . . . 
because interests coalesce around the advantageous aspects 
of the status quo. Although the alleged conduct [of 
wrongfully denying benefits that were clearly due to the 
beneficiary, resulting in his death] of Travelers and 
Greenspring in this case is extraordinarily troubling, even 
more disturbing to this Court is the failure of Congress to 
amend a statute that, due to the changing realities of the 
modern health care system, has gone conspicuously awry 
from its original intent. 
 
Does anyone care? Do you?119   
 
This judge brings to the forefront the serious concerns implicit in ERISA 
law – the lack of equitable relief allowed to injured beneficiaries in these 
circumstances.  
 In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, there were two separate cases of 
egregious HMO behavior, consolidated because the preemption issues were 
the same for both.120 Juan Davila, covered under his employer’s benefit 
plan, was prescribed Vioxx for arthritis pain by his treating doctor.121  
Aetna, the plan administrator that reviews requests for coverage and pays 
providers, declined the prescription and advised that it would only cover 
Naprosyn; Davila ingested the Naprosyn and suffered a severe reaction that 
required hospitalization and extensive treatment.122 Ruby Calad, also 
covered under an ERISA plan, underwent surgery and her doctor 
recommended an extended hospital stay to prevent post-surgery 
complications.123 Her plan administrator’s discharge nurse, a CIGNA 
employee, concluded that Calad did not need the extended stay and advised 
CIGNA to deny coverage, which it did.124 Forced to return home too early, 
she suffered post-surgery complications and required hospitalization.125  
                                                                                                                 
119 Id. at 64-65 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Catherine L. Fist, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A 
Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 99 (1996)). 
120 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).  
121 Id. at 205. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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 Both plaintiffs sued the plan administrators, alleging violations of a 
Texas bad-faith insurance statute.126 The district court held that ERISA 
preempted the claims, and, as the plaintiffs refused to amend their 
complaints to allege ERISA claims, dismissed the complaints with 
prejudice.127 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs’ claims were 
cognizable actions under ERISA’s “[section] 502(a)(1)(B), which provides 
a cause of action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, and 
[section] 502(a)(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches 
of fiduciary duty to the plan.”128 But because the decisions were mixed 
eligibility and treatment decisions by HMOs, they were not fiduciary in 
nature, and no relief was available under section 502(a)(1).129 
 The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs only complained about 
the denials of coverage promised under the terms of the plan, and that they 
were fully capable of, upon denial, paying for the treatment themselves and 
then seeking reimbursement through a section 502(a)(1)(B) action, or 
through a preliminary injunction.130 The Court held that essentially the 
claims were for the wrongful denial of benefits, which was a claim 
available under section 502, and that when a state law cause of action 
duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy, 
it conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy 
exclusive and therefore is preempted.131 The Court rejected plaintiffs’ 
argument that its claim was saved under the savings clause, which 
specifically regulates insurance, instead holding that because, as held in 
Pilot Life Ins. Co., Congress set out a comprehensive remedial scheme in 
ERISA, and “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain 
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be 
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were 
                                                                                                                 
126 Davila, 542 U.S. at 205 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 88.001 (West 
2011)). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 206.  
129 Id. (citing Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000)).  
130 Id. at 211. Clearly the Court (as it was a unanimous decision) did not 
understand the position the plaintiffs were in and were unable to empathize or 
sympathize: what person can afford to pay for a hospital visit on his own, without 
insurance? How is this a reasonable suggestion? I cannot imagine the brazenness in 
even suggesting that the plaintiff take on this responsibility, when his insurance 
should be covering it, and failed to do so out of severe negligence. And the Court 
appears to support such an act, or to shield the fiduciary, when justice and 
Congressional intent clearly foresee a different outcome.  
131 Id. at 208-09, 213-14. 
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free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in 
ERISA.”132   
 Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence is enlightening; she stated that she 
joined the “rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court 
revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”133 She 
noted that the Court’s interpretations of preemption and the “equitable 
relief” clause under section 502(a)(3) had left a “regulatory vacuum” 
because “virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few 
federal substitutes are provided.”134 She went on to give specific examples 
of situations in which fiduciary breaches have left the beneficiary in a 
deficient position due to an inability to receive ‘make-whole’ relief under 
ERISA.135 Thus, we are left with a bad taste of ‘justice’ under ERISA: that 
some members of the Court recognize that it is misinterpreting or 
incorrectly applying ERISA, leaving plaintiffs harmed yet with little or no 
relief. 
 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, the plaintiff was diagnosed 
with a “severe dilated cardiomyopathy, a heart condition”, and she applied 
for long term disability under her employer’s employee welfare benefit 
plan.136 MetLife, the insurance provider on the plan, approved her for the 
initial 24 months of benefits, concluding that she could not perform the 
material duties of her job.137 MetLife directed her to a law firm which 
would help her apply for Social Security disability benefits, and “an 
                                                                                                                 
132 Davila, 542 U.S. at 217 (alteration in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
133 Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).  
134 Id. (quoting DeFilice, 346 F.3d at 456-57 (Becker, J., concurring)). 
135 Id. at 222-23 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 
(1985) (“[T]he Court stated, in dicta: [T]here is a stark absence - in [ERISA] itself 
and in its legislative history - of any reference to an intention to authorize the 
recovery of extracontractual damages for consequential injuries.”) (second and 
third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assoc.’s, 508 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1993) (“[T]he Court held that [section] 502(a)(3)'s 
term ‘equitable relief’ . . . refer[s] to those categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not 
compensatory damages).”) (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 
(2002) (“the Court ruled that, as [section] 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for 
equitable relief, the provision excludes “the imposition of personal liability ... for a 
contractual obligation to pay money.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
136 Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008). 
137 Id.  
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Administrative Law Judge found that her illness prevented her not only 
from performing her own job but also from performing any jobs [for which 
she could qualify] existing in significant numbers in the national 
economy,” thus meeting the standard for Social Security benefits.138 She 
was granted permanent disability benefits, the majority of which went to 
MetLife and the rest of which went to the lawyers.139 MetLife subsequently 
denied her benefits beyond the 24-month mark, determining that she was 
“capable of performing full time sedentary work,” applying a standard 
similar to the one used by the administrative judge, who had found her 
incapable of such work.140   
She brought suit for judicial review of this denial of benefits, and 
the district court granted MetLife’s motion for judgment because the plan 
granted the plan administrator discretionary authority in deciding 
benefits.141 The Sixth Circuit set aside the denial of benefits because of: 
 
(1) the conflict of interest [arising from MetLife’s 
authority to determine whether it was obligated to pay 
benefits to an employee]; (2) MetLife's failure to reconcile 
its own conclusion that Glenn could work in other jobs 
with the Social Security Administration's conclusion that 
she could not; (3) MetLife's focus upon one treating 
physician report suggesting that Glenn could work in other 
jobs at the expense of other, more detailed treating 
physician reports indicating that she could not; (4) 
MetLife's failure to provide all of the treating physician 
reports to its own hired experts; and (5) MetLife's failure 
to take account of evidence indicating that stress 
aggravated Glenn's condition.142 
  
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a plan 
administrator both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits on 
claims, it creates a conflict of interest that a court may review for abuse of 
discretion in denying benefits, because “every dollar provided in benefits is 
a dollar spent by ... the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar in 
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
139 Id. at 2346-47. 
140 Id. at 2347. 
141 Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006). 
142 Metro. Life Ins., 128 S. Ct. at 2347. 
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[the employer's] pocket.”143 A troubling example appears when “[t]he 
employer's fiduciary interest may counsel in favor of granting a borderline 
claim while its immediate financial interest counsels to the contrary”, and 
“the employer has an interest . . . conflicting with that of the 
beneficiaries.”144 Here, the Court affirmed the lower court’s review of the 
benefit denial, and in doing so, took a step forward in beneficiary 
protection. 
 
B. GOOD MORNING AMERICA INVESTIGATES UNFAIR CLAIMS 
PRACTICES IN DISABILITY INSURANCE 
 
 In 2008, Good Morning America, a daily news program aired by 
ABC, broke several investigative news stories about disability insurers and 
unfair claims practices. In April, the story of Susan Kristoff displayed to 
the world the dishonest practices and lengths one insurer was willing to go 
to avoid paying her disability claim. She was diagnosed with Stage IV 
metastic breast cancer and had several doctors’ accounts confirming that 
she was disabled.145 The contract with Cigna, the disability insurer, 
provided that she be paid 60% of pre-disability income upon disability.146  
But Cigna denied her claims, and she spent two years attempting to furnish 
the “additional information” constantly requested by Cigna as “necessary” 
to further review her claim.147 Finally, she hired a lawyer and wrote to 
Good Morning America about her plight. Good Morning America 
contacted Cigna to attempt to resolve the issue.148 In response, Cigna sent a 
                                                                                                                 
143 Id. at 2348 (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 
144 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
144 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. at 115 (1989) (citing that Restatement comment); cf. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 319 (8th ed. 2004) (A conflict of interest is “[a] real or seeming 
incompatibility between one's private interests and one’s public or fiduciary 
duties.”)).  
145 See Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, Denied: Fighting for Insurance 
Coverage, ABC NEWS (Jun. 27, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id52 
57491&page=1; Brent Adams, Every Bad Faith Insurance Victim Cannot Have 
Good Morning America As Their Lawyer, INJURYBOARD BLOG FAYETTEVILLE, 
N.C. (Feb. 1, 2009 9:20 PM), http://fayetteville.injuryboard.com/miscellaneous/e 
very-badfaith-insurance-victim-cannot-have.aspx?googleid=256444.  
146 Adams, supra note 145.  
147 Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145.  
148 Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145.  
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canned statement to Good Morning America and promptly approved 
Kristoff’s claim, denying that it was because of the show’s involvement.149  
 Another story published online in 2009 described Charles Tucker’s 
fight with Standard Insurance over disability benefits. Tucker, a 48 year-
old accountant, suffered from a severe and debilitating form of multiple 
sclerosis.150 He had been paying for long-term disability insurance 
coverage, but when he became too sick to work, he stopped working and 
filed a claim. He received constant notices requesting more information and 
for months could not receive a final determination from the insurer.151  
Eleven doctors examined Tucker, and all concluded that he had MS.  
However, the insurer’s doctor, without examining Tucker or contacting him 
about the inquiry, determined that there was insufficient evidence for such 
a conclusion. Tucker hired an attorney and contacted Good Morning 
America. The show’s anchor contacted the insurer and spoke with a 
spokeswoman for the company, Susan Pisano, also a lobbyist for 
America’s Health Insurance Plans. The next day, Standard Insurance 
approved Tucker’s claim, but denied that it was because of Good Morning 
America’s investigation.152 
 One personal injury attorney blogged about this seeming epidemic 
of disability claims denials, arguing that disability claimants are in the 
worst position to fight denials.153 He stated what should be obvious: “The 
disabled person is the least likely to be able to afford an attorney [because] 
a major source of income has been taken away.”154 Perhaps his assertion is 
correct, that most insurers are betting on the fact that denials will not be 
appealed due to lack of money, or fear that the insurer will insist that a 
fraud is being committed, or lack of understanding of the denial-appeal 
system.155 If this is true, then the argument for strict regulatory oversight 
becomes absolutely necessary, as this will ensure that such claimants will 
                                                                                                                 
149 Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145; Adams, supra note 145. 
150 See Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, ‘GMA’ Gets Answers: Man with MS 
Fights for Long-Term Disability Insurance, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/TheLaw/gma-answers-man-ms-fights-long-term-
disability/story?id=6689847.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. 
153 See Frank J. Dito Jr, Good Morning America Airs Report about Disability 
Insurance, NEW YORK INJURY LAW BLOG (Nov. 19, 2009), http://nyinjuryla 
wupdateblog.com/good-morning-america-airs-report-about-disability-insurance.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
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not only have fair reviews of their claims but have recourse and knowledge 
of the appropriate recourse.  
 
C. VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE ERISA’S REMEDIES 
PROBLEM 
 
 Several authors write of different approaches for allowing extra-
contractual relief under ERISA. Three authors argue that compensatory 
(i.e., money) damages are appropriate under ERISA’s “other appropriate 
equitable relief” clause in section 502, because such relief is allowed in 
trust law.156 Another argues that plaintiffs use RICO claims to receive 
appropriate relief.157 Yet another approach argues that state insurance 
unfair practices statues must be saved from preemption, as section 
514(b)(2)(B) expressly enforces state insurance laws, while section 502 
only generally provides remedies and does not expressly preempt insurance 
laws.158 
1. Trust Law As A Basis For Additional Remedies To 
Beneficiaries 
 
 In a poignant review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Aetna 
v. Davila, Charlotte Johnson advocates that the Court has not enforced 
ERISA as it was intended by Congress, and has effectively, but 
inadvertently, “painted itself into a corner by restrictively interpreting 
ERISA to preclude compensatory relief to victims of HMO patient 
treatment decisions.”159 She argues that, as ERISA was enacted before the 
surge of HMOs, Congress could not have anticipated ERISA’s effect and 
regulation of HMO liability.160 The Court has time and again decided that, 
under ERISA, injured participants and beneficiaries may only receive 
traditional equitable relief, i.e., injunction or restitution, and not 
compensatory relief, e.g., money damages; thus, the Court has provided a 
shield for HMOs against plan participant claims.161 
                                                                                                                 
156 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1589; Harthill, supra note 6, at 722; Langbein, 
Trust Law As Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1340-41; Langbein, What ERISA 
Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, 1338, 1362. 
157 Lalena J. Turchi, Health Insurance: Paying the Premium or Paying the 
Price? – ERISA Preemption and RICO’s Recourse, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
526, 551-59 (2008). 
158 Bogan, supra note 6, at 113-14. 
159 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1589-90.  
160 Id. at 1590.  
161 Id.  
2011 ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION 197 
 The only way of effectively getting around this shield was pointed 
out by Justice Ginsburg in her Davila dissent: allow make-whole 
compensatory relief under section 502(a)(3).162 The Court’s interpretation 
of “appropriate equitable relief” is strange, in that it refuses to impose 
personal liability on the defendant, as that would transfer the equitable 
restitution to one of legal restitution.163 However, section 409 allows a 
fiduciary to be personally liable for breaches, thus such personal liability is, 
in fact, permitted and authorized under ERISA.164 Johnson also advocates 
Justice Stevens’ position, that Congress intended ERISA to provide a broad 
framework under which the courts may apply make-whole compensatory 
relief, due to ERISA’s skeletal framework incorporating some facets of 
trust law combined with Congressional intent to “protect the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans.”165 Further, monetary 
(compensatory) damages are authorized under ERISA because, as shown in 
Varity, section 502(a)(5) permits payment of civil penalties for fiduciary 
breaches to participants and beneficiaries, and sections 502(a)(5) and 
502(a)(3) are nearly identical.166 Further, Johnson argues that trust law 
permits monetary equitable relief to individuals, yet the Court’s decision to 
overlook this principle of trust law has resulted in fiduciary breaches, in the 
HMO context, to not be a breach at all.167   
 Johnson concedes that the remedial scheme in ERISA is properly 
fixed by Congress, not “creativity in the courts.”168 This article is 
encouraging in its analysis of trust law, however, the concession that only 
Congress can fix the problem is frustrating. Courts interpret laws, and if 
they misinterpret the laws, Congress may react and amend the law.  
Unfortunately, this does not always happen, and the health insurance 
industry likely has a stronghold on many politicians that prevented such an 
amendment from being passed.   
 Professor John Langbein argues that Congress only referenced trust 
law as a regulatory structure, by using the tenets of loyalty and prudence, 
but left ERISA skeletal in form to be refined by the judiciary.169 The Court 
itself acknowledged that Congress intended the judiciary to look to settled 
                                                                                                                 
162 Id. at 1591. 
163 Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).  
164 See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006).  
165 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1612 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006); Varity 
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97, 502-03 (2006)).  
166 Id. at 1613 (citing Varity, 516 U.S. at 510).  
167 Id. at 1622-23.  
168 Id. at 1617. 
169 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1326.   
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common law in shaping ERISA, thus creating a “federal common law of 
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.”170 Langbein 
illustrates several instances where the Court failed to correctly apply trust 
law principles, such as in Russell by rejecting the plaintiff’s claim for delay 
damages.171 Delay in making a distribution from a trust fund “has long been 
understood to be a breach of trust.”172 In the Uniform Trust Code of 2000, 
money damages for breaches of trust are included in the available 
remedies.173 In Bogert’s treatise on trust law, breaching trustees “may be 
directed by the court to pay damages to the beneficiary” and in cases of 
negligence or misconduct, the beneficiary may have a claim “to recover 
money damages from the trustee.”174 Thus, it seems clear that trust law, in 
fact, does allow beneficiaries to recover compensatory and consequential 
damages.   
 In drafting ERISA, Congress surpassed trust law verbiage and 
further subjected the fiduciary to “such other equitable or remedial relief as 
the court may deem appropriate,” on top of making the fiduciary liable to 
the plaintiff for recovery of the loss incurred, profits made by the fiduciary 
in the breach, and any gains made from the breach.175 This phrase is also 
found in section 502(a)(3), and is more expansive than the trust law 
standard, and it is the belief of several scholars that this language is meant 
to provide compensatory and consequential relief, as Congress was simply 
wording it in a way to address fairness.176 If the Court refuses to utilize 
trust law principles, then perhaps the statutory construction should 
persuade it that, because this phrase surpasses trust law verbiage, Congress 
intended for fairness to govern, thus allowing additional recovery for 
egregious breaches.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
170 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989). 
171 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).  
172 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1328. 
173 Id. at 1336 (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 106, 1002 (amended 2001)). 
174 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1337 
(citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 34, 38-39 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)).  
175 See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988); Langbein, What ERISA 
Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1335. 
176 Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”, supra note 6, at 1335-36.   
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2. Applying the Savings Clause with Force: State Unfair 
Insurance Practices Statutes Should be Saved from 
Preemption under the Pilot Life Rationale 
 
 In an article written before Davila, Professor Donald Bogan argues 
that state unfair insurance practices laws should be saved from preemption 
under the savings clause.177 These laws are specifically aimed at the 
regulation of the insurance industry, fulfill the requirements in the savings 
clause, and are saved from preemption under section 502 because of the 
express language in section 514(b)(2)(B), authorizing and enforcing state 
insurance laws to ERISA plans.178 In analyzing Pilot Life, he argues that 
the Court only preempted the law at issue because it was a general bad faith 
law that did not specifically regulate insurance, and as such was preempted 
by the remedies in section 502.179 In this case the Court made a landmark 
decision: that section 502 was intended by Congress as “the exclusive 
vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants . . . asserting improper 
processing of a claim for benefits.”180  
 Bogan points out that state unfair insurance practices statutes do 
more than simply provide punitive damages remedies, they “establish and 
define a standard of care owed by the insurer to the insured that attaches to 
every insurance policy.”181 The Supreme Court has, in the past, declared 
that state insurance laws affect an integral part of the policy relationship 
between the insurer and insured, and are saved from preemption.182 Bogan 
                                                                                                                 
177 Bogan, supra note 6, at 113-14. 
178 Id. at 114. 
179 Id. at 124-25 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 
(1987)).  
180 Id. at 126 (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)). In a subsequent decision by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, a claim under the Florida unfair insurance practices 
statute for disability benefits was denied. It was denied for two reasons: while it 
directly regulated insurance, it failed to meet all three prongs under the McCarran 
Ferguson test, thus precluding it from regulating the “business of insurance.” The 
court concluded that this plus the Pilot Life analysis forced preemption due to 
section 502. Id. at 131-32 (citing Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 
1467, 1468-69 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
181 Id. at 133. 
182 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985); 
Bogan, supra note 6, at 134 (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 
374 (1999) (holding that a California notice-prejudice law, requiring the insurer to 
establish prejudice before denying a claim filed late, was saved from preemption 
because it served as an integral part of the policy relationship).  
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asks: why are state insurance unfair practice statutes not also saved, when 
they clearly affect every insurance contract and “effectively create 
mandatory contract terms that require insurers to timely investigate and 
settle claims, to notify insured employees of the benefits and coverage 
contained in the insurance policies that are pertinent to a claim, and to 
refrain from attempts to obtain fraudulent releases of claims from their 
insureds?”183 He notes several lower courts, which have held that state 
insurance bad faith remedies laws do regulate insurance and are thus saved 
from preemption.184 Most of these cases, however, have subsequently been 
overruled since his article was published.  
 Bogan further argues that, taking Supreme Court precedent of 
saving insurance laws from preemption, those laws should be preempted 
because of the express language in section 514(b)(2)(B), even when the 
state remedies laws conflict with section 502, as the former expressly 
exempted state laws that regulate insurance.185 The issue really boils down 
to two competing sections of the same federal statute: one provision 
expressly exempting certain state statutes from preemption, and one 
provision providing general remedies.186 He asserts that statutory 
construction principles mandate that the courts give effect to legislative 
intent in such circumstances.187   
 The savings clause is unambiguous in its exemption of state 
insurance laws. There is no support in the legislative history that the court 
may pick and choose which insurance laws to apply, especially with 
regards to state insurance remedies laws.188 However, looking at the 
statement of Senator Williams on page 7 infra, it would appear that the 
remedies in section 502 eliminate all other laws, except for the provided 
“narrow exceptions” in ERISA. Bogan argues that the “narrow exceptions” 
are the state insurance bad faith laws, and thus are saved from preemption 
and section 502.189 Therefore, as the Court has saved other insurance laws 
from preemption under the savings clause, it should also save state 
                                                                                                                 
183 Bogan, supra note 6, at 134. 
184 Id. at 144-45. An example of the cases cited: Colligan v. UNUM Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., No. 00-K-2512, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8103 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 
2001), overruled by Kidneigh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 345 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 
2003).   
185 Bogan, supra note 6, at 152.  
186 Id. at 153. 
187 Id. at 153-54. 
188 Id. at 154 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 745-46 
(1985)). 
189 Id. at 154. 
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insurance unfair practices statutes, as they were intended to be saved by 
Congress because they integrally affect the insurer-insured insurance policy 
relationship.  
 This is a different view on ERISA and does not entail rejecting any 
statutory language. I support this reading of ERISA; however, the Court 
has, as aptly described by Johnson, “painted itself into a corner” and likely 
will not adopt this reading. The Court is unlikely to undertake a sweeping 
change of heart and overrule twenty-plus years of precedent.190 
 
3. Alternative Pleading: One Argument to Use RICO for 
Fraudulent Claims Practices  
 
 In an article written by an employee benefits consultant, Lalena 
Turchi empathizes with the strife many beneficiaries face with benefits 
claims against fiduciaries.191 She is able to give a first-hand account of the 
administrative inefficiencies inherent in the insurer-provider billing system 
which leads to erroneous rejections, and the disheartening rejection due to a 
decision that the treatment is not “medically necessary.”192 She argues that, 
since the Court has rejected application of state insurance bad faith laws, 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), found in 
18 U.S.C. § 1961, should be used.193 It is of note that RICO claims allow 
for treble damages against defendants.194 
 The Court allowed the plaintiffs-beneficiaries to assert a RICO 
claim in Humana v. Forsyth, and permitted the treble damage provision to 
                                                                                                                 
190 Perhaps the Court only takes such drastic action once a millennium, such as 
was necessary in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and such action is 
not deemed as important for the health insurance industry and protection of plan 
participants. 
191 Turchi, supra note 157, at 526. 
192 Id. at 527.  
193 Id. at 551. 
194 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c): “Any person injured in his business or property 
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any 
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he 
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that 
no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in 
the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The 
exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against 
any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case 
the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction 
becomes final.” 
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apply in a suit against an insurer involved in a scheme where it received 
discounts for hospital services but failed to pass those discounts on to the 
plan beneficiaries. The plan agreement, which provided that the insurer 
would pay 80% and the insured is responsible for the remaining 20%, was 
not followed, as the insurer paid at a discount and forced the insured to pay 
more than the agreed-upon 20%.195 The Court held that RICO 
complemented the state statutory and common law claims for relief, and 
therefore did not supersede, preclude or conflict with the state laws under 
McCarran-Ferguson.196 The claims alleged violations of RICO through a 
pattern of racketeering activity consisting of mail, wire, radio and 
television fraud.197 The Court noted that RICO advances the state’s interest 
in protecting against insurance fraud and does not frustrate state policy, and 
insurers have relied on RICO when bringing fraud claims.198 However, this 
insurer was not governed under ERISA. 
 Turchi finds support for RICO claims in ERISA plans in several 
cases, such as Maio v. Aetna, where plan participants in an HMO brought 
suit against the insurer for overpayment of insurance.199 While the court 
dismissed for lack of standing, it stated that the plaintiffs would have had 
standing if they had alleged that the health care received under the plan 
“actually was compromised or diminished as a result of insurer’s 
management decisions challenged in the complaint.”200 Accordingly, had 
the proper allegations been made, a RICO claim apparently would have 
been permissible. In another case, a plaintiff sued for a fraudulent insurance 
telemarketing scheme when an insurer sold her a death and dismemberment 
policy with limited value, and led her to believe it was a term life plan.201  
The district court, granting a motion to dismiss in part, however, stated that 
her loss of funds through premiums paid to the insurer was a cognizable 
injury to property as required under RICO.202  
 In Klay v. Humana, Inc., a suit brought by physicians against 
HMOs, the doctors alleged that the HMOs were engaged in a scheme to 
underpay the physicians via a computer program that reimbursed the 
                                                                                                                 
195 Id. at 552 (citing Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 299-301 (1999)).  
196 See 525 U.S. at 311. 
197 Id. at 299 (citing RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961). 
198 Humana, 525 U.S. at 299, 302. 
199 Turchi, supra note 157, at 554 (citing Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 
(3d Cir. 2000)).  
200 Id. (citing Maio, 221 F.3d at 472).  
201 See McClain v. Coverdell & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D. Mich. 
2003). 
202 Turchi, supra note 157, at 555 (citing McClain, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 637).  
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physicians based on “financially expedient cost and actuarial data rather 
than medical necessity.”203 The RICO claims included racketeering 
activities through mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion, as the HMOs 
threatened that the physicians, if they refused to cooperate, would lose 
patients, be blacklisted, and not be paid in full if they were not under 
contract with the HMO.204 The Eleventh Circuit held that “it would be 
unjust to allow corporation to engage in rampant and systemic wrongdoing, 
and then allow them to avoid class actions because the consequences of 
being held accountable for the misdeeds would be financially ruinous” in 
response to the insurers’ argument that such a suit would devastate the 
health care industry.205 
 Turchi argues that health plan participants suffer the same harm 
and experience the same calculated wrongdoing when denied benefits as 
the plaintiffs in the above mentioned cases, and RICO claims are the best 
method to obtain adequate remedies.206 Her analysis states that, in allowing 
a RICO claim, the Court will provide the much needed relief for ERISA 
preemption when an insurer denies benefits and insured suffers injuries, as 
it will force insurance companies to be more conservative in their benefit 
denials when there is a possibility for treble damages for bad faith.207  
 This approach is optimistic and inventive. Unfortunately, it is 
likely to be rejected by the Supreme Court, under the view that the 
remedies provided in section 502 are the sole remedies available. It is not 
an issue of federal versus state laws that can apply; the issue is that the 
language in section 502 is narrowly construed by the Court, and such a 
narrow interpretation will likely not allow a plaintiff to invoke RICO as the 
“other appropriate equitable relief” allowed under section 502(a)(3). An 
alternative to this is stricter regulatory oversight of insurers, specifically 
ERISA insurers, which should have the same result – compliance with 
insurance regulations and protection of beneficiaries.   
 
IV. CASE STUDY: UNUM PROVIDENT 
 
 The Unum scandal has been immortalized as probably the most 
egregious known scheme to defraud participants and commit fiduciary 
                                                                                                                 
203 Id. at 557 (citing Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005)).  
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breaches. Unum is a disability insurer. It is made up of the parent company, 
Unum Group, and several subsidiaries, including Unum Life Insurance 
Company of America, the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, Provident 
Life and Accident Insurance Company, Provident Life and Casualty 
Insurance Company, and First Unum Life Insurance Company. In 1997, the 
parent company acquired the Paul Revere Company, a Massachusetts 
corporation providing individual long-term disability insurance.208 In 1999, 
the parent company became Unum as a result of a merger between Unum 
Corporation and Provident Companies, Inc. When the companies were 
merged, an oversight resulted in no streamlining of policies, practices or 
procedures among the newly acquired groups.209 Thus, claims adjusters 
were localized and followed whatever procedures had been in place before 
the merger and had little oversight by the parent company.   
 
A. THE LAWSUITS AND SCANDAL 
 
 An attorney at Unum realized that the company could gain 
discretionary review of its plan decisions, i.e., its claim denials, by 
incorporating Firestone language, which limits judicial review of benefit 
denials to only abuse of discretion situations.210 An internal Unum 
executive memorandum advocated the “enormous advantages that ERISA, 
as interpreted by the courts, bestowed upon Unum” because of state law 
                                                                                                                 
208 MULTISTATE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT, Rackeman, 
Sawyer & Brewster, P.C., submitted to state departments of insurance at 2 (Apr. 
14, 2008).  
209 Telephone interview with senior management employee, Unum (July 1, 
2010).  The interviewee requested to remain anonymous.  
210 Id. at 1321; see Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111, 
115 (1989) (Stating: “Trust principles make a deferential standard of review 
appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959) (‘[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee 
with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the 
court except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion’). See also G. 
Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 560, pp. 193-208 (2d rev. ed. 
1980). A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in 
such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable. 
Id., § 559, at 169-71. Whether ‘the exercise of a power is permissive or mandatory 
depends upon the terms of the trust.’ 3 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 187, p. 14 
(4th ed. 1988).”) 
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preemption.211 Further, it advocated that such protection precludes jury 
trials, compensatory or punitive damages, and provides relief only for the 
amount of the benefit in question, which Unum would have had to pay 
anyway, but not before the claimant pays a lot of money and time to force 
such payment.212 The memorandum went on to state that twelve claims 
situations were identified “where we settled for $7.8 million in the 
aggregate. If these 12 cases had been covered by ERISA, our liability 
would have been between zero and $0.5 million.”213 This memo illustrates 
ERISA’s weaknesses and insurers’ ability to exploit those weaknesses 
(loopholes which shield insurers from liability and penalties), to the 
detriment of beneficiaries with claims.   
 J. Harold Chandler, the CEO of Unum until 2003, instituted cost-
containment measures, whereby claims processors were pressured to deny 
valid claims, especially during the last month of the quarter to meet 
“projections” and “budget goals.”214 Several investigative reporting 
television programs demonstrated these mechanisms through internal 
Unum emails, which advised claims employees to deny claims in order to 
meet desired goals.215 One Unum employee, a staff physician, admitted that 
Unum instructed him to use language to support denials of disability claims 
and denied him the ability to request additional medical testing to fully 
determine a claimant’s disability.216 
 In Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., the beneficiary, Weiss, 
sued First Unum under RICO, claiming that First Unum discontinued 
payment of his disability benefits as part of its racketeering scheme 
involving an intentional and illegal policy of rejecting expensive payouts to 
disabled insureds.217 Weiss, an investment banker, had insurance through 
his employer, which included long-term disability (“LTD”) insurance by 
First Unum. He had a heart attack in 2001, which left him suffering 
permanently with ventricular tachycardia and unable to work due to 
lightheadedness, weakness, and shortness of breath.218 His claim for was 
                                                                                                                 
211 Id. at 1321 (citing Memorandum from Jeff McCall to IDC Management 
Group & Glenn Felton, Provident Internal Memorandum, Re: ERISA (Oct. 2, 
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213 Id. (citing Memorandum, supra note 211).  
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216 Id. (citing McSharry v. Unum/Provident Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 
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217 Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2007).  
218 Id. at 256. 
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approved for short-term disability benefits, which resulted in seven months 
of benefit payments.219 At the end of the maximum allowable short-term 
disability benefits, Unum paid Weiss LTD benefits for another three 
months, and then discontinued paying benefits.220 Weiss brought suit in 
state court, and Unum removed to federal court and filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the state claims were preempted under ERISA.221  
While the case was pending, Unum resumed payment of his LTD benefits, 
retroactive to the prior termination date.222 
 Weiss added both federal and state RICO claims, arguing that his 
claim was terminated because it exceeded $11,000 per month.223 In support 
of this argument, he alleged that on October 3, 2001, defendants David 
Gilbert, Paul Keenan, George DiDonna, Lucy-Baird Stoddard, Unum 
employees, and others conspired at a roundtable meeting to terminate 
Weiss’s benefits and devise a rationalization for doing so.224 Weiss claimed 
that DiDonna, the insurer physician, did not receive or examine his hospital 
records until the termination decision was reached, and tests that would 
make clear the severity of his injury were purposely never ordered.225  
Weiss sidestepped a simple state bad faith claim by arguing that his denial 
is one instance in a pattern of fraudulent activity by First Unum aimed at 
depriving its insureds with large disability payouts of their contractual 
benefits.226 
 The District Court dismissed his RICO claims, believing that the 
allowance of such a RICO claim would interfere with New Jersey’s 
statutory regulation of insurers, and thus run afoul of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.227 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, using the 
Humana analysis for ability to assert RICO claims.228 The court noted that 
                                                                                                                 
219 See id.  
220 Id.  
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222 Id.  
223 Weiss, 482 F.3d at 257.  
224 Id. 
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 255. 
228 Id. at 256. The court expansively noted Humana v. Forsyth  in its analysis, 
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common law right of action; (3) the possibility that other state laws provided 
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the state insurance trade practices act (“ITPA”) allowed the insurance 
commissioner to determine whether an insurer had engaged in an unfair or 
deceptive practice, which includes unfair claims settlement practices.229 If a 
violation was found, the commissioner may assess a $1,000 penalty for 
each negligent act or violation, unless the insurer knew or should have 
known the act was a violation - then the penalty is $5,000 per act or 
violation.230 The commissioner was required to investigate upon receipt of 
a consumer complaint of a violation of this act, and upon a finding of 
violations, may order the insurer to pay restitution to the aggrieved party or 
other equitable relief.231 The court also found there was a state common law 
private right of action against insurers for wrongly withheld benefits, other 
state laws allow claims, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which 
provided treble damages available to redress such violations.232 
 The appeals court found that the claim alleged that First Unum 
embarked on a fraudulent scheme to deny insureds their rightful benefits, 
“clearly an unconscionable commercial practice in connection with the 
performance of its obligations subsequent to the sale of merchandise, i.e. 
payment of benefits.”233 Ultimately, the court held that Weiss could 
appropriately bring a RICO claim against First Unum, and remanded the 
case.234   
 In McCauley v. First Unum, the plaintiff’s disability insurance was 
through his employer plan and First Unum was both the administrator and 
payor of benefits.235 McCauley was diagnosed with advanced colon cancer 
in April 1991 and underwent severe chemotherapy treatments to save his 
life.236 Due to these treatments, he took several short-term disability leaves 
                                                                                                                 
grounds for suit; (4) the availability of punitive damages; (5) the fact that the 
damages available (in the case of Nevada, punitive damages) could exceed the 
amount recoverable under RICO, even taking into account RICO's treble damages 
provision; (6) the absence of a position by the State as to any interest in any state 
policy or their administrative regime; and (7) the fact that insurers have relied on 
RICO to eradicate insurance fraud.” Id. at 261 (citing Humana, 525 U.S. at 311-
14).  
229 Weiss, 462 F.3d. at 263 (citing N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-5 (2003)).  
230 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-7(a) (2003)).  
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234 Id. at 269. Note here that the court completely failed to mention ERISA’s 
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in 1991 under the group disability plan.237 Over the next three years, he 
experienced health problems in connection with his cancer and took several 
short-term disability leaves.238 In 1994, he notified his employer that his 
health conditions were too traumatic and he could not continue to work.239   
 In May 1995, First Unum denied his claim.240 Upon McCauley’s 
appeal and submission of additional information, First Unum again rejected 
his claim in September 1995.241 McCauley attempted to rejoin the 
workforce and accepted a General Counsel position, but his health 
problems persisted.242 Because he found work, his former employer ceased 
paying the disability plan premiums and advised him to convert the policy 
and make future payments, which he did.243 On January 16, 1996, he 
applied for long-term disability benefits under his conversion policy, as he 
accepted that he simply could not work due to his severe health 
problems.244 First Unum again denied his claim on the basis that the 
employment with the former employer had terminated in 1994, and, 
therefore, that he had exercised his conversion after the allowable period.245 
 McCauley brought suit for wrongful denial of benefits. He alleged 
that certain procedural irregularities, such as missing documents from his 
file and the incorrect assertion to McCauley that a medical doctor reviewed 
his file (only a nurse reviewed it) which occurred in the handling of his 
claim demonstrated that First Unum's conflict of interest had affected its 
decision to deny him benefits.246 While both courts held that the insurer’s 
first denial of benefits was proper, as McCauley’s physician’s letter did not 
indicate total disability, the additional information submitted should have 
resulted in coverage.247 This additional information was a memorandum 
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238 Id., noting, for instance, he had part of his liver removed because cancer 
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written by McCauley, with the advice and knowledge of his physician, 
listing his medical issues as (1) chronic diarrhea, (2) chronic and acute 
renal impairment, (3) progressive vascular sclerosis, (4) high cholesterol, 
(5) insomnia, and (6) incisional scarring and pain, and stated:  
 
[He] is only able to control bowel movements by carefully 
timing his food ingestion and lists a number of ways in 
which this limits his daily activities. Respecting his renal 
impairment, the memorandum explains that McCauley has 
chronic blood in the urine and pain in the kidney area and 
that he forms a kidney stone every two weeks. As a result, 
his physician recommends that he not sit for long periods 
of time. Moreover, the memorandum states that during the 
acute phase of his renal impairment, “it is impossible for 
the patient to perform at any level.” As to his vascular 
sclerosis, the memorandum explains that McCauley’s 
vascular system was permanently damaged by the 
chemotherapy treatments and that he suffers “severe 
chronic headaches at the base of the skull, resulting in an 
inability to focus eyesight and a lack of concentration.” 
His insomnia is described as “chronic and recurring,” 
resulting in a “general feeling of lethargy and malaise” and 
leaving him with a “need to take naps during the day.” The 
memorandum also states that McCauley “is in pain on an 
almost constant basis” and takes Percocet, an opiate, to 
manage that pain.248 
 
A nurse, not a doctor, reviewed this additional evidence and rejected his 
claim, because it was “‘not an official document from [an] attending 
physician.’”249 However, the rejection letter stated that it had rejected the 
claim because “‘these conditions were acknowledged by your physician on 
the initial application and in his narrative letter of March 1995.’”250 
 The court granted First Unum’s motion for summary judgment, 
stating that a de novo standard of review of the benefit denial was not 
applicable because the plan had Firestone language (which granted the 
insurer discretionary authority in benefit determinations, and a court may 
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only review where there has been an arbitrary or capricious action).251 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, under the 
Metropolitan Life v. Glenn standard, and found that the plan administrator 
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's second claim for long-term 
disability benefits, because its reason for doing so was deceptive and 
unreasonable.252   
 Several bad faith suits were brought against Unum, and in one case 
(a non-ERISA case), a five million dollar punitive judgment was awarded 
by the jury due to the egregious bad faith acts by Unum.253 A district court 
in Massachusetts wrote that “an examination of cases involving First Unum 
. . . reveals a disturbing pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials, 
bad faith contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics.”254  
That court listed more than thirty cases in which First Unum’s denials were 
found to be unlawful, including one decision in which the behavior was 
“‘culpably abusive.’”255 A state insurance commissioner noted that Unum 
looked “‘for every technical legal way to avoid paying a claim.’”256  
Several insurance state commissioners enforced fines, to the tune of 
millions of dollars, for the unfair and egregious claims practices of Unum 
employees.257   
 
B. THE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES STEP IN 
 
 On January 7, 2003, the Massachusetts Division of Insurance 
conducted a market conduct examination of the Paul Revere Company’s 
handling practices of individual disability insurance claims (“IDI” 
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252 Id. at 128, 133, 135 (“Following Glenn, a plan under which an 
administrator both evaluates and pays benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of 
interest that courts must take into account and weigh as a factor in determining 
whether there was an abuse of discretion, but does not make de novo review 
appropriate.” (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2348, 2348 (2008))).   
253 Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1319 (citing 
Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 
2002), aff’d, 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
254 Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247 
(D. Mass. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). 
255 Id. at 247 n.20. 
256 Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law, supra note 6, at 1320 (citing Mike 
Pare, $1 Million Fine Hits Unum, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 19, 
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2011 ERISA: REMEDIES, PREEMPTION 211 
claims).258 In September 2003, a multistate targeted market conduct 
examination was commenced by the Maine Bureau of Insurance, the 
Massachusetts Division of Insurance, and the Tennessee Department of 
Commerce and Insurance, concerning the claims practices of Unum, 
Revere and Provident in both IDI and group LTC policies.259 Additionally, 
the remaining forty-seven states plus the District of Colombia acted as 
“participating states” in this 2003 exam.260 Contemporaneously with the 
Multistate Examination, the Department of Labor conducted an 
investigation of the companies (the “DOL Investigation”) pursuant to 
Section 504 of ERISA.261 
 According to the exam report, the examination team requested the 
companies to provide a comprehensive database including all claims closed 
during 2002.262 Initially, 300 claim files randomly selected from IDI and 
LTD claims closed during 2002, or for which benefit determinations were 
appealed or litigated during 2002, or claims open as of year-end 2002 were 
evaluated for the initial review.263 The initial review comprised 300 claims 
(100 claims each for Unum, Revere and Provident).264 “The proportion of 
selected IDI and LTD claims was based on the relative reported reserves 
for each company as of December 31, 2002.”265 The team also commenced 
a second, follow-up review in 2004, as the companies advised that they had 
made several changes in claim administration implemented in 2003.266  
 The initial review actually consisted of 299 files instead of 300, 
because the companies were unable to locate one of the claims files 
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selected for review.267 This initial review concluded with four “general 
areas of concern” for both the IDI and LTD claims handling. The four areas 
were: (1) excessive reliance on in-house medical professionals; (2) an 
unfair bias and inappropriate interpretation of medical reports to the 
detriment of claimants based on the excessive reliance upon the in-house 
medical professionals; (3) failure to evaluate the totality of the claimants’ 
medical conditions (benefits were denied due to the failure to “properly 
evaluate cumulative effects” of multiple claimant conditions); and (4) the 
inappropriate burden placed on claimants to justify eligibility for 
benefits.268 
 After the follow up review in 2004, the team concluded that further 
regulatory action was necessary, resulting in the Regulatory Settlement 
Agreements (“RSA”), which provided a “Plan of Corrective Action” that 
the companies implement in their claims handling procedures.269 The RSA 
stated that a further review would be completed in 24 months to assess 
implementation of the practice and procedures set forth in the RSA.270 The 
RSA also provided for a $15 million penalty to be paid by the 
companies.271  
 The RSA required the following changes in claims practices and 
procedures to reduce any potential bias and promote claims handling 
accuracy: 
 
x The engagement of experienced claim personnel at the 
earliest possible stage of claim reviews; 
x Increased emphasis upon claim staff accountability for 
compliance with the terms of insurance policies and 
applicable law; 
x Increased involvement of higher levels of claim 
management staff in each claim denial or claim 
termination decision; 
x Creation of a separate compliance/accountability 
function at the claim denial and claim termination 
level; 
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x Assurance that co-morbid conditions are properly 
evaluated at every level of claim review; 
x Increased utilization of Independent Medical 
Examinations; 
x Additional compliance training for all claim staff, with 
emphasis upon the results of the multistate 
examination, the Plan, and the NAIC Unfair Claim 
Settlement Practices Act; and 
x Additional training for group policyholder human 
resources personnel so as to better facilitate the 
process for LTD claims.272 
 
With regards to the corporate governance, the companies were required to 
address corporate control issues by implementing the following changes: 
 
x The Board of Directors of the Parent Company will be 
expanded by three members, each of which will have 
significant insurance industry or insurance regulatory 
experience (two will have regulatory experience); each 
candidate will be approved by the Lead States and by 
the DOL; 
x The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors will be 
expanded by one member; at least one of the new 
members of the Board of Directors will be appointed 
to the Audit Committee; 
x The Board of Directors will establish a new 
Regulatory Compliance Committee, comprised of two 
of the new members of the Board, and three existing 
independent directors; the Regulatory Compliance 
Committee will have responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with the Plan and other compliance-related 
oversight functions; and 
x The companies will create a Regulatory Compliance 
Unit, which will report directly to the Regulatory 
Compliance Committee; the Regulatory Compliance 
Unit will monitor compliance with the Plan (including 
the functions of the Claim Reassessment Unit) through 
the performance of periodic audits, provide assistance 
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to claimants to ease and facilitate the claim submission 
process, and gather data for the Lead States’ ongoing 
monitoring of compliance with the Plan.273 
 
Further, the RSA and Plan required the Regulatory Compliance Committee, 
the companies’ senior management, the lead regulators and the DOL to 
meet on a quarterly basis to evaluate compliance with the Plan and RSA.274  
In 2005, the RSA was amended to allow LTD and IDI claimants the 
opportunity to have denied claims reassessed.275 
 The reassessment of claims was performed by the Claim 
Reassessment Unit (“CRU”), a newly formed claims unit within the 
companies.276 Its results were evaluated in another multistate market 
conduct examination, conducted in 2007, to evaluate compliance by the 
companies. More than 79,000 claimants elected to have their claims 
reassessed, however, only 23,190 claimants correctly submitted the 
required Reassessment Information Forms.277 Therefore, only 23,190 
claims were actually reassessed by the companies, which is approximately 
29% of the total requested reassessments.278   
 The examining team concluded that 41.7% of the claims (including 
both IDI and LTD) reassessed were reversed in whole or part, resulting in 
approximately $676.2 million in benefits paid to claimants, either 
immediately or reserved for future payments.279 Forty-five percent of the 
LTD reassessed claims were reversed in whole or part, resulting in 
approximately $558.6 million of benefits paid or reserved for future 
payment.280 Twenty-two percent of IDI reassessed claims were reversed in 
whole or part, resulting in approximately $117.6 million in benefits paid or 
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reserved for future payment.281 In total, it appears the companies paid more 
than a billion dollars in benefits due to the reassessed claims.  
 The 2007 exam also evaluated the companies’ compliance with the 
claims procedures required under the RSA. The team evaluated claims 
reassessed by the CRU, both IDI and LTD, along with a sample of claims 
assessed by other claims personnel.282 The team assessed 50 CRU IDI 
claims, 100 CRU LTD claims, 50 Operations IDI claims, and 100 
Operations LTD claims.283 According to the RSA, the error rate in claims 
could not exceed 7% for each area assessed.284 The team concluded that the 
companies were well below this error rate, and in some instances there 
were zero errors.285 Therefore, according to the 2008 multistate market 
conduct examination report, the companies are in complete compliance 
with the RSA. 
 In 2007, California’s Department of Insurance (“CDI”) also 
conducted an independent market conduct exam, releasing the report in 
2008.286 The examiners evaluated the reassessed claims subject to the 
separate California Settlement Agreement between Unum and CDI. One 
hundred and ninety-one reassessed claims were reviewed, along with 30 
post-CSA claims (closed between December 2005 and May 2006) and 60 
post-CSA claims (closed between August 2006 and July 2007).287   
 The examiners found seven violations in evaluating the 191 
reassessed claims (approximately 3% error).288 The violations included: (1) 
five instances of failure to comply with the CSA’s definition of “total 
disability” in denying claims and (2) two instances of failure to effectuate 
                                                                                                                 
281 Id. at 7.  
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prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims where liability was 
reasonably clear.289 In response, Unum voluntarily imposed a written 
refresher training course for the CRU employees, emphasizing compliance, 
and reassessed the noted claims.290   
 There were no violations found in the 90 post-CSA claims.291 The 
report noted a 54% drop in consumer complaints against Unum after it 
adopted the measures required in the regulatory settlement agreements.292   
 
C. THE REST OF THE STORY: UNUM IS NOW A MODEL DISABILITY 
INSURER AND TRIES TO AMELIORATE ITS BAD REPUTATION 
 
  I had the opportunity to speak with a senior management 
employee at Unum. He acknowledged the egregious behavior which 
occurred and resulted in the lawsuits and RSA, but was very clear about 
Unum’s complete turnaround. He advised that it is a completely different 
company under these new claims practices and procedures, as evidenced by 
the most recent market conduct reports. The procedures implemented to 
ensure compliance and fairness include an ethics hotline, where employees 
are encouraged to report any wrongdoing in business practice and remain 
anonymous, a notice to beneficiaries upon a denied claim of their right to 
request an independent medical exam, a requirements for claims personnel 
to contact attending physicians if there are questions or when clarification 
is necessary, and a policy to give significant weight to social security 
disability decisions and attending physician decisions.293   
 The departments of insurance view this outcome as a success. In a 
2009 letter from the Maine, Massachusetts, Tennessee and New York 
departments of Insurance to the editor of the Insurance Forum, the 
commissioners and superintendents advocated that the “systemic 
misconduct” that led to the multistate examinations was no longer present 
at Unum, according to the latest exam reports.294 Mila Kaufman, 
superintendent of the Maine Department Insurance declared that “this case . 
. . is an example of effective state-based insurance regulation for insurance 
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consumers. Regulators identified a problem and worked together to 
effectively address it.”295 She went on to support Unum’s change, stating 
“it is also an example of an insurer reforming its practices and becoming a 
model for other insurers. The strong new processes and the resulting 
change in corporate culture – measure by the very low rate and in some 
cases a 0% error in claim determinations is remarkable.”296 This view was 
also advocated by the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner, stating she 
“is pleased” with Unum Group’s compliance and using the procedures to 
“ensure its claimants are treated fairly going forward.”297  
 In my interview, the company seems to be frustrated with the lack 
of knowledge of the RSA and changes in procedure. In my insurance 
classes, when studying bad faith and ERISA law, we read about the Unum 
cases but never read about the regulatory involvement; perhaps due to time 
constraints. Unum is a great case study to show regulators working together 
to reform an insurer into a fully compliant and better market actor. During 
the RSA negotiations, Unum was advised that the standards provided in the 
RSA would eventually be enforced nationally. Unfortunately, this is not 
true, as is seen from the Good Morning America cases.298  
 
V. MORE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT WILL ALLEVIATE 
EGREGIOUS INSURER ACTIONS AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE  
 
 The kind of regulatory cooperation between states that occurred in 
the Unum case is exactly what is needed at present to ensure beneficiaries 
are protected from unscrupulous insurers. As discussed, ERISA fails to 
provide the remedies to claimants when benefits are wrongly denied. As 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to change its position on interpreting ERISA 
and Congress is unlikely to amend ERISA, it is left to the state regulators to 
                                                                                                                 
295 Press Release, Mila Kaufman, Superintendent, Me. Bureau of Ins., Unum 
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effect change and compliance. Per the savings clause, ERISA insurers are 
still subject to compliance with state insurance laws. Thus, regulators must 
strictly enforce the types of procedures required of Unum as to all ERISA 
insurers, which will alleviate the need for money damages; as such 
procedures and examinations will ensure compliance and result in 
protection of beneficiaries. To this end, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) should assist in implementing this 
change.  
 
A. PURPOSE OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF INSURANCE   
 
 Each state has a regulatory authority which oversees the insurance 
industry transacting business in its state. They generally regulate insurer 
activity and compliance with all state insurance laws and regulations, such 
as licensing, policy form approval, rate approval, ensure adequate financial 
conditions, receive consumer complaints and conduct market conduct 
examinations to ensure compliance and fairness to consumers.299 These 
departments exist primarily to ensure compliance with state laws and to 
protect consumers. ERISA-insured plans are governed by these laws and 
oversight by the state departments of insurance.   
 
B. REGULATORY COOPERATION WILL LEAD TO INCREASED 
BENEFICIARY PROTECTION  
 
 As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has held that ERISA 
does not allow compensatory or consequential money damages beyond that 
of the denied benefit. In Mass. Mutual v. Russell, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that an unreasonable delay in receipt of benefits does not warrant 
consequential damages, or money damages, being paid to the beneficiary in 
an individual capacity, as ERISA only envisioned the plan to receive such 
damages.300 In Varity Corp., the Court held that an individual may recover 
                                                                                                                 
299 See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Ins., Purpose and Duties of the Connecticut 
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300 Russell, 473 U.S. at 144, 148. 
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individually.301 In Pilot Life and Andrews-Clarke, the Court refused to 
apply state bad faith statutes because they were not specific to the 
insurance industry, no matter how egregious the misconduct by the 
insurer.302 In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, the Court refused to apply a state 
insurance bad faith statute to the HMO, noting that although it was specific 
to the insurance industry, an HMO’s mixed decision on treatment and 
eligibility was not a fiduciary function, thus it could not be held liable for 
any damage that occurred as a result.303 The Court instead suggested that 
beneficiaries who were wrongly denied benefits pay for the services out of 
their own pocket and then bring suit for enforcement.304 This statement by 
the Court is completely out of touch with America and current economic 
conditions. With unemployment at 10% and economic crisis abroad, what 
average person, who relies on an employer-provided health plan, has the 
wherewithal to single-handedly pay for medical services, which are 
extremely expensive, out of their own pocket? As shown in the Good 
Morning America cases, several of the beneficiaries who were denied 
benefits were left with no income and often choose between paying the 
mortgage, the utilities, or food for their family, never mind paying an 
attorney to fight with the insurer over the denied benefits.305 
 As a result, there is only one authority left with the ability to 
adequately regulate this industry and protect consumers: the state 
departments of insurance. Not only is it their stated purpose as state 
agencies, but it is sorely needed due to the lack of oversight elsewhere.  
The Unum example demonstrates that regulators are able to cooperate and 
work together to implement fair practices and procedures and oversee 
compliance. The state departments of insurance simply need to enact the 
same practices and procedures from the RSA in each state, and even on a 
national level, to ensure beneficiaries everywhere are protected from 
insurer opportunism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
301 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2011); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 
(1996). 
302 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987); Andrews-Clarke v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 55-56 (D. Mass. 1997). 
303 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 212 (2004). 
304 Id. at 211. 
305 Cuomo & Wagschal, supra note 145. 
220 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.1 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 The current regime of insurer regulation in the ERISA context is in 
danger of harming beneficiaries due to the lack of motivation by insurers to 
be fair and to strictly comply with state claims practices laws. To combat 
this inequity, I propose that the state departments of insurance intercede 
and enforce strict regulatory oversight of such insurers, as was done in the 
Unum situation. There, the state departments of insurance collaborated and 
implemented practices and procedures for Unum to adopt and use in its 
claims handling. As a result, Unum has drastically changed in its claims 
practices and is arguable a model for the industry in terms of its customer 
service of claimants. These practices and procedures are not nationally 
enforced. If such practices and procedures were enforced, it would 
admittedly serve as an added expense on insurers. However, these practices 
and procedures would more effectively regulate this area, thereby leading 
to fairness in claims handling, and ultimately protecting beneficiaries the 
entire goal behind ERISA.  If strict regulation is in force, then beneficiaries 
would not need to resort to additional remedies, as the insurers would fear 
large penalties from state department of insurance for noncompliance. This 
fear, along with reputation damage, would keep ERISA insurers in line.   
 
  
 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, ACTUARIAL LITIGATION:  
HOW STATISTICS CAN HELP RESOLVE  
BIG CASES 
 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG 
 
Thank you very much. The Dean said I’m a skilled mediator. As 
long as he didn’t say I’m a model mediator. A couple of months ago, 
somebody introduced me as a model mediator, and a critic stood up and 
said, “Model in Webster’s Dictionary; a small replica of the real thing.” I 
want to thank the Dean for mentioning my book, What is Life Worth. Now 
you may have trouble finding that book today in Barnes & Noble or on 
Amazon.com. Don’t worry, my personal supply of my book is virtually 
inexhaustible. 
It’s a real pleasure for me to be here today. There was no way I was 
turning down an opportunity to be here today and partake in a small part of 
[this symposium]. It is true, as the Dean pointed out, that for various 
reasons, which you can read in my book, I got involved in some of these 
public law challenges over the last twenty-five years starting with Judge 
Weinstein, Agent Orange, 9/11, Virginia Tech, the Pay Czar (which I think 
is a very unfortunate characterization of my role, Pay Czar). 
[L]et me make a few comments about all of these assignments. 
First, these special funds that are set up, like the one I’m doing now, with 
BP, are very, very rare and they should be very rare. I’m asked all the time 
[whether these funds], like the 9/11 fund, the Agent Orange fund, the 
Virginia Tech fund, [are] “an alternative to the conventional way of 
resolving disputes, the wave of the future?” Absolutely not. They are not 
the wave of the future, they should not be the wave of the future, and even 
if you wanted them to be replicated, it won’t happen. I mean I do these 
every six years when some tragedy befalls the country. There are 
variations; you heard . . . others talking about bankruptcy and mass 
settlements. Those are cousins to what I do. I’m engaged with a design and 
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an implementation and an administration that’s very, very different from 
those in terms of its lack of checks and balances, in terms of its delegation, 
and in terms of its function.   
What I do is really out of the box. It is a precedent to nothing and 
this BP thing is a wonderful idea of why it’s a precedent for nothing. 
Within thirty days after the deep-water explosion, the administration sits 
down with BP; no statute, no judicial oversight, no regulation, [no] 
administration, no checks and balances in the form of senate confirmation 
or me or anybody like me, and they shake hands and BP announces to the 
world, “We have decided to put up twenty billion dollars.” Now how many 
times can you think of a company, or an admitted wrongdoer, who decides 
that it’s in our interest and it’s in the public interest [to] fund twenty billion 
dollars?   
[After] 9/11, Congress passed a law to set up a special fund.  
Congress didn’t appropriate one dollar for that fund. Congress just said, 
“Whatever it costs, Feinberg, pay it out of petty cash from the US 
Treasury.” No appropriation, pay whatever it takes to get the job done. 
[With the] Agent Orange [fund], under the auspices of Judge Weinstein, . . 
. eight chemical companies . . . decided to settle a class action . . . put up 
one hundred eighty million dollars with interest, which over ten years will 
grow to about two hundred fifty million dollars. That’s when interest 
mattered . . . . 
These programs – ask yourself a very practical question when you 
think about these special programs. Who is funding these programs? Who 
is going to fund them?  If you don’t have a deep pocket willing to cut the 
check; even if you had a deep pocket, as a philosophic matter, these 
programs are so alien to the conventional way we resolve disputes that 
even if you come up with some sort of law review article that’s going to 
point out how these programs can be expanded and made more pervasive 
along the legal spectrum; I don’t think you’ll get much support for it. 
The conventional adversarial litigation system is so engrained in 
the fabric of this country. It’s such a part of our history, our heritage; you 
may nibble at the edges, but you’re not going to change that system. . . . 
There is a problem with any profession. There’s a problem with the 
adversary system, but when you talk about wholesale changes, here’s an 
alternative way to do it. Unless that alternative way is grounded in history 
as an alternative – and there are some examples, workers’ compensation, 
the most obvious – unless you’re going to have a real historical basis for 
making radical change, these programs that I’ve administered over the past 
twenty-five years should be viewed as aberrations, as one-offs. 
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Now people . . . may look at the way these programs are 
administered and designed and you may say, “You know, we can take a 
little of this and get a little of that.” That’s fine, but any idea that, “Well we 
did it for BP, we did it for 9/11, let’s do it for asbestos, or let’s do it for 
pharmaceuticals or let’s do it for chemicals,” it isn’t going to happen. 
That’s why you really need . . . these people  . .  within the design mold of 
mass aggregation and mass ligation, class actions; a discussion of that, 
that’s where I think you’re going to likely see some change. That’s where 
you may see some change, not what I do, which is really an aberration and 
a sideshow. 
Philosophically, you see, there are real problems with what I do. 
Now take 9/11; the 9/11 Victim Compensation. . . . It was not a mistake. 
The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund was absolutely the right thing to do 
and I’ve been defending it since it was passed by Congress, signed by the 
President and we implemented it. It was successful and it was the right 
thing to do, but they’ll never do it again. They will never do it again, not 
the way it was done in 2001 by Congress where it delegated to one person 
the authority to design and administer a program that by statute gave 
everybody a different amount of money in order to buy them out – to 
attract them out of a tort system. And even though I’ll defend the 9/11 
Program, it is a very, very close question. Philosophically, it raises 
tremendous issues in a free society. There was no 9/11 Fund for the victims 
of Katrina. You should have read some of the emails that I got when I was 
administering that fund.  
“Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in Oklahoma City, where’s my 
check?” “Dear Mr. Feinberg, I don’t get it. My daughter died in the 
basement of the World Trade Center in the original 1993 attacks committed 
by the very same people, how come I’m not eligible by a check?”  And it 
didn’t end with terrorism. “Dear Mr. Feinberg, explain something to me. 
Last year my wife saved three little girls from drowning in the Mississippi 
River and then she drowned a heroine. Where’s my check?” 
It’s very, very difficult to justify public money, yet tax payer 
money one hundred percent to some people who are victims of life’s 
misfortunate. Nobody else is getting a check, and even though I think it 
could be justified with 9/11 and it was the right thing to do, it’s not by 
trying to explain away differences among victims – I can’t do that. Maybe 
you can, but from the perspective of the country, it was the right thing to 
do, not from the perspective of the victims. The country wanted to do it. 
The country wanted to show its community and cohesiveness with the 
victims. Fine, from the country’s perspective, but very, very difficult issues 
get raised. Then to delegate to one person – I mean I’m getting hammered 
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now with BP and with the anniversary coming up next week – hammered. 
One person is making these decisions. 
Now there are differences obviously with all of these programs. 
The problem in BP is the sheer volume paid. I’ve received, in nine months, 
eight hundred thousand claims. You know, its human nature. BP announces 
to the world, “Twenty billion. We’re going to make you whole.” Well, I’m 
a dentist, are they going to make me whole? I’m a veterinarian, a 
chiropractor, why shouldn’t I file a claim? Proximate cause, what is that? 
That’s something taught maybe at Connecticut Law School, but what that 
have to do with me?  But for causation is what I’m interested in. But for the 
skill and human nature being what it is, every financial ill-eye suffers 
because of that bill. It’s in good faith and you’re not going to convince 
people otherwise. So in nine months, we have distributed to two hundred 
thousand people, four billion dollars. In nine months, and you still get 
criticized.  
So these programs raise important issues, philosophical, political, 
etcetera. . . . How do you decide what a person ought to get paid, whether 
it’s in tort or [when] Congress passes a law that says, “Pay Czar.” How do 
you decide what a corporate official at CitiGroup should get paid? How do 
you decide compensation? How do you decide it? 
Now the first thing you find out is when you read the statutes or the 
rules or the compact or the escrow agreement; that gives you some 
guidance as to how you’re going to go about compensating. Notice that in 
these cases, they largely involve death, physical injury. Pay Czar is 
financial compensation outside the tort system and BP is largely – not 
exclusively but largely – old fashioned economic loss: financial wage loss, 
income loss arising out of the spill. [There’s] very, very little actuarial 
work [involved], very little. First of all, you basically have an unlimited 
budget in a lot of these, you see, so there’s no actuarial requirement in 
terms of trying to allocate limited resources, thank goodness. One of the 
biggest problems that I confront in my work is when Peter thinks I’m 
nickel and diming him in order to pay Paul out of a limited fund, you see. 
So the more money I have, the more I’m able to deflect arguments like that. 
Most of the work in defining compensation depends on the statute 
and the nature of the cohort of people you’re trying to help. In 9/11, the 
overwhelming compensation went to death. We paid about three thousand 
people something like six billion dollars. . . . Notwithstanding the title of 
my book, What is Life Worth, I like the title because it sells books, but it is 
a little bit of a misnomer . . . because we’re not placing value in 9/11 on the 
moral integrity of any person. I’m doing what judges and juries do in 
Connecticut every day. . . . What is the economic loss suffered by the 
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victim? How old was he? How long would he have worked? What does the 
census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics tell us about what a secretary 
makes in the World Trade Center? Male or female? How many 
dependents?   
Put aside the administrative law problem of having one person do it 
and delegate to one person, it is basically rather common, if you want to 
know the truth. What I do in all of these assignments is not rocket science. 
The people in this room could do exactly what I do, exactly. This is not 
something where I have a magic bullet here. I do what judges and juries do 
every day. In BP, but for the difficult problem, shall we say, of people not 
paying their taxes so that it’s hard to prove the claim, it’s rather 
straightforward. What did you earn before the spill? What did you earn 
after the spill? How do you tie the difference to the spill?  
I mean I’ve got claims from fifty states, from fifty states. “Mr. 
Feinberg, we served the best shrimp scampi in Hartford. Now we can’t get 
shrimp from the Gulf and we’ve lost ten percent of our clientele base.” 
“Well proximate cause. . .” “What? What does that mean? Pay me. You’ve 
got twenty billion dollars.”  
One final point . . . . One thing that I’m not involved in, in any of 
these cases, is insurance, contribution, subrogation – not on my watch. 
Thank goodness. Here’s a claimant. Pay the claimant or don’t pay the 
claimant.  “Well, there are offsets from insurance.” . . . “There’s an 
indemnity agreement that BP has with Transocean and with Halliburton.” I 
don’t want to hear about it. That’s not what I’m not here for. I’m here to 
pay the claimant and get a release. Corral the claims and pay the people. 
Now if BP and Transocean have contributions, indemnity agreements, 
offsets, insurance, it’s not my problem. My problem is to pay the claim. 
Whatever else is going to happen is going to happen, but not on my watch. 
Otherwise, I’m already bogged down with eight hundred thousand claims.  
People want their money, you see. . . . there have been two hundred seventy 
thousand claims filed since November 23rd, and about seventy percent of 
them have been processed. Not all paid, but processed. 
So that’s sort of what I’m doing, and why I thought . . . this [was] 
the right crowd to [consider] the ramifications of what I do or what our 
cousins do in the mass tort system and . . . aggregative statistics and 
aggregative law.   
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This Article addresses the normative issues raised by the use of 
statistical sampling to adjudicate large case aggregations. In its recent 
decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court referred to 
sampling pejoratively as “Trial by Formula.” This Article argues that the 
pejorative label is undeserved. In fact, sampling can be justified in many 
more situations than courts currently apply it, and society is paying a very 
high price for limiting its use. I explored some of the normative issues in an 
earlier publication, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, and the current Article expands on my earlier 
analysis in four respects. First, it analyzes the effect of sampling on 
settlement and discusses in more detail the problem of frivolous and weak 
filings. Sampling tends to reduce the likelihood of settlement and also 
provides cover for undesirable lawsuits. However, while both of these 
effects must be considered in any efficiency analysis, neither is likely to tip 
the cost-benefit balance against the use of sampling in large enough case 
aggregations. Second, this Article evaluates sampling in the context of an 
outcome-oriented rights-based theory. In this connection, the most serious 
problem is that sampling gives high value plaintiffs only an average 
recovery. Statistical Adjudication discussed this topic as well, but the 
current Article generalizes the analysis in a useful way. Third, the Article 
offers some further thoughts about process-based participation and the 
day-in-court right based on work that post-dates Statistical Adjudication. 
Fourth, the Article explores another possible objection to sampling that 
Statistical Adjudication did not address. This objection, which I call the 
“methodological legitimacy objection,” is distinct from adverse effects on 
outcome and limitations on individual participation. It rests ultimately on 
the assumption that adjudication at its core involves reasoned deliberation 
that engages the facts of particular cases. The problem with sampling from 
this perspective is that it substitutes a formulaic method for fact-sensitive 
reasoning. This Article shows that while the methodological legitimacy 
objection has some intuitive appeal, it is very difficult to sustain in a 
rigorous way. 
 
*** 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Statistical methods pervade the law and litigation. Sometimes the 
substantive law adopts an explicitly probabilistic standard suitable for 
evaluation by statistical techniques. One example is the likelihood of 
confusion requirement for trademark infringement, which calls on the court 
to estimate the probability that an ordinary consumer will be confused.1  
Sometimes the substantive law adopts a standard that, while not explicitly 
probabilistic on its face, nevertheless authorizes statistical methods. An 
example is the discrimination element of a disparate impact Title VII claim, 
which sometimes involves a statistical analysis to determine the existence 
and magnitude of differential effects.2 Indeed, constitutional civil rights 
claims based on the Equal Protection Clause often depend on statistical 
evidence insofar as liability turns on a comparison of the challenged 
conduct to statistical features of a larger population.   
 Statistical methods are used even more frequently to generate 
evidence to prove a claim. Sometimes a legal standard that is not inherently 
linked to statistical properties of a phenomenon is nevertheless most easily 
proved statistically. For example, liability might turn on acts of the 
defendant reflected in written records too numerous to examine 
individually.  In such a case, the plaintiff might rely on a sample to draw 
inferences about liability.3 For another example, statistical models are often 
used to estimate damages in antitrust and other complex cases where losses 
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1 See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1 et seq. (4th ed. 1996). Courts use a multi-factor test 
to infer likelihood of confusion from factors such as the strength of the mark, the 
similarity of the marks, and the proximity of the products, but any inference is 
probabilistic and necessarily refers to statistical properties of the relevant consumer 
population.  See id. § 23:19. 
2 See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF 
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79-89 (3d ed. 2010).  
3 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.493 (4th ed. 2004). 
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must be measured relative to a counter-factual baseline that cannot be 
easily reconstructed using non-statistical techniques.4 
  In fact, the law is bound up with statistical generalization at a very 
deep level. Any general rule reflects statistical generalizations about a large 
population of regulated phenomena, whether the generalization is done 
through the use of formal methods or through informal guesses or even 
rough political compromise. For example, the general rule that drivers must 
not exceed fifty miles per hour on a stretch of roadway is based on 
estimates of the average risk of harm at speeds in excess of fifty miles per 
hour. Thus, when the speed limit is applied to an individual driver, the 
driver’s liability is evaluated not by the risk that she actually created, but 
rather by the average risk aggregated over all drivers in all possible 
situations.   
 This brief account might lead one to conclude that statistical 
methods fit litigation smoothly.5 But as we know, the use of statistics is 
controversial. Perhaps the most controversial yet important application is 
the use of sampling to adjudicate mass tort or other large-damage cases by 
extrapolating from sample outcomes. Whether the extrapolation involves 
simple averaging or more complex regression techniques, the result is the 
same. Very often some cases receive outcomes that differ systematically 
from the outcomes those cases would have received if they had been tried 
individually. 
 Despite the problems, however, there are well-known cases in 
which courts have used sampling to determine damages and sometimes 
liability as well. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,6 for example, the Ninth 
Circuit approved the use of sampling to award compensatory damages in 
9,541 consolidated cases.7 On the advice of a statistical expert, the district 
judge randomly selected a sample of 137 cases and used the sample cases 
                                                                                                                                      
4 Another example is calculating backpay for class members in an 
employment discrimination case involving discriminatory hiring and promotion. 
See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258-63 (5th Cir. 1974). The 
court must somehow imagine what would have happened to each class member 
had there been no discrimination. This is such a complex polycentric problem that 
there is no other feasible method to do it than to use statistical models. 
5 In his paper Probability Sampling in Litigation and his presentation to the 
Actuarial Litigation Conference, Professor Joseph Kadane gave more examples of 
the use of statistics in litigation. 
6 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
7 Id. at 782. 
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to generate a total compensatory damage award for the entire group.8   
Perhaps the most famous sampling case is Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 
Inc.,9 in which Judge Parker, plagued by an onslaught of asbestos litigation, 
employed sampling to determine individual damages in 2,298 consolidated 
asbestos cases.10  He constructed a stratified sample of 160 cases, tried the 
sample cases, and gave the sample mean to all the other cases in the 
aggregation.11 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Judge Parker’s use 
of sampling infringed the Seventh Amendment jury trial right and 
impermissibly altered state substantive law in violation of Erie’s dictates.12  
But this case still stands as a dramatic reminder of what might still be 
possible in some circumstances. 
 Most recently, an en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
following Hilao, gave a favorable nod to the use of sampling to determine 
back pay for class members in a massive and highly publicized Title VII 
class action, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.13 The court did so over Wal-
Mart’s objection that Title VII gave it individualized defenses that could 
only be adjudicated in individual suits.14 The Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court objected to the sampling procedure—calling it “Trial by Formula”—
on the ground that sampling impaired Wal-Mart’s entitlement to “litigate 
its statutory defenses to individual claims” and thus violated the Rules 
Enabling Act.15 Even so, there is still room left for sampling in future cases.  
It is not clear how far the Court’s objection extends, and in any event, its 
Rules Enabling Act rationale does not apply to sampling that is 
legislatively authorized.  
                                                                                                                                      
8 See id. The district court did not simply apply the sample average. Instead, a 
special master made damage recommendations for different injury subgroups by 
relying on the results of discovery in the sample cases. Then a jury heard testimony 
on the sampling procedure and special master’s recommendations with freedom to 
reject, accept, or modify the results.  
9 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 
10 Id. at 653. 
11 Id. 
12 Cimino, 151 F.3d 297, 320-21. 
13 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625-28 (9th Cir. 2010); see 
id. at 627 n.56 (noting that the invalid claim rate for the sample could be applied to 
the entire aggregation). Any sampling would take place, however, only after the 
plaintiffs succeeded in proving company-wide discrimination and thus prima facie 
liability. See id. at 643. 
14 See id. at 624-25.  
15 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
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 This Article, prepared for the Actuarial Litigation Conference held 
at the University of Connecticut School of Law, addresses the normative 
questions raised by these and other controversial uses of sampling.16 In 
addressing these questions, it is important to distinguish between an 
outcome quality metric and a process-based participation metric. An 
outcome metric focuses on the quality of the judgments and settlements 
that sampling produces. Evaluation of outcomes in turn depends on 
whether one takes a utilitarian or a rights-based approach. The utilitarian 
evaluates outcome quality in terms of aggregate social benefits and costs.  
The rights-based proponent evaluates outcome quality in terms of how 
effectively parties’ rights are enforced.   
 By contrast, a process-based evaluation ignores outcome effects 
altogether and focuses instead on the intrinsic value of participation.  
According to the United States Supreme Court, each individual has a due 
process right to her own personal “day in court”; that is, her own 
opportunity to control litigation that binds her.17  If this day-in-court right 
guarantees individual participation in all cases, it poses a serious obstacle 
to sampling, since sampling imposes outcomes on parties without giving 
them an opportunity to litigate their own suits.  However, the day-in-court 
right is not absolute. The question then is what reasons for using sampling 
justify limiting party participation opportunities consistent with a process-
based approach. 
 I explored these normative questions in a previous article, 
Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process 
Scarcity (which I shall refer to as Statistical Adjudication for short).18 I 
summarize the main points of that earlier article here and extend its 
analysis in four respects. First, I analyze the effect of sampling on 
settlement and discuss in more detail the problem of frivolous and weak 
                                                                                                                                      
16 The Actuarial Litigation Conference was held on April 15, 2011, and it 
focused on the use of sampling to litigate mass tort cases in the form of class 
actions or large-scale, non-class aggregations. For another discussion of the 
normative issues, see Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula”, TEX. 
L. REV. (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i 
d=1945514 (arguing that sampling better achieves equal treatment among litigants 
and greater transparency of outcomes). See also Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough 
Justice, 1, 30 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677.   
17 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008). 
18 Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, 
Statistical Adjudication]. 
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filings. I ignored settlement effects in Statistical Adjudication and only 
touched on the frivolous suit problem. Both points deserve more extensive 
treatment. Second, I expand in this Article on the implications of an 
outcome-oriented rights-based theory for sampling. I discussed this topic in 
Statistical Adjudication, but the following discussion generalizes that 
analysis in a useful way. Third, I offer some further thoughts about 
process-based participation and the day-in-court right based on my more 
recent work.   
 The fourth extension deals with a possible objection to sampling 
that I did not discuss in Statistical Adjudication. This objection is distinct 
from adverse effects on outcome and limitations on individual 
participation. Simply put, it insists that sampling is incompatible with what 
adjudication is supposed to do. I believe that this objection rests ultimately 
on an assumption that adjudication at its core involves reasoned 
deliberation that engages the facts of particular cases. The problem with 
sampling from this perspective is that it substitutes a formulaic method for 
case-specific and fact-sensitive reasoning.   
I shall refer to this objection as the “methodological legitimacy 
objection” to highlight its focus on legitimacy and its assumption that 
legitimacy has to do with the method of decision making rather than the 
quality of outcomes or the degree of participation. In theory, the 
methodological legitimacy objection retains whatever force it has even if 
there is no reason to worry about externalities, party participation is 
adequate, and litigation costs are reduced. In practice, however, it is likely 
to operate, when it does, behind the scenes, as a factor influencing 
decisions to reject sampling on other grounds. For example, the Wal-Mart 
Court might have had something like this concern in mind when it went out 
of its way to characterize sampling pejoratively as “Trial by Formula.”19   
In any event, the methodological legitimacy objection has sufficient 
plausibility and superficial appeal to warrant separate discussion even if it 
is difficult to tell when it is being invoked. As we shall see, the objection is 
very difficult to sustain in a rigorous way.  
The body of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I frames the 
problem more precisely.  Part II focuses on outcome effects with special 
attention to settlement and frivolous and weak lawsuits. Part III focuses on 
process-based participation and adds some further thoughts on the day-in-
court right. Finally, Part IV discusses the methodological legitimacy 
objection. Throughout, I mean to consider applications of sampling to 
                                                                                                                                      
19 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  
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determine damages, liability, or both. To be sure, there are special 
problems with applying sampling to determine liability and much of what I 
say fits damage sampling better than liability sampling. But liability 
sampling has been done in the past and might be done more often in the 
future if process scarcity becomes an even more pressing concern.20  
 
II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM MORE PRECISELY 
 
 Sampling runs the risk of distorting outcomes relative to individual 
trials and substantive entitlements, deprives parties of participation 
opportunities, and calls for a decision-making method that might be at odds 
with the usual case-specific reasoned deliberation associated with 
adjudication. On the positive side, sampling saves litigation resources, 
helps to equalize litigating power across the party line, and improves real 
recovery for plaintiffs trapped in a lengthy litigation queue. Parts II, III, and 
IV explore the normative tradeoff.    
 Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify the precise 
nature of sampling’s effect on outcome and the normative problem 
sampling creates from an outcome quality perspective. Some commentators 
claim that sampling produces more accurate outcomes than individual trials 
in many situations.21 The truth, however, is not nearly as rosy as these 
claims suggest.   
 To see why, let us compare the result from an individual trial of a 
tort case with the result for the same case when it is part of a mass tort 
aggregation subject to sampling. There is, of course, an error risk 
associated with an individual trial.  Suppose the same case is tried over and 
over again. If the defendant is in fact liable and juries are reasonably 
reliable, we would expect most, but not all, of the trials to end in plaintiff 
verdicts. Moreover, the distribution of damage awards, with the incorrect 
defendant verdicts counted as zero, should roughly resemble a bell-shaped 
curve (i.e., a normal distribution) with a possible spike at zero. The mean of 
this distribution will closely approximate the expected trial outcome, and 
the mean of the distribution without the zero awards will closely 
                                                                                                                                      
20 For more on sampling to determine liability elements, see Laurens Walker 
& John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999). 
21 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The 
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 815, 851 (1992).   
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approximate true damages.22 In addition, the standard deviation of the 
distribution – that is, the spread around the mean – measures the error risk 
from an individual trial. Let us call this distribution the “individualized 
error distribution,” or IED for short.   
Now assume instead that the case is part of an aggregation of 1000 
mass tort cases. Suppose 10% (100 cases) are sampled and tried and that 
the average of the sample verdicts is calculated (with defendant verdicts 
assigned a value of zero). Imagine that we repeat this process over and over 
again. Each time we sample 100 cases randomly, try each of the 100 cases, 
and calculate the sample average. Not all the samples will be the same, of 
course, and the sample averages for the different rounds will vary a bit.  
Nevertheless, if we graph all the sample averages for all the rounds, they 
should form a bell-shaped (normal) distribution. Let us call the distribution 
of sample averages the “sample average distribution,” or SAD for short.   
The mean of SAD with the erroneous zero verdicts closely 
approximates the average expected trial outcome for all the 1000 cases in 
the aggregation, and the mean of SAD without the zero verdicts closely 
approximates the average true damages for all cases. Moreover, according 
to basic statistical theory, the standard deviation of SAD should be small 
and it should get smaller as the sample size increases. In other words, the 
sample averages cluster rather tightly about the mean and they cluster ever 
more tightly with increasing sample size.23 This means that sampling gives 
a very good estimate of damages for the average case. But it also means 
that sampling gives a rather poor estimate of damages for those cases that 
deviate substantially from the average. 
                                                                                                                                      
22 For example, assume that the defendant caused $100,000 in damages and 
that the case is tried 100 times. Suppose that there is a 10% risk of error in 
determining liability, so 90 of the trials yield plaintiff verdicts and 10 yield 
defendant verdicts.  Also, suppose that of the 90 plaintiff verdicts, 25 are for 
$50,000, 25 are for $150,000, and 40 are for $100,000. The mean of the entire 
distribution, including the 10 defendant verdicts, each counted as zero, is $90,000, 
which is the same as the expected trial verdict when the probability of error in 
determining liability is 0.1 (i.e., likelihood of proving liability (0.9) x the expected 
damage amount if liability is proved (100,000) = $90,000). Considering only the 
distribution of the 90 plaintiff verdicts, the mean is $100,000, which is the true 
damage amount for the case.   
23 For a discussion of this and other statistical properties of the sample 
average, see RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2d ed.1986).   
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To be more precise, if the cases in the aggregation do not vary 
much in salient characteristics (i.e., the aggregation is strongly 
homogenous), then all the cases closely resemble the average case and as a 
result the sample average is a very good approximation for every case. 
Moreover, if the error risk associated with an individual trial for each case 
is high (i.e., the standard deviation of the IED is large enough), then an 
individual trial does a relatively poor job of accurately determining case 
outcomes. With sampling doing a good job and individual trials doing a 
poor job, it is easy to see that sampling can produce a more accurate 
outcome than an individual trial for each case.  
 This is what the proponents of sampling are keen to point out—
and it is a very important observation, one not clearly understood by judges 
and lawyers. The problem, however, is that this happy result breaks down 
when the aggregation is heterogeneous or the error risk associated with an 
individual trial is relatively small, or both.24 Indeed, it does not take much 
heterogeneity before the sample average gives an estimate that is inferior to 
an individual trial for at least one case in the aggregation.25 Whether this is 
a normative problem depends on one’s theory of adjudication.  As Part II.B 
explains, a utilitarian theory can accommodate a good deal of 
heterogeneity, but a rights-based theory is less forgiving. 
The degree of population heterogeneity and the magnitude of the 
error risk for individual trials are both empirical questions, and there might 
be reasons to believe that the former is small and the latter large for some 
case aggregations. However, there are some, and perhaps many, 
aggregations for which this will not hold true. Even worse, judges will 
often find it difficult to determine which aggregations meet the 
                                                                                                                                      
24 For a more detailed explanation and an example, see Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication, supra note 18, at 577-87. 
25 The intuition is easy to grasp. When we take a sample, we know that the 
sample average is very likely to be close to the value of the average case for the 
population as a whole. This follows directly from the statistical property of the 
SAD mentioned in the text. Consider a case located at an extreme of the 
distribution of cases in the aggregation. This case will have a value much higher, 
or much lower, than the average case and thus the sample average. As long as 
judges and juries do a reasonably good job of deciding cases accurately on average 
and make only random errors that are not systematically skewed to one side, it 
follows easily that an individual trial is likely to come closer to the true outcome 
for the extreme case than the much lower (higher) sample average.   
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homogeneity and error risk conditions and which do not.26 Assessing the 
relevant variables requires specific information about how individual cases 
vary over the aggregation and how much error individual trials create.27  
This case-specific information is costly to obtain, and those costs are 
precisely what sampling is meant to avoid.28      
 In sum, my point is that the mean of the IED (which is the 
expected outcome from an individual trial) for at least some cases is likely 
to differ from the mean of the SAD (which is the expected outcome in the 
same case if sample averaging is used). The same is true, although in a bit 
more complicated way, for more sophisticated regression techniques.29   
 These points distinguish the use of statistical methods to adjudicate 
case aggregations from the more accepted uses of statistics in litigation 
mentioned in the Introduction. Using sampling to extrapolate case 
outcomes from sample cases is not expressly authorized by any substantive 
law of which I am aware. Nor is it strictly necessary in the same strong way 
that statistical models are necessary to construct the counterfactual world 
for determining damages in complex antitrust cases. Calculating damages 
in an individual tort suit is a much more straightforward process than 
reconstructing what the market would have looked like without an illegal 
antitrust conspiracy or unlawful attempt to monopolize. 
It is important to be clear about this last point. Sometimes 
advocates of sampling point to the impossibility of adjudicating individual 
cases for an extremely large population, such as hundreds of thousands of 
asbestos cases or the more than one million individual Title VII suits that 
were aggregated in the Dukes v. Wal-Mart class action. This way of 
                                                                                                                                      
26 This point raises an important question. What level of confidence in the 
degree of homogeneity and the error risk in individual trials should be required 
before sampling is justified? Suppose a judge is convinced that it is more likely 
than not that the aggregation is sufficiently homogenous so that the sample average 
will yield a more accurate result for each case than an individual trial. Should this 
be enough, or should something less than preponderance suffice?    
27 For example, some cases in a mass tort aggregation will be weaker on 
liability elements than others (such as a smoker who has trouble proving specific 
causation); some cases will have weaker evidence to support legal requirements for 
obtaining damages, and some cases will have more serious injuries than others 
(such as cancer versus benign abnormalities). 
28 Stratified sampling can reduce these problems. However, one must still 
know a good deal about the population of cases to form sufficiently homogenous 
subgroups for a stratified sample. 
29 See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 584-87.       
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framing the argument has rhetorical force, but it is incorrect. The fact is 
that individual litigation is not technically impossible.30 Simply set up a 
queue and proceed. Matters are very different for the complex antitrust 
case. Calculating damages in a way that bears any reasonable relationship 
to those actually suffered is analytically impossible without using a 
statistical model. But it is not analytically impossible to litigate each mass 
tort or Title VII case individually. It might take hundreds of years to do it 
(although these kinds of numbers are usually hyperbolic given the 
inevitability of settlement), but in theory it can be done.   
This is an important point because it highlights the respect in which 
sampling can force plaintiffs who have superior litigating advantages, such 
as better lawyers, better cases, or simply a better position in the litigation 
queue, to forego those advantages and accept average outcomes 
significantly less than the actual value of their cases. To be sure, some of 
these advantages are a matter of luck and not properly the subject of a 
moral claim. I shall discuss this point later when I examine the rights-based 
arguments against sampling.31 For now, the important point is that the 
normative issues must be squarely addressed in the sampling context; they 
cannot be dodged simply by arguing that there is no other way to provide 
relief to anyone. By contrast, in the antitrust case, no plaintiff can complain 
that she would have done better without the statistical approach, because 
the statistical approach is analytically essential to provide her with any 
meaningful relief at all. 
None of this means, of course, that there are no good reasons to use 
statistical methods to adjudicate mass tort or other large-scale case 
aggregations. For one thing, individual trials generate unacceptably high 
costs in a world of scarce judicial resources.32 Moreover, separate trials 
generate delay costs for plaintiffs late in the litigation queue and those costs 
                                                                                                                                      
30 The pure epidemiological mass tort suit might be an exception. See Samuel 
Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215-20 
(using Vioxx as an example of an “epidemiological mass tort” in which individual 
recovery is impossible because drug use leaves no trace of evidence to prove 
individualized causation, even though epidemiological studies confirm a 
correlation between use and injury). Professor Issacharoff argued at the Actuarial 
Litigation Conference that the only hope for recovery in these cases is to aggregate 
all the individual suits and use epidemiological statistics to generate an aggregate 
damage award.  For more on this example, see infra note 67. 
31 See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
32 This is, of course, due in large part to very restrictive nonparty preclusion 
rules.  See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 882-83 (2008). 
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can substantially erode the real value of any recovery. This dim prospect 
creates strong pressure to settle early and on terms favorable to the 
defendant. Sampling removes this type of unfairness. In addition, statistical 
methods facilitate aggregate litigation, which helps to equalize litigating 
power across the party line and produce settlements and trial outcomes 
closer to the substantive law ideal.33       
These are very weighty reasons. The question, however, is whether 
reasons like these can justify imposing on some parties statistically 
generated outcomes that are likely to deviate systematically from their 
substantive entitlements and from the results of individual trials. In 
analyzing this question, one should distinguish between consensual and 
nonconsensual use of sampling and between use to extrapolate final 
judgments and use to facilitate voluntary settlements.34   
This Article focuses on nonconsensual sampling used to impose 
final judgments. This is the most controversial application because it is 
supported neither by consent to sampling itself nor by consent to the 
settlements that sampling facilitates. Thus, it is the most difficult to justify.  
Moreover, it is also the most important application. It turns out that 
justifying nonconsensual use is critical to justifying sampling more 
generally because many of the uses that seem consensual are on closer 
inspection less consensual than they first appear.   
Let me explain this last point a bit more clearly. In large case 
aggregations, individual plaintiffs are not likely to be the ones who give 
consent. The attorney usually decides whether to agree to sampling and 
whether to settle, and in a world of high agency costs typical of mass tort 
aggregations, attorneys cannot always be trusted to represent the interests 
                                                                                                                                      
33 Roughly, by aggregating separate claims into a single lawsuit, plaintiffs 
achieve economies of scale and incentivize their attorney to invest more than she 
would in an individual suit and at a level that is closer to what the defendant is 
likely to invest. 
34 Judges sometimes try a sample of cases from a large aggregation not to 
impose final judgments, but rather to generate a common baseline of trial verdicts 
from which parties can estimate the value of their own cases for settlement 
purposes.  Because parties use the sample verdicts as a common baseline, their 
respective valuations are likely to converge, which makes settlement more likely. 
Moreover, the randomness of the sample helps to reduce the variance of party 
estimates, and the judge can reduce variance even further by increasing the sample 
size (although this also increases costs). For a useful discussion of the benefits of 
sampling to facilitate settlement in large case aggregations, see Alexandra D. 
Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008). 
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of plaintiffs faithfully.35 Given that lawyer-client incentives diverge, one 
should question the extent to which party consent actually legitimates 
sampling.       
There is another reason to question consent in the sampling 
context. Any consent is likely to be thin. To see why, start with the premise 
that a party will agree to sampling whenever she expects a better outcome 
from sampling than from an individual trial. It follows that if delay costs 
are high enough with a long litigation queue so that the expected value of a 
trial outcome in the plaintiff’s case is virtually zero, a plaintiff should be 
willing to accept virtually any kind of sampling procedure. But then 
consent is not meaningful because the plaintiff’s choices are radically 
limited. Sampling might still be justified—and I shall argue in Parts II and 
III that it is—but it must be justified without relying on consent. 
Thus, it is critical to justify nonconsensual use of sampling. As the 
basis for consent weakens, the need for an independent justification grows 
stronger, and any independent justification of sampling must include 
nonconsensual use. There are also other reasons to put nonconsensual use 
center stage. Parties are not always able to settle even with the benefit of a 
judicially created baseline, and the settlement process creates transaction 
costs that could be avoided if the judge were simply to give all parties the 
average or regression result. So there are efficiency advantages to coercive 
imposition as well.   
 
III. AN OUTCOME-BASED ANALYSIS 
  
Thus, the question is: When and why can courts use sampling to 
generate final judgments that are imposed on parties without their consent?  
The following discussion analyzes this question. It first summarizes the 
likely effects of sampling on trial judgments and settlements, and then 
reviews the normative arguments from utilitarian and rights-based 
perspectives.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
35 Both class actions and non-class aggregations are plagued by agency 
problems.  See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and 
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 
DUKE L.J. 381, 464-65 (2000); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and 
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1377, 1390-91 (2000).     
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A. LIKELY OUTCOME EFFECTS 
 
1. Litigated Judgments 
 
 Statistical Adjudication made three main points about the effect of 
sampling on litigated judgments.36 First, the sample average can deviate 
from a trial judgment for at least one and possibly many cases in the 
aggregation depending on the degree of heterogeneity. This is the same 
point as the one developed in Part I above.  Second, it is possible to reduce 
this risk by adjusting the sampling procedure and using regression rather 
than sample averaging, but these refinements require information about the 
population of individual cases, which is costly to obtain. Third, sample 
averaging distorts litigation investment incentives by introducing a new 
source of free rider and externality problems.   
 As to the third point, the precise nature of the distortion depends on 
four factors: (1) whether the sample cases receive the sample average or 
their own trial verdicts; (2) whether the trial costs in the sample cases are 
spread over all cases in the population or left for the parties in the sample 
cases to bear; (3) the pattern of multiple representation of plaintiffs, and (4) 
the severity of agency problems in a large case aggregation with 
contingency fees.37 Some combinations of these factors skew litigation 
investment incentives and results in the defendant’s favor.38 Other 
combinations skew incentives and results in the plaintiffs’ favor. Statistical 
Adjudication proposed ways to mitigate these adverse effects.39   
 In short, sampling can alter outcomes relative to litigated 
judgments in individual trials, and can do so in ways that for some and 
perhaps many cases deviate systematically from what the parties’ 
substantive entitlements require. But sampling also produces benefits for 
many parties and for society at large by reducing cost, risk, and delay.  
How one strikes the balance depends on whether one takes a utilitarian or a 
rights-based perspective, as Section II.B below explains. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
36 See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 576-94. 
37 See id. at 587-94.  
38 Assuming that the party who invests more is more likely to win. 
39 Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 587-94. 
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2. Settlements  
 
 The effect of sampling on settlement incentives is complicated. To 
begin with, it depends on the sampling protocol and in particular on three 
aspects: (1) whether the sampled cases are allowed to settle after they are 
chosen for the sample; (2) whether the sample plaintiffs receive the sample 
average or their own trial verdict; and (3) whether trial costs are averaged 
and spread over all cases in the population or left for sample plaintiffs to 
bear.   
 First, consider the question whether sample cases should be 
allowed to settle. On the one hand, forcing trial without party consent 
seems problematic. On the other hand, the point of sampling is to generate 
trial outcomes from which to extrapolate, and allowing parties in the 
sampled cases to settle makes it more difficult to achieve this goal. One 
might simply add settlements to the sample mix, but doing so complicates 
the task of extrapolation. Settlements are difficult to compare to trial 
verdicts because settlements discount for likely trial success and are 
influenced by relative bargaining power, which may or may not correlate 
strongly with the relative litigating power that affects trial verdicts. To 
make settlements comparable to trial verdicts, therefore, each settlement 
must be adjusted to take account of these differences, which is bound to be 
a complicated and imprecise task.40    
Given these problems, one might be tempted to exclude 
settlements, but doing so creates a different set of problems. The cases that 
settle are not randomly selected, so excluding settlements will taint the 
randomness of the remaining trial verdicts. Worse yet, it gives the 
defendant an incentive to settle the strongest sample cases in order to 
                                                                                                                                      
40 Suppose the plaintiff’s probability of success in proving liability at trial is p; 
the likely damage award conditional on success is w, and the cost to the plaintiff 
(defendant) of litigating through trial is CP (CD). Also assume that the plaintiff’s 
relative bargaining power is Ȗ, meaning that the plaintiff is likely to capture a 
fraction of the settlement surplus equal to Ȗ. The lowest amount the plaintiff will 
accept in settlement is pw-CP, and the largest amount the defendant will offer is 
pw+CD. Therefore, the settlement surplus is CP+CD and the likely settlement is: pw-
CP + Ȗ(CP+CD). If this sample case went to trial and the plaintiff succeeded in 
proving liability, we would expect a jury verdict close to w. If the cases in the 
sample vary by w and p, it will be difficult to adjust a settlement of pw-CP + 
Ȗ(CP+CD) so that it is commensurable with verdicts of w in the sample cases that 
go to trial.   
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reduce the sample average and thus reduce total liability for all cases in the 
larger population.  
 These problems might not be all that serious if a single attorney 
represents the entire aggregation of plaintiffs and consults her own interest 
in a fee when she makes the decision whether to settle. Under these 
circumstances, the attorney has an incentive to counter the defendant’s 
strategy by rejecting settlement offers in the cherry-picked cases. This is so 
because an attorney who settles cherry-picked cases loses the fee she would 
have earned with a larger sample average applied to the whole 
aggregation.41   
 Let us assume that the sample cases do not settle, either because 
settlement is barred or because the attorney rejects every settlement offer.  
What are the parties likely to do before cases are sampled if they know 
sampling will be used? Party incentives depend on the other two features of 
the sampling protocol: whether sample plaintiffs receive the sample 
average or their own trial verdict, and whether trial costs are averaged and 
spread over all cases in the population or left for sample plaintiffs to bear.  
These two elements create four possible scenarios: 
 
 All Cases Receive 
Sample Average 
Sampled Plaintiffs 
Receive Own Trial 
Verdicts 
Total Costs 
Spread Over All 
Cases 
 
SCENARIO I 
 
SCENARIO II 
Each Sample 
Case Bears Its 
Own Costs 
 
SCENARIO III 
 
SCENARIO IV 
 
Scenario I is attractive on fairness grounds because it treats all 
plaintiffs in the aggregation equally. But Scenario I might be difficult to 
implement constitutionally if there are due process problems with denying 
the parties in the sample cases the benefit of their own trial verdicts.  This 
pushes in the direction of Scenario II.  Scenarios III and IV also have some 
                                                                                                                                      
41 More precisely, the defendant would have to offer a premium that 
compensates the attorney for the fee amount lost due to a lower sample average. 
This is certainly possible but rather unlikely for large case aggregations. Of course, 
aggregate attorney representation can exacerbate the problem of agency costs, but 
that is a problem that exists without sampling as well.   
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attractive features, but there is a strong fairness reason to distribute costs 
equally over all cases since all plaintiffs in the aggregation benefit from the 
sample plaintiffs’ litigation efforts, and this consideration weighs against 
Scenarios III and IV. For this reason, the following discussion focuses on 
Scenarios I and II. 
In the Appendix, I present a simple settlement model and use it to 
analyze the settlement effects of sampling under Scenario I and Scenario II, 
comparing the results to the no-sampling baseline.42 In doing so, I consider 
two different allocations of settlement power: one in which each plaintiff 
controls the settlement decision in her own individual case, and one in 
which all plaintiffs are represented on contingency by the same attorney 
who controls the settlement decision and settles en-masse. 
The most important result of this analysis is that the use of 
sampling under Scenario I and Scenario II makes settlement impossible, or 
at least more difficult, for many cases that could have settled without 
sampling. It follows then that sampling is likely to reduce settlement 
frequency. Moreover, this is true whether the individual plaintiff or the 
attorney for the aggregation controls the settlement decision—although the 
distribution and magnitude of the effects differ. The result for expected 
settlement amounts is less surprising. High value claims settle for less than 
they would without sampling. Low value claims normally settle for more.   
The following provides a bit more discussion of these settlement 
impacts, but the details are in the Appendix. 
 
a. Scenario I 
  
The intuition behind the results for Scenario I is easy to grasp. In 
the simple settlement model, parties can settle if and only if the defendant’s 
expected loss from going to trial is greater than or equal to the plaintiff’s 
expected gain. Expected loss and expected gain depend on each party’s 
estimate of plaintiff’s likely success, the expected recovery if plaintiff 
succeeds, and expected litigation costs through trial. When parties settle, 
they bargain over how to apportion the savings in trial costs between them, 
and when they have different estimates of likely success, they also bargain 
over how to split the additional gains from trade.    
                                                                                                                                      
42 The analysis uses the standard economic model of settlement under 
asymmetric estimates of likelihood of success. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) [hereinafter BONE, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE].  
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To see this clearly, suppose the plaintiff and the defendant make 
different estimates of plaintiff’s likely success. Let pʌ and pǻ be plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s estimates, respectively.43 Suppose the two parties agree on 
w, the likely recovery if plaintiff succeeds, and on CP and CD, the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s costs, respectively, of litigating through trial. These latter 
two assumptions are not entirely realistic, but they are useful for 
simplifying the discussion and conveying the basic intuition.44     
Given that both parties agree on w, the conventional settlement 
model holds that settlement is feasible without sampling if and only if: 
 
pǻw + CD  pʌw - CP 
 
The settlement surplus that parties create by settling is the 
difference between the left hand and right hand sides of this inequality, 
which is pǻw + CD – (pʌw - CP) = (pǻ - pʌ)w + CP + CD. Another way to state 
the feasibility condition is that the settlement surplus must be greater than 
or equal to zero; in other words, there must be something for the parties to 
bargain over: 
 
(pǻ - pʌ)w + CP + CD  0                 (1) 
  
Scenario I sampling has two effects on Expression (1). First, it 
gives all the plaintiffs in the aggregation the sample average for their 
individual cases.  When the aggregation encompasses claims with different 
valuations, this effect reduces the value of w, the expected recovery 
conditional on success, for above-average claims and increases it for 
below-average claims. Second, sampling reduces total litigation costs (i.e., 
CP + CD), since only the sampled case are tried. Before the sample is 
selected, there is a chance that any case could be chosen for the sample, so 
                                                                                                                                      
43 Thus, pʌ and pǻ might refer to the likelihood of success in establishing 
liability and proving damages, or they might refer only to the likelihood of success 
in proving damages conditional on the plaintiff establishing liability without 
sampling. The referent for the variables depends on whether sampling is used only 
to determine damages or also to determine liability.  
44 For example, in the typical case, the plaintiff is likely to be better informed 
about the seriousness of her injuries (and thus about w) than the defendant. Also, 
CP and CD might vary with case value. It is possible to modify the model to take 
account of these factors, but doing so complicates the analysis. In a later footnote, I 
make a few comments about how asymmetric estimates of w might affect the 
results.  See infra note 47. 
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the parties in every case discount litigation costs by the fraction of cases to 
be sampled. The impact of these two effects on the likelihood of settlement 
depends on whether pǻ  > pʌ or pǻ  < pʌ.    
First, consider the case where pǻ > pʌ.  In this situation, all the 
terms in Expression (1) are positive, which means that settlement is 
feasible for all cases whether or not sampling is used. However, sampling 
reduces the settlement surplus for above-average cases because w and CP + 
CD both get smaller. For below-average cases, w increases with sampling 
but CP + CD decreases. Therefore, the settlement surplus rises or falls 
depending on which factor dominates.   
Although settlement is feasible in all these cases, the likelihood 
that parties will reach a settlement can be affected by the size of the 
settlement surplus. As I explain in the Appendix, one theory holds that 
parties have greater difficulty reaching a settlement when the settlement 
surplus is smaller because there is a more limited range of allocations on 
which the parties can agree. Another theory holds that parties have greater 
difficulty reaching a settlement when the surplus is larger because they are 
more likely to bargain hard when more is at stake. Therefore, the effect on 
settlement depends on which theory of bargaining behavior holds true, 
which might vary with the circumstances.45 
Next consider the case where pǻ  < pʌ. The results here are more 
striking. If pǻ  < pʌ, the difference pǻ – pʌ is always negative, so the (pǻ – 
pʌ)w term in Expression (1) is always negative. Therefore, if w increases 
enough with sampling (so the negative (pǻ – pʌ)w term gets sufficiently 
larger in the negative direction) or if CP + CD decreases enough with 
sampling (so the positive term gets sufficiently smaller), a case that has a 
positive settlement surplus—and therefore could settle without sampling—
can have a negative settlement surplus with sampling and be impossible to 
settle.46 
                                                                                                                                      
45 I tend to think that hard bargaining kicks in only for very large settlement 
surpluses. If I am correct, then we would expect a reduced surplus to make 
settlement more difficult, unless the surplus is very large both before and after the 
change.   
46 The effects vary between above-average and below-average claims in the 
aggregation. For above-average cases, w decreases with sampling. This means that 
the negative term (pǻ – pʌ)w is smaller in the negative direction and thus has a 
weaker impact in reducing the settlement surplus. Still, the magnitude of the 
reduction in CP + CD, which depends on the fraction of cases sampled, can be so 
large that Expression (1) turns from positive without sampling to negative with 
sampling for above-average cases that are not too far out on the tail of the 
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These effects obtain whether plaintiffs control their own 
settlements or an attorney for the aggregation controls the settlement and 
settles en masse.  In the latter case, switching to sampling does not affect w 
because aggregations settle anyway for average recovery per case 
multiplied over all cases, which is exactly the same as the estimate under 
sampling. However, sampling reduces expected litigation costs since only 
sample cases are litigated, which reduces CP + CD.  
The Appendix develops the analysis more rigorously and describes 
the different effects that Scenario I sampling can have on the settlement 
surplus for different types of cases and different sample sizes. The 
conclusion is the same throughout. For the most likely aggregations, 
Scenario I sampling rarely, if ever, converts a case that cannot settle into 
one that can, but frequently converts cases that can settle into ones that 
cannot.47 
                                                                                                                                      
population distribution. In theory, it is also possible for sampling to turn some 
cases that cannot settle without sampling into cases that can settle with sampling.  
However, the Appendix shows that the conditions necessary for this to occur 
should rarely hold as a practical matter. For below-average cases, w increases with 
sampling. This means that the negative term gets larger in the negative direction 
and has a stronger impact in reducing the settlement surplus. This result, combined 
with the reduction in CP + CD, guarantees that many below-average cases that could 
have settled without sampling become impossible to settle with sampling. 
47 The results are slightly different if the parties have different estimates of w. 
In the most extreme case, the plaintiff knows w, but the defendant knows only the 
background distribution of w for all cases in the aggregation (i.e., what fraction are 
high value and what fraction are low value). Under these circumstances, the 
defendant must use the average value of w over all the cases; let’s denote the 
average by v. Instead of (1), the settlement condition without sampling for this 
situation is: 
pǻv - pʌw + CP + CD  0 
      For above-average claims, w is greater than v, so it is possible that this 
condition will not be satisfied when pǻ > pʌ and w–v is very large, in which case 
settlement is impossible without sampling.  (When pǻ > pʌ, the condition is always 
satisfied for below-average claims, i.e. those for which v > w.) If Scenario I 
sampling is used, however, all cases can settle because the plaintiff calculates 
expected value based on v, the sample average, the same as the defendant does.  
This means that for above average cases that are located very far out on the tail of 
the distribution, i.e., where w–v is large enough, settlement can become feasible 
with sampling when it is impossible without sampling. However, these should be 
fairly rare occurrences because not many cases are likely to deviate sufficiently 
from the mean to make this possible. Also, for a very high value claim, the 
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b. Scenario II 
  
Not much more need be said about Scenario II. It has the same 
effect on CP + CD as Scenario I because litigation costs are shared equally 
just as they are in Scenario I. But Scenario II sampling reduces the impact 
on w.  This is because sample plaintiffs get their own trial verdicts. All the 
parties anticipate this possibility because all of them know there is a chance 
their case will be chosen for the sample, and therefore they include the 
possibility in their estimates of case value before a sample is chosen. This 
means that sampling produces a smaller reduction in w for above-average 
cases and a smaller increase in w for below-average cases. How much 
smaller depends on the fraction of cases chosen for the sample: the larger 
the fraction, the smaller the effect.   
Nevertheless, Scenario II sampling has the same effect as Scenario 
I on the two critical factors defining the settlement surplus: it reduces 
(increases) w for high-value (low-value) claims, and it reduces total 
litigation costs. This means that it has the same general impact on the 
likelihood of settlement, except that the ranges of (pǻ – pʌ) values 
corresponding to the different effects vary to some extent from Scenario I.  
The precise results are in the Appendix. 
In sum, the use of sampling can significantly reduce the settlement 
rate and thus increase litigation costs, all other things held equal. As the 
following section explains, this effect is important because it reduces 
sampling’s cost-saving benefits and to that extent weakens the efficiency 
case for using it. Sampling also gives plaintiffs average recovery, which in 
effect transfers wealth from high-end to low-end plaintiffs. While this 
transfer must be justified under both utilitarian and rights-based theories, it 
is much more problematic for a rights-based theory. The following 
discussion explores these points. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
settlement produced by sampling (which is based on v) departs markedly from the 
plaintiff’s substantive entitlement, which can raise particularly serious fairness 
concerns. 
      When pǻ < pʌ, the results are also similar to those for the symmetric 
information case, although the relevant ranges of pʌ  – pǻ are different. It is still 
unlikely that sampling will enable settlement for above average claims, but it is 
somewhat more likely than in the symmetric information case. Also, sampling 
never enables settlement and sometimes scuttles settlement for below average 
cases. 
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B. AN OUTCOME-ORIENTED NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAMPLING IN 
LIGHT OF ITS OUTCOME EFFECTS 
  
1. Within a Utilitarian Metric 
 
 From a utilitarian perspective, the goal is to maximize aggregate 
utility, or in the version of utilitarianism associated with law and 
economics, the goal is to minimize social costs. The social costs of 
procedure include expected error costs and expected process (or 
administrative) costs. Thus, procedure aims on this view to minimize the 
sum of expected error and process costs; i.e., to produce more accurate 
outcomes but not at the price of excessively costly implementation.   
More precisely, the social cost of erroneous outcomes is measured 
in terms of the policies that the substantive law aims to achieve. An error 
weakens deterrence and thus distorts primary incentives relative to the 
substantive law ideal. Process costs include the costs of such things as 
preparing and filing motions, litigating the issues, holding hearings, and 
deliberating on a decision. From a law-and-economics perspective, a 
procedure that reduces error risk might require such a large resource 
investment that the additional process costs outweigh the marginal 
reduction in error costs.48   
In Statistical Adjudication, I discussed the efficiency case for 
sampling.49 Extrapolating from the sample average makes a great deal of 
sense on efficiency grounds. First, as long as aggregations are limited to 
transactionally-related cases, the sample average should do a reasonably 
good job of inducing efficient incentives. Agents shape their primary 
conduct in light of expectations, and the sample average is just an 
expectation measure. Second, insofar as sampling reduces the delay costs 
that dilute the real value of a damages payment, it should enhance 
deterrence. Third, using the sample average can reduce the variance 
                                                                                                                                      
48 To complicate matters further, there are two types of error, false negatives 
(for example, holding an innocent defendant liable) and false positives (for 
example, exonerating a guilty defendant). See BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 
42, at 128-32 (explaining the importance of considering these two types of error). 
If false negatives are more costly than false positives, a rule might reduce the error 
risk overall and still increase expected error costs if it reduces the less costly type 
of error and increases the more costly one.   
49 See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 595-98. 
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associated with the expected outcome and thus improve incentives for risk-
averse defendants.50   
On the other side of the coin, sampling adds costs of its own. First, 
the sampling procedure must be implemented—the sampling protocol 
designed, the cases actually sampled, and the results analyzed—and this 
adds process costs. Nevertheless, these costs should be relatively small 
compared to the litigation and trial costs that sampling saves.  Second, by 
speeding up recovery and attracting more lawsuits, sampling could lead to 
over-deterrence in some cases. For example, the prospect of having to pay 
claims sooner could create serious cash flow problems for defendants faced 
with massive potential liability, and this in turn could force otherwise 
viable and productive companies into bankruptcy. However, as I argued in 
Statistical Adjudication, these concerns are better handled in ways other 
than delaying the payment of valid claims.51 Third, sampling can skew 
litigation incentives across the party line, and skewed incentives are likely 
to lead to skewed outcomes. However, the asymmetric stakes in ordinary 
litigation already produce a skewing effect, and the problems sampling 
creates can be mitigated to some extent by choosing the right sampling 
protocol. Moreover, the adverse effects might be offset somewhat if the 
case aggregation made possible by sampling corrects for a litigating power 
imbalance across the party line.52   
I concluded in Statistical Adjudication that the litigation cost 
savings and beneficial incentive effects make a powerful case for sampling 
from an efficiency perspective. Moreover, in order to minimize the risk of 
skewed litigation investment incentives, I recommended that courts use a 
sampling procedure that gives all plaintiffs the sample average and spreads 
litigation costs evenly over the aggregation. The following discussion 
extends this analysis by considering effects on settlement and filing 
incentives more carefully.53   
                                                                                                                                      
50 This is so when the standard deviation of the distribution of possible sample 
averages, i.e., the SAD, is less than the standard deviation of the distribution of 
possible trial verdicts, i.e., the IED.   
51 Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 596. 
52 For a discussion of how aggregation reduces skewed litigation investment 
incentives, see David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have 
and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000); Note, Locating Investment 
Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2665 (2004).      
53 I touched on the filing issue in Statistical Adjudication, but I gave it only 
cursory attention. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 593-94. 
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First consider settlement. Section A above showed that a switch 
from individual litigation to sampling is likely to reduce the settlement rate 
for cases in the aggregation. With a reduced settlement rate, some (perhaps 
many) cases that would have settled instead incur additional litigation costs 
and these costs reduce sampling’s cost-saving benefits. The magnitude of 
this effect, however, is uncertain: it depends in part on when sampling 
takes place and how much individual litigation precedes it. Sampling’s 
adverse effect on settlement can increase costs substantially when the 
parties must have ample opportunity to invest in litigation of their 
individual suits between the time they become aware that sampling will 
take place and the time that the court actually draws the sample. This pre-
sampling investment, after all, is a large part of what is saved by an early 
settlement. The trial judge can control these costs to some extent by 
managing the litigation to minimize pre-sampling expenditures and by 
implementing the sampling protocol expeditiously.   
Assuming, however, that there is sufficient opportunity before 
sampling for parties to invest substantially, the adverse effect of sampling 
on the settlement rate is likely to be significant and should be included in 
an efficiency analysis.54 The total cost of scuttled settlements increases 
with the size of the aggregation, so larger aggregations will generate higher 
costs. Of course, the total cost savings from sampling increase as well. 
Although it seems reasonable to suppose that cost savings will dominate 
most of the time, it depends on the fraction of cases that would have settled 
without sampling and the amount of extra investment those cases incur 
with sampling. 
Second consider frivolous and weak suits.  Since only the sample 
cases are tried, undesirable suits can receive the sample average simply by 
hiding in the aggregation. One might try to deter this strategy by 
entertaining summary judgment motions in individual suits before 
sampling, but doing so would increase pre-sampling costs and magnify the 
adverse settlement effects discussed in the previous paragraph. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the problem of frivolous and weak 
                                                                                                                                      
54 So too should the effect on settlement quality. The Appendix derives the 
likely settlement amount assuming equal bargaining power. This should be 
compared to the expected trial award in individual litigation, assuming that the 
expected trial award is the proper baseline for assessing deterrence and 
compensation gains.  
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filings already exists in the absence of sampling.55 Large case aggregations 
tend to settle en-masse and the attorney for the aggregation has an incentive 
to include frivolous and weak cases in order to inflate the population size 
and the ultimate settlement. In the end, it is unclear whether or how much 
sampling exacerbates these already existing problems.56     
Even if the problems are more serious with sampling, the use of a 
sampling procedure makes possible new approaches to managing the risk.  
For example, a judge might refuse to apply the sample average when the 
sampling procedure yields a large enough fraction of zero or very small 
sample verdicts. The idea is to deprive frivolous and weak suits of their 
cover when the sample results signal a serious frivolous suit problem. This 
approach wastes the process costs invested in sampling whenever the judge 
refuses to extrapolate, but it could still make sense if it deterred enough 
frivolous and weak suits. The important point is that sampling can open up 
new ways to handle the frivolous suit problem.57   
  
2. Within a Rights-Based Metric 
 
The analysis is much more complicated and the conclusions more 
qualified within a rights-based theory and this is one of the chief reasons 
sampling is so controversial. In Statistical Adjudication, I examined two 
                                                                                                                                      
55 See S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlement, 42 U. MEM. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1783792; Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort 
Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688 (1989). 
56 The defendant who anticipates this strategy can try to counter it by offering 
a smaller aggregate settlement or even refusing to settle outright. One might think 
that this is an important difference from sampling, which does not give the 
defendant this type of control. However, the defendant’s total liability with 
sampling is not affected by frivolous and weak suits because the sample average 
takes account of their presence. It is the meritorious plaintiffs who are hurt, since 
they receive a sample average diluted by the presence of frivolous and weak suits 
in the sample mix. 
57 The literature on statistical techniques for sorting fraudulent from legitimate 
insurance claims might provide useful insights. See generally Richard A. Derrig, 
Insurance Fraud, 69 J. RISK & INS. 271 (2002) (providing an overview); Patrick L. 
Brockett, Richard A. Derrig, Linda L. Golden, Arnold Levine & Mark Alpert, 
Fraud Classification Using Principal Component Analysis of RIDITs, 69 J. RISK & 
INS. 341 (2002) (proposing a statistical technique for sorting claims). 
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versions of an outcome-oriented, rights-based theory.58 One version 
assumes that legal rights are designed to enforce moral rights. In other 
words, it looks through the legal right to focus on the moral right that the 
legal right protects.  The other version assumes that legal rights have force 
as utility-checking rights independent of their underlying justifications. 
Accordingly, it focuses on the positive legal right that the substantive law 
creates. 
The existence of substantive rights, whether moral or legal in 
character, necessarily implies the existence of procedural rights. For 
without procedural rights, substantive rights could be sacrificed on 
utilitarian grounds—contrary to their status as rights—simply by denying 
the socially costly procedures needed to enforce them.59  
The core problem for sampling is the same no matter which version 
of a rights-based theory one adopts.  Sampling can produce outcomes for at 
least some cases that systematically diverge from what moral or legal rights 
guarantee. This divergence can be justified in a utilitarian theory by relying 
on the social costs that sampling saves. But this type of justification is not 
available in a rights-based theory, or at least not available in quite as 
straightforward a way. A right is supposed to guarantee its holder the 
treatment it specifies even when the social costs of doing so are high.  
Thus, it would seem that sampling, by sacrificing substantive rights to 
achieve social gains, is just what an outcome-based procedural right is 
meant to prevent.  
 At first glance, this problem might seem intractable. However, 
Statistical Adjudication explored several ways to address it. In general, 
there are two possible approaches to addressing the problem. One approach 
assumes that the use of sampling is a prima facie violation of procedural 
rights, but that the violation is justified when sampling helps to prevent 
seriously unfair results produced by high litigation costs and protracted 
delay.60 The second approach denies that there is even a prima facie 
violation. It argues that a proper understanding of the rights at stake shows 
                                                                                                                                      
58 Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 605-17. 
59 For an excellent discussion of this point, see RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, 
Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 93-94 (1985). 
60 In this approach, the statistical method used must treat all plaintiffs with 
equal concern and respect and must aim for outcomes that take account of case-
specific facts to the extent practically feasible under the circumstances. See Bone, 
Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 615-17. The latter constraint might call 
for a regression analysis in many situations. 
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that they can make room for sampling, provided that the sampling 
procedure is properly designed.61    
 More generally—and here I expand on my argument in Statistical 
Adjudication to take account of subsequent work—any sensible conception 
of outcome-based procedural rights must incorporate four factors that 
together allow for the use of sampling in appropriate circumstances.62  
First, a sampling procedure generates aggregate liability that closely 
approximates what the defendant should pay under the substantive law, and 
it does so regardless of how the total damages are distributed among 
plaintiffs. The defendant might insist, as defendants do in these cases, that 
it has a right to contest liability in each individual case, but there is no 
obvious outcome-based justification for such a right as a normative matter.  
After all, the defendant’s expected loss is the same in both situations. In 
fact, its total liability is likely to be more accurately measured with 
sampling.63    
Second, it must matter in some way that a plaintiff who obtains a 
recovery less than her substantive entitlement makes up for the shortfall 
with the litigation costs that she saves through sampling. One might object 
that each plaintiff has a right to the remedy that the substantive law 
guarantees and that this substantive right does not deduct for litigation 
costs. On this view, any shortfall in recovery would be a reason by itself to 
condemn sampling on moral grounds. But this view cannot be correct.  If it 
were, severe delay costs would be irrelevant as well. It would be enough 
that the plaintiff recovered a formal judgment in the right amount even if 
she did so many decades after her injury. 
The reason litigation cost savings matter is that the substantive 
rights courts enforce are institutional rights and as such take account of the 
salient features of the institutions in which they operate, including the 
                                                                                                                                      
61 In Statistical Adjudication, I focus on the nature of the underlying 
substantive right. I argue for a corrective justice theory of tort law that recognizes a 
moral right to compensation only for expected loss. Since the sample average 
measures expected loss, sampling gives each plaintiff exactly what corrective 
justice requires. See id. at 605-15.    
62 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1011, 1013-18 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights]; Robert 
G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 513-16 (2003) [hereinafter Bone, 
Agreeing to Fair Process]. 
63 This follows from the statistical property that the sample average is very 
close to the population average. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.    
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courts that enforce them. Accordingly, they take account of the different 
ways that rightholders obtain redress within the institution of adjudication, 
including through the litigation costs they save.  This point may seem fairly 
obvious for legal rights, which after all are created with enforcement in 
mind. But it is also true for moral rights, although in a less obvious way.  
Courts do not enforce background moral rights directly; they enforce legal 
rights that instantiate the moral rights institutionally. And those legal rights, 
as institutional rights, take account of institutional context, including the 
litigation costs the institution creates.64     
The third factor goes to the nature of the procedural right itself.  
Because outcome error is inevitable and because process costs must matter 
to the amount of procedure any society provides, outcome-oriented 
procedural rights are most sensibly defined not as rights to some predefined 
set of specific procedures, but rather as rights to a fair and just distribution 
of error risk across cases and litigants.65 Understood in this way, procedural 
rights guarantee that each litigant is treated with equal concern and respect 
in decisions about how error risk is distributed. This means that the overall 
error risk can be distributed unequally as long as the reasons for doing so 
accord equal concern and respect to each individual as a substantive-right-
holder. Reasons sounding in social utility, standing alone, are too 
impersonal to meet this condition. However, reasons that focus on how 
collective gains benefit each individual personally can qualify. 
The fourth factor shifts from the rights litigants possess to the 
duties they owe one another. This is too complex a subject to provide a 
detailed analysis here. Let me summarize briefly. The American system of 
litigation is highly adversarial and parties are given broad freedom to 
control their own lawsuits. These facts might lead one to conclude that the 
only duties parties owe one another are duties to refrain from obviously 
objectionable conduct, such as intentionally filing a frivolous suit or 
imposing costs for the sole purpose of burdening one’s opponent. But a 
closer examination of actual litigation procedure and practice shows that 
                                                                                                                                      
64 This does not collapse moral rights theory into legal rights theory. In 
contrast to legal rights, moral rights recognize that background moral principles 
continue to exert independent force on courts. For example, a court has some 
freedom to adopt a procedure that better implements a moral right even it also 
distorts the corresponding legal right to some extent. 
65 See, e.g., Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, supra note 62, at 1015-18; 
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process, supra note 62, at 513-16. This is not the place to 
parse the content of this right carefully.   
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the duties of parties are more robust. Indeed, the fact that procedural rights 
are institutional rights means that parties owe a general duty of fair regard 
to one another that is tied to what makes adjudication as an institution work 
fairly for all litigants.66   
These four factors taken together can justify sampling on outcome 
quality grounds in a range of circumstances. The defendant’s outcome-
oriented rights are fully satisfied by a properly designed sampling 
procedure. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ procedural rights are institutional and 
as a result take account of institutional context, including the reality of high 
litigation and delay costs.  This opens the door to an argument that 
procedural rights are satisfied for plaintiffs who end up at least as well off 
net of litigation costs with sampling as without, a group that includes 
plaintiffs with cases relatively close to the sample mean. As for those 
plaintiffs with cases further out on the tail of the distribution, they have 
procedural rights only to equal concern and respect. This means that they 
are entitled not to specific procedures or a specific result, but rather to a 
good reason for the outcome they must bear that respects them as 
individual rightholders. Moreover, they also owe duties of fair regard to 
others in the aggregation the same as everyone else.   
Still, the fact that parties have procedural rights imposes 
constraints on when sampling can be used. It is not enough, as it is for a 
utilitarian approach, that sampling reduces net social costs compared to 
individual litigation. In a rights-based theory, sampling must be a sensible 
solution to the problem of high litigation costs and long litigation delays 
and a solution that fits the fact that parties are rightholders.   
For example, suppose cost and delay put some litigants at risk of 
unfair outcomes due only to the (bad) luck of where they happen to end up 
in the litigation queue. Because one’s place in the queue is a matter of luck 
and no one can make a moral claim to benefit from this luck, it makes 
sense to evaluate sampling not ex post, after queue position is set, but 
rather ex ante, before any plaintiff knows where she is in the queue. From 
an ex ante perspective, all the plaintiffs face an equal chance of filing late 
and thus an equal chance of suffering unfair delay. Insofar as sampling 
                                                                                                                                      
66 See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: 
Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 
619, 623-24 (2011) [hereinafter Bone, The Puzzling Idea] (arguing that a duty of 
fair regard is at work when Rule 19 and Rule 23(b)(1)(B) force some plaintiffs to 
accept outcomes less than what their substantive entitlements guarantee so that 
other plaintiffs receive minimally fair recovery). 
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makes aggregation feasible, it responds to this unfairness for each and 
every plaintiff. That it does so is a justification for its use that accords equal 
concern and respect to each plaintiff as an individual rightholder.67   
Thus, as long as sampling does not distort outcomes for high value 
plaintiffs by too much,68 it can be justified as compatible with outcome-
oriented procedural rights.   
 
IV. A PROCESS-ORIENTED ANALYSIS 
  
There are reasons to doubt the coherence of a process-oriented 
participation right in civil adjudication, but I will not discuss those doubts 
                                                                                                                                      
67 A more extreme example is the epidemiological mass tort. See supra note 
30.  The Vioxx litigation is an example. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-
3700, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64388 (E.D. La. June 29, 2010). Vioxx is a drug 
prescribed for back pain. After Vioxx was on the market for some time, medical 
research established a statistically significant link to risk of cardiac abnormalities.  
However, the cardiac events associated with the use of Vioxx are caused by many 
other factors as well, and Vioxx leaves no signature trace linking it to the injury.  
As a result, few plaintiffs can marshal the evidence necessary to prove individual 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence—even though the epidemiological 
studies show convincingly that the drug is responsible for a significant fraction of 
cardiac injuries in the population as a whole.   
       Given this situation, if suits must proceed individually, many deserving 
plaintiffs would choose not to sue because the chance of success is too small 
compared to the cost of litigating. Moreover, many of those who did sue would 
lose on the causation issue. This would result in potentially serious under-
enforcement of tort law, which could impair compensation and deterrence goals.  
One solution is to aggregate the individual suits into a single class action and use 
sampling to provide an aggregate damage award for the class as a whole. This 
solution does not deal with the causation-proof problem, which will still produce 
an aggregate award significantly below what is optimal, but it does deal with the 
failure-to-sue problem and thus provides some relief to those injured parties who 
would not otherwise choose to sue. To deal with the causation-proof problem and 
provide complete relief that holds the defendant fully accountable, one must use 
the epidemiological studies to craft an aggregate damage award based on the 
statistical probability of injury overall. But to do this, one must ignore—or at least 
skirt—doctrinal obstacles in existing tort law.     
68 This condition would not be satisfied for case populations that have 
observable features that strongly indicate high variance. Moreover, it might require 
the use of regression for some aggregations. 
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here.69 Instead, I shall assume that such a right makes sense and briefly 
explore its implications, just as I did in Statistical Adjudication. The 
discussion in Statistical Adjudication explained why a sampling lottery is a 
just way to distribute participation opportunities when each litigant has a 
right to his own day-in-court and budget constraints preclude giving 
everyone a meaningful individual trial.70 It also defined the appropriate 
scarcity conditions for the use of sampling and explored implications for 
the choice of sampling methodology. In doing the analysis, however, I 
accepted, for purposes of argument, the Supreme Court’s robust version of 
the right, the so-called right to a personal day in court that guarantees broad 
freedom to control strategic choices in individual litigation. With a right 
defined so broadly, it followed that sampling could be used only in 
relatively narrow circumstances.71   
 I now believe that the best account of the day-in-court right, as that 
right is reflected in settled features of litigation procedure and practice, is 
much more limited. The particular version of the right that fits the 
participation opportunities parties actually enjoy falls far short of the 
relatively unchecked freedom of strategic choice and party control usually 
associated with the broad version of the day-in-court right.72 For example, a 
plaintiff can be forced to consolidate her case with hundreds, even 
thousands, of others under the Multi-District Litigation Act.73 The MDL 
judge often appoints a litigation committee to control litigation strategy on 
behalf of the group. The result is that attorneys for most plaintiffs have 
very little, if any, control over litigation strategy. In effect, plaintiffs are 
forced to accept a group rather than an individual day in court and they are 
often forced to do so for reasons that sound in efficiency.74 Another 
example is the (b)(3) class action that binds absent class members to 
achieve judicial economy gains and often does so without giving those 
                                                                                                                                      
69 See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty 
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 279-88 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking] 
(explaining the reasons for doubt).  
70 See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 18, at 628-50 (arguing that 
since sampling distributes participation opportunities by lottery, it is justified 
whenever a lottery is a just distributional device).    
71 Id. at 628-34. 
72 I have described some of these limitations in a recent article.  Bone, The 
Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at 614-24.  
73 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008); see Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at 
620-22.   
74 Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 66, at 620-22. 
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absentees realistic opportunities to participate.75 To be sure, notice must be 
sent to class members and absentees have a right to opt out, but they are 
still bound even if notice fails to reach them and even if they do not 
understand the notice they receive. Moreover, class representatives and the 
class attorney represent the interests of the class as a whole, not the 
individual interests of each class member.76 
 These examples and others like them point to a flexible conception 
of the day-in-court right, one defined by a balance of considerations 
relevant to assuring that adjudication works fairly and justly for all 
litigants.77 The fact that the day in court is a right still rules out routine 
reliance on minimizing social costs, but as the MDL and class action 
examples indicate, it does not rule out social cost arguments altogether.    
 This flexible and institutional conception allows greater room for 
sampling. To be sure, the right bars routine use of sampling, just as it bars 
ordinary utilitarian justifications for its use. At the same time, however, 
sampling might be reconciled with a process-oriented day-in-court right on 
broader grounds than avoiding serious unfairness. For example, substantial 
enough litigation cost savings might justify sampling in the same way 
judicial economy gains sometimes justify truncated participation in MDL 
and (b)(3) class actions. In fact, the argument for sampling is stronger in 
some respects than the argument for the class action on process-oriented 
participation grounds. Sampling allows more individual participation than 
the class action, since all litigants make some litigation choices before the 
sampling procedure is implemented.78 Also, sampling can be designed to 
guarantee even more participation, although doing so increases costs. For 
example, each party in the larger aggregation might be given a chance to 
object to the sampling protocol before implementation, and perhaps to 
                                                                                                                                      
75 Id. at 592-95.  
76 Id. 
77 For a more extensive discussion, see id. at 615-17. 
78 In fact, there are notable similarities between sampling and the class action.  
Sample cases usually share many common questions with cases not chosen for the 
sample. Moreover, the plaintiffs in non-sample cases should be able to point to a 
case in the sample that is typical of their own, at least if the overall aggregation is 
not too heterogeneous and the sample is large enough. In addition, there is no 
reason to believe that the sample cases would not be litigated vigorously or that 
lawyers litigating those cases would sell out the aggregation, at least no more 
reason than already exists without sampling.  
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argue against application of the sample average to her particular case 
afterward.79     
 It is important to be clear, however, that squaring sampling with 
process-oriented participation is only one step in justifying its use. As 
discussed in Part II above, sampling must also pass an outcome-oriented 
analysis under a utilitarian or rights-based metric. Furthermore, if there is 
any sense to the methodological legitimacy critique, sampling must be 
justified separately on legitimacy grounds as well. Part IV addresses this 
last topic.   
 
V. THE METHODOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY OBJECTION 
 
 To set the stage for the legitimacy objection, imagine that the 
defendant and all the plaintiffs genuinely consent to the use of a sampling 
procedure and their consent is their own and not just their attorney’s.80   
Also, assume that the sampling procedure is carefully designed to generate 
a reliable expected outcome for the population of cases as a whole, and 
suppose too that it significantly reduces litigation costs and does not 
adversely affect third parties. In other words, sampling in our hypothetical 
preserves deterrence benefits without harming others and does so at a 
significantly lower cost than individual litigation. Is there any reason left to 
object to it?   
Many people—and I count myself among them—would answer no.  
Nevertheless, one has reason to feel a bit uneasy. After all, deciding cases 
by extrapolating from a sample is a rather strange way to do adjudication.  
In the traditional ideal, judges focus on the facts of each individual case 
                                                                                                                                      
79 There is one more potential obstacle to sampling: the jury trial right.  See, 
e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that trial judge’s sampling plan violates the defendant’s Seventh 
Amendment jury trial right). Sampling provides jury trials only for the sample 
cases. Still, if the sample is large enough, each case in the larger aggregation 
should have at least one case in the sample that is very similar to it and tried to a 
jury. Moreover, it is not clear that jury trial must be extended to each separate 
party. After all, the class action binds absent class members without giving them an 
individual jury trial, and offensive nonmutual issue preclusion can bind a party to a 
judge decision in a case where that party would otherwise be entitled to a jury trial. 
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979). I leave an 
analysis of the jury trial objection for another occasion.  
80 Suppose the parties prefer a speedier resolution at a lower cost.  
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and reason from those facts to a decision for that case.81 There are 
exceptions, of course—the class action being the most notable—but the 
fact that these are exceptions, and some of them rather controversial, tends 
to prove the general rule. 
This uneasiness with sampling might just be a result of 
unfamiliarity with its use, but I suspect that more is involved. For example, 
some critics of large-scale aggregation object to procedures like sampling 
because they believe that aggregative procedure is somehow at odds with 
what adjudication is about as an institution.82 This type of objection might 
be about adverse effects on outcome-based rights or process-based 
individual participation, already dealt with in Parts II and III above.83 But it 
is also possible that the objection runs deeper, that it rests on a view that 
aggregative procedures like sampling are institutionally incompatible with 
civil litigation because they force courts to act in ways that are foreign to 
adjudication.  
To illustrate this point, consider the Supreme Court’s gratuitous 
indictment of sampling as “Trial by Formula” in the recent Wal-Mart 
case.84 The Court’s explicit argument invoked Wal-Mart’s supposed 
entitlement to “litigate its statutory [Title VII] defenses to individual 
claims”, noted that sampling abridges this entitlement, and concluded that 
sampling violates the Rules Enabling Act for this reason.85 This argument 
                                                                                                                                      
81 By the traditional ideal, I mean something like Professor Chayes’s 
traditional model of litigation. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing two polar models of 
litigation—traditional and public law). 
82 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). I also 
suspect that objections based on the symbolic or expressive value of individual 
trial fall into this category. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-93 
(1971). These objections tend to focus on the institutional benefits of 
individualized procedure rather than on party rights.    
83 For example, Professor Redish invokes the right to individual participation 
and fits it into a broader theory of democratic legitimacy. He argues, in effect, that 
many uses of the class action do violence to democratic legitimacy because they 
deprive class members of the right to individually litigate their own claims, a right 
that instantiates democratic participation in adjudication. See REDISH, supra note 
82. 
84 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
85 Id. 
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is weak and not well defended in the case.86 Moreover, the Court could 
have made the argument perfectly well without going out of its way to take 
a gratuitous rhetorical swipe at sampling.   
 The Court’s use of the phrase “Trial by Formula” suggests a 
strong aversion to sampling on the ground that it substitutes a statistical 
formula for an individual trial. But why is the use of a formula such a 
problem?  We can only guess at the answer. It is difficult to see how it can 
be about bad outcomes or about participation rights that the parties would 
otherwise have exercised. Wal-Mart has no legitimate reason to complain 
about the outcome. This is because a properly designed sampling procedure 
will generate a total amount of backpay damages for the class that closely 
approximates Wal-Mart’s aggregate liability—perhaps even more closely 
than individual trials.87 Moreover, although Wal-Mart is not able to litigate 
its defense to each individual suit with sampling, it does get to participate 
fully in each sample case.88 Furthermore, because each plaintiff probably 
has too little backpay at stake to justify an individual suit, all plaintiffs 
share a strong interest in aggregate resolution, which can be accomplished 
only through some type of aggregate procedure like sampling. So neither 
outcome quality nor participation rights seem capable of providing an 
answer to our question. But there is another possibility. Perhaps the Court 
believes that sampling just does not belong in adjudication because it 
                                                                                                                                      
86 For example, although Title VII recognizes a substantive right to individual 
defenses against backpay awards, it is not clear that the statute also confers a right 
to litigate those defenses individually. If it does not, it is unclear what “substantive 
right” is being “abridged . . . or modified” within the meaning of the Rules 
Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
87 To be sure, the averaging effect of sampling almost certainly will give some 
class members a smaller, and some a larger, backpay award than their substantive 
entitlements guarantee, but that does not affect Wal-Mart. It is also worth noting 
that, while the Court does not refer to the rights of class members, the distribution 
of backpay among class members can be justified from a rights-based perspective.  
The typical backpay amount would not support an individual suit and the 
possibility of qualifying for a (b)(3) class action is remote without the use of 
sampling. Thus, one can argue that all plaintiffs have an interest in sampling so 
they can recover at least some backpay award. 
88 Also, any claim that Wal-Mart might have to process-based participation 
must take account of the adverse effect on the participation rights of class 
members, most of whom would probably not be able to bring their backpay claims 
at all without sampling. Indeed, it is fairly obvious that Wal-Mart seeks individual 
litigation precisely because it is likely to discourage the pursuit of individual 
backpay claims.   
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involves trying cases with a “formula” and not attending individually to the 
facts of each case.   
In any event, I believe that the institutional argument has sufficient 
intuitive appeal that it should be addressed separately. Even if judges and 
scholars do not invoke it explicitly, they could still be influenced by it 
implicitly while formulating their express objections on outcome quality or 
participation grounds.89 In a world of institutional differentiation and 
specialization, the legitimacy of an institution depends in large part on the 
presence of structural elements that fit the institution’s distinctive purpose 
and function.90 Following this logic, critics of sampling might say that the 
function of courts is to decide individual claims of right and that traditional 
litigation procedure is essential to this function and thus essential as well to 
the institution’s legitimacy. 
I shall refer to this type of argument as the “methodological 
legitimacy objection” since it focuses on legitimacy and supposes that 
legitimacy depends on the method used to decide a case. To get a clearer 
grasp on the nature of the argument, let us consider a more obvious 
example than sampling. Most people bristle at the idea that a judge would 
decide an issue by flipping a coin, and they are likely to object even though 
the issue is in equipoise, each side has an equal chance to win, and no third 
parties are harmed.91 The objection is that flipping a coin is simply not a 
                                                                                                                                      
89 In particular, judges might be more willing to embrace an argument that 
sampling violates outcome-based rights or infringes a litigant’s due process right to 
a personal day in court because they also believe that sampling is simply not what 
adjudication is about. 
90 For example, the legitimacy of the legislative process depends on a voting 
system that facilitates public participation and, in theory at least, assures 
representative accountability to electorate preferences. This voting system adds 
legitimacy because it fits the function of legislation in a way that accommodates 
democratic values. However, voting would contribute nothing to legitimacy if the 
legislature were suddenly enlisted to adjudicate individual cases as well. In fact, 
many would deem it illegitimate for a legislature to take on the function of 
adjudication, even if the parties agreed and even if all the legislators wanted to do 
it.   
91 See, e.g., In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Mich. 2003) (judge censured 
for flipping a coin when neither side’s argument was more persuasive); Adam M. 
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2009) 
(providing several examples). The hypothetical assumes that the decision is not 
subject to a burden of persuasion that would break the tie. To make the situation 
more concrete, imagine that the issue is committed entirely to the judge’s 
discretion. It is worth pointing out though that the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
 
2011             A NORMATIVE EVALUATION            263 
 
 
proper decision procedure for adjudication. If pressed to explain why, a 
critic would probably focus on the close link between adjudication and 
case-specific deliberation.92 She might argue that judges are supposed to 
decide cases by reasoning through the implications of general rules and 
principles on the facts of the particular case and that this mode of reasoning 
is essential to adjudication’s legitimacy. 93   
It is important to be clear about the nature of this objection. It has 
nothing necessarily to do with adverse effects on the substantive or 
procedural rights of the parties. Moreover, neither coin flipping nor 
sampling is an arbitrary decision procedure.94 A judge can have a very 
good reason to use either method. For example, flipping a coin can be 
justified on moral grounds when it is impossible to tell which party is 
correct and both have equally strong substantive entitlements.95 So too, 
sampling makes sense when the sheer volume of cases produces serious 
problems for individual litigation, as previously discussed.  
The methodological legitimacy objection, I believe, has to do with 
the fact that sampling, like coin flipping, disables the usual reasoning 
process at the point of actual decision. The judge relies exclusively on a 
statistical method rather than applying rules and principles to the facts of 
each specific case. Still, the question remains why this is an illegitimate 
method when the judge can provide a sensible reason for using it. The 
                                                                                                                                      
persuasion burden, as a general rule for breaking ties, is itself based on statistical 
generalizations about broad categories of cases.    
92 See Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the 
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1084-85 
(2011) (arguing that people oppose lotteries because they substitute luck for 
reason, and quoting the N.Y. Commission on Judicial Conduct in In re Friess, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
88 (1984), for the proposition that: “The public has every right to expect that a 
jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue and . . . render reasoned rulings and 
decisions.”).   
93 See generally JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS 38 (1989) (emphasizing 
that “the use of lotteries to resolve decision problems under uncertainty 
presupposes an unusual willingness to admit the insufficiency of reason.”).    
94 Cf. id., at 102 (noting that randomness in legal decisions is often associated 
with arbitrariness or whimsy).  
95 See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 
RATIONALITY & SOCIETY 483, 495-505 (1988) (discussing equal entitlement and 
scarcity conditions for using the lottery as an exclusive or nonexclusive method of 
allocation and noting that using the lottery under these conditions is supported by 
reasons). 
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answer must be that the application of reason at the point of case-specific 
decision is a fundamental aspect of adjudication that neither the parties nor 
the judge can change without risking the institution’s legitimacy.    
It is quite common to view adjudication as intimately tied to a 
special reasoning process that combines general principles with case-
specific facts.96 For example, Lon Fuller characterized common law 
reasoning in this way. He described a decision process that closely 
resembles the method of reflective equilibrium.97 Roughly, judges interpret 
the law by placing existing legal principles and norms alongside the facts 
of the particular case. The judge moves back and forth between her best 
understanding of the law and whatever moral or practical intuitions the 
facts generate, adjusting law and intuition until they fit together in 
reflective equilibrium.  
However, even if this account of adjudicative reasoning is correct, 
as I believe it is, there remains the question why exceptions are not 
permitted when they respond in a sensible way to serious litigation 
problems. One possible reason to worry about exceptions has to do with 
public perception. The concern on this account is that the public will lose 
faith in the legitimacy of adjudication if judges employ unfamiliar methods 
to resolve cases. But this concern is exaggerated and ultimately 
unpersuasive. For one thing, public perceptions are malleable. For example, 
the public might accept coin flipping as legitimate in a particular case if 
they knew that the parties requested it and understood that it was supported 
by good reasons. In addition, public perception is circular. People tend to 
equate what is legitimate with what is familiar.98 If judges routinely flip 
coins, for example, public opinion could shift toward accepting coin 
flipping as a proper decision method. Finally, it is simply implausible that 
the public would give up on the court system just because judges 
                                                                                                                                      
96 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986); Lon L. Fuller, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 372-81 (1978).   
97 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 
B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995) (describing Fuller’s views in terms of reflective 
equilibrium). On the method of reflective equilibrium more generally, see JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-45 (rev. ed. 1999). 
98 The other alternative is to base their opinion on what they believe courts 
should do. But in that case, it is not the perception that matters, but the underlying 
normative theory that supports the perception. 
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occasionally used sampling to decide large case aggregations, especially if 
they also provided good reasons for doing so.99   
 This leaves only one reason I can think of for worrying about 
exceptions. This has to with the adverse effect of occasional use on the 
quality of adjudicative decisions over the long run. The concern is that 
allowing some exceptions will invite more exceptions and send 
adjudication down a slippery slope, transforming the institution in 
undesirable ways. This concern might have force for coin flips. Maybe a 
few coin flips would not be a problem, but if judges became accustomed to 
flipping coins, they might relax constraints on its use and make coin 
flipping a more general practice. Also, a judge faced with a difficult 
decision might be tempted to give up too soon and resort to flipping a coin 
when a more careful analysis would show that a reasoned decision is 
feasible. This could be particularly problematic if hard cases are the ones 
where principled decision is most valuable for the development of the law.   
Whatever merit it might have for coin flips, this slippery slope 
argument is much less convincing for sampling. No matter how frequently 
sampling is used, there will always be sample cases decided in the ordinary 
way. Thus, judges never completely escape individualized decisions.  
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that every case must be adjudicated 
individually in order to produce good common law rules and principles or 
sound interpretations of statutes or constitutional provisions. Finally, the 
use of sampling is limited to large case aggregations and requires much 
more deliberation and preparation than coin flipping. Thus, the slippery 
slope is a lot less slippery for sampling than for coin flipping. 
In sum, it is not at all clear that the methodological legitimacy 
objection has force against a well-justified use of sampling in mass tort 
aggregations. Sampling is sufficiently different from coin flipping even 
though both employ probabilistic techniques and randomized decision 
procedures.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
99 There is a closely related argument that deserves brief mention. According 
to this argument, adjudication has social value as a symbol of our collective 
commitment to principled reason in government and that this symbol’s message 
would be diluted if judges flipped coins or used sampling. Even if the premise is 
true, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. I find it rather far-fetched to 
believe that the message would be lost if judges sometimes used sampling. Indeed, 
the fact that sampling is itself supported by good reasons should reinforce the 
message of reason’s importance in government. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Sampling is an extremely useful tool for litigating large 
aggregations of cases. Squaring it with adjudication, however, raises a 
number of complicated normative questions. In this Article and in my 
earlier work, I have attempted to address three types of challenges: 
challenges directed to sampling’s effect on outcome quality, challenges 
directed to its effect on process-based participation, and challenges based 
on sampling’s supposed incompatibility with adjudication’s distinctive 
mode of decisionmaking.   
In the end, sampling can be justified in many more situations than 
courts currently apply it, and society is paying a very high price for 
ignoring this insight. Courts should be more receptive to the benefits of 
sampling and judges should engage the task of justifying its use more 
carefully. The system of adjudication would be much the better for it. 
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APPENDIX 
 
This Appendix models the settlement decision under a no-sampling 
regime and under two different sampling scenarios. The point is to show 
that sampling can often reduce the likelihood of settlement and skew the 
settlement amount.   
The analysis considers settlement incentives before any cases are 
actually sampled on the assumption that all parties know that sampling will 
take place and also know the court’s sampling protocol. I consider the 
results when each plaintiff controls her own settlement decision, and then 
when an attorney representing all plaintiffs in the case aggregation on 
contingency makes the settlement decision in her own self-interest. 
 
I. MODEL AND TERMINOLOGY   
 
Let N be the total number of cases in the aggregation. Let Į be the 
fraction of cases that will be sampled. So ĮN is the number of cases in the 
sample. Assume that each case has a single plaintiff and a single defendant 
and that the plaintiffs are all different but the defendant is the same.  
Suppose there are two types of claims in the aggregation, high-value claims 
(H) and low value claims (L). To simplify the analysis, assume that these 
two types of claims vary only with respect to the amount of damages and 
not the objective likelihood of plaintiff’s success.100 Let wH and wL be the 
damages for a high-value and a low-value claim, respectively.   
Suppose that the plaintiffs and the defendant know w, but disagree 
about plaintiff’s likelihood of success in proving liability or damages, or 
both, at trial. This type of disagreement can occur, for example, when there 
is asymmetric information so that one party has information about the 
claim not yet known to the other side. Assume all the plaintiffs share the 
same estimates of likely success, which we shall denote pʌ. Let pǻ be the 
defendant’s estimate of plaintiff’s likelihood of success and assume that it 
is the same for all the cases.101   
                                                                                                                                      
100 This is just for purposes of simplification. One can also vary likelihood of 
success and get similar qualitative results. 
101 Therefore, the parties might have different information about liability or 
they might view generally known evidence of liability differently. Alternatively, 
they might agree on the probability of liability but disagree on the likely fraction of 
full damages that the plaintiff will be able to prove. In this case, p can be 
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Now let ȕ be the fraction of high-value claims in the aggregation.  
Also, let CP be each plaintiff’s cost of litigating her individual case all the 
way through trial and let CD be the defendant’s cost.102 To simplify the 
analysis, assume that the parties have equal bargaining power in settlement 
negotiations, so they split the settlement surplus evenly.103 Finally, it will 
be convenient to have a variable to denote the average damage amount over 
the entire class. Let v be this average, so v = ȕwH + (1-ȕ)wL.  
It is worth noting that the assumption that both parties know 
whether a case is high or low value – and therefore agree on w – is rather 
strong. It is more realistic to assume that the plaintiff has private 
information about the value of w for her particular case. Nevertheless, the 
strong assumption simplifies the analysis and conveys the essential insight.  
In footnotes, I explain why the results are likely to be similar when 
information about w is asymmetric.104 
 
II. THE NO-SAMPLING BASELINE 
 
First, we need to determine the results in a litigation world without 
sampling. These results will serve as a baseline against which to compare 
the impact of sampling.   
 
A. PLAINTIFFS CONTROL SETTLEMENT DECISION 
 
Suppose that each plaintiff makes the decision whether to settle 
and for how much. Without sampling, the conditions for settlement being 
feasible for a high-value and a low-value claim, respectively, are: 
 
pǻwH + CD  pʌwH - CP 
pǻwL + CD  pʌwL - CP 
 
                                                                                                                                      
interpreted as the probability of success on liability times the fraction of a full 
damage recovery the plaintiff is likely to receive.  
102 For simplicity, I assume that CP and CD are the same for high-value and 
low-value claims. I could relax this assumption, but it would complicate the 
analysis unnecessarily.   
103 We could generalize by letting Ȗ be the plaintiff’s relative bargaining 
power; that is, Ȗ would be the fraction of the settlement surplus that the plaintiff 
can capture. In this model, I set Ȗ = 0.5. 
104 See infra notes 105-108, 110. 
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These are just the standard settlement feasibility conditions. The 
defendant’s expected trial loss must be greater than or equal to the 
plaintiff’s expected trial gain for the defendant to be willing to offer a 
settlement that the plaintiff is willing to accept.   
Rearranging, we get: 
 
(pǻ - pʌ)wH + CP + CD  0          (1) 
(pǻ - pʌ)wL + CP + CD  0          (2) 
 
The expression on the left hand side is the settlement surplus, which must 
be nonnegative for settlement to be feasible.105 
 When bargaining power is equal, as we assume it is, the expected 
settlement is likely to be at the midpoint of the settlement range. Letting 
SH* and SL* be the expected settlement for a high-value and a low-value 
case, respectively, we have: 
 
SH* = (pʌ + pǻ)wH/2 + (CD – CP)/2       (3) 
SL* = (pʌ + pǻ)wL/2 + (CD – CP)/2        (4) 
  
B. ATTORNEY FOR ALL PLAINTIFFS CONTROLS SETTLEMENT 
DECISION AND SETTLES EN MASSE   
 
 Now assume that all the plaintiffs in the aggregation are 
represented by the same attorney, who is hired on contingency with a 
contract that specifies a contingency percentage of r. Suppose that the 
attorney only settles en masse and that she makes the settlement decision to 
maximize her own fee; in other words, assume that agency costs are high.    
                                                                                                                                      
105 Suppose instead that information about w is asymmetric: the plaintiff 
knows whether her case is high or low value, but the defendant only knows the 
background fraction, ȕ, of high value claims. In this situation, the defendant will 
assign the average value, v, to all cases. Let zH = wH – v and zL = v – wL. Then the 
conditions for settlement being feasible without sampling, for a high-value and a 
low-value claim, respectively, are:  
(pǻ – pʌ)wH – pǻzH + CP + CD  0 
(pǻ – pʌ)wL + pǻzL + CP + CD  0 
 Thus, the settlement surplus differs from the symmetric information case 
by a factor equal to the amount by which the true value of w differs from the 
average value, discounted by pǻ. 
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The smallest settlement the attorney will accept, S, is one that 
makes her indifferent between settling or going to trial. This condition is: 
rS = rnpʌv – nCP. Thus, the attorney’s minimum settlement demand is:  
 
npʌv – nCP/r 
 
The most the defendant is willing to offer is a settlement that 
makes it indifferent between settling and going to trial. Therefore the 
defendant’s maximum offer for the whole aggregation is: 
 
npǻv + nCD 
 
The feasibility condition for settlement if settlement takes place en masse 
is: 
 
npǻv + nCD – npʌv + nCP/r  0 
 
Simplifying, we get:  
 
(pǻ - pʌ)v + CP/r + CD  0                  (5) 
 
And S* for an en masse settlement with attorney control is: 
 
S* = n[(pʌ + pǻ)v + CD - CP/r]/2        (6) 
 
III. WITH SAMPLING 
 
The parties’ expectations change with sampling. A plaintiff knows that if 
she is chosen for the sample, she will receive either her own trial verdict or 
the sample average depending on the sampling protocol – and the 
defendant knows the same thing. If the sample plaintiffs’ costs are shared 
equally by all plaintiffs, then each plaintiff’s litigation costs are the same 
and equal to ĮCP. However, if sample plaintiffs must pay their own 
litigation costs, then the litigation costs for each of the sample plaintiffs are 
CP and the litigation costs for each of the remaining plaintiffs are 0.    
Let us assume that the defendant in all the scenarios averages total 
litigation costs for the sampled cases over all the cases in the aggregation.  
It follows that the defendant’s anticipated litigation costs are the same for 
all cases; namely ĮCD.  
The following discussion analyzes only Scenarios I and II. The 
other two scenarios can be analyzed in the same way. 
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A. SCENARIO I: SAMPLE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVE SAMPLE AVERAGE AND 
COSTS ARE SHARED EQUALLY 
 
1. When the Plaintiffs Control the Settlement Decision 
 
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility 
 
  With these assumptions in place, we can set forth the feasibility 
conditions for settlement before any sample is chosen. In Scenario I, all the 
plaintiffs get the sample average and share the sample plaintiffs’ litigation 
costs equally. Therefore, a plaintiff’s expected value of litigating through 
trial when she knows sampling will take place is: pʌv – ĮCP. The 
defendant’s expected loss is: pǻv + ĮCD. Therefore, the feasibility condition 
for settlement in Scenario I is: 
 
(pǻ - pʌ)v + Į(CP + CD)  0                      (7) 
 
 Given this, let us examine whether the use of sampling is likely to 
reduce, increase, or leave unaffected the likelihood of settlement compared 
with the no-sampling baseline. To determine this, we must compare (7) 
with (1) and (2). It is useful to consider cases where pǻ  pʌ and cases 
where pǻ < pʌ separately.   
First, suppose pǻ  pʌ. Comparing (1) and (2) with (7), it is easy to 
see that settlement is feasible for all cases with and without sampling.  
However, sampling might affect the probability of successful settlement for 
high value and low value claims. For high value claims, sampling reduces 
the settlement surplus. This follows directly from the fact that v < wH and Į 
< 1. Whether this is likely to reduce or increase the frequency of settlement 
depends on how the size of the surplus affects the likelihood of settlement.  
One view is that a larger surplus creates more points of potential agreement 
for the parties, which makes settlement more likely. Another view is that a 
larger surplus invites harder bargaining because there is more to gain, 
which makes settlement less likely. Under the first view, sampling is likely 
to reduce the probability of settlement for high-value claims. Under the 
second view, it is likely to increase the probability.    
For low-value claims, the effects depend on the magnitude of pǻ - 
pʌ.  In particular, using sampling increases the surplus if pǻ - pʌ > (1-
Į)(CP+CD)/(v–wL), which is, after rearranging,  
Į > 1 – [(pǻ - pʌ)(v–wL)(CP+CD)]. For any realistic Į, such as a 10% or 15% 
sample size, this condition is not likely to be satisfied unless v > wL, which 
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in turn is not likely unless wH > wL. It follows that using sampling is likely 
to reduce the settlement surplus for most low-value cases as well.106  
Second, suppose pǻ < pʌ. When this condition holds, some cases 
that can settle without sampling cannot settle with sampling. To see this 
point, note that the following two conditions must be satisfied if a case can 
be settled without sampling but not with sampling, if the claim is high 
value: 
 
(pǻ - pʌ)wH + CP + CD  0 
(pǻ - pʌ)v + Į(CP + CD) < 0 
 
Let q = pʌ - pǻ. Solving for q in each inequality and putting the 
inequalities together, we get: 
 
Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD)/wH 
 
For this to be possible, Į(CP + CD)/v <  (CP + CD)/wH, which implies that Į 
< v/wH. 
Therefore, for high-value claims with pǻ < pʌ (i.e., q > 0), the case 
can settle without sampling but not with sampling if and only if:  
 
Į < v/wH, and 
 
Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD)/wH 
 
If q  Į(CP + CD)/v, then the case can settle with or without sampling, and if 
q > (CP + CD)/wH, then the case cannot settle whether or not sampling is 
used. 
                                                                                                                                      
106 The results are a bit different when information about w is asymmetric.  See 
supra note 105. One must compare (7) with (pǻ – pʌ)wH – pǻzH + CP + CD for high-
value claims and with (pǻ – pʌ)wL + pǻzL + CP + CD for low-value claims. When pǻ 
> pʌ, it is theoretically possible for sampling to enable settlement for high value 
claims (but never for low value claims) when settlement is not otherwise feasible.  
For this to hold true for a high value claim, two conditions must be satisfied: 
(pǻ – pʌ)wH – pǻzH + CP + CD < 0 and 
(pǻ - pʌ)v + Į(CP + CD)  0 
The latter condition is always satisfied and the former is satisfied if zH > [(pǻ - 
pʌ)wH + CP + CD]/pǻ. In other words, the case must be quite far out on the tail of 
the distribution before sampling enables settlement.  
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 The opposite result—i.e., that sampling makes settlement 
feasible—is also possible but highly unlikely for most aggregations. It can 
be easily shown that for sampling to enable settlement when it would not 
otherwise occur, the following condition must be satisfied:  (CP + CD)/wH < 
q  Į(CP + CD)/v. This condition can hold only if Į > v/wH. But this 
constraint on Į (the sample size) is not likely to hold for most aggregations.  
As long as the standard deviation of the aggregation is not unusually large, 
v/wH will be a reasonably large fraction and no court is likely to sample a 
large fraction of cases from the aggregation.107  
One can do the same analysis for low-value claims. It is easy to see 
that the switch to sampling can never make settlement possible for a low-
value claim if it is not possible without sampling. This is because (pǻ - pʌ)v 
+ Į(CP + CD) < (pǻ - pʌ)wL + CP + CD whenever pǻ < pʌ (since v > wL).  
However, the switch to sampling scuttles settlement for low-value cases 
whenever Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD)/wL.108     
To summarize, we have the following two results for cases where 
pǻ < pʌ: 
 
x For realistic values of Į and aggregations that are not 
too widely dispersed about the mean, switching from 
no-sampling to sampling never turns a case that cannot 
settle into one that can.  
x More importantly, using sampling turns some cases 
that can settle into ones that cannot. These are cases 
where Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD)/wi  (i = H or L).  
 
                                                                                                                                      
107 When information about w is asymmetric, similar results obtain. See supra 
note 105. It is easy to derive the parallel conditions for sampling to scuttle 
settlement for high value claims, assuming pǻ < pʌ: 
Į < [1 – pǻzH/(CP + CD)]v/wH, and 
Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD – pǻzH)/wH 
If Į > [1 – pǻzH /( CP + CD)]v/wH, there is a range of q for which sampling 
enables settlement of high value claims, just as for the symmetric information case.  
However, as long as pǻzH /( CP + CD) is relatively small, Į is very unlikely to 
exceed this threshold and sampling will only scuttle settlement of high-value 
claims.   
108 Similar results obtain for low-value claims when information about w is 
asymmetric. Sampling never enables settlement no matter what Į is. Moreover, 
sampling scuttles settlement when Į(CP + CD)/v < q  (CP + CD + pǻzL)/wL.    
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To give a concrete example of the second result, suppose a high-
value claim is worth $1,000,000 and a low-value claim is worth $600,000 
and 20% of the aggregation is high-value claims. Suppose CP = CD = 
$150,000, and a 10% sample is used, so Į = 0.1. Then v = .2×1,000,000 + 
.8×600,000 = 680,000, and v/wH = 0.68. Therefore, the condition Į < v/wH 
is satisfied (and, of course, Į < v/wL for all Į, since v/wL > 1). In this case, 
Į(CP + CD)/v = 30,000/680,000 = .044. For high-value claims, (CP + CD)/wH 
= 300,000/1,000,000 = 0.3. For low-value claims, (CP + CD)/wL = 
300,000/600,000 = 0.5. Assume pǻ < pʌ. If the difference between the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates of p is between 0.044 and 0.3, using 
sampling will turn all claims into ones that cannot settle.  
 
b. Effect on Settlement Amount 
 
Next, consider the effect of sampling on the expected settlement 
amount. Assuming equal bargaining power, so the parties split the surplus 
evenly, the expected settlement amount with Scenario #1 is: 
 
S* = [(pʌ + pǻ)v + Į(CD – CP)]/2              (8) 
 
We must compare (8) with (3) and (4). It is easy to see that 
sampling always reduces the settlement amount of high-value claims – 
from [(pʌ + pǻ)wH + (CD – CP)]/2 to [(pʌ + pǻ)v + Į(CD – CP)]/2. Sampling 
also increases the expected settlement for low-value claims if Į > 1 - [(pʌ + 
pǻ)(v-wL)/(CD – CP)], which should (almost) always hold true.   
 
2. When the Attorney Controls the Settlement Decision and 
Settles En-Masse 
 
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility 
 
The condition for a feasible settlement under Scenario I when the 
attorney is in control is: 
 
(pǻ – pʌ)v + Į(CP/r + CD)  0           (9) 
 
We must compare (9) with (5). Doing so yields the following results: 
 
x If pǻ  pʌ, the aggregation can settle en-masse with and 
without sampling, but the surplus is less with 
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sampling. The surplus is (pǻ – pʌ)v + CP/r + CD without 
sampling and (pǻ – pʌ)v + Į(CP/r + CD) with sampling. 
x If pǻ < pʌ, then for all Į (with q = pʌ – pǻ), a case that 
cannot settle without sampling cannot settle with 
sampling.  But there are cases where settlement is 
scuttled with sampling. These are cases where Į(CP/r + 
CD)/v < q  (CP/r + CD)/v.109  
 
To illustrate, consider the same example as we analyzed above: wH 
= $1,000,000; wL = $600,000; 20% of the aggregation is high-value claims; 
CP = CD = $150,000, Į = 0.1, and v = 680,000. Assume r = 0.25, which is 
roughly the average contingency recovery in large aggregations. Then CP/r 
+ CD = 750,000.   
If pǻ  pʌ, then settlement is always possible, but sampling reduces 
the size of the surplus by $675,000. This is a significant amount given that 
v is $680,000.  For example, suppose pǻ – pʌ = 0.4. Then the surplus falls 
from $1,022,000 to $347,000.    
If pǻ < pʌ, then using sampling will turn cases that can settle into 
cases that cannot whenever 0.11 < q  1. Therefore, as long as the 
divergence in estimates is large enough, every such case will turn from 
feasible to impossible to settle when sampling is used. 
 
b. Effect on Settlement Amount 
 
The expected en masse settlement under Scenario I with the 
attorney in control is: 
 
S* = n[(pʌ + pǻ)v + Į(CD - CP/r)]/2          (9) 
 
To determine the effect on the settlement amount, we must 
compare (9) with (6). It is easy to see that sampling increases the expected 
settlement amount if, as is very likely, CP/r > CD.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
109 If q  Į(CP/r + CD)/v, then the case can settle with or without sampling. If q 
 (CP/r + CD)/v, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used or not. 
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B. SCENARIO II: SAMPLE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVE OWN VERDICTS AND 
COSTS ARE SHARED EQUALLY 
  
1. When the Plaintiffs Control the Settlement Decision 
 
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility 
 
When sample plaintiffs receive their own verdicts, a plaintiff’s 
expected value of litigating through trial knowing that sampling will be 
used depends on whether the claim is high or low value. Since Į is the 
probability a plaintiff will be selected for the sample and since a sample 
plaintiff receives her own verdict, wH or wL, and a non-sample plaintiff 
receives the sample average, v, the feasibility conditions with sampling 
become for high-value and low-value claims, respectively: 
 
(pǻ - pʌ)[ĮwH + (1-Į)v] + Į(CP + CD)  0       (10) 
(pǻ - pʌ)[ĮwL + (1-Į)v] + Į(CP + CD)  0        (11) 
 
We must compare (10) with (1), and (11) with (2). Doing so and 
applying the same method as above yields the following results (where q = 
pʌ – pǻ):110 
 
x If pǻ  pʌ, all high-value and low-value cases can 
settle, but the surplus is less with sampling for high-
value claims. The surplus is less with sampling for 
low-value claims if pǻ – pʌ < (CP + CD)/(v – wL) and 
greater with sampling if the inequality is reversed. 
x If pǻ < pʌ, then for all high-value cases and all Į, a 
case that cannot settle without sampling also cannot 
settle with sampling.  But there are cases where 
settlement is scuttled with sampling: a case can settle 
without sampling but not with sampling if 
Į(CP+CD)/[ĮwH+(1-Į)v] < q  (CP + CD)/wH.111   
                                                                                                                                      
110 It is possible to derive parallel conditions that apply when information 
about w is asymmetric, just as in Scenario I. See supra notes 107-108.   
111 If q  Į(CP+CD)/[ĮwH+(1-Į)v], then the case can settle with or without 
sampling. If q > (CP + CD)/wH, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used 
or not. 
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x If pǻ < pʌ, then for all low-value cases and all Į (and 
with q = pʌ – pǻ), a case that cannot settle without 
sampling also cannot settle with sampling. But there 
are cases where settlement is scuttled with sampling: a 
case can settle without sampling but not with sampling 
if Į(CP+CD)/[ĮwL+(1-Į)v] < q < (CP + CD)/wL.112  
 
b. Effect on Settlement Amount 
 
Under Scenario II, the expected settlement amounts with sampling 
become for high-value and low-value claims, respectively: 
 
SH* = {(pʌ + pǻ)[ĮwH + (1-Į)v] + Į(CD - CP)}/2      (12) 
SL* = {(pʌ + pǻ)[ĮwL + (1-Į)v] + Į(CD - CP)}/2       (13) 
 
We must compare (12) with (3) and (13) with (4).  It is clear from 
inspection that sampling reduces SH*. Sampling increases SL* if pʌ + pǻ > 
(CD – CP)/(v – wL), which should usually be the case unless defendant’s 
litigation costs greatly exceed the plaintiff’s or the low-value case is very 
close to the population average.  
 
2. When the Attorney Controls the Settlement Decision and 
Settles En-Masse 
  
a. Effect on Settlement Feasibility 
 
The feasibility condition with attorney control and sampling is: 
 
(pǻ – pʌ)v + Į(CP/r + CD)  0            (14) 
 
This is the same as for Scenario I with the attorney controlling the 
settlement decision and settling en-masse. Therefore, the same results hold. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
112 If q  Į(CP+CD)/[ĮwL+(1-Į)v], then the case can settle with or without 
sampling. If q > (CP + CD)/wL, then the case cannot settle whether sampling is used 
or not. 
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b. Effect on Settlement Amount 
 
The expected settlement without and with sampling are the same as 
for Scenario I, so the results are the same as well. Sampling increases the 
expected settlement amount if, as is very likely, CP/r > CD.  
REEVALUATING COMPLEX MEDIATION 
GENERALIZATIONS 
 
EDWARD BRUNET* 
 
*** 
 
Several generalizations dominate the mediation discourse. When 
discussing mediation one often hears the almost mythic words of trust, 
confidentiality, expertise, and asymmetric information advantages held by 
risk neutral and data rich insurance companies. This short essay critiques 
these generalizations and exposes them as incomplete and erroneous. 
Mediator expertise is elusive and not always necessary. Mediators 
frequently lack substantive expertise and exhibit only procedural expertise. 
Their expertise is only partial and may be minimal. 
Confidentiality, often deemed central to a mediation, is similarly 
overblown. In truth, the mediators commitment to confidentiality is 
overstated. Most mediators act to filter and then redistribute important 
information gained in earlier caucus sessions. Such “noisy mediation” is 
central to mediation theory and indispensable to settlement. Mediator 
comments are often pregnant with new information hints. The stereotype 
that data rich insurers, repeat players in dispute resolutions possess an 
advantage in making and receiving offers is not universally true. The 
emergence of sophisticated and efficient networks of organized plaintiffs 
who operate to prevent insurers from controlling the mediation process 
undercuts this generalization. 
I have mixed reactions to trust, often claimed a mediation 
essential. To be sure, trust remains a helpful and useful characteristic that 
plays a major role in settlement, particularly in the early stages of 
mediation. However, units of trust are difficult to create and do not 
guaranty a successful mediated settlement. 
 
*** 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
* Henry J. Casey Professor, Lewis and Clark. I thank Jessie Young for 
research help and Jeff Jones and Kate Lichter for comments. Any errors remain 
mine.  Readers should be aware that I plead guilty to mediating over 75 disputes, 
mostly environmental insurance coverage and employment disputes.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Several generalizations dominate mediation discourse, particularly 
in complex litigation. These commonly accepted generalizations, often 
involving insurance companies, have almost been transformed into myth 
and appear to be too widely accepted. In fact, these generalizations appear 
to lack reliable proof.  
Consider the following generalized assertions regarding expertise, 
trust and success. For example, one often hears that the mediator is or 
should be an expert.1 Expertise is the coinage with which we assess 
mediator hiring and competence. Similarly, the mediator appears clothed in 
a tunic of trust and is esteemed by the disputants because of such potential 
trust.2 Trust has become a crucial ingredient of mediation and is the subject 
that takes center-stage in the parties’ vetting process in mediator selection. 
Success represents yet another mediator homily. We often hear that a 
particular mediator is successful or, conversely, is no longer successful.3 
Never mind that defining success which might be described in a variety of 
ways,4 including leading the disputants to dismiss a pending lawsuit but 
also just achieving new respect and a degree of self-awareness that will 
facilitate an ability to more properly evaluate settlement possibilities. 
This list of mediation generalities goes on. One frequently hears 
that the presence of an insurance company skews the relative levels of 
information or, put more bluntly, creates information asymmetries.5 Some 
                                                                                                                 
1 Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 12 n.15 (1996) 
(“Most parties who are serious about resolving the dispute will choose a mediator 
who can give a strong, credible and objective evaluation of the legal and factual 
issues in the case.”).  
2 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation- A Preferred Method of Dispute 
Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S29 (1989). 
3 See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEG. J. 349 (1993); 
Riskin, supra note 1, at 12 n.15 (noting that Richard Ralston, a Kansas City 
lawyer-mediator, who has extensive experience as a lawyer and U.S. Magistrate 
judge, asserts that the disputants will select a mediator “who can close the 
negotiations.”).  
4 See Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Mediation, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 587, 608 (2005). 
5 Id. at 595 n.39 (“[D]escribing how ‘attorneys who run portfolios of cases 
(including class actions)’ hope to ‘diversify the risk’ of new information causing 
bad outcomes in cases by assuming it will cause good outcomes in other cases in 
their portfolios.”) (quoting Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: 
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characterize insurance companies as data rich because they accumulate and 
save information from earlier disputes.6 As repeat players, insurers might 
have access to more information relevant to the dispute and be able to more 
accurately predict the probable outcome of a case.7 Of course, insurance 
companies invest in the business of collecting data and possess huge 
incentives to reap a return on this investment. 
This advantage, or informational asymmetry, is allegedly of 
tremendous value when making settlement overtures to the possibly ill-
informed plaintiff. In this world of complex mediation generalities, 
defendant insurers are often data-rich “repeat players”8 who know the score 
due often to access to much more information than their opponents 
regarding the past relevant judgments and settlements. Myth holds that 
these experienced these insurers possess an important advantage in 
settlement negotiations because of their data-edge.9  
Yet another generalization triggers the “Parable of Lucky Uncle 
Joe.” Plaintiffs or their attorneys have earned a contrasting generalized 
reputation for eschewing the data-based probabilities advanced in 
mediation or negotiation by defendants. Instead, the reigning generalization 
suggests that plaintiff or her attorney is prone to feel lucky and to ignore 
the data with the attitude that probability assessments are wholly wrong and 
“just won’t apply to me.” In this generalization the plaintiff Uncle Joe 
ignores the fact-based offer advanced by the data-rich, repeat player 
insurance company defendant because he feels lucky. Like the luck or 
hunch dominated fisherman who decides to go fishing with confidence on a 
day or a time that is unlikely to achieve success, Uncle Joe formulates his 
settlement offers and case analysis on hoped for good fortune rather than 
fact. 
This essay exposes and critiques these mediation generalities. In a 
very real sense, these generalities seem to have derived from a type of 
                                                                                                                 
Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 113 
(2004)).  
6 Gregory D. Ewig, Using the Internet as a Resource for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 
(2002). 
7 Id. at 1223. 
8 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
9 Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About 
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 663, 701 n.173 (2001) 
(arguing that “repeat players in the settlement game” have the ability to absorb 
information about how particular types of cases settle).  
282 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.1 
 
mythology. Very little in the way of actual proof or data supports the 
generalities discussed. Instead, the propositions focused upon seem vague 
and can often be challenged as incomplete, questionable or overstated. I 
conclude by urging students and users of mediation services to avoid 
generality and, wherever possible, to challenge the use of hyperbole.  
While I am writing about mediation of complex cases generally, there is no 
question that the prime audience of this essay should be the insurance 
industry particularly. The generalities here addressed plague both counsel 
for defending insurers and their insurance clients. 
 
II. GENERALIZATION #1: HIRE THE MEDIATOR WHO IS A 
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT. 
 
A great amount of ink has been spilled extolling the need for 
mediator expertise.10 Several problems exist with the notion that disputants 
should seek an expert mediator. First, determining the degree of mediator 
expertise is deceptively difficult. For disputants who have not used the 
particular mediator being vetted, the normal problem of lack of first hand 
experience routinely occurs. Unfortunately, it normally takes a 
considerable amount of time to assess the true level of mediator expertise 
and that time, of course, is spent in the mediation process itself, well after 
mediator expertise is assessed. 
A related problem is that much of the information garnered 
regarding the possible mediator is entirely second-hand and indirect. This 
means that what a party learns about the mediator is not really based upon 
more reliable first-hand observation or direct assessment.11 What one learns 
about expertise is all too frequently dependent on the filter of a third party 
who comes close to monopolizing accurate assessment.12 Professor Robert 
Bone characterizes settlement process as a form of monopoly.13 This 
                                                                                                                 
10 See e.g., Riskin, supra note 1, at 46 (“The need for subject-matter expertise 
typically increases in direct proportion to the parties' need for the mediator's 
evaluations…[and] the kind of subject-matter expertise needed depends on the 
kind of evaluation or direction the parties seek.”). 
11 Fromm, supra note 9, at 698 (“The most thorough, useful, and exclusive 
resource of settlement is a person’s own firsthand knowledge of settlements.”). 
12 Id. (describing the “virtual monopoly over information about confidential 
settlements”). 
13 See generally Robert G. Bone, The Economics of Civil Procedure 79-80 
(2003) (asserting that “settlement is a bilateral monopoly”). The logic of this pont 
seems obvious, but contracting parties are free to negotiate with oher potential 
partners, provided that competition exists. Once two potential contract partners 
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problem pervades the process of mediator selection and is not unlike the 
all-to-common problem of building a case entirely upon circumstantial 
evidence. 
Then there is the obvious difficulty of defining a measure of 
mediator expertise or competence. Substantive knowledge of the law 
underlying the dispute differs greatly from the procedural nuances that 
become good mediation practice. So-called “evaluative mediation” often 
stems from a mediator’s substantive knowledge.14 Some disputants might 
desire such “expertise,” while others may react negatively to anything 
beyond procedural sophistication.15  
Questions of the mediator’s procedural expertise also should be 
addressed with a factually sensitive approach. Mediators develop 
specialties that can facilitate their roles. For example, some mediators are 
experienced in complex litigation and others bring a full plate of 
employment law to the ADR table. It seems obvious that disputants select 
the mediator who is an appropriate fit.16 
 Korobkin and Guthrie challenge the ability of lawyers to 
accurately value assets and question whether repetition of key negotiation 
dynamics will improve lawyer performance.17 Others fail to rely on the 
ability of the so-called repeat player to control valuable information 
                                                                                                                 
spend time and money assessing a possible deal, the sunk costs might rule out 
tuning away to another contractint entity. 
14 See Leonard Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and 
The New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Leonard Riskin, 
Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH 
COST LITIG. 11 (1994).  
15 See Jeffry Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from 
Ideology, 2000 J. DIS. RES. 247, 264 (2000) (“In practice, however, it appears that 
the most highly sought mediators are those who provide exactly this sort of 
evaluative feedback to the parties and use some measure of evaluation as part of 
their facilitation of reasonable party dialogue leading to settlement.”). 
16 See, e.g., Maria R. Volpe, Taking Stock: ADR Responses in Post-Disaster 
Situations, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 389 (2008) (criticizing recent BP 
Gulf oil spill system because the infrastructure for conducting these large scale 
events was created and implemented by those mainly outside the field in the 
disaster areas). 
17 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: 
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 83 (1997). 
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essential to a settlement.18 Taken together, these influential studies make 
assessments of mediator expertise elusive and difficult to achieve.19 
 
III. GENERALIZATION #2: THE MEDIATOR WILL KEEP SECRET 
OR PRIVATE THE INFORMATION LEARNED DURING A 
CONFIDENTIAL CAUCUS CONTEXT. 
 
Perhaps no other mediation generalization strikes such a sharp, 
focused note as the notion that the mediator will keep confidential all the 
information learned during the mediation session. This confidentiality 
pledge goes to the very core of a mediated dispute and is often reasserted 
during the mediation session by the mediator. The typical mediator will 
cover and promise the need for mediator confidentiality at the opening 
phase of the mediation and reaffirm his obligation to be confidential also in 
caucuses. These uses of confidentiality are internal to the mediation in that 
they recur within the mediation process at the opening and curing caucuses.  
They are much different uses of confidentiality than those “external” to the 
phases of mediation such as questions of mediation privilege that may arise 
following a mediation.20 
Belief in the sanctity of this platitude permits a party to freely 
discuss the true issues in the case and to disclose the “interest” of the 
disputant to the mediator.21 If such party disclosures fail to occur, the 
crucial information flow that fuels the mediation process atrophies and 
chances of settlement diminish. Aptly put by Ellen Deason, “if parties are 
to participate in mediation wholeheartedly, they need to have confidence 
that they can predict the extent to which their statements will be protected 
from disclosure.”22 
There is little doubt that many mediators scrupulously follow this 
respected generalization in what has been labeled an “understanding” 
                                                                                                                 
18 Fromm, supra note 9, at 698-700. 
19 Stempel, supra note 15, at 265 (“If, in actual use of what is generally 
considered mediation, participants frequently prefer mediators who being 
evaluative techniques to the process, it is needlessly bucking reality to insist that 
‘real’ mediation must be devoid of any evaluative component.”). 
20 See generally Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: 
Contract Law Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U. DAVIS L. REV. 38 (2001) 
(describing a post-mediation problem unlike the internal promises of 
confidentiality that occur during a mediation). 
21 Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation 
and Mediation—Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 563-64 (2005). 
22 Id. at 564. 
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model of mediation.23 The model focuses on the mediator purely as a 
listener, and as a trainer whose goal is to empower the disputants to resolve 
their own conflicts. Yet, many mediators appear to depart substantially 
from this reluctance to “filter” and “leak” the forbidden and learned fruits 
of private caucusing. In a process labeled “noisy mediation,” these 
mediators often find themselves revealing some of the data learned in a 
prior caucus session.24 
In their 1994 classic article emphasizing the economic implications 
of mediation, Professors Brown and Ayres suggested that such a “noisy 
mediation” would significantly help to settle the dispute.25 In contrast to the 
understanding-based model of mediation, an economic analysis emphasizes 
caucusing in analyzing the value a mediator brings to a negotiation by 
controlling the flow of information. Hidden information can be a major 
impediment to settlement. “By shuttling back and forth between meetings 
with individual disputants, mediators can collect and distribute private 
information.”26 Brown and Ayres explain that mediators do this by sending 
“noisy translations of information disclosed during private caucuses.”27 For 
example, a mediator might determine based on caucuses that there is a zone 
                                                                                                                 
23 See, e.g., GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: 
MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008) (asserting that the “understanding” 
model of mediation focuses on the parties as being in control of the mediation 
process and outcome; or the parties themselves are in the best position to find a 
solution because they are the ones who created, and are living in the problem 
context); Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: the 
Understanding-Based Model of Mediation, 4 J. AM. ARB. 225, 226-30 (2005) 
(asserting that increase of “understanding” regarding an adversary will help to 
resolve a dispute creatively). 
24 See, e.g., John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 69-70 (1997). 
25 See Jennifer Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 
VA. L. REV. 323, 329 (1994) (setting forth a theoretical need for the mediator to use 
leaked information that will be filtered and formulated by the mediator to aid in 
settling a case). 
26 Id. at 326. 
27 Id. at 328. See also Douglas E. Noll, The Myth of the Mediator As 
Settlement Broker, DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 46-47 (May-July 2009) (discussing the 
procedural and real-life implications of the fine line between trust and 
confidentiality and explaining how they must be broken to reach a settlement); 
Janis Sue Porter, Mediation of Personal Injury Cases: Mediation Can Settle Most 
Personal Injury Cases, 52 OR. ST. B. BULL. 34, 35 (Feb.-Mar. 1992) (describing 
the confidential nature of mediation and how it eventually must yield to be able to 
secure a settlement). 
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of agreement between the parties or that a set of trade-offs might bring the 
parties closer to agreement. “Revealing that there are gains from trade or 
that a particular set of trades might be acceptable to the other side has the 
effect of indirectly disclosing to each party some of the mediator’s private 
discussions with the other side.”28 Without such filtering and information 
transfer the mediator will be the only person in the process to achieve true 
“understanding.”29 
This economic theory helps to explain the important aspect of 
mediation practice. While mediators need to keep certain information 
confidential, they also need to evaluate and then transfer new, valuable 
information to disputants. Some of the new “filtered” information 
transferred will not be in the same form as it was when the mediator gained 
access to it. As transferred to a disputant, selected information may be 
“noisy.” The mediator may take X, a piece of information learned in 
confidence from disputant A, and later ask disputant B “how would you 
react if your disputant A had decided to do X?” This process of filtering 
and conveying ideas to get negotiation movement and to transfer new 
information from a disputant lies at the heart of the mediation process.  
Brown and Ayres observed that mediators acted as information 
brokers who collected valuable information about the strengths and 
weaknesses of a dispute and the relating settlement value. This theory of 
noisy mediation relies upon the mediator’s willingness to intentionally 
transfer data and to do so in a way that facilitates settlement. Strict 
confidentiality represents a lack of sharing of information between parties 
and “greatly decreases the likelihood that any claim will be filed.”30   
Some degree of noisy mediation appears essential to settlement. 
Nevertheless, some commentators criticize such behavior as “most 
problematic” because a mediator’s proposal will likely involve “a possible 
settlement option that implicitly contains messages about the preferences or 
                                                                                                                 
28 Brown & Ayres, supra note 25, at 327. See also Fran L. Tetunic, Mediation 
Myths and Urban Legends, 82 FLA. B.J. 52, 52-53 (May 2008) (asserting that total 
confidentiality is a myth in Florida’s court-mandated mediation). 
29 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Charles B. Craver & Ellen E. Deason, ADR: THE 
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 231-37 (4th ed. 2011) (setting forth mediator goals of 
achieving fairness, respect and ability to understand one’s opponent as above all 
other mediation purposes). 
30 Laurie Kratky Dor, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let 
Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 
488 (2006). 
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facts of the other party.”31 This criticism essentially accuses noisy 
mediators of unethical conduct, a serious accusation beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
 
IV. GENERALIZATION #3: THE DISPUTANTS’ SELECTION AND 
FUNCTIONAL USE OF THE MEDIATOR IS BASED AND 
DEPENDENT ON TRUST  
 
One frequently hears that trust is the foundation of mediation.32 
Without trust, a mediation is doomed to failure. The presence of trust 
creates an open information environment in which the parties feel free to 
disclose their interests to the mediator. The building of trust  provides a 
safe environment in which the mediator can increase information flow and 
make efficient use of trust.  
All-star mediator Ken Feinberg maintains that neutrality and trust 
are essential characteristics of an effective mediator.33 The mediation 
process can only work effectively when there is a trust relationship between 
the parties and their mediator, and where each party develops a quantum of 
trust allowing information to flow to the mediator.34 
These generalizations regarding trust are difficult to challenge. I 
salute and acknowledge the crucial role of trust in the mediation process. 
At the same time, however, the notion that trust can be massed produced in 
a cookbook, mechanical recipe that can be sold to all potential buyers 
strikes me as highly questionable. We are not all All-star mediators with a 
rich background and long resume capable of creating trust as early in the 
                                                                                                                 
31 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New 
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 
38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 443 (1997) (asserting that “[s]uch issues cannot be 
resolved easily either by broad protections of confidentiality or by reference to the 
lawyers' (and even other professionals') duties of confidentiality.”). 
32 Feinberg, supra note 2, at S29 (Trust in a mediator is essential because if the 
parties believe that a mediator may be required to divulge information of the 
mediation, parties would be deterred from choosing mediation as a means of 
conflict resolution); see also, e.g., Christopher Harper, Mediator As Peacemaker: 
The Case for Activist Transformative-Narrative Mediation, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 
595, 602 (2006) (describing, inter alia, mediator trust and non-intervention or 
neutrality as a pervasive myth in mediation). 
33 Feinberg, supra note 2, at S29.  
34 Id. (“Any suspicion that the mediator may become an adversary or witness 
against one of the parties in future litigation will undermine the parties’ trust in the 
mediator.”). 
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mediator vetting stage. Respected mediators are few and far between and 
even they need to earn the nuggets of trust needed to grease the units of 
information flow essential to mediation success.  
The timing associated with building trust merits careful attention.   
I stress that early trust building is essential to a winning mediation 
formula.35 If high levels of trust are present early in a mediation context, 
the parties will offer the mediator critical information to be filtered and 
perhaps distributed in the form of noisy mediation comments by the 
mediator. However, the absence of any trust early in the mediation will 
delay information flow and related symmetrical data possession essential to 
resolving the dispute. 
Trust is not created magically or mechanically. What factors cause 
the growth and emergence of trust essential to mediation? A brief review of 
scholarly thinking reveals a less than clear answer. Some mediators stress 
the value of reputation as the main path to enhanced trust.36 In great 
contrast, others regard trust as an ill-defined foundational concept of 
mediation because “it hides the normative judgments that a mediator must 
make about what are good and bad agreements under the practical 
circumstances at hand.”37 
The relationship between trust and mediation can be depicted 
graphically. Consider the triangle below which illustrates the critical role of 
trust in the mediation process. The space within and without this triangle 
represents a negotiation context and is designed to help understand how the 
interjection of the mediator and units of trust into the disputing fray will 
heavily influence the settlement process. 
 
                                                                                                                 
35 Christophe Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 569 
(2009) (noting that “goodwill gestures start the evolution of  a relationship from 
suspicious competitors to trusting  partners”). 
36 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 2; Leslie, supra note 35, at 570 (assesrting 
that “honoring ones word and staying out of ones way” help trust building). 
37 See James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination 
on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 73 (2004) (setting forth a less than enthusiastic view of trust 
in mediation). 
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Graph #1: No Information, No Deal 
 
 
 
In Graph #1 the parties are engaged in negotiation but unable to 
agree to a deal. The mediator is of little or nor help because she is located 
far from the action and is playing “catch-up” due to a lack of information.  
The mediator is “out of it”, well outside the information-rich triangle and 
incapable of linking the adversaries without a better structural position and 
without additional intake of information and production of trust. In 
contrast, the parties in this graph are positioned inside the triangle, a 
position that yields access to incentives and information. They have more 
information than the mediator and the incentives to negotiate and 
ultimately resolve the dispute. Yet, they lack the high level of information 
essential to reduce risk and to agree to settle. No adequate information, no 
deal. 
Graph #2, below shows an overall lack of trust. In Graph #2 below 
the parties do not trust the mediator nor one another. Not surprisingly, no 
trust effectively means no deal. Settlement fails to happen. Note the 
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structural position of the mediator who is now within the negotiation 
triangle where information might be traded and the disputed facts might 
become more clear. Some potential for settlement exists. Yet, the mediator, 
perhaps new to the process, has not created trust essential to settlement. No 
trust, no deal. 
 
Graph #2: No Trust, No Deal 
 
 
 
  Graph #2, however, contains a structure that is supportive of 
settlement, which focuses on the need for both party respect and trust to 
make a deal. Of course, at times there will be the resources and a healthy 
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environment for agreement. In Graph #2 the mediator has assimilated 
additional information and is structured to aid in settlement inside the 
negotiation triangle. The mediator of Graph #2 is no longer “out of it” in 
terms of lacking information. Yet, a mediated deal remains impossible 
because trust seems nonexistent, preventing settlement. 
In contrast, Graph #3, below, illustrates the impact of trust. The 
parties trust the mediator. Information appears to flow and risk may 
decrease. 
 
Graph #3: Mediator Trust Results in Settlement 
 
 
 
In Graph #3 the impact of mediation operates in a more positive 
way. The plaintiff and defendant are within the negotiation triangle, dealing 
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with each other. This dynamic is shown by the horizontal lines at the 
bottom of the triangle. Also note the position of the mediator within the 
triangle, meaning that the neutral is well-stocked with information and 
assessment abilities. The mediator is depicted as an insider who in Graph 
#3 is “with it,” able to help the parties deal with one another. The diagonal 
lines at the sides of the triangle show that the parties are playing the 
negotiation game with the mediator. This is inevitable. Yet, the parties are 
greatly aided by the presence of trust, here shown as a vertical line first 
connecting the adversary parties and then vertically influencing the 
negotiation itself by connecting the formerly distrustful adversaries.   
The ingredient of trust seems the most important in the recipe of 
settlement. Peace is close at hand and trust has done its magic. The 
adversary parties trust and respect the mediator. In essence the graph 
demonstrates a mediator who enters into process well-informed (inside the 
negotiation triangle) and has the ability to produce trust which, in turn, 
facilitates settlement. 
Here the adversary parties settle using probability assessments or 
values and the mediator is using evaluative mediation. The mediator hired 
is capable of collecting information to accurately assign probability 
assessments and appears well into the fray as an active participant. The 
mediator understands risk and is capable of communicating risks and 
evaluations to the disputants. Note also that the mediator has an incentive 
to help settle the case which should facilitate increases in mediator 
reputation.  
The need to create trust is essential but elusive as well as 
complicated. Reputation appears the gold standard in the creation of early 
trust.38 The achievement of a strong reputation as a neutral surely creates a 
degree of trust. The beauty of reputation-created trust is it can be triggered 
early in the multiple phases of litigation. Early trust based on reputation 
need not be prepared at or near the beginning of litigation. Reputation 
based upon trust exists without any need for a mediator to do much; it 
belongs to the mediator and typically is the mediator’s to lose. Reputation 
will decrease where the parties observe untrustworthy actions.39 
There are other means of creating trust units, each difficult and 
each demanding. Some mediators strive for open and transparent events 
                                                                                                                 
38 Ellen E. Deason, The Need for Trust As A Justification for Confidentiality in 
Mediation: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1387, 1401 (2006) 
(“Reputation is one of the key variables in this calculus, for it will be enhanced by 
trustworthy behavior.”). 
39 Id. 
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held early in the dispute.40 These events provide the disputants with an 
opportunity to see the mediator in action and hold the potential for either 
reducing or increasing trust. Caucusing will, of course, be undervalued in 
these events due to its placement of the mediator in secret positions that can 
worry the parties and decrease the quantum of mediator trust. Nonetheless, 
an early caucus gives a mediator opportunity to permit the clients to vent 
emotionally charged feelings and to begin to earn a reputation as an 
empathetic and active listener. These early trust enhancing events seem 
more appropriate for caucus contexts and are riskier if done in open 
session. 
 
V. GENERALIZATION #4: INSURERS DOMINATE DATA RICH 
DISPUTES BECAUSE THEY POSSESS ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION AND LACK THE PLAINTIFF’S RISK-TAKER 
ATTITUDE 
 
Data rich disputes, often defended by insurance companies, present 
the classic battle between parties differentiated by asymmetric information.  
One frequently hears the generalization that insurer’s possess a rich mine of 
information which creates a significant advantage.41 The insurance industry 
files likely contain relevant information from previous disputes, such as 
settlement amounts of similar cases, judicial judgments, or mediator 
predispositions.42  
                                                                                                                 
40 See, e.g., Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
515, 573-75 (2004) (noting that “Transparacy Facilitiest trust”). 
41 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) 
(“All plaintiffs want their damages immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be 
exploited by a rich defendant because his need is so great that the defendant can 
force him to accept a sum that is less than the ordinary present value of the 
judgment . . . It might seem that settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to 
avoid the costs of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the 
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his offer by that 
amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs of litigation even if he 
settles.”). 
42 See Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco 
Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 129 (2001) (“While in 
the past, one might have started with the assumption that the defendant had the 
resources to swamp the plaintiff, these [plaintiff] firms have accumulated sufficient 
capital through major victories in cases such as asbestos, tobacco, Dalkon Shield, 
etc., so that it may well be the plaintiff that is in the stronger resource position.”). 
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Popular thought dictates that the insurer’s asymmetric information 
creates a negotiation edge for defendants simply because they hold more 
relevant information. The myth posits that the insured defendant will be 
able to bargain more effectively by enabling more accurate assessments 
that are actually grounded in reality.43 
Part of this mythology suggests that the plaintiff and her attorney 
will take excessive risk and be classified as risk takers in decisions relating 
to trial or settlement. Consider the Parable of Uncle Joe, a risk-taking 
fisherman who tends to feel lucky and invincible. Uncle Joe is utterly 
confident and unable to compromise or to bargain realistically. He thinks 
that he will catch a big fish regardless of fishing conditions. Translating 
this Parable to the litigation context is not difficult. Some plaintiffs ignore 
bad news and turn down attractive offers by exercising risk-taking 
behavior. 
But is the Parable of Uncle Joe universally accurate? Unlikely.  
Today’s plaintiffs are represented by resourceful attorneys well connected 
with others with similar cases. Professors Issacharoff and Klonoff describe 
networks of plaintiffs’ counsel who efficiently coordinate briefing and 
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procedural proficiency of mediation practice. Others selected as mediators 
may lack much substantive knowledge in the topic to be mediated. A 
healthy skepticism towards mediation expertise prevails and actually aids 
the vetting process. 
Confidentiality, likewise, is a well-respected notion, almost a 
mantra of mediation practice, heard repeatedly at the beginning phases of a 
mediation. Like many clichés or mantras, this commitment to 
confidentiality seems to be either overstated or unrealistic. It fails to 
recognize that the mediator acts as a filter who analyzes and then 
distributes selected information learned in caucus session. Even Judge 
Posner has acknowledged the efficient use of noisy mediator comments 
that can facilitate settlement. The classic 1994 article by Brown and Ayres 
correctly justifies the process values of noisy mediator comments. A clear 
demand for evaluative mediation exists45 and relies on this process of 
mediator assimilation and subsequent leaking or distribution of information 
collected from the adversary parties. 
Moreover, the need for trust in the meditative process seems 
universally accepted and valid. It is hard to be critical of such a valuable 
and important tenet of dispute resolution. My comments on trust seem 
somewhat more measured and prudent. Mediation needs and depends on 
trust for its success.  
Lastly, Generalization #4 combines two notions, one that the 
defending party, often represented by a data rich insurance company,  
possesses an advantage in making and receiving offers grounded in reality, 
and a second axiom, the Parable of Lucky Uncle Joe, the lucky fisherman-
plaintiff who is a classic risk-taker who thinks that he can beat the odds 
habitually. When these two generalizations are combined, settlement 
mythology predicts that the defendant will evaluate settlement offers more 
accurately and will prepare and transmit to the mediator offers containing a 
patina of legitimacy. The mediator, in turn, may be impressed and thankful 
for this reality based information and might find herself subconsciously 
siding with the data rich party. 
This scenario, while surely possible, occurs less with every passing 
day. Modern Uncle Joes appear, but with less frequency. Instead, 
individual plaintiffs’ attorneys join forces to aggregate their discovery, 
monetary judgment information, and settlement data.  Uncle Joe, while he 
still exists, is increasingly isolated. The nature of dispute resolution (or 
                                                                                                                 
45 See Eric Green, Reexamining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, 
Complex Litigation: Lessons From the Microsoft and Other Mega-Cases, 86 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1171, 1186 (2006). 
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fishing) has changed greatly and now invites collaboration but on the 
plaintiff side of a dispute. Increased collective action has produced a new 
group of data-rich plaintiffs who are able to challenge the former 
information surplus held by insurance companies. Although I do not 
suggest that consortiums of collaborating plaintiff’s attorneys hold 
information that is at the level of data-deep insurance companies, I do agree 
with those who have questioned the generalization that asymmetric 
information inevitably aids the insurance industry. Those times are past and 
a new era of collaboration on the plaintiff’s side clearly has emerged. 
PROBABILITY SAMPLING IN LITIGATION 
 
JOSEPH B. KADANE* 
 
*** 
 
Random sampling is a widely used and well-established techniques 
used to reduce the cost of providing interpretable data. This paper discusses 
examples in the several different kinds of litigation in which random 
sampling has been useful. The paper concludes with speculation about the 
possible use of random sampling in mass tort litigation. 
 
*** 
 
This paper aims to contribute to a discussion of the possibility of 
using statistical methods to handle mass tort cases efficiently. After 
reviewing the basics of sampling, the paper summarizes cases involving 
sampling that the author participated in. The conclusion gives some thoughts 
on how mass tort litigation might be approached statistically. 
 
I. PROBABILITY SAMPLING 
 
The purpose of random sampling is to allow inference from the 
items observed to items unobserved. It is usually used to save the effort of 
having to observe each member of a population. 
It is important to distinguish random sampling from other kinds of 
sampling. The hall-mark of random sampling is the use of a random number 
table or an equivalent computer program to choose units. The reason for the 
use of random numbers is to make transparent the process by which items 
are chosen for observation. This is important because without 
randomization, biases can creep in, whether advertent or inadvertent, that 
can destroy the validity of the inference to unobserved members of the 
population. While often random sampling is implemented in which each 
item has the same probability of selection, this is not necessary. What is 
necessary is that the probability of selection of each item be known in 
advance.1  
                                                                                                                 
* Leonard J. Savage University Professor of Statistics and Social Sciences, 
Emeritus, at Carnegie Mellon University. His most recent books are "Statistics in the 
Law" (Oxford University Press 2008) and "Principles of Uncertainty" (Chapman 
and Hall 2011), also free on the web at www.stat.cmu.edu/~heidi/uncertainty- 
kadane.pdf . 
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Perhaps an example would illustrate this important point. Imagine a 
clinical trial of two treatments for a particular medical condition. Suppose 
that the physician (we'll call her Phyllis) who actually treats the patients 
observes the health of the patients in two categories, healthy and not, but this 
observation will not be available to those responsible for analyzing the 
results. Suppose also that healthy patients do better, whatever treatment is 
assigned to them, than do unhealthy patients. If Phyllis believes that one 
treatment is suitable for healthy patients and the other for unhealthy patients, 
and assigns treatments that way, the results of the trial will favor the 
treatment she assigns to healthy patients. If Phyllis wishes one treatment to 
be favored in the results, she can achieve this by her treatment assignments. 
In the first case her motives were pure, she was simply assigning treatments 
to help her patients as best she could. In the second case, her motives could 
be malign, for example, if she had a financial stake in her favored treatment. 
But her actions would be the same, and the consequences would be the same. 
Only by random sampling, where the decision of which treatment is assigned 
to a patient is removed from Phyllis, can outside observers be confident of 
lack of bias in the result.2 
A relative of random sampling is systematic sampling, in which 
every kth member of a list is used as a sample, starting with some arbitrary 
member of the list.3 Whether this is an adequate substitute for random 
sampling depends on the circumstances and the ordering of items in the list. 
Often the use of systematic sampling is benign. However, I remember one 
case in which systematic sampling was used to choose jury venires in 
Atlantic County, New Jersey.4 This has the effect that all persons with the 
same last name are adjacent in the list. Jurors were listed alphabetically 
starting with the fifth letter of their last name. There had been a previous 
system found to be discriminatory. A local bank proposed the following 
replacement. Often the choice of k was small, like 2 or 3. The consequence 
of this was that there were, more often than would have been true had the 
sampling been random, people in the same family, with the same last name, 
chosen for the same jury venire. Attorneys facing such a venire felt that they 
had to use peremptory challenges on every member of such a family if they 
challenged any member, to avoid offending potential jurors. The effect was 
                                                                                                                 
1 See WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 10-11 (J. Wiley & Sons 
1977). 
2 For more on this example, see Scott M. Berry & Joseph B. Kadane, Optimal 
Bayesian Randomization, J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y B (1997). 
3 See COCHRAN, supra note 1, at ch. 8.   
4 State v. Long, 499 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
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to reduce the number of useable peremptory challenges available to the 
parties. This jury challenge was successful.  
Sometimes there are special considerations that make it wise to 
separate a population of interest into various subpopulations, called strata, 
and to sample from each stratum. This, not surprisingly, is called stratified 
sampling. There are useful formulae to guide the choice of sample sizes for 
each such stratum.5  
Another useful technique is sampling proportional to size. This is 
especially useful in sampling financial transactions in which the questions of 
interest center on dollar amounts rather than on typical items. Then if items 
are chosen for analysis according to the size of the transactions, a more 
accurate estimate of the dollar consequences of the transactions can result.6 
Two standard references on random sampling are Cochran (1977)7 
and Kish (1995).8 
 
II. AN EARLY LEGAL EXAMPLE 
 
Like new members of many organizations, new scientific methods 
go through a period of hazing by the legal system before accepted. For 
example, in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. City of Inglewood, a random sample 
of days was selected to determine the proportion of sales made to 
non-residents of Inglewood (and therefore not subject to a sales tax). The 
best estimate from that sample was $28,250 with a standard deviation of 
$2,100, or a 95% confidence interval of $24,000 to $32,400 (per quarter for 
11 quarters). The judge in the case rejected the sampling evidence, but 
permitted Sears to do a complete audit, which found the figure of $26,750 
per quarter (not counting some unavailable sales tickets).9 
 
III. MORE RECENT EXAMPLES 
 
This section is a brief survey of some cases that involve sampling, to 
display the wide variety of situations in which the technique is a 
cost-effective method of determining the approximate truth. I begin with 
                                                                                                                 
5 See COCHRAN, supra note 1, at ch. 5.  
6 Id. at 250.  
7 Id.  
8 LESLIE KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (J. Wiley & Sons 1995). 
9 See R. Clay Sprowls, The Admissibility of Sample Data into a Court of Law: a 
Case History, 4 UCLA L. REV. 222 (1956-57) I did not participate in this case, and 
have no other source about it than Sprowls. 
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some disclaimers. First, this is nothing like a random sample of cases. Many 
of them are cases about which I have personal knowledge, because I was 
involved in them as an expert witness. Because many cases settle without a 
public record and few legal opinions say much about the sampling methods 
used, personal experience with cases seems an essential source of 
information. Second, some of the cases alluded to are still being litigated, 
and I am necessarily restricted in what I can say about them. Table 1 displays 
the topics to be discussed. 
 
A. REMITTITURS 
 
When a plaintiff has won a tort case, and damages have been 
awarded by a jury, the defendant can ask for a remittitur, under which the 
judge requires the plaintiff to accept a smaller damage award or a new trial, 
sometimes only on damages, sometimes on liability as well. The choice of a 
new trial seems required by the Seventh Amendment in federal cases, 
although this choice has been criticized as a sham.10 While the traditional 
criterion for awarding a remittitur is whether the jury award “shocks the 
conscience of the court”, New York, in a new law adopted in 1986 requires 
comparison with other similar cases. This requires the court to identify the 
cases it considers to be comparable, and then to analyze the amounts 
awarded to find the appropriate amount of remittitur in the case before it. 
Judge Weinstein, applying New York law, did this in the case of Geressy v. 
Digital Equipment Corporation.11 
 There are several issues raised by this procedure. The first is the 
criteria used to determine comparability. A second is the database of cases 
available for study. This is usually cases of record, which omit cases that 
settled under conditions of confidentiality. Since plaintiffs are one-time 
players, while insurance companies are not, this asymmetry gives an 
incentive for secret settlement of cases with large damages. Third, when a 
list of comparable cases has been assembled, what remittitur should result?12  
  
 
                                                                                                                 
10 Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the 
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J., 731 (2003); Joseph B. Kadane, Calculating 
Remittiturs, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 125-31 (2009).  
11 Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).  
12 On the latter point, see Kadane, supra note 10; Joseph B. Kadane, Response 
to Professor Haug, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 137 (2009); Mark Haug, Comment on 
Calculating Remittiturs by Kadane, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 133-35 (2009).   
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B. CROSS-SECTIONAL JURY CHALLENGES 
  
 A jury challenge is a motion to enforce the constitutional right to a 
jury venire composed of a representative cross-section of the community. 
Only some groups of people are considered “cognizable”, notably those 
based on race, sex and ethnic origin. Usually such a claim compares the 
proportion of a cognizable group in a series of venires to the proportion in 
the community often using census data.13  Data on the race, sex and ethnic 
origin of jury venires is often difficult to obtain, even concerning federal 
juries.14  
 
C. STOPS ON THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE 
 
 The issue in this case is whether blacks were being stopped for 
traffic violations on the southern end of the New Jersey Turnpike at 
extraordinarily high rates.  
 A study from a stationary vantage-point (a bridge over the turnpike) 
yielded an estimate of 13.5% black drivers. A moving survey (from a car set 
on cruise-control at or near the speed limit) found roughly 15% black 
drivers, and that nearly all drivers were speeding, so the police, in principle, 
could stop whomever they wished. The proportion of black drivers among 
those stopped was about 46.2%, so the disparity was large, supporting a 
claim of differential enforcement of the law. The upshot was (1) evidence 
seized in about 15 stops was suppressed; (2) a consent decree with the Civil 
Rights Division of the Justice Department; and (3) some reform of the 
practices of the New Jersey State Police.15  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
13 For more on jury challenges generally, see David Kairys, Joseph B. Kadane 
& John P. Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 
65 CALIF. L. REV. 776 (1977).  
14 N. Chernoff & Joseph B. Kadane, Preempting Jury Challenges: Strategies 
for Courts and Jury System Administrators, JUST. SYSTEMS J. (forthcoming 2012).   
15  See Joseph B. Kadane & Norma Terrin, Missing Data in the Forensic 
Context, 160 J. ROYAL. STAT. SOC’Y A 351-57 (1997); Joseph B. Kadane & John 
Lamberth, Are Blacks Egregious Speeding Violators at Extraordinary Rates in New 
Jersey?, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 139 (2009); JOSEPH COLLUM, THE BLACK 
DRAGON: RACIAL PROFILING EXPOSED (2010); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 ( N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).   
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D. WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
 
 The law in many states requires employers to carry worker's 
compensation insurance, in case of an injury in the work-place. Private 
insurers offer such insurance, and participate in a high-risk pool in 
proportion to the premia for workers compensation insurance written by that 
insurer in that year. This gives each insurance company an incentive to under 
report. In a series of lawsuits, several insurance companies are accused of 
having done so, for example by attributing more premium to related auto and 
general liability insurance, so as to minimize their apparent workers 
compensation premium. Policy/years are being sampled to determine the 
truth of such allegations, and, if true, their extent. I serve as a 
court-appointed neutral expert to guide such sampling. 
 
E. SALES TAXES 
 
 Pennsylvania sales tax excludes medication. Thus, Scope, which has 
no medication, is taxed, but Listerine, which has medication, is not taxed. 
The law requires retailers to collect sales tax. If the retailer fails to collect the 
tax owed, it must pay the missing tax to the state. If it erroneously collects 
tax, it must pay those funds to the state as well. 
 In a sales tax audit, the auditor told his team to be sure to include in 
the sample any Scope transactions they ran across. Thus, the sample was not 
random. In defense, I testified that I thought the retailer owed the $6 found in 
uncollected tax, but not the $300,000 the state wished to extrapolate from the 
$6 they found. This case raises a general issue that the cost that might be 
gleaned from a random sample of transactions is a probability distribution 
for how much the taxpayer owes. But this does not specify how much the 
check should be.16 
 
F. DISABILITY ACCESSIBILITY OF APARTMENTS 
 
 The Americans with Disabilities Act requires that apartments be 
accessible to the handicapped. To enforce this, architects sent to apartment 
complexes and select certain apartments to be assessed. If the selection of 
those apartments is not done by a random sample, the results cannot be 
reliably extrapolated to the apartments that were not inspected. 
                                                                                                                 
16 For commentary on this issue, see Joseph C. Bright, Joseph B. Kadane & 
Daniel S. Nagin, Statistical Sampling in Tax Audits, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 305 
(1988).  
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G. INDIAN OIL AND GAS CLAIMS  
 
 The federal government has a fiduciary responsibility to collect 
royalties for oil and gas leases on Indian tribal lands. The tribes allege that it 
has not done so correctly, and have sued. To asses these claims, a random 
sample of leases is taken, and audited. An important difficulty is that the 
records kept by the Interior Department are incomplete.17 
 
H. MEDICARE FRAUD  
 
 This case involved the defense of a physician who was accused of 
requiring medically unnecessary testing of patients in a laboratory he owned. 
The government wished to establish its case using a random sample of the 
patient records of the physician in question. Since the government's case was 
essentially an allegation of pattern or practice, it seemed that a random 
sample of carefully reviewed cases could be more informative than a hasty 
examination of every record. I was asked to testify that this sampling was an 
inherently unscientific approach, and the government should be required to 
examine every patient record. This I declined to do.  It is possible to me that 
the law might require every patient record to be examined; scientifically a 
random sample of adequate size is sufficient.18  The defendant spent some 
time in prison. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 Random sampling is now widely used in litigation. Properly applied, 
it is an efficient way to find reasonable estimates of the facts, and the theory 
permits estimation of the sampling error.  
 There is interest in applying statistical sampling to mass tort 
litigation. In these cases, a large number of injured people are joined in a 
class, and liability has been found. The issue is how much to award to each 
person. Their circumstances and extent of injury (financial, physical, etc.) 
typically vary. The standard of the law, that each injured person deserves to 
have their individual case heard and judged, is administratively impossibly 
burdensome. Roughly the idea is to try a few cases, and use the outcome of 
                                                                                                                 
17 For one aspect of this work, see Mary S. Fowler & Joseph B. Kadane, Oil and 
Gas on Indian Reservations: Statistical Methods Help to Establish Value for Royalty 
Purposes, 14 J. STAT. EDUC. 3 (2006).  
18  Joseph B. Kadane, Ethical Issues in Being an Expert Witness, 4 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 21 (2005). 
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those cases as guides to settle the rest. An argument is made19 that deliberate 
choice would better serve the ends of justice than the present system that 
allows the parties to speed or delay trials they deem to be helpful or harmful 
to their clients' interests. I believe that statistical ideas could be used in this 
setting, but just how to do it would depend on the specific context. I would 
look for variables that are believed to be important to determining the 
liability and the extent of damages. These might be used to create strata to be 
sampled from. More parsimoniously, a regression model (linear or 
non-linear) might be used. Until there is an actual case to address, these ideas 
should be taken as speculations. 
 
Table 1:  Brief description of the cases discussed 
 
 Nature of Case 
Legal 
Question 
Sampled 
Items 
Special 
Consideration References 
a. remittiturs 
is award in line 
with awards in 
comparable 
cases? 
comparabl
e cases 
which cases are 
comparable?  7th 
amendment vs. 
due process 
Thomas 
(2003); 
Kadane 
(2009a); 
Kadane 
(2009b) 
b. cross-sectional jury challenge 
is the jury 
venire an 
adequate 
cross-section 
of the 
population? 
jurors 
(race, sex, 
etc.) 
date hard to get 
standards of 
adequacy 
Jury work; 
Kairys, 
Kadane & 
Lehoczky 
(1977); NJ 
cases; 
Chernoff and 
Kadane 
(2011) 
c. stops on the NJ turnpike 
racially 
differential law 
enforcement 
drivers 
(race) 
mind of officer 
missing race data 
NJ v. Soto 
(1996); 
Kadane & 
Terrin 
(1997); 
Kadane & 
Lamberth 
(2009); 
Collum 
(2010) 
  
                                                                                                                 
19 Alexandra Lahav, Rough Justice (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal).  
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d. 
workers 
compensation 
insurance 
premiums 
appropriately 
reported to 
pool 
WC 
insurance 
contract 
availability of 
hard copy records in litigation 
e. sales taxes properly collected? 
items sold 
and taxes 
collected 
right of defendant 
to have all records 
examined 
Bright, 
Kadane & 
Nagin (1988) 
f. 
disability 
accessibility of 
apartments 
apartment 
complex in 
compliance 
with ADA? 
apartment 
units safe harbors In litigation 
g. 
Indian oil and 
gas claims 
against federal 
government 
proper 
collection of 
royalties 
lease years adequacy of records 
Fowler & 
Kadane 
(2006) 
h. Medicare fraud 
patient 
treatments 
appropriately 
billed 
patient 
records ethical issue 
Kadane 
(2005) 
  


IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALLS?: UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE, BACK PAY, AND THE TWO CLASSES OF  
TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS 
 
WYATT R. JANSEN* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be entitled to an award 
of back pay relief,1 intended “to make the victims of discrimination whole 
by restoring them so far as possible . . . to the position where they would 
have been were it not for unlawful discrimination.”2 Back pay relief under 
Title VII compensates plaintiff-employees for loss of pay attributable to 
discriminatory employment acts, including losses due to unemployment, 
underemployment, and failure to promote. Most common are suits alleging 
discriminatory firings,3 in which case back pay relief compensates, in 
whole or in part, for loss of income suffered during the period when the 
plaintiff was unemployed or underemployed due to an improper 
termination. Since many employees bringing Title VII firing suits qualify 

* B.A., New York University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, The University of 
Connecticut School of Law, 2012. Many thanks to Professor Peter Siegelman. 
 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)); see also Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-22 (1975) (holding that back pay, though 
an equitable remedy, may only be denied infrequently and for reasons that do no 
frustrate the purposes of Title VII). 
2 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (noting that this 
compensatory goal, while important, is a purpose that is secondary to the primary 
goal of Title VII to stop illegal employment discrimination) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 
733, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Title VII is not designed to provide a windfall to 
plaintiffs, but rather serves to put the plaintiff in the same position he or she would 
have been in absent discrimination.”). 
3 See LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 
CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION IN COURT 6 (2008), available at 
http://www/americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen_abf_edl_r
eport_08_final.pdf (noting that 60% of all employment discrimination cases are 
brought because the plaintiff was fired, allegedly because of illegal 
discrimination). 
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for unemployment insurance,4 prevailing plaintiffs in such suits are likely 
to receive back pay awards that cover periods during which the plaintiff 
also received unemployment insurance benefits.  
The overlap of back pay and unemployment insurance benefits 
described above is widely acknowledged to be a double recovery or 
“windfall” for plaintiffs.5 Consider the following illustration: employee 
“E”, living and working in Connecticut, suffers a discriminatory firing 
causing six weeks of unemployment. If E previously earned $1,000 per 
week, her loss of pay from the firing is $6,000, and she would likely collect 
$6,000 in back pay under Title VII. If E also receives unemployment 
insurance benefits, she will be paid about $462 for each week that she is 
unemployed,6 totaling $2,772 over the six-week period of unemployment. 
Absent intervention, E collects a total of $8,772 in compensation for the 
six-week period during which she actually lost $6,000 of income. That is, 
from the perspective that unemployment insurance benefits stand in the 
shoes of a claimant’s ordinary wages, E actually lost $3,2887 due to the 
discriminatory firing, and was overcompensated by the back pay award to 
the tune of $2,722. On the other hand, if unemployment insurance benefits 
are not fully or truly paid for by employers, or if the benefits should not 
stand in the shoes of back pay as a matter of public policy, the $8,772 in 
compensation may not be an overpayment.  

4 A basic requirement to receive unemployment insurance benefits is that the 
applicant be involuntarily unemployed—a condition that an employee who is fired 
clearly meets. See generally infra Part II.B. 
5 See, e.g., Thomas W. Lee, Deducting Unemployment Compensation and 
Ending Employment Discrimination: Continuing Conflict, 43 EMORY L.J. 325, 335 
(1994) (“[W]hile the deduction of unemployment compensation from back pay 
may provide a windfall for the employer . . . failure to offset unemployment 
benefits similarly provides a windfall for the employee.”) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
6 See CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS – 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/progsupt/unemplt/ucelig 
b.htm#Basic%20Eligibility%20Requirements (last updated Oct. 11, 2011) (stating 
in Connecticut, a weekly unemployment insurance benefit entitlement is calculated 
by averaging the claimant’s income in the two highest of the four most recent 
quarters, and dividing that average by 26). Therefore, in E’s case, assuming a 
stable salary for the calculation period, E is entitled to [((2*$12,000)/2)/26], or 
$461.54 per week.  
7 The difference between E’s ordinary weekly salary and her unemployment 
insurance entitlement. 
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This conflict has been divisive and remains unresolved by the 
Supreme Court. Absent controlling precedent, the lower federal courts have 
taken two distinct approaches.8 Some circuit courts of appeals have held 
that unemployment insurance benefits must be ignored when calculating a 
back pay award (the “restrictive rule”). In other circuits, the established 
rule allows district court judges to consider such benefits in their sound 
discretion (the “discretionary rule”), in which case the court may choose to 
either deduct unemployment insurance benefits from a back pay award or 
leave the back pay award undisturbed. (No circuit requires that the benefits 
be deducted.)  
Much of the difference of opinion regarding the treatment of 
unemployment insurance benefits centers on whether or not those benefits 
are rightly considered “collateral sources.” Collateral sources are, in the 
simplest sense, benefits received by plaintiffs that are independent of—that 
is, collateral to—the defendant, and courts have traditionally been barred 
from considering such benefits when calculating a plaintiff’s damages.9 For 
example, a plaintiff who receives $100 in support from his mother to 
compensate for a tortious loss of $100 would be allowed under the 
collateral source rule to collect the full amount of damages from the 
tortfeasor, as those benefits were not sourced from, and are thus collateral 
to, the tortfeasor. Unemployment insurance benefits, on the other hand, are 
superficially not collateral to employers, since those employers are 
responsible for funding the unemployment insurance program.  
Complicating this field further is what this Note terms “subrogation 
statutes,” which have been enacted in a significant minority of states. 
Subrogation statutes automatically reduce back pay awards by the amount 
of unemployment insurance benefits received during the same time period 
covered by a back pay award, and repay the recovered funds directly to the 
unemployment insurance fund.10 In those circuits with a discretionary rule, 
there is some evidence that district court judges consider whether or not a 
plaintiff will be subject to subrogation when calculating his or her back pay 
award.11 On the other hand, district court judges in circuits following the 
restrictive rule are barred from considering the effect of subrogation.  

8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part II.C. 
10 See infra Part II.D. 
11 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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The effect of the circuit courts’ approaches is illustrated in the 
following table,12 assuming the same income and unemployment insurance 
benefit figures from the aforementioned illustration of plaintiff E:  
 
Table 1 – Subrogation and the Circuit Courts 
  Plaintiff A  Plaintiff B Plaintiff C Plaintiff D 
 
Subject to 
subrogation, 
in a 
discretionary 
circuit. 
Subject to a 
subrogation, 
in a 
restrictive 
circuit. 
Not subject 
to 
subrogation, 
in a 
discretionary 
circuit. 
Not subject to 
subrogation, 
in a restrictive 
circuit. 
Total lost 
income. $6,000 $6,000 $6,000 $6,000 
Unemployment 
insurance 
benefits 
received. 
$2,772 $2,772 $2,772 $2,772 
Amount 
recovered by 
unemployment 
insurance fund 
through 
subrogation. 
($2,772) ($2,772) $0 $0 
Back pay 
awarded by the 
court as 
damages in 
Title VII suit.  
$6,000 $6,000 $3,228 $6,000 
Total 
compensation 
received by 
plaintiff. 
$6,000 $6,000 $6,00013 $8,772 
 

12 This table assumes that judges with the discretion to reduce a back pay 
award by unemployment benefits received will always reduce back pay in the 
absence of a subrogation statute and never do so when the plaintiff is subject to 
subrogation. 
13 In the discretion of the district court judge, the $6,000 back pay award is 
reduced by the amount of unemployment insurance benefits received, resulting in 
the prevailing plaintiff collecting a total of $6,000 of both unemployment 
insurance benefits and back pay. 
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 As is evident from the above table, three out of four combinations 
of circuit court approach and state law ensure that a plaintiff will receive 
the “right” amount of total compensation.14 But in states that do not have 
subrogation statutes in circuits following the restrictive rule, the prevailing 
plaintiff receives nearly 50% more compensation than otherwise similarly-
situated plaintiffs.15 Though this result only occurs in one possible 
combination of state and federal law, a restrictive approach without 
subrogation is the governing legal standard in as many as twenty states, 
including California and Florida,16 and it is therefore likely that the 
majority of Title VII plaintiffs who have collected unemployment 
insurance benefits receive this double recovery.  
This result is due exclusively to the complex and sometimes 
contradictory statutory and doctrinal frameworks that underlie this area of 
the law, particularly from the delegation of unemployment insurance 
regulation to the states and the resultant lack of a centralized policy 
regarding treatment of such benefits. This Note first discusses these 
discrete frameworks: Title VII,17 unemployment insurance, the collateral 
source rule, and state subrogation statutes. The approach by the federal 
appeals courts is subsequently discussed, as well as how the federal district 
courts exercise their discretion to consider back pay awards where they 
may lawfully do so. This Note then recommends an approach that may 
bring coherence to these inconsistent and often colliding structures and the 
approaches taken by the circuit courts, in the absence of a major reform of 
the unemployment insurance system.   
 
II. THE STATUTORY AND DOCTRINAL STRUCTURE  

14 That is, the back pay award that is necessary to replace the wages that the 
plaintiff actually lost due to a discriminatory employment action but not including 
unemployment insurance benefits, without regard for, as discussed infra Part II.B, 
the incidence of the unemployment insurance tax on employers. 
15 This figure, of course, will vary based on factors including replacement rate, 
length of unemployment period, and salary. For example, since unemployment 
insurance benefits typically have an individual weekly benefit ceiling employees 
with high salaries will be overpaid by unemployment insurance benefits by much 
less than medium- and low-income plaintiffs as a proportion of their ordinary 
wages. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 6 (in 
Connecticut as of October 2011, $573). 
16 See infra note 74, Part III.A. 
17 For purposes of simplicity, this Note focuses on actions brought under Title 
VII, though the debate is relevant to other forms of employment discrimination, 
including suits arising under Section 1981 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
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 This Note addresses the deductibility of unemployment insurance 
benefits from back pay awards in Title VII suits through analysis of the 
legal structures operating in the foreground and background of such cases. 
This Part will generally discuss the purpose of Title VII and remedies 
available under that statute, the system of unemployment insurance in the 
United States, the origins and rationale of the collateral source rule, and 
state subrogation statutes. 
 
A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or sex by private employers.18 
Through express language, judicial interpretation, and congressional 
revision, the Act proscribes both intentional discrimination by employers as 
well as employment actions that lack discriminatory intent, but which have 
a disparate impact on persons from a protected class.19 
 While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the 
official enforcement agency for Title VII,20 the Commission brings only a 
small fraction of the employment discrimination cases that it reviews. It 
follows that most Title VII suits are brought by individuals hiring private 
counsel or proceeding pro se.21 As a result, plaintiffs have an important role 
under Title VII as private attorneys general, both asserting their individual 
right to be free from discriminatory employment actions and policing 
employers to vindicate the broader purposes of the statute—namely, to 
eliminate employment discrimination.22 

18 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 6 (2d ed. 2007). 
19 See generally RUTHERGLEN, supra note 18. 
20 See id. at 8.  
21 See NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that the EEOC intervenes as 
plaintiff in just 3% of all employment discrimination cases). 
22 See Donald T. Kramer, Factors or Conditions Said to Justify Increase in 
Attorney’s Fees Awarded Under § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 140 
A.L.R. FED. 301 (1997) (stating the private attorney general model serves as the 
justification for Title VII’s fee shifting structure, which awards attorney’s fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs, but not to prevailing plaintiff’s under ordinary circumstances). 
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Section 706(g) of Title VII permits courts to award back pay as an 
equitable remedy for illegal employment discrimination.23 Though Title 
VII back pay sounds in equity and the plain language of Title VII is 
permissive, the Supreme Court has indicated that judges are significantly 
limited in their discretion to decide not to award back pay relief.24 In 
addition to back pay, prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII suits have available a 
broad range of statutory relief: reinstatement or, if reinstatement is 
impossible, front pay;25 additional compensatory damages for both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses like job search expenses, reputational 
damage, and emotional pain and suffering;26 punitive damages in 
circumstances where a defendant acts with malice or reckless indifference 
to the federally-protected rights of the plaintiff;27 and finally, reasonable 
attorney’s fees.28 
Part and parcel of using back pay as the primary remedy under 
Title VII is that suits brought under the statute tend to be low in value.29 

23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)) (“If the court finds that the 
respondents has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an illegal 
employment practice, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but not limited to, reinstatement, or hiring or 
employees, with or without back pay”); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 415-22 (1975) (stating back pay has become the presumptive remedy for 
employment discrimination). 
24 See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421 (“[B]ackpay should be denied 
only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central 
statutory purposes of eradicating employment discrimination throughout the 
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past 
discrimination.”). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 706(g), 78 Stat. at 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2006)). 
26 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1073 (1991) (current version at 42 U.S. 1981a (2006)). 
27 Id. (stating punitive damages are only available in certain forms of 
employment discrimination cases and subject to the same caps as compensatory 
damages); see Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-40 (1999) 
(stating the standard for whether punitive damages are appropriate is not 
egregiousness, but rather whether the employer has engaged in discriminatory act 
despite perceiving that the act is in violation of federal law). 
28 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 103, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). 
29 Discrimination Law in the 1990’s, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261, 265 (Laura Beth Nielsen 
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While the size of damages awards increased after the 1991 amendment of 
Title VII, which made available compensatory relief, punitive damages, 
and jury trials,30 the median Title VII back pay award remains under 
$50,000.31  
 
B. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES   
  
The Social Security Act of 1935 first enabled the unemployment 
insurance system. Rather than creating a federal regime, the Act instead 
encouraged the states to enact their own unemployment insurance 
programs, so long as they operated within certain federal guidelines (such 
as minimum tax rates).32 This joint federal and state statutory scheme has 
resulted in state unemployment insurance programs that are often widely 
divergent with respect to coverage, benefits, funding, and administration.33  
Despite this divergence, there are points of congruence among the 
state systems. Across all states, unemployment insurance benefits share a 
common aim of providing partial and temporary wage replacement for 
involuntarily unemployed workers meeting certain conditions regarding 
continuity and type of employment.34 These benefits primarily serve two 
goals: narrowly, to stabilize the standard of living for unemployed 
individuals during those individuals’ periods of unemployment, and 
broadly, to reduce overall economic volatility during periods of widespread 
unemployment.35  

& Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (showing that pre-1991, employment 
discrimination back pay awards were usually small and positively related to an 
employee’s pay). 
30 Id. at 268 tbl.3. 
31 Id. at 279 tbl.8. The $50,000 figure is one that is not per plaintiff, but rather 
per case; because a not-insignificant number of cases are brought with more than 
one plaintiff.  See NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 12 (6% of employment discrimination 
cases involved 2-10 plaintiffs); it is likely that plaintiffs’ actual awards are 
somewhat lower. 
32 Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE 
L.J. 21, 22 (1945); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-440, 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 3 (2010).   
33 Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 335, 344 (2001).  
34 See id. at 344-46. 
35 Id. at 341-42. 
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The unemployment insurance system is directly financed by both 
state and federal payroll taxes, paid solely by qualifying employers,36 
which together constitute as much as 15% of an employer’s total annual tax 
bill.37  The structure of tax rates is twofold: first, a federal rate that is as low 
as .8% and is applied to a base of an employee’s first $7,000 of wages; 
second, a state tax, with rate and base terms that vary widely among the 
states, but that must remain within certain federal guidelines.38 These state 
tax rates are typically adjusted annually and calculated relative to a state’s 
unemployment insurance fund balance, with a lower balance triggering 
higher overall rates and a higher balance resulting in generally lower 
rates.39  
 Through a process known as the “experience rating,” market-wide 
state tax rates are adjusted for each employer based on that employer’s 
history of firing its employees, with the resultant individualized tax rate 

36 With the notable exceptions of Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 
which withhold unemployment insurance taxes from employee wages in addition 
to taxing employers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 4 
n.9.  For the purposes of simplicity and coherence, this Note ignores these 
exceptions to the general rule. 
37 Lester, supra note 33, at 340. The employer-funded model used by the 
United States is distinctly different from the financing of unemployment insurance 
in other countries, where funds come from a variety of sources exogenous to 
employers. See Steven Jurajda, Unemployment Outflow and Unemployment 
Insurance Taxes, CERGE-IE Working Paper Series No. 143 at 2 (1999). 
38 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 5.  
In Connecticut, for example, the tax rate for newly established employers is 
3.7% as applied to the first $15,000 of each employee’s wages, with rates for 
established employers ranging from 1.9% to 6.8%. See Employer Information 
Notice, CT Unemployment Insurance Tax, Connecticut Department of Labor, Sept. 
2011, available at http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/uitax/EmplNotices/EmplNotic 
e0911.pdf. Thus, newly-established Connecticut employers employing employees 
making $15,000 or more per year pay $555 in unemployment insurance taxes per 
employee per year. See id.  
In Texas, for another example, the rate for a new employer is .78%, with 
maximum and average tax rates of 8.25% and 2.03%, respectively, applied to a 
base of $9,000 of wages. Unemployment Tax Rates, Texas Workforce 
Commission, http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/tax/unemployment-tax-rates.html. 
Thus, an employer would pay (per year and per employee earning $9,000 or more 
in annual wages) unemployment insurance taxes of $70.2 at the minimum rate and 
$182.70 at the average rate. 
39 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 7. 
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called the “experience-rated component.”40 Through use of the experience 
rating, an employer with a history of many firings (and one that has thus 
imposed a high cost on the unemployment insurance pool) is subject to a 
higher tax rate than an employer without such a history. Use of the 
experience rating can adjust the effective tax rate on an employer to as high 
as 10.5%,41 though states typically set a maximum rate. Because the 
experience rating can thereby impose significant financial consequences on 
an employer for firing employees, the rating is believed to have the effect 
of deterring layoffs,42 and may be a means of controlling employer-side 
moral hazard in unemployment insurance generally.  
 To be sure, the cost of unemployment insurance benefits may be 
indirectly paid, in whole or part, by employees in the form of reduced 
earnings—that is, the ultimate incidence of the unemployment insurance 
tax may fall on employees. The significance of tax incidence is that, to the 
extent that the cost of unemployment insurance is borne by employees 
instead of employers, the benefits are less clearly categorized as 
independent of (that is, not collateral to) employers, and public policy and 
collateral source rule doctrine thus may more strongly favor treating the 
benefits as collateral.  
The unemployment insurance system appears designed for the 
incidence of the tax to apply fully to employers, by not requiring 
contribution from employees and through use of the experience rating.43 
Despite this intention, however, it may be that employers shift the 
incidence of the unemployment insurance tax forward, by charging 
consumers more for goods or services, or backwards, by reducing the price 
they pay for labor input.44 There is no consensus that the unemployment 
insurance tax is back-shifted, and those studies that have attempted to 
isolate the effect of the unemployment insurance tax have come up with 
divergent results.45 Recent data suggests that the costs may be shared 
between employers and employees, with one study showing that employers 

40 Id. at 5. 
41 Lester, supra note 33, at 345 (in Pennsylvania). 
42 See Jurajda, supra note 37, at 2 (the experience-rated component has been 
demonstrated to influence employer decision-making in regards to both initially 
laying off workers and recalling previously laid-off workers). 
43 See generally Lester, supra note 33.  
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 382.  
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are not able to shift the costs of inter-firm experience rating variances, but 
may be able to shift some portion of the “market rate”, or base tax burden.46 
 Cost shifting, if it does occur, may not be so simple in the case of 
unemployment insurance, however. Since the experience rating means that 
a firing costs an employer money in the form of higher tax rates, and, as 
discussed above, that upward adjustment is not shown to be back-shifted, 
any employee contribution to the unemployment insurance tax may be 
negated by the cost of his firing to the employer. For example, Texas 
calculates its experience rating by dividing the last three years of 
unemployment insurance benefits paid out over three years of an 
employer’s taxable wages, and multiplying that by a flat tax rate.47 For 
example, suppose a new Texas employer employs three workers at $10,000 
per year for a period of three years, but fires one worker at the end of year 
2, entitling that worker to collect a 50% unemployment insurance benefit. 
That employer’s effective unemployment tax rate will resultantly increase 
from 2.72% to 8%;48 on the Texas taxable wage base of $9,000, the 
employer would pay $1,440 in unemployment insurance tax in year three 
per employee, as compared to $482 in year two. That is, the firing will cost 
the employer nearly $1,000 per employee per year for the three years that 
the firing is computed in the employer’s experience rating. This is all to 
demonstrate that the back-shifting of tax may be mitigated by the 

46 Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, Effects of the Unemployment 
Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment, Claims and Denials, 78 J. PUB. 
ECONOMICS 81, 95 (2000) (noting, however, that “large standard errors preclude 
[the authors] from drawing strong conclusions”).  
In Texas, for example, the “market” tax rate is .78%, while the average 
experience rating tax rate is 1.96%, both applied to $9,000 of wages. If employees 
are responsible for the entire market rate (as opposed to partial responsibility, as 
demonstrated by the above-referenced study), and employers were responsible for 
the experience rate, the proportion of employee to employer contribution would be 
roughly 1:3. See Texas Workforce Commission, supra note 38.  
 There is an intuitive logic to the findings by Anderson and Boyer, if back-
shifting does in fact occur. Since the experience rating is determined based on an 
employer’s past history of layoffs, firms that reduced employee wages to account 
for higher unemployment taxes that result from the experience rating would 
essentially expect employees to be paid less to work for an employer that is more 
likely to cause them to be unemployed. 
47 See TWC TAX DEPT., Your Tax Rates – 2011, http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/t 
ax/unemptax2011.html#oa (Sept. 30, 2011). 
48 Id. (That is, [$5,000/$8000] * [1.28]). 
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concomitant increase in tax burden caused by a firing, which itself appears 
to be fully absorbed by the employer.  
Unemployment insurance funds have been in financial peril in 
recent years. At the close of the fourth quarter of 2009, state unemployment 
insurance fund balances were the lowest they have ever been in the history 
of unemployment insurance,49 and this undercapitalization is expected to 
worsen with the ongoing recession.50 Compounding these historically low 
funding levels is the reality that loans from the federal government are 
currently buoying the balances of many state unemployment funds; because 
these loans are reflected in the historically low fund balances, state funds 
are likely even more weakly positioned than they appear at first glance.51 
 
C. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
 
 Circuits that follow the restrictive rule typically do so on the basis 
that considering unemployment insurance benefits violates the collateral 
source rule. As a general principle of tort law (treated as both a rule of 
evidence and as substantive law), the collateral source rule proscribes 
courts from considering benefits received by a plaintiff that are 
independent of (i.e., collateral to) a defendant when calculating a plaintiff’s 
damages.52 The collateral source rule typically does not protect benefits 
provided by a defendant or a party identified with a defendant,53 but rather 
only applies to truly independent or third-party sources, such as gratuitous 
support from family members or an unintended benefit arising from a 
defendant’s wrongful act.54 
Perhaps the quintessential application of the collateral source rule 
is to exclude evidence of plaintiff-purchased insurance benefits covering a 
loss for which that plaintiff is later awarded damages. For instance, due to a 
negligent act by tortfeasor “T”, plaintiff “P” incurs medical expenses that 
are covered by P’s insurer. In a later suit against T, P may still collect 
damages for medical expenses when the collateral source rule is applied, 
even though P did not pay for those expenses out of pocket. In this 

49 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 9 (after figures 
were adjusted for inflation). 
50 Id. at 13-14. 
51 See id. at 9 (overall balance of state fund reserves was negative $15 billion).  
52 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Collateral-Source 
Rule). 
53 Linda L. House, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 101, 103 (1992). 
54 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 143 (1987).  
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circumstance, P effectively receives a double recovery—one from the 
insurer and another from the tortfeasor, both purporting to compensate for 
the same injury. It is in reaction to such results that proponents of “tort 
reform” efforts have sought to abrogate the collateral source rule.55  
This common application of the collateral source rule may not in 
fact result in a windfall,56 however, despite the mechanism of P receiving 
two payments for one injury. In the above example, P purchased insurance 
coverage and paid insurance premiums in exchange for the contractual 
right for payment upon the occurrence of the tortious act at issue. Because 
the insurance coverage was purchased in order to cover the cost of the 
injury, presumably the premiums were calculated so as to pay for the cost 
of covered events, plus overhead.57 By charging P a rate calculated to the 
risk and cost of a covered event, the insurance policy primarily changes the 
timing of the payment for the injury to the period when P makes premium 
payments, but does not alter that P has a cost associated with the injury that 
will require compensation in order for P to be made whole. 
Further preventing a windfall in many traditional insurance 
applications of the collateral source rule is the effect of a subrogation right, 
held by many or even most insurers.58 Where this right exists, a collateral 
source is entitled to the rights and remedies belonging to the plaintiff for 
which the plaintiff was compensated by the collateral source, eliminating 
any windfall ex post.59 Thus, if P’s insurance contract includes a 
subrogation right (and it likely does), his insurer may seek to collect the 
medical damages awarded to P to the extent that it reimbursed P for such 

55 See Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral 
Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 349 (2008). 
56 For the purposes of this note, “windfall” and “double recovery” are 
distinguished. Windfall will describe the situation where a plaintiff collects more 
than his actual losses, and is thus overcompensated or “profits” from a defendant’s 
wrongdoing. Double recovery will mean that a plaintiff receives two payments for 
the same injury, which, as this Note explores, may or may not result in a windfall. 
See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 1738 (9th ed. 2009) (defining windfall as “[a]n 
unanticipated benefit, usu. in the form of a profit and not caused by the recipient”). 
Compare id. at 1389, Double Recovery (“a judgment that erroneously awards 
damages twice for the same loss . . . [or] recovery by a part of more than the 
maximum recoverable loss . . .”). 
57 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 253 (8th ed. 2011). 
58 Wershbale, supra note 55, at 349-50 (noting, however, that subrogation 
rights are rarely asserted). 
59 See id. at 349. 
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expenses, and P will (theoretically) have paid lower premiums to account 
for this.60  
Aside from factors that mitigate the occurrence of a windfall, there 
are public policy justifications that favor the collateral source rule even 
when it does result in a windfall. Windfalls can serve as a rough means of 
providing for attorney’s fees, which, if not otherwise available, would 
detract from the make-whole nature of compensatory relief.61 Similarly, a 
windfall may be used to award punitive damages when they are not 
provided by law.62  
Perhaps more convincing are those policy arguments related to the 
redistributive and deterrent uses of windfalls. For one, allowing insurance 
coverage to reduce a wrongdoer’s cost for his wrongs reduces the 
concomitant incentive to prevent future wrongdoing to avoid future costs of 
similar wrongs.63 The collateral source rule thus furthers the deterrent 
function of compensatory relief.64 There is also an intuitive preference to 
award windfalls, where they must exist, to the victim and not the violator.65 
Finally, if insurance reduces a plaintiff’s tort award dollar-for-dollar, there 
is significantly less reason to buy insurance in the first place, and there are 
strong reasons for favoring insurance coverage. 
There are, however, several competing considerations. Any 
windfall may be inappropriate in a make-whole relief scheme, which is 
focused on compensating plaintiffs for actual losses, and is less concerned 
with the source of that compensation.66 Where statute or other relevant law 
speaks clearly on the issue, using the collateral source rule to roughly 

60 POSNER, supra note 57, at 253.  
61 That is, a plaintiff with paid counsel will either pay an hourly fee or will 
have a contingency agreement, costs of which may not be accounted for in an 
ordinary damages award that is not accompanied by attorney’s fees. Since 
unreimbursed fees either indirectly (in the case of an hourly rate) or directly (in the 
case of a contingency agreement) reduce the amount of damages actually 
recovered by the plaintiff, the award may no longer put the plaintiff in the position 
he or she would have been in but for the wrongdoing. See, e.g., Daena A. 
Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform and 
Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COMM. 799, 802 (1988); Robert 
Hernquist & Arthur v. Catour, An Examination of the Collateral Source Rule in 
Illinois, 38 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 169, 172-73 (2006). 
62 See Hernquist, supra note 61, at 181. 
63 POSNER, supra note 57, at 253. 
64 Goldsmith, supra note 61, at 801; POSNER, supra note 57, at 253. 
65 House, supra note 53, at 104; Hernquist, supra note 61, at 188. 
66 Hernquist, supra note 61, at 182.  
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provide attorney’s fees and punitive damages may be unnecessary or 
improper.67 Finally, subrogation rights may be an inefficient solution to 
preventing windfalls,68 and the collateral source rule may, by increasing 
damage awards, artificially inflate insurance premiums.69 
Perhaps as a result of these concerns, the collateral source rule has 
been steadily weakened: erosion of the rule began almost immediately 
following its adoption by the Supreme Court in the 19th Century,70 and by 
2007 all but 12 states had created some statutory alteration to the common 
law rule.71 For example, a number of states now allow post-verdict 
reduction of a defendant’s liability for collateral benefits received that are 
not subject to subrogation, while refusing such a reduction where the 
collateral source does hold a subrogation right.72 
 
D. STATE SUBROGATION STATUTES  
 
States have taken several statutory approaches to the double 
recovery that can result when back pay awards overlap with unemployment 
insurance benefits,73 but by far the most common is to invest a legal 
subrogation right in the state’s unemployment insurance fund. At least 16 
states accomplish this through statutes requiring reimbursement of state 
unemployment funds for insurance benefits paid that overlap with back pay 
awards, typically by the employer repaying the fund directly and then 

67 See id. at 186. 
68 This is said to result from the additional litigation costs incurred by both 
private and public actors in order to enforce subrogation rights. House, supra note 
53, at 105-06. 
69 House, supra note 53, at 106. 
70 Hernquist, supra note 61, at 177. 
71 Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The 
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and 
Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2007). 
72 Wershbale, supra note 55, at 353-54 (noting that these post-verdict hearings 
likely increase the litigation and administrative costs of actions subject to the 
collateral source rule).  
73 Some states require that an employer repay state unemployment funds if a 
plaintiff’s back pay award is reduced by the amount of unemployment insurance 
benefits received. See, e.g., TEX. LABOR CODE § 210.001 (2011); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 151A, § 69C (2004); CAL.UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1382 (2010). At least one 
state does not set off unemployment insurance benefits from back pay awards, but 
allows back pay to be considered employment such that it serves to toll the accrual 
of unemployment benefits. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-303(e) (2008). 
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giving the plaintiff a reduced award.74 Thus, in states with subrogation 
statutes, a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded back pay damages for a 
period in which that plaintiff also collected unemployment insurance 
benefits would typically receive as his back pay damages the difference 
between his total lost wages and the unemployment benefits he had 
received during the benefit period. The defendant-employer is then 
required to directly remit to the unemployment insurance fund an amount 
equal to the overlapping benefits.75  
The following table illustrates the effect of subrogation, using the 
same income, back pay damages, and unemployment insurance 
compensation figures as Table 1:  
 
 
 

74 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-110 (2011) (“[A]n individual who 
has an award for any week and for which week he, at a subsequent date, received a 
pay award by reason of a decision of the national labor relations board or other 
source, as a result of the action taken by the National Labor Relations Board or 
other source, shall immediately repay to the division such amounts as will 
reimburse the division for all benefit payments made for the period during which 
he drew benefits and for which the national labor relations board or other source 
has caused a payment to be made in the form of back pay award to the claimant; 
and the employer's account charged for such benefits shall be credited 
accordingly.”); see also ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (LexisNexis 2011); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, § 3325 (2005); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/900 (West 2011); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-13-1 (LexisNexis 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.3 (2011); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.415 (West 2011); 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-809 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
268.085 (West 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.381 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 612.371 (LexisNexis 2011); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 874 (2011); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 60.2-634 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.190 (West 2002); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-3-306 (2011). 
75 Though this Note refers to statutes having this effect as “subrogation 
statutes,” they may share some characteristics with repayment arrangements 
(agreements by which a victim agrees to pay back an insurer for benefits received 
when he sues and collects from an injurer). See SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 238-
39.  
 In traditional insurance relationships, it may be that a repayment 
arrangement would be a disincentive to bringing suit, since most or all of the award 
would necessarily be repaid to the insurer. Id. at 239. This does not likely hold true 
in the case of repayment of unemployment insurance benefits in Title VII firing 
suits, since those benefits are typically 50% or less of a claimant’s salary. 
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Table 2 – Subrogation and Back Pay 
  With subrogation statute 
Without subrogation 
statute 
Back pay award $6,000 $6,000 
Unemployment benefits 
received $2,772 $2,772 
Amount paid by 
Defendant to Plaintiff $3,228 $6,000 
Amount reimbursed to 
unemployment insurance 
fund 
$2,772 $0 
Total damages paid by 
Defendant $6,000 $6,000 
Change in unemployment 
insurance fund balance $0 ($2,272) 
 
As demonstrated in Table 2, subrogation ensures both that the 
plaintiff receives the “correct” amount of compensation for loss of wages 
and that the unemployment insurance fund balance remains as if a 
discriminatory firing had not occurred. Moreover, the employer is still 
responsible for the full cost of his discriminatory firing. It is also evident 
that without subrogation, with the plaintiff receiving both unemployment 
insurance benefits and a back pay award, the assets of the unemployment 
insurance fund are impaired.76 
Though subrogation is the most common statutory approach to the 
problem discussed in this Note, the majority of states do not vest any legal 
subrogation right in their unemployment insurance funds. In these states, 
prevailing Title VII plaintiffs receive both a full back pay award and 
unemployment insurance benefits absent judicial intervention. As described 
earlier in this Note, many of such states are located in federal circuits that 
follow the restrictive rule, where district court judges cannot consider 
unemployment insurance benefits received by plaintiffs and, as a result, the 

76 Though, of course, this impairment is not necessarily a problem: 
unemployment insurance funds exist to pay out benefits to the unemployed.  
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plaintiff receives both the unemployment insurance benefits and the full 
back pay award. 
 
III. APPROACH BY THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
 The Supreme Court has simply never resolved the question 
presented by this Note. The most frequently cited Supreme Court case in 
this area is NLRB v. Gullet Gin, in which the Court held that the National 
Labor Relations Board did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 
reduce a settlement under the National Labor Relations Act by amounts 
received as unemployment insurance benefits; but even there, the Court 
made no affirmative holding on the Board’s discretion to make such a 
deduction.77 The Court stated only in dicta that unemployment insurance 
benefits were collateral sources, on the basis that the state, not the 
employer, made such payments, and because the NLRB had a long-
standing practice of refusing to deduct such benefits.78  
The Gullet Gin ruling has failed, however, to elucidate this area of 
the law. It has been interpreted both as supporting the discretion to deduct 
unemployment insurance benefits, since it upheld the NLRB’s 
discretionary approach to withholding,79 and as prohibiting discretion by its 
dicta regarding the collateral source rule.80 In the absence of a clear 
directive from the Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts of appeals 
remain split as to whether or not district courts are prohibited from 
considering unemployment benefits when calculating back pay awards, or 
whether the those courts may, in their discretion, reduce back pay awards 
by unemployment insurance benefits received. This Part examines each 
approach in turn. 
 
 
 
 

77 NLRB v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951).   
78 Id. at 365-66.  
79 See, e.g., EEOC v. Fin. Assur., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 686, 694 (W.D. Mo. 
1985) (quoting Gullet Gin, and stating that, “by analogy, one might well argue that 
a similar discretion—either to deduct or to refuse to deduct—is vested in the courts 
in connection with administering Title VII.”). 
80 See, e.g., Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Manu. Co., 715 F.2d 1549, 1550-51 (11th 
Cir. 1983). 
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A. THE RESTRICTIVE RULE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING BACK PAY AWARDS 
  
The Third,81 Fourth,82 Sixth,83 Eighth,84 Ninth,85 and Eleventh86 
Circuits have held that unemployment insurance benefits are collateral 
sources that courts cannot consider when calculating a plaintiff’s back pay 
damages. The cases rely on the traditional definition and treatment of 
collateral sources;87 legislative intent;88 preference for shifting any double 
recovery to plaintiffs over defendants;89 and furthering the statutory 
objective to end employment discrimination.90 
Typical is the approach of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. That court strongly opposed 
allowing the district courts discretion to consider unemployment insurance 
benefits, holding that that such benefits were plainly a collateral source that 
were paid to serve a social policy of the state, rather than to discharge an 
obligation of the employer.91 The court there also based its holding on its 

81 See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 82 (3d Cir. 1983). 
82 See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195-96 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(reversed on other grounds). 
83 See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
84 See Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir. 
1994) (noting that the state had a subrogation statute). 
85 See Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 696 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982).  
86 See Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(reversing prior 11th Circuit precedent allowing the district courts to make such a 
deduction on the basis that, at the time Gullet Gin was decided, it was the NLRB’s 
practice to always refuse to make such deductions, and as such the refusal to 
deduct had become “settled back pay law” under the NLRA, which served as the 
model for the Title VII back pay provision). 
87 See McKenna v. City of Phila., 636 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (2009). 
88 See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l., 766 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that 
Congress included a deduction for interim earnings and amounts reasonably 
earnable, but failed to provide for other setoffs). 
89 Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 1983) (“There is no 
reason why the [unemployment] benefit should be shifted to the defendant, thereby 
depriving the plaintiff of the advantage it confers.”). 
90 Id. at 84. 
91 See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
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belief that two “identically situated claimants” could not be made whole by 
“radically different backpay awards.”92  
In accord with Thurman was the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Group, where the court reversed a 
district court ruling deducting unemployment benefits from a back pay 
award.93 The court held that the collateral source rule applied even when 
the employer contributes to the unemployment insurance fund,94 and noted 
that the deterrence purpose of back pay awards was ill-served by deduction 
of unemployment insurance benefits because it made discrimination less 
costly for defendant-employers.95  
Though it found the question “extremely close and one over which 
reasonable persons could differ,” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc. reversed a district court’s reduction of a back 
pay award by unemployment benefits received.96 The reversal was, in large 
part, grounded on the Craig court’s finding that unemployment insurance 
benefits were collateral and intended for the benefit of employees, not 
employers.97 Craig went further to declare that deductibility should never 
be left to the discretion of district court judges, relying on the Supreme 
Court’s holding that the courts of appeals must apply the back pay 
provision in a “consistent and principled” manner,98 and noting that while 
back pay might ordinarily be discretionary because it sounds in equity, it 
has become a presumptive and near-mandatory remedy for prevailing 
plaintiffs in Title VII suits.99 Significantly, however, the court also noted 

92 Id. (quoting Rasimas v. Mich. Dept. of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th 
Cir. 1983)). It should be noted that it is not clear that a plaintiff who has received 
unemployment insurance benefits is identically situated to a plaintiff who has not 
received said benefits.  
93 See Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1114.  
94 Id. at 1112 (quoting Chi. Great W. Ry. v. Peeler, 140 F.2d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 
1944) (holding that insurance or Workmen’s Compensation Act funds were 
collateral sources)). The Gaworski Court does not indicate whether it believes that 
the funds are collateral despite employer contribution because: (a) of the incidence 
of the unemployment insurer tax; (b) direct employee contributions; or (c) 
regardless of incidence or direct contribution. 
95 Id. at 1113. 
96 Craig, 721 F.2d at 82. 
97 See id. at 82-85. 
98 Id. at 85 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 
(1975)). 
99 Id.  
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that the plaintiffs in that case were subject to a state subrogation statute,100 
so that their back pay would later be reduced by operation of law.101  
 
B. THE DISCRETIONARY RULE: THE WITHHOLDING OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FROM BACK PAY AWARDS IS LEFT TO 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS.  
 
The First,102 Second,103 Fifth,104 Seventh,105 and Tenth106 Circuits 
have held that deduction of unemployment benefits is properly left to the 
discretion of the district courts. This Part examines both the reasoning for 
this conclusion and the practices of the district courts in exercising this 
discretion. 
 
1. Reasoning 
 
Circuits adopting the discretionary approach generally do so with 
the goal of preventing double recoveries. A robust example is the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Enterprise Steamfitters:  
 
We see no compelling reason for providing the injured 
party with double recovery for his lost employment; no 
compelling reason of deterrence or retribution against the 
responsible party in this case; and we are not in the 
business of redistributing the wealth beyond the goal of 
making the victim of discrimination whole.107  
 
The holding in Enterprise Steamfitters was cited favorably and 
clarified by the Second Circuit in Dailey v. Societé General. There, the 

100 Id. at 83-84.  
101 That is, the Craig court could not have possibly reduced the plaintiff’s back 
pay award without interfering with the operation of the state unemployment 
insurance statute or causing a double reduction of back pay.  
102 See Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1115 (1st Cir. 1995) (construing 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i)). 
103 See EEOC v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters Local No. 638 of U. A., 542 F.2d 
579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976).  
104 See Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980). 
105 See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969). 
106 See EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 639 (10th Cir. 1980). 
107 Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d at 592.  
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court declined to mandate that unemployment funds be deducted from back 
pay awards, acknowledging “compelling reasons” for why such benefits 
should not be deducted,108 but ultimately left the deduction of said benefits 
to the “sound discretion” of the district courts instead of following the 
restrictive rule.109 
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Ostapowicz v. 
Johnson Bronze Co. upheld a district court decision reducing a plaintiff’s 
back pay award by the amount of unemployment compensation that either 
was or reasonably could have been received by the plaintiff, holding that 
the district court’s deduction represented a “conscientious effort to 
calculate reasonable and equitable awards under conditions which do not 
allow for absolute precision.”110  
 
2. Discretion in the District Courts 
 
District courts in circuits following the discretionary rule have 
focused on several factors to determine whether or not to deduct 
unemployment insurance benefits from back pay awards. Significantly, 
some courts have recognized the existence of state subrogation statutes and 
chosen not to deduct insurance benefits when a plaintiff is subject to 
subrogation, because the plaintiff’s award will later be reduced by 
operation of law.111 In addition to the effect of subrogation, district courts 
have refused to reduce a plaintiff’s back pay award where, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, the plaintiff did not receive a windfall,112 and 
where the court generally preferred awarding windfalls to plaintiffs rather 
than defendants.113 

108 Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (giving, as 
an example, that where the choice lies with awarding either the plaintiff or the 
defendant a windfall, the windfall should inure to the plaintiff).  
109 Id. 
110 Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 1976).  
111 See, e.g., Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1555 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that an offset for unemployment insurance benefits was 
“particularly inappropriate . . . because, under Colorado law, an employee who 
receives a back pay award must repay the Colorado Division of Employment and 
Training all unemployment benefit payments received for the period covered by 
the back pay award”). 
112 See Brooks v. Fonda-Fultonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 938 F. Supp. 1094, 1110 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).   
113 See Shannon v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006).  
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Those district courts that have chosen to reduce back pay awards to 
account for unemployment insurance benefits have done so for a variety of 
reasons: because unemployment insurance benefits are not a collateral 
source;114 because the purpose of the back pay remedy is not to punish 
employers or to provide windfalls for employees, but rather solely to 
compensate for a plaintiff’s actual economic losses;115 because deduction 
would have a negligible effect on deterrence;116 and, significantly, because 
unemployment compensation was not recoverable by the unemployment 
insurance fund  because the jurisdiction lacked a subrogation statute, and “a 
double recovery was not necessary to make [the] plaintiff whole.”117 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
  
 This Part concludes that unemployment insurance benefits should 
not be treated as traditional collateral sources for the purposes of Title VII 
back pay awards, both as a matter of law and public policy.  Next, this Part 
reaffirms that the restrictive approach has effected to arbitrarily favor 
certain plaintiffs over others. Finally, this Part concludes by proposing that 
all circuits adopt the discretionary approach.  
 
A. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT BE 
TREATED AS SOURCES COLLATERAL TO EMPLOYERS.  
 
Unemployment insurance benefits should not be treated as sources 
collateral to employers for two reasons. First, insurance coverage paid for 
by an employer cannot be collateral to that employer, even if employees 
indirectly pay for a portion of coverage. Second, the policy justifications 
that underlie the collateral source rule in its traditional applications are 
inconsistent with the nature of back pay relief under Title VII and in the 
context of unemployment insurance benefits.  

114 Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (D. Conn. 1993) (“While 
collateral sources are not offset, unemployment compensation is not from a source 
independent of the employer . . . [m]aking a person discriminated against whole is 
not achieved by awarding damages in excess of the actual loss when the excess 
does not come from a collateral source.”).  
115 See Cole v. Uni-Marts, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).  
116 See Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber Co., 921 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Me. 1996).  
117 Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 521 F. Supp. 238, 243 (D. Mass. 1981) 
(“[E]quitable considerations militate in favor of a reduction of the gross back pay 
award here [where] [t]he unemployment compensation paid to the plaintiff is not 
recoverable from her by the commonwealth.”). 
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1. Unemployment Insurance Benefits Are Not Collateral 
Sources as Traditionally Defined 
 
Collateral benefits are “compensation . . . from a source 
independent of the tortfeasor,”118 that is, a collateral source is one “other 
than the injurer.”119 In the context of Title VII, however, it is the employer 
who is the injurer. And though unemployment insurance benefits are 
actually paid out by the government, to the extent that the source of 
compensation is an employer, these payments cannot be considered 
“collateral.” 
True, state governments act as administrators of unemployment 
insurance funds and collect premiums through taxation. But relying on this 
aspect of the unemployment insurance relationship to characterize 
unemployment benefits as collateral privileges form over function. First, 
the state’s role as intermediary has no bearing on the fact that employers 
are the sole direct source of funding that provides for the unemployment 
insurance benefits. Indeed, we would consider ordinary insurance 
premiums paid by an individual insured to be sourced from that individual, 
even though the premiums are later intermingled with other insureds’ 
premiums and invested by an insurer, as the states similarly do with 
employer unemployment insurance tax proceeds. Second, insurance 
relationships are nearly always characterized by the presence of an 
intermediary—typically, insurance contracts create a principal-agent 
relationship, with the purchaser of insurance acting as principal, appointing 
the insurer as his agent to take care of insured losses on his behalf.120 
Through a slight variation of this familiar agent/principal lens, states are 
the agents designated by federal and state law to represent the employer-
principal and to discharge its obligations to the employee-beneficiaries. 
This intermediary relationship does not alter the fact that unemployment 
insurance payments made by the agent-state are still attributable to the 
principal-employer, and represent the discharge of liability.121  
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118 BLACK’S, supra note 52. 
119 SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 142-43.  
120 See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 5 (2d ed. 2008). 
121 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. g (2006) (“Employee 
and nonemployee agents who represent their principal in transactions with third 
parties on the principal’s account and behalf.  Employee-agents whose work does 
not involve transaction interactions with third parties also act ‘on behalf of’ their 
employer-principal.”). But note, however, that while the employer/state 
relationship in the unemployment context may lack the required control element. 
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when . . . the agent shall act on 
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Of course, as discussed earlier in this Note, the incidence of 
unemployment insurance taxes may play an important role in resolving this 
dispute. That is, employees may bear some of the cost of unemployment 
insurance programs to the extent that the cost of the tax is back-shifted 
through reduced earnings. But although there is no consensus as to the 
incidence of the tax, the best estimates find that employees are responsible 
for no more than a portion of the market tax rate, so that ultimately, 
employers almost certainly pay for most of the unemployment insurance 
program. Moreover, it is not clear that unemployment insurance benefits 
are rendered collateral simply because the employer adjusts employee 
wages to reflect the cost of unemployment insurance. Even if so, the cost 
remains shared between the employee and employer, with the average 
employer responsible for the majority of the cost; the benefits can only 
colorably be considered collateral to the extent that the employee is 
responsible for paying for the benefits through a reduced wage. Further, the 
reasoning for excluding bargained-for insurance coverage as a collateral 
source—that the insured has paid for the covered event through premiums 
calculated to that plaintiff’s level of risk—does not hold true when only the 
base-rate, and not the experience rating, is back-shifted to an employee. In 
that case, there is no guarantee that the employee has made a contribution 
proportional to the risk and cost of loss. 
With the exception of administration by state governments and, as 
described above, that risk is not related to premium, the unemployment 
insurance system closely tracks traditional forms of insurance in its 
operation and structure. Unemployment insurance, like traditional 
insurance, has as one of its primary functions risk-spreading; in this 
context, it is attempting to ensure that the risks posed by unemployment to 
both individuals and society as a whole are spread among employers.122 
And, as in insurance generally, risk-classification is undertaken by 
unemployment insurers through the experience rating (in traditional 
insurance, “underwriting”), in order to charge participants for the amount 
of risk that they bring to the insurance pool. In addition, the structure of 
unemployment insurance gestures to concerns about moral hazard and 

the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control. . . .” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01), in some instances “relationships that are less than 
fully consensual and, therefore, not common-law agency relations trigger legal 
consequences equivalent to those of agency.” Id. at cmt. d. 
122 Tax incidence may, as discussed infra Part II.B., distort the effect of this 
intention.  
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adverse selection,123 both of which are familiar concepts in ordinary 
insurance. Though participation in the unemployment insurance system is 
mandatory, and though unemployment insurance may serve broader social 
goals, neither is unusual in the insurance context. Many ordinary forms of 
insurance require mandatory participation,124 and have at least a partial 
function of providing social stability and other positive externalities.125  
Even if one is inclined to the view that unemployment insurance 
benefits are payments made as a kind of social welfare, funded, like similar 
programs, through taxation linked to employment, it is not clear that such 
payments should be immune from deduction from back pay awards. Judge 
Richard Posner, for example, posits that such benefits, to the extent that 
they are financed by the government, should be deducted from back pay 
awards and that the government should have a right to recovery.126 The 
government, in his view, is another victim (in this case, of a discriminatory 
firing) and should not alone bear the burden of damages.  
Thus, unemployment insurance is most closely associated with the 
employer, perhaps best analogized as a traditional insurance product that is 
bought and paid for by employers for the benefit of employees. In the case 
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123 Policing of insured-side moral hazard – the theoretical tendency of 
insurance to minimize incentives to protect against or minimize the costs or risks 
of a loss—is reflected in unemployment insurance requirements that those 
collecting unemployment benefits actively look for jobs and request their insurance 
benefit anew each week. (Both of these requirements encourage the unemployed to 
find new employment, and to stop receiving insurance benefits, faster than they 
might without the requirements.) Insurer-side moral hazard is less of a concern 
with unemployment insurance than it is with traditional insurance because 
unemployment insurance is administered by the states, which lack the profit 
motive driving insurer-side moral hazard.  
Adverse selection – the theoretical tendency for high risk insureds to over-
consume insurance and for insurers to screen out high-consumption insureds – is 
controlled by measures that force employers to “purchase” insurance through 
mandatory taxation and by “enrolling” all involuntarily unemployed persons who 
apply for benefits and meet unemployment insurance requirements.  
124 For example, auto insurance is required in almost every state. BAKER, 
supra note 120, at 451. 
125 Examples of these positive externalities include liability insurance, which 
ensures that plaintiffs are guaranteed remuneration for covered losses, thus 
avoiding an insolvent or unwilling defendant from avoiding responsibility for his 
bad acts, and property insurance, which is universally required by mortgagors in 
order to secure their collateral, but which also provides the positive externality of 
neighborhood stability. See id. at 8. 
126 POSNER, supra note 57. 
2011       IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALLS?             333 
of Title VII, however—where the employer is both the source of funds and 
the defendant—these funds cannot be considered collateral.  
 
2. Public Policy Does Not Support Extending the Collateral 
Source Rule to Unemployment Insurance Benefits in the 
Title VII Context  
 
 It is not seriously disputed that application of the collateral source 
rule usually results in a plaintiff receiving a double recovery, which itself 
often, but not always, results in a windfall for the plaintiff. This Note has 
explored many of the various policy rationales that have been used to 
justify both the initial double recovery and the windfall that may result. But 
in the particular context of Title VII and unemployment insurance benefits, 
most of these rationales are simply inapposite. 
 To start, a double recovery cannot be justified as a means of 
indirectly awarding punitive damages or providing attorney’s fees in Title 
VII suits. Both punitive damages and attorney’s fees are explicitly available 
in the (relatively recently revised) text of Title VII,127 a clear expression of 
Congress’s intent as to how and when fees and damages should be 
awarded.128  Indeed, punitive damages are available on only a limited basis 
under Title VII;129 by so limiting their availability, Congress has indicated 
it almost surely did not intend punitive damages to be awarded to plaintiffs 
on the sole (and irrelevant to Title VII) basis of the plaintiff previously 
having collected unemployment insurance benefits. Attorney’s fees, on the 
other hand, are widely available under Title VII, even (after its 1991 
revision) for certain plaintiffs who lose their cases,130 and thus it is simply 
not necessary to account for them by “rounding up” a damages award.   

127 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 
1071, 1073 (1991) (current version at 42 U.S.C 1981a (2006)). 
128 See ANDREW S. BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 162-63 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]f punishment is desired, it is surely better to 
administer it through punitive damages [rather than the collateral source rule], 
where the punishment is explicit and where the amount awarded can be fixed in 
accordance with the extent to which it is felt the defendant deserves punishment.”). 
129 See infra Part II.A.  
130 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 
261 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006)) (defendant is liable for 
attorneys fees if the plaintiff can show that a protected characteristic was 
considered by the defendant in taking an unlawful employment action, even if the 
defendant can show that the same decision would have been made without 
consideration of the protected characteristic, thereby avoiding liability). 
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Ordinary insurers avoid a double-recovery with the near-universal 
contractual assertion of a subrogation right, which eliminates the risk of a 
windfall to the insured by virtue of having obtained a collateral benefit. 
But, as this Note points out, the majority of states do not hold a statutory 
subrogation right, and thus have no means of collecting benefits for which 
there exists an overlap. In those states that have asserted a subrogation 
right, the concern that employers will not bear the full cost of their 
wrongdoing has been eliminated, along with the need to choose between 
awarding a windfall to either the employee or employer, because though 
unemployment benefits are deducted from a plaintiff’s back pay award, 
they are then remitted to the unemployment fund by the employer.131 
Similarly, deterrence and social responsibility for wrongdoing are not 
weakened as against the employer, since it remains fully responsible for 
lost wages. Indeed, subrogation has the effect of preserving the strength of 
the insurance pool, as compared to windfalls, which have the opposite 
effect.132 
To be sure, in those states lacking subrogation statutes, deducting 
unemployment benefits from an award favors defendants, because it 
reduces the amount of damages that he will have to pay the plaintiff and, in 
that sense, lowers the cost of its discriminatory act. But unlike other 
applications of the collateral source rule, in which the defendant’s reduced 
award is not mitigated by an associated cost, unemployment insurance 
administration is designed so that each firing has a commensurate effect on 
the unemployment insurance tax rate. Thus, there remains a disincentive to 
taking the wrongful action that, to some degree, mitigates forces impairing 
the deterrence effect of damages and social cost of a firing to an 
employer.133 
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131 See infra Part II.D.  
132 See infra Table 2. It is feasible that this approach would also provide a 
benefit to some employers in the form of reduced premiums by, as discussed 
earlier in this Note, increasing the overall strength of the unemployment fund.  
133 It is very important to note, however, that this may not compensate for the 
full costs of discriminatory firings on society, the elimination of which is a primary 
interest of Title VII. Since the true social cost of such firings is not easily 
calculated, it is difficult or impossible to determine precisely whether or not the 
experience rating can capture these costs.  
 Another potential concern regarding the discretionary rule, even in a 
system with a subrogation right, is that it may create an incentive to settle cases for 
less than the full cost of the discriminatory act (though at least equal to or more 
than the amount of a back pay award less any unemployment insurance benefits 
received). That is, the defendant-employer knows that in a system with subrogation 
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B. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT BE UNIFORMLY 
DISALLOWED AS DEDUCTIONS FROM BACK PAY AWARDS.  
 
Because of the divergent approaches taken by both the circuit 
courts of appeals and of the state legislatures, prevailing plaintiffs in Title 
VII suits are placed on very different footings solely on the basis of 
residency. District court judges in at least 20 states are required to award 
plaintiffs what this Note has shown should be considered a windfall.134 In 
many other states, on the other hand, plaintiffs are subject to subrogation 
statutes or to judicial reduction of their back pay award. The basis of this 
differing treatment, however—essentially, disharmony in the law—has 
nothing to do with Title VII’s aim of making victims of discrimination 
whole and ending employment discrimination. 
Take one example: the Fourth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes 
Virginia and Maryland, which have subrogation statutes,135 and North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia, which do not, has adopted the 
restrictive approach. Suppose that an employer located in Virginia 
discriminatorily fires employees living in West Virginia, Maryland, and 
Virginia. Further suppose that the firing causes all of the employees 
identical loss of pay, and that the employees collect identical amounts of 
unemployment insurance benefits as a result of the firing.136 Upon 
prevailing in a Title VII suit, the plaintiff-employees would each receive 
the same amount in back pay damages. Following the suit, however, those 
plaintiffs living in West Virginia are not subject to subrogation and enjoy 
both unemployment insurance benefits and a back pay award; their 
identically situated coworkers residing in Virginia and Maryland, on the 
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it will remain fully responsible for the loss upon a verdict for the plaintiff-
employee. The employee, however, knows that it will only receive the amount of 
back pay minus the unemployment insurance benefits upon prevailing, and 
resultantly has an incentive to accept a settlement for anything more than that 
amount.  
Of course, a plaintiff who believes that he or she will be entitled to punitive or 
special compensatory damages may be less swayed to settle, as may a high-income 
plaintiff, for whom the deduction of back pay benefits represents a smaller 
proportion of the overall award.  
134 That is, in states that lack subrogation statutes that are located in circuits 
that do not allow the district courts the discretion to deduct unemployment 
insurance benefits from back pay awards. See infra Table 2.  
135 See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-809 (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 60.2-634 (2006). 
136 They would not, in reality, since they all live in different states.  
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other hand, repay the unemployment fund and receive the excess of back 
pay over amounts received as unemployment insurance compensation. As 
demonstrated in Table 1,137 this difference is significant: unreduced awards 
may be more than 50% higher than that of plaintiffs whose award is 
reduced by a court or through subrogation.  
The result is indefensible in the context of the rule of law in 
general and of Title VII in particular, which mandates principled and 
uniform application of the back pay provision.138 In fact, while many circuit 
courts of appeals have gestured to the ideal of uniform application of Title 
VII when refusing to allow the discretionary approach, denial of discretion 
has, as illustrated above, produced the opposite effect of widening 
differences between similarly-situated plaintiffs. 
 
C. THE DEDUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE DISTRICT COURTS.  
  
As just described, statutory methods of subrogation are incoherent 
across states, rendering identical back pay awards drastically different 
depending on a prevailing plaintiff’s state of residence. The restrictive rule, 
uniformly banning consideration of unemployment compensation when 
determining back pay awards, ignores and enables this incoherence. The 
federal district courts, however, are well-situated—both as fact finders and 
as a relatively localized adjudicative body—to ensure uniformity of back 
pay awards. The circuit courts of appeals can, and should, accomplish 
uniformity by adopting the discretionary rule, allowing district courts to 
consider evidence of unemployment benefits when calculating a Title VII 
plaintiff’s back pay damages. District courts, in turn, should leave 
unchanged awards for those plaintiffs whose unemployment insurance 
benefits will be subject to subrogation, but should reduce back pay awards 
when such benefits will result in a windfall, perhaps to the extent that those 
benefits are attributable solely to an employer and not to employees 
through back-shifting, when and if such a calculation can be reliably made. 
 The abandonment of the restrictive rule is necessary because the 
present two-tiered system of compensation for Title VII plaintiffs is in 
conflict with the “consistent and principled application of the [Title VII] 
backpay provision” required by the Supreme Court.139 And ensuring that 
Title VII is consistently applied by adopting the discretionary approach is 
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137 Infra Table 1.  
138 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1975). 
139 Id.  
2011       IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALLS?             337 
unlikely to diminish the attainment of the statute’s ultimate goal: to reduce 
employment discrimination. Defendants do not receive a windfall in those 
states that have subrogation statutes, because the employer remains 
responsible for the entire amount awarded by the court; in states without 
subrogation statutes, the reduced awards likely have at most a minor impact 
on the deterrent effect of the back pay provision due to the increased costs 
associated with a firing for which unemployment insurance benefits and 
Title VII back pay damages are claimed.  
In fact, reducing back pay awards is plainly consistent with 
congressional intent to put plaintiffs in the “position where they would 
have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.”140 In a Title VII 
firing suit, the position that the plaintiff would have been in absent 
discrimination is employed; were the plaintiff employed, she would not 
have received unemployment compensation. Awarding a plaintiff the total 
amount of back pay that she would have received if she were not fired, 
while refusing to reimburse the plaintiff to the extent that she received a 
benefit as a result of a firing, is consistent with the make-whole nature of 
back pay relief under Title VII.  
It cannot be ignored that employment discrimination suits are 
relatively low value, and that the private attorney general model is likely 
weakened by the lower incentives to sue that may result from reduced back 
pay awards. This incentive structure, however, was strengthened by the 
addition of attorney’s fees and punitive damages under the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, both of which (perhaps unlike the windfalls at issue here) 
furthered Congress’s expressed intent that the back pay provision make 
plaintiffs whole, but go no further. 
 The discretionary approach is also in accord with the purposes of 
unemployment insurance. Recall that unemployment benefits are paid both 
to sustain individuals and their families during periods of temporary 
unemployment and to stabilize the economy during periods of high 
unemployment. The first purpose is fulfilled when the plaintiff is able to 
access his or her insurance benefits during unemployment, and is not 
nullified when those benefits are later recouped. At that point, the plaintiff 
has either found employment or no longer qualifies as “temporarily” 
unemployed; in either case, the insurance benefits have accomplished their 
income-flow-smoothing function. Nor does reduction of back pay awards 
impact the economy-wide purposes of unemployment insurance, which, 
again, is important during the actual period of volatility, but does not have 
its stabilizing function impaired when later recouped. On the contrary, the 
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140 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).  
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restrictive rule, by lowering unemployment insurance fund balances as 
demonstrated in Table 2, may have the effect of reducing compensation, 
increasing the duration of unemployment and decreasing labor force 
participation.141 
 Allowing the federal district courts to consider the amount of 
unemployment insurance benefits a prevailing plaintiff has received will 
help to ensure that Title VII back pay awards are truly compensatory. 
While in some cases a discretionary approach may result in some benefit to 
defendant-employers, in all cases it will ensure that the back pay provision 
is consistently applied in accord with congressional and Supreme Court 
mandates.  
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The nature of unemployment insurance and the text of Title VII 
counsel that the circuit courts of appeals allow the district courts the 
discretion to consider unemployment insurance benefits when calculating 
back pay awards for plaintiffs. In states that have subrogation statutes, the 
district courts should impose no offset, but rather allow reimbursement of 
the state fund by operation of law. This result ensures plaintiffs receive 
their entitled make-whole relief, holds defendant-employers liable for the 
full costs of their discriminatory acts, and benefits the entire pool of 
insureds by not contributing to the further destabilization of state 
unemployment insurance funds. Even in states that do not assert 
subrogation rights, consistent application of Title VII suggests that 
unemployment insurance benefits should be offset from a prevailing 
plaintiff’s back pay award.  
Those states that do not have subrogation statutes should consider 
their role as a large-scale insurer and act to pass laws that guarantee fair 
and appropriate benefit payouts while considering the rights of all 
participating insureds to a stable and fairly administered fund. As 16 states 
have realized, the best way to accomplish this is, like the majority of 
conventional private insurers, vesting the unemployment insurance funds 
with a subrogation right.   
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141 See Anderson, supra note 46. As discussed earlier in this Note, market rates 
for the unemployment tax are calculated by reference to the balance, income, and 
expenses of the unemployment insurance fund. 
LESSONS FROM THE PRICE-ANDERSON NUCLEAR 
INDUSTRY INDEMNITY ACT FOR FUTURE CLEAN ENERGY 
COMPENSATORY MODELS 
 
TAYLOR MEEHAN 
 
*** 
 
The following note discusses the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry 
Indemnity Act as a model liability insurance system for future clean energy 
technologies and sources such as carbon sequestration and geothermal 
energy. The Price-Anderson Act implements a tiered insurance system that 
requires individual commercial nuclear power plants to secure private 
insurance policies for site-specific incidents up to a certain threshold. This 
first layer of indemnity is then supplemented by an industry-wide pooling 
system that provides indemnification in the event of an incident that 
accrues greater financial losses than the initial, primary insurance layer 
obtained by the responsible nuclear plant. In the event the industry-wide 
insurance pool funds are exhausted, the federal government is the final 
indemnifier, providing additional compensation to affected individuals 
when deemed appropriate. This note considers the history of the Price-
Anderson Act, its development and subsequent amendments since its 
enactment in 1957, and highlights the specific aspects of the system that 
should be adopted in the future.  In particular, the note argues that carbon 
sequestration technology and geothermal energy are presently situated in a 
similar situation as the nuclear industry was in the early 1950s. The 
parallels between the industries – most notably the low risk of an industrial 
accident, yet extensive consequences in the event of an incident – invite 
comparison and analysis into whether the nuclear industry indemnity 
system is a transferable model to future clean energy technologies.  
Ultimately, the note argues that a number of the key components of the 
Price-Anderson Act – particularly its liability cap, federal involvement, no-
fault liability, federal jurisdiction, and continually written policies – not 
only are suitable for future systems, but in fact should be implemented by 
the insurance industry when underwriting the carbon sequestration and 
geothermal energy insurance system. The note concludes that the United 
States is in dire need of restructuring its national energy policy and an 
essential aspect to this national policy is creating an underlying system of 
liability that can be applicable, with specific adaptations in lieu of inherent 
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differences in these technologies, to new clean energy sources. The current 
system of the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity Act is America’s 
best solution.  
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
With the increasing energy demand in the United States and the 
diminishing supply of traditional domestic fossil fuels,1 the nation is 
confronted with serious energy concerns that necessitate a review of our 
national energy policy. Not only is the United States the largest energy 
producer, consumer and net importer per capita in the world,2 but the 
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1 Energy production from fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil and natural gas) is 
expected to continue to dominate U.S. energy production for years to come. 
Naturally, the continual production of fossil fuel reserves and the increased energy 
demand within the United States has led to significant concerns of a diminishing 
domestic supply of such resources. While the energy industry is alarmed at the 
potential diminution in domestic fossil fuel resources, the United States has 
witnessed a boom in the exploration, development and early production of natural 
gas reserves located in deep, shale rock formations around the country. These shale 
formations contain natural gas reserves that were previously considered 
inaccessible and uneconomical for energy production. However, with the 
increasing development and use of a technological drilling process called hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) these shale fields are opening up a vast amount of potential 
for natural gas production within the United States. The practice, however, is 
highly controversial.  The energy industry currently heralds fracking as the answer 
to U.S. energy needs while environmental groups and legislators are concerned 
with potential groundwater contamination and increased seismic activity within 
surrounding drilling areas. The national debate on the practice is presently 
unfolding. See J. DANIEL ARTHUR, P.E., BRIAN BOHM, P.G. & MARK LAYNE, 
PH.D., P.E., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS 
WELLS OF THE MARECELLUS SHALE, Ground Water Protection Council 2008 
Annual Forum 7-9 (Sept. 21-24, 2008). 
2 See International Energy Statistics, UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, INDEPENDENT STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, http://www.eia.gov 
/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=44&aid=2 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2011). But see China Overtakes the United States to Become World’s Largest 
Energy Consumer, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479 (finding China has recently surpassed 
the United States in total energy consumption, however the United States remains 
the largest energy consumer per capita). 
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country also boasts the world’s largest coal reserves – making the United 
States extremely dependent on fossil fuel energy for short-term and long-
term economic growth.3 Concerns over energy security and foreign 
dependence are exacerbated by scientific and social apprehension 
surrounding the leakage of greenhouse gas from these fossil fuel energy 
sources into the environment.4  
Accordingly, the United States must continue to focus on its 
development of clean energy sources that can help mitigate many of the 
risks and problems associated with fossil fuel energy. Headlining these 
developments are clean energy sources and technologies such as nuclear 
energy, carbon sequestration and geothermal energy. In order to properly 
support the clean energy movement, the United States must attract 
significant financial investment from the private sector as well as provide a 
system of adequate insurance coverage in order to mitigate any associated 
risks.  
The following commentary examines the benefits and deficiencies 
of the current financial protection program of the nuclear energy industry, 
which was established by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity 
Act. It continues, arguing in support of the development of a similar, yet 
varied version of the underlying nuclear industry indemnity system to 
insure future clean energy sources and technologies.  
Analysis of the Price-Anderson Act reveals a variety of important 
issues and concerns for insurers attempting to provide coverage for clean 
energy technologies and sources such as carbon sequestration and 
geothermal energy. While these technologies are each distinct and consist 
of specific, technical issues that are unique to their own field, the Price-
Anderson Act offers a general model of a public-private partnership that 
has successfully insured the nuclear industry for over fifty years.  
The following commentary will begin by discussing the history and 
development of the Price-Anderson system, as it has been amended and 
renewed four times since its original enactment. The note will then provide 
analysis of the long-term liability issues associated with the nuclear 

3 See Guri Bang, Energy Security and Climate Change Concerns: Triggers for 
Energy Policy Change in the United States?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1645 
(2010).  
4 KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, 
NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE POLICY 12 (World Resources Institute 2005) (The United States is among 
the leading emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, most notably carbon 
dioxide. In 2000, the United States amounted for 20.6% of the world’s greenhouse 
gas emissions.).  
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industry, carbon sequestration and geothermal energy. In particular, the 
note will argue in support of the establishment of a similar, private-public 
tiered insurance pool system for future clean energy industries.  
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
 
The United States is in a similar position today as it was in the 
1950s.  In the 1950s, the nation was confronted with the harsh realities of 
the aftermath of World War II and the increasing industrial growth of the 
nation. The need for a rise and diversification in its energy production to 
meet the demand was essential. Therefore, the federal government 
encouraged energy diversification, invested in research and development of 
alternative energy sources, and provided regulatory incentives to advance 
oil, coal and nuclear development within the private sector.5  
In 1954, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, which provided 
for the development and regulation of civilian and military uses of nuclear 
materials in the United States.6 The Act marked the first time the private 
sector was encouraged to become a player in the development of 
commercial nuclear power plants. The initial version of the statute, 
however, did not establish a system of indemnification for, or limits on, 
private licensee liability in case of offsite injury to individuals or damage to 
property.7 
Thus, the private sector approached the invitation with both caution 
and uncertainty. The private sector was concerned with the lack of nuclear 
experience – not only from a technological standpoint but also from an 
insurance perspective. The lack of certainty prompted a resistance from 
insurance companies to provide commercial liability coverage for private 

5 See Roger H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, A Half Century of US Federal 
Government Energy Incentives: Value, Distribution, and Policy Implications, 27 
INT’L J. GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES 42, 43 (2007).  
6 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006) (The Act is the 
fundamental U.S. law on both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear 
materials. It provides for the development and regulation of nuclear materials and 
facilities in the United States. The Act declares that "the development, use, and 
control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve 
the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition 
in private enterprise."). 
7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 
amended by the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (2006)). 
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sector nuclear development.8 Accordingly, representatives from the private 
sector stressed to Congress that they would be forced to withdraw from the 
field if their liability was not limited by legislation.9  
 
III. THE PRICE-ANDERSON NUCLEAR INDUSTRY INDEMNITY 
ACT  
 
In response to such concerns, Congress passed the Price-Anderson 
Act in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. The Price-
Anderson Act established a nuclear liability indemnity system and 
encouraged further development of the nuclear industry within America.10  
This system included a liability cap in the event of a nuclear incident – a 
provision that was necessary for initiating private investment and 
development of nuclear energy within the United States.11  
The nuclear industry is an area in which large amounts of energy 
production is accompanied with low, yet devastating, potentials of risk, 
especially during early developments. Thus, the Price-Anderson Act sought 

8 See Barry Brownstein, The Price-Anderson Act: Is It Consistent with a 
Sound Energy Policy?, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 17, 1984), http://www.cato.org/pu 
b_display.php?pub_id=902  (“Consider the following statements from the 1956 
and 1957 hearings on the then-proposed Price-Anderson amendment. A vice 
president of Westinghouse, Charles Weaver, stated: ‘Obviously we cannot risk the 
financial stability of our company for a relatively small project no matter how 
important it is to the country's reactor development effort, if it could result in a 
major liability in relation to our assets.’”) (quoting Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors 
Against Reactor Hazards-Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, p. 110); see also id. (“General Electric also indicated 
during the hearings that it was prepared to halt its work in the nuclear industry 
should a limitation on liability not be passed.”) (citing Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental 
Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 148); and id. 
(“Suppliers of reactor shields also indicated their unwillingness ‘to undertake 
contracts in this field without being relieved of uninsurable liability in some 
way.’”) (quoting Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings Before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 
85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 148). 
9 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 
59, 64 (1978). 
10 Act of September 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(b)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006). 
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to implement a sufficient liability and compensation framework to both 
protect the American public in the event of a nuclear incident as well as 
advance financial investment and development of the industry.12 The Act is 
essentially an insurance program that encourages private development of 
nuclear power, establishes a legal framework for handling potential liability 
claims, and provides a ready source of funds to compensate injured victims 
of nuclear accidents.13 
In drafting the indemnity plan, Congress initially established a two-
tiered insurance system. The primary layer of the system required each 
commercial nuclear power plant to secure its own insurance coverage up to 
a certain threshold. In the event that the primary layer was exhausted, the 
federal government would provide an additional layer of financial 
protection.14  
The initial two-tiered model has since been bolstered to include an 
additional industry-wide pool that requires nuclear reactors to collectively 
contribute to a separate insurance pool.15 Accordingly, the current system 
consists of a three-tiered system. To date, the primary layer requires each 
nuclear plant to secure $375 million in financial protection.16 In the event 
of an incident exceeding the primary layer’s coverage, the industry-wide 
pool kicks in and each reactor is assessed a prorated share of the excess up 
to $111.9 million.17 The $111.9 million is adjusted every five years for 

12 The original act implemented a system that would last for ten years. This 
was an attempt by legislators and nuclear industry actors to readdress the 
Amendment once significant development within the nuclear field and commercial 
liability industry could occur.  42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
13 National Energy Issues: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. 
Resources, 107th Cong. 53, 54 (2001) (statement of John L. Quattrocchi, Senior 
Vice President, Underwriting, American Nuclear Insurers, West Hartford, CT) 
[hereinafter Quattrocchi].  
14 The Price-Anderson Act: Background Information, AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y 
(Nov. 2005), http://www.new.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf.   
15 The Insurance Institute defines an insurance pool as “a group of insurance 
companies that pool assets, enabling them to provide an amount of insurance 
substantially more than can be provided by individual companies to insure large 
risks such as nuclear power stations.” See Insurance Pools Definition, INSURANCE 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www2.iii.org/glossary/i/ (last visited Aug. 22, 
2011). 
16 Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief FundsíNuclear 
Insurance: Price-Anderson Act, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION (Jun. 2011), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/funds-fs.html.  
17 Id.  
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inflation and represents the maximum retrospective assessment that each 
insured licensee can be assigned per incident.18  
The additional pool, also known as the Secondary Financial 
Protection program, is currently comprised of 104 power reactors and 
amounts to nearly $12.6 billion dollars.19 This industry-wide retrospective 
rating program will be used in the event that a loss exceeds the primary 
insurance limit.20 In turn, if the second tier is fully exhausted, Congress is 
committed to determine whether additional relief is needed.21 If Congress 
determines additional relief is necessary, the federal government is the final 
indemnifier.22 
Since its enactment, the Price-Anderson Act has been amended in 
1966, 1975, and 1988. Recently, the Act was renewed with the passage of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which extended the program until 
December 31, 2025.23 The following sections discuss the development and 
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act and their significance to the legal 
and insurance framework of the nuclear industry.   
 
A. 1957 PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
 
In 1957, Dwight Eisenhower signed into law the Price-Anderson 
Act, establishing the first nuclear indemnification plan for commercial 
nuclear power plants within the United States.24 The Act initially required a 
commercial nuclear power plant licensee with energy capacities of 100,000 
electrical kilowatts or more to obtain $60 million of financial protection – 

18 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 56.  
19 Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance, AMERICAN NUCLEAR INSURERS 2 
(Jul. 2011), http://www.amnucins.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20t 
he%20US.pdf [hereinafter ANI Liability Insurance].   
20 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(k) (2006).  
21 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2006).  
22 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (2006). (The federal indemnity agreement covers 
liability for any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or loss of or damage to 
property by a nuclear incident occurring within the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2214(q) (2006)). 
23 Cole Mahone Adams, Damages and Injury: Smith v. Carbide and 
Chemicals Corporation and the Application of Kentucky Law under the Price-
Anderson Act, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 175, 177 (2008-2009). 
24 See S. REP. NO. 85-296, at 8 (1957) (The Act provides the United States 
with “a practical approach to the necessity of providing adequate protection against 
liability arising from atomic hazards, as well as a sound basis for compensating the 
public for any possible injury or damage arising from such hazards.”).  
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the maximum amount of private insurance potentially available at the time 
– in order to remain in operation.25 In the event of a nuclear incident, the 
Atomic Energy Commission agreed to indemnify the nuclear operators or 
manufacturers for all liability up to, but not in excess of, $500 million.26  
The initial act established the precedent for a liability cap for the 
federal government and also included “omnibus coverage,” which extended 
coverage not only to a person with whom an agreement of indemnification 
was executed but also to any person or persons deemed liable under state 
tort law.27 While the original $500 million proved to be a rough estimation 
of liability, each successive amendment Congress has addressed, and 
raised, the liability cap to reflect an appropriate balance between industry 
capacity and potential harm.28  
 
B. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: 1966 AND 1975 AMENDMENTS  
 
In accordance to the 1957 version of the Price-Anderson Act, the 
statute was to expire following a ten-year trial period.29 Congress, however, 
extended the bill in 196630 and again in 1975.31 The 1966 amendment 
addressed three major concerns of legal impediments claimants faced when 
seeking relief under the Act – proving legal causation, state statutes of 
limitations and jurisdictional variances.  
The Joint Committee tasked to remedy the deficiencies of the Act 
was concerned that the burden of establishing causation was too stringent, 
as many state tort laws required findings of fault or negligence.32 The 
argument followed that proving the fault or negligence standard was too 
difficult of a burden on the individual victim. Thus, in order to address the 
uncertainty in state tort law regarding the applicability of causation, the 

25 Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 577 (1957) (codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 2210(b) (2006)). 
26 Dan M. Berkovitz., Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation 
Legislation?–The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1989). 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 58. 
29 See Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006)). 
30 See Act of September 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855. 
31 See Act of December 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111. 
32 David M. Rocchio, The Price-Anderson Act: Allocation of the 
Extraordinary Risk of Nuclear Generated Electricity: A Model Punitive Damage 
Provision, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 521, 538 (1987). 
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1966 amendments included a provision for the waiver of various defenses 
under state tort law in the event of a major accident termed an 
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence.”33 This provision was enacted in order 
to assure that the victim’s entitlement to compensation would be 
determined under a strict liability standard, instead of the negligence 
standard that most state courts require.34  
In addition, the Committee addressed the fact that due to the latent 
nature of injury, harm and damage caused by exposure to radioactive 
material, state statutes of limitation would most likely invalidate any claims 
as untimely.35 As a result, the 1966 Amendment provided a provision that 
waived the application of state statutes of limitations that were more 
restrictive than the three-year limit specified by the Act.36 Finally, the 1966 
amendment invoked a removal provision, which brought claims arising out 
of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence within the jurisdiction of federal 
district courts.37All claims resulting from the same “extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence” were to be consolidated into one federal court. The court 
would then be responsible for adjudicating all claims, distributing any 
compensatory damages if necessary and prioritizing any payouts in the 
event of fiduciary exhaustion.38  
In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act through 1987. The 1975 
amendments drastically changed the system by beginning to phase out the 
$500 million layer of federal indemnity. The amendment shifted the 
secondary layer of protection instead to the nuclear industry and private 

33 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1982) (An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is defined 
“any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct 
material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing 
radiation levels offsite, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Secretary 
of Energy, as appropriate, determines to be substantial, and which the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, determines has 
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or 
property offsite.” When determining whether an incident is to be considered an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission established 
a set of criteria that can be found in 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-140.85 (1988)).   
34 See S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 3-4 (1966). 
35 See Rocchio, supra note 32, at 525. 
36 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(1)(F)(iii) (2006) (The Act allows “any issue or 
defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three years 
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known, 
of his injury or damage and the cause thereof.”). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(3)(A)-(C) (2006). 
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insurance companies.39 The Act required each nuclear plant to contribute 
up to $5 million of retrospective premiums in the event of a nuclear 
accident at any commercial nuclear plant within the United States for 
which damages exceeded the required $60 million amount of private 
insurance for each site.40 The total amount of financial protection in this 
secondary layer depended on the number of operating power plants, 
however the government retained the assurance that it would provide 
compensation in the event that the total protection was less than the 
previous amount of $560 million.41  
 
C. 1988 AMENDMENTS  
 
In the aftermath of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant,42 Congress opted to further increase the liability cap 
and financial protections of the Act.43 In the 1988 amendment, Congress 
increased the liability of the nuclear industry to $9.87 billion dollars, nearly 
ten times greater than the original liability cap.44  
Following the Three Mile Island incident, lawsuits were filed in 
state and federal courts due to the language of the Act – that is, only 
“extraordinary nuclear occurrences” could be consolidated in federal 
court.45 Thus, Congress amended the Act in 1988 by granting United States 
district courts with original removal jurisdiction over all “public liability 

39 Berkovitz, supra note 26, at 14.   
40 Id. at 14-15. 
41 Id. at 15.  
42 See Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Three Mile Island Accident: 
Backgrounder, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, available at http://www.nr 
c.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last visited Aug. 22, 
2011) (On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near 
Middletown, Pa., suffered a severe core meltdown, leading to the most serious 
nuclear incident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history. No 
deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community occurred, 
but it brought widespread change to the security, operation, emergency response 
and regulations of the nuclear industry). 
43 Id. 
44 Berkovitz, supra note 26, at 41. 
45 See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 486 (1999) (The 
Supreme Court held, among other issues, that the Price-Anderson Act’s terms “are 
underscored by its legislative history, which expressly refers to the multitude of 
separate cases brought 'in various state and Federal courts' in the aftermath of the 
Three Mile Island accident.”). 
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actions” arising under the Price-Anderson Act.46 This amendment, 
combined with the waiver of defense provisions, the omnibus coverage and 
the predetermined sources of funding, provided individuals seeking legal 
recourse significant advantages in federal court that might not otherwise be 
offered under state tort law.47 The substantive rules for decision, however, 
remain derived from state law in which the nuclear incident occurs, unless 
such law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act.48 
 
D. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT SINCE 2005 
 
 With strong bipartisan support, Congress passed the Energy Policy 
Act (EPAct) of 2005, which, among other provisions, provided for the 
extension of the Price-Anderson Act from 2005 until December 31, 2025.49  
This is the longest extension of the program since its enactment. The most 
significant amendment from EPAct is the increase in the amount of annual 
financial contributions from commercial reactors.50 The Act now requires 
individual site operators to provide $375 million of primary financial 
protection and to contribute $111.9 million to the Secondary Financial 
Protection Program, plus 5% for legal costs per reactor.51  

Ǥ THE REGULATING AGENCY: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMITTEE 
  
  Congress established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
as an independent regulating agency designed to license and regulate the 
nation’s civilian use of nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of 
public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and 
to protect the environment.52 An essential component of the NRC’s role as 

46 42 U. S. C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006). 
47 O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1100 (7th Cir. 
1994) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-218, at 4 (1987)). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2006). 
49 Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 602-608, 
119 Stat. 779, 779-781 (2005). 
50 70 FR 61885-01, Rules and Regulations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(2005) (codified in scattered sections of 10 C.F.R.). 
51 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supra note 16, at 1. 
52 William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 
Keynote Address at the Emerging Issues Policy Forum, Powering the Future 2010: 
Nuclear Regulation and the Nuclear Renaissance 1-2 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1027/ML102790151.pdf. 
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a federal agency is that it is not an entity that promotes the use of nuclear 
and radiation technologies,53 but instead is one that regulates the use of 
such technologies to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear 
industry.54  
  As stated by Commissioner William C. Ostendorff during a 
keynote address on the nuclear renaissance in Amelia, FL,55 the agency 
strives to adhere to its principles of good regulation through independence, 
transparency, efficiency, clarity, and reliability.56 If the nation is to proceed 
with clean, alternative energies as an integral part of our national energy 
policy, then the clean energy technologies will also need an independent 
regulatory agency similar to the NRC. Such an agency would ensure best 
practice techniques, regulation of licenses and operations, and uniformity 
across the industry as well as provide direction as an oversight committee 
in promoting safety and the public interest.  

V. THE INSURERS: THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR INSURERS 
 
Since the establishment of the Price-Anderson system, a group of 
member insurance companies – the American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) – has 
been responsible for all of the nuclear liability policies.57 American Nuclear 
Insurers is an unincorporated voluntary joint underwriting association that 
directly writes nuclear liability insurance for nuclear facilities.58 In order to 
be a member company of ANI, insurers are required to contain an A.M. 

53 Id. at 2. The role of promoting nuclear technologies was assigned to the 
Department of Energy and its predecessor, the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA), in the 1970s. 
54 Id.  
55 Commissioner Ostendorff is one of the five head members (commissioners) 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, The 
Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commfuncdesc.html (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
56 See Ostendorff, supra note 52, at 2.   
57 As of January 1, 1998, the insurance pools had underwritten the following 
policies: Operating power reactors: 69 sites; Non-power reactors: 27; Fuel 
fabrication facilities:  6; Waste disposal and storage facilities: 12; Miscellaneous 
facilities including nuclear laundries and research laboratories: 55; Discontinued 
nuclear facilities: 20; Suppliers and transporters: 225. See Paul Bailey, THE PRICE-
ANDERSON ACT - CROSSING THE BRIDGE TO THE NEXT CENTURY: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, ICF INCORPORATED FOR THE NRC 75 (Oct. 1998). 
58 American Nuclear Insurers, Overview, http://www.amnucins.com/About 
Ani.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter ANI]. 
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Best Rating of “A-” or better, possess a policyholder surplus (PHS) of at 
least $100 million, and release unqualified, audited financial statements for 
the latest financial reporting period.59 Currently, there are 21 insurance 
companies that are member companies of ANI.60  
 American Nuclear Insurers manages both domestic and foreign 
underwriting syndicates.61 The domestic syndicate provides third party 
nuclear liability insurance to every commercial nuclear power plant in the 
United States as well as other entities that support the operation of power 
plants such as fabricators of nuclear fuel, nuclear research facilities, waste 
management and disposal facilities, and companies that supply any goods 
and services to the nuclear industry.62  
 Under the foreign underwriting syndicate, ANI participates in 
reinsurance programs in 18 foreign countries.63 ANI retains around a third 
of the liability exposure under each policy while ceding the remaining 
amount to insurers around the world.64 This approach allows ANI to 
organize the resources of the worldwide insurance community and spread 
the uncertainties of the risk over a large financial base.  
 American Nuclear Insurers provide four specific liability policies 
in order to satisfy nuclear plant’s requirements under the Price-Anderson 
Act. These policies include a Facility Form Policy, Secondary Financial 
Protection Program, Facility Worker Form Policy, and Supplier’s and 
Transporter’s Policy.65 The Facility Form Policy is the site-specific 
insurance coverage that owners or operators of commercial nuclear power 
plant are required to have under the Price-Anderson Act.66 This coverage is 
strictly limited to liability for bodily injury or offsite property damage 

59 Richard Jones, Nuclear Insurance: Where Does it Fit in the Green 
Generation?, 16 J. REINSURANCE 71, 74 (Spring 2009).  
60 Id. at 75. These insurance companies include Ace American Insurance 
Company, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, AXIS Reinsurance Company, 
Federal Insurance Company (Chubb), Swiss Re America, and State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Co., among others. 
61 Id. at 76. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.   
64 Ian Hore-Lacey, World Nuclear Association, The Encyclopedia of Earth, 
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, United States (Dec. 7, 2009, 10:35 PM), 
http://www.eoeart h.org/article/Price-Anderson_Act_of_1957_United_States (last 
accessed Aug. 22, 2011). 
65 See ANI Liability Insurance, supra note 19, at 1-4. 
66 Id. at 1-2. 
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caused by nuclear material.67  
 Underwriters for the Facility Form Policies included two distinct 
provisions in order to tailor it to the nuclear industry. First, the policies are 
written on a continuous basis with no explicit end date. The insurance 
coverage ends only when the owner or operator of the commercial nuclear 
power plant or ANI cancels the terms.68 Any claims resulting from the 
policy term remains under the coverage. This takes into account the latent 
nature of any damage or harm stemming from nuclear exposure.69 Second, 
the policies cover not only the owner or operator of the plant but also any 
entity connected with the nuclear plant, thus assuring all third party nuclear 
liability claims will be covered while also preventing potential stacking of 
limits.70  
 The Secondary Financial Protection Program, discussed 
previously, provides for the industry-wide indemnification in the event of a 
nuclear incident that exceeds the site-specific insurance policy. The 
structure of the insurance coverage under the Price-Anderson Act has 
enabled insurers to provide stable, high quality coverage for nuclear risks.  
 
VI. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT AS MODEL COMPENSATION  
 
 The Price-Anderson Act represents the balancing of the interests 
and needs of the public not only as private citizens but also as consumers in 
and beneficiaries of the private business enterprise of nuclear energy.71  
The following sections highlight the components of the Act that make it a 
model compensation system for clean energy technologies that have not yet 
enjoyed the long history and maturity of the nuclear industry. 
 
A. NECESSITY OF A LIABILITY CAP 
 
 In order to encourage development of the nuclear industry as well 
as provide adequate protection for the American public, Congress 
implemented the liability cap for the nuclear industry in order to strike the 
appropriate balance of accountability and development. This limitation, 
however, does not directly limit the ability of individual claimants affected 
by any nuclear incident from recovering. As discussed in Duke Power v. 

67 See Jones, supra note 59, at 77. 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 78.  
71 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 55. 
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Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., the legislative history of the 
Act clearly indicates that the primary – and secondary insurance pools – are 
not figures that were arrived at on the supposition that it alone would be 
sufficient to guarantee full compensation in the event of a nuclear 
accident.72 The initial primary insurance was conceived of as a “starting 
point” or “a working hypothesis” derived from expert appraisals of the 
exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of 
that figure.73 This figure has risen from $560 million to $12.6 billion over 
the past four decades in order to ensure public protection. In addition, 
legislative history indicates that Congress would likely enact extraordinary 
relief provisions in order to provide for additional relief. 
 
[T]his limitation does not, as a practical matter, detract 
from the public protection afforded by this legislation. In 
the first place, the likelihood of an accident occurring, 
which would result in claims exceeding the sum of the 
financial protection, required and the governmental 
indemnity is exceedingly remote, albeit theoretically 
possible. Perhaps more important, in the event of a 
national disaster of this magnitude, it is obvious that 
Congress would have to review the problem and take 
appropriate action. The history of other natural or man-
made disasters, such as the Texas City incident,[74] bear 
this out. The limitation of liability serves primarily as a 
device for facilitating further congressional review of such 
a situation, rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of 

72 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 85 (1978). 
73 Id. 
74 See Hugh W. Stephens, The Texas City Disaster, 1947 (1997). The Texas 
City incident was the worst industrial accident in United States history, killing at 
least 581 people, injuring over 5,000 individuals and causing extraordinary 
amounts of property damage from ammonium nitrate blasts in the Port of Texas 
City. Following the incident, a class action was filed against the federal 
government under the Torts Claim Act, however the Courts refused to provide 
compensation for the victims because the Act may be invoked only on a "negligent 
or wrongful act or omission" of an employee, which created no absolute liability of 
the Government by virtue of its ownership of an "inherently dangerous 
commodity" or property, or of its engaging in an "extrahazardous" activity. After 
the court decision, Congress acted to provide compensation through Public Law 
378, 69 Stat. 707 (1955). The last claim was processed in 1957, resulting in federal 
compensation of nearly $17 million. 
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the public.75   
 
While upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court duly 
noted the legitimacy of and need for the cap on liability by stating “the 
limit on liability [is] ‘a classic example of an economic regulation—a 
legislative effort to structure and accommodate ‘the burdens and benefits of 
economic life.’”76 
The limit on liability remains the most controversial component of 
the Act, as critics argue that it constitutes a subsidy for the nuclear industry 
by not requiring unlimited liability. First of all, there is no record of the 
federal government ever paying a direct subsidy to any private licensees 
under Price-Anderson. The nuclear industry not only has paid the costs of 
the private, and secondary financial protection, insurance fees but it has 
also “paid millions of dollars in indemnity fees and has assumed more than 
$9 billion in potential retrospective assessments to compensate injured 
accident victims – all of this at no cost to the government.”77  
 In exchange for the limit on liability, the Price-Anderson Act 
provides a large, readily available source of compensation for any 
individuals affected from a nuclear incident that would otherwise not 
exist.78 To the contrary, the Bhopal Disaster in India in 1984 demonstrates 
the problems with a system that fails to assure an available pool of funds in 
the event of an industrial accident, despite having no liability cap. The 
Bhopal Disaster is considered the world’s worst industrial catastrophe, as a 
leak of methyl isocyanate gas and other chemicals from a pesticide plant in 
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India resulted in the exposure of hundreds of 
thousands of people to hazardous toxins.79 The Indian government panel 
charged with tabulating the deaths and injuries determined that over 3,800 
individuals died as a result of the leakage, 11,000 were disabled and an 
additional 150,000 to 600,00080 were affected.81 
 Following years of litigation, the operating company, Union 
Carbide Corporation, settled with the Indian Government for $470 million, 

75 Duke Power at 85-86 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-883, at 6-7 (1965)). 
76 Id. at 83. 
77 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59.  
78 Id. 
79 Jackson B. Browning, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal, in CRISIS 
RESPONSE: INSIDE STORIES ON MANAGING IMAGE UNDER SIEGE 365 (Jack A. 
Gottschalk ed., 1993). 
80 See AMNESTY INT’L, CLOUDS OF INJUSTICE: BHOPAL DISASTER 20 YEARS 
ON 61 (2004). 
81 Browning, supra note 79, at 365.  
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approximately $1,000 in compensation for each individual killed, disabled 
or injured from the disaster.82 The Price-Anderson Act represents not only a 
balancing of the risks of the nuclear industry but also of the protection of 
the American public. The truth of the matter is “that there is always a limit 
on liability – that limit equal to the assets of the company at fault.”83 Those 
who drafted the Price-Anderson Act understood this and the legislative 
branch appropriately determined the private-public partnership, which 
established a liability threshold for the industry, was the most reliable 
system to ensure financial protection to the American people.  
 Throughout the five decades of the Price-Anderson Act, the public 
has never had to bear the economic brunt of any nuclear incident within the 
United States. Thus far, the insurance pools of the nuclear industry have 
paid more than $200 million in claims and litigation costs since Congress 
passed the Act.84 Out of this assessment, $71 million in costs were 
disbursed following the Three Mile Island Accident in 1979.85 The cost of 
nuclear commercial power plant insurance is borne by the industry, which 
is unlike various other energy sources within the United States. For 
example, the hydropower electricity industry is not responsible for 
incidents such as dam failure or resultant flooding; instead the public is the 
one to bear the burden of such costs.86 This example is illuminated by the 
1977 failure of the Teton Dam in Idaho, which caused approximately $500 
million in property damage, however the individuals affected from the 
failure were only compensated $200 million of low-cost government 
loans.87  
 In contrast, under the Price-Anderson Act, the insurance pools have 
absorbed $200 million of the costs and the nuclear industry has paid $21 
million in indemnity fees to the federal government.88 The success of this 
program has led Congress to extend the model to protect the public from 
other hazards or harm, such as medical malpractice, faulty vaccinations, 
toxic waste and terrorist attacks.89 Congress should again adopt such a 

82 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59. 
83 Id. 
84 Nuclear Energy Inst., Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability 
Insurance at No Cost to the Public, (Jun. 2010), http://www.nei.org/resour 
cesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/factsheet/priceandersonact/. 
85 Id. 
86 GWYNETH CRAVENS, POWER TO SAVE THE WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
NUCLEAR ENERGY 214 (Alfred A. Knopf 2007). 
87 Id.  
88 See Nuclear Energy Inst., supra note 84. 
89 Id. 
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model to extend towards clean energy technologies and production in order 
to properly encourage investment, development and innovation while also 
maintaining a high level of protection to the public.  
 
B. NO-FAULT LIABILITY 
 
In 1966, the legislative branch addressed concerns that many state 
tort laws required findings of fault or negligence in order to establish 
liability. This created a major obstacle for individual’s seeking relief from 
the nuclear industry, as the technicalities and even knowledge of 
radioactive leakage, the nuclear industry and the proximate cause of an 
injury proved evasive. To appropriately resolve this issue, the Act 
implemented a waiver of defenses under state tort law in the event of a 
nuclear incident that shifted the standard essentially to one of strict 
liability.  
Under this regime, claimants are legally required to only 
demonstrate that the injury or property damage sustained was caused by the 
release of nuclear material from the insured facility, however fault on a 
particular defendant does not have to be established.90 The result of this 
provision is to effectively ensure a strict liability standard that provides the 
public with necessary protections from the judicial system. Such 
protections are essential in areas in which legal causation is difficult to 
prove. 
 
C. FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
 
 State tort laws have historically governed nuclear liability 
determinations,91 however amendments to the Price-Anderson Act 
following the events at Three Miles Island revised the system in order to 
provide a federal overlay. Currently, the Act contains a pre-emption 
provision,92 which gives federal district courts jurisdiction over tort actions 
arising out of nuclear accidents and “expressly provides for removal of 
such actions brought in state court even when they assert only state-law 
claims.”93 The removal of such claims eliminates confusion and 

90 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 57. 
91 John L. Quattrocchi, Nuclear Liability Insurance in the United States: An 
Insurer’s Perspective, in REFORM OF CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY: INTERNATIONAL 
BUDAPEST SYMPOSIUM 1999 (OECD 2000). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2006). 
93 See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484-85 (1999). 
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uncertainties surrounding the applicability of the Price-Anderson Act and 
establishes a level of assurance in how the judicial system will approach 
such claims.  
  Furthermore, as discussed in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 
the Price-Anderson Act “provides clear indications of the congressional 
aims of speed and efficiency.”94 The chief judge of a district court is given 
the authority to appoint a special caseload management panel to oversee all 
filings and court hearings associated with a nuclear incident case.95 These 
panels are designed to consolidate cases, set priorities, expedite cases or 
allow more equitable considerations of claims, and implement any 
measures as “as will encourage the equitable, prompt, and efficient 
resolution of cases arising out of the nuclear incident.”96 Each of these 
provisions is in place to reduce the legal costs as well as promote efficiency 
and efficacy of the compensation process. 
 
D. LIABILITY IS CHANNELED TO THE PARTICULAR LICENSEE 
RESPONSIBLE 
 
 The Price-Anderson Act channels financial responsibility and 
liability insurance obligations to the particular nuclear power plant 
responsible for the incident.97 This mechanism helps assure that claimants 
will be provided financial compensation in the event of sustaining injury or 
property damage.98 Under the Act, contractors, subcontractors, and 
suppliers to DOE contractors and NRC licensees, as well as the DOE 
contractors themselves, are fully indemnified for all liability.99 These 
operators, however, are all connected with, or “channeled” to, a particular 
nuclear power plant. Accordingly, each power plant is responsible for 
indemnifying any accidents or incidents arising from its contractors, 
subcontractors, or suppliers activities. This is crucial in order to ensure full 
protection as well as development of the nuclear industry from all sectors.  
Without such assurance – both the economic assurance of indemnification 
for the public and legal insulation from individual liability for participating 
entities in the nuclear industry – the development of nuclear energy would 
certainly have faltered.  

94 Id. at 486. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(3)(A) (2006). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(3)(C)(vi) (2006). 
97 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(t), 2210(c) (2006). 
98 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 56. 
99 Berkovitz, supra note 26, at 8. 
358 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.1 
E. GUARANTEED POOL OF FUNDS; CONTINUOUSLY WRITTEN  
 
 While criticism surrounds the liability cap of the Price-Anderson 
Act, the alternative of the Act is that the nuclear power plants would need 
to secure their own source of coverage. Not only, as mentioned already, 
would this detract most, if not all insurance companies, but in fact it would 
place the public in an extraordinarily unsettling situation. Establishing 
liability without the Price-Anderson Act would, in theory, place no legal 
limit on liability, however each claim would depend on state tort law and 
procedures, which may or may not provide for no-fault liability.100 Even in 
the event that defenses are waived, a defendant with theoretically no 
liability limit might not be able to pay a judgment if obtained.101 Thus, the 
Price-Anderson Act establishes “assurance of prompt and equitable 
compensation under a pre-structured and nationally applicable protective 
system [which gives] way to uncertainties, variations and potentially 
lengthy delays in recovery.”102  
 Under the Price-Anderson Act, compensation is evenly distributed 
over the entirety of those affected, however in an alternative system, such 
as a claim-based system, when the defendant’s assets are exhausted by 
earlier judgments, future claimants will be left without any compensatory 
relief or redress through judicial system.103 Such a system would create an 
onslaught of lawsuits in order for claimants to be the first to express their 
grievances, rather than appropriately assuring the public a system that will 
orderly and equitably compensate those affected by any nuclear incident.104 
  This sentiment was expressed in Duke Power, as the Supreme 
Court noted that  
 
. . . the congressional assurance of a $560 million[105] 
fund for recovery, accompanied by an express statutory 
commitment, to “take whatever action is deemed 

100 See H.R. 8631: To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act Before Joint 
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong. 69 (1975) (statement of William A. Anders, 
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
101 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 59 (“The simple fact is that there is 
always a limit on liability—that limit equal to the assets of the company at fault.”). 
102 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp, 438 U.S. 59, 89 (1978). 
103 Id. at 90. 
104 H.R. 8631: To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act, supra note 101. 
105 This was the figure at the time of Duke Power, however, the current 
assurance from both the primary insurance and secondary insurance pool is $12.6 
billion.  
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necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the 
consequences of” a nuclear accident, [is] a fair and 
reasonable substitute for the uncertain recovery of 
damages of this magnitude from a utility or component 
manufacturer, whose resources might well be exhausted 
at an early stage.106 
 
 Furthermore, the American Nuclear Insurer policies are written on 
a continual basis and contain no expiration date.107 Claims based during the 
time of the policy are accounted for and the licensee is still held responsible 
if the claim is found valid, even if they are no longer in operation.  
 
F. LITIGATION AND INVESTIGATION COSTS INCLUDED  
 
  Under the Price-Anderson Act, the expenses of investigating and 
defending claims or suits against the nuclear industry are included in the 
limit of liability.108 The legal costs for defending many of these actions can 
be quite expensive. By including the legal and investigation costs in the 
Act, Congress established definite confines for liability costs that insurance 
companies providing the financial protection plans to the nuclear industry 
could rely upon. In essence, the inclusion of these costs enables insurers to 
offer their maximum capacity commitments without fear of exceeding such 
commitments.109 This provision is crucial in enabling insurers to maintain 
and, most likely, increase the assets they place at risk.110  
 
G. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT PROVIDES STABILITY IN THE MARKET  
 
 Finally, the requirement of the Price-Anderson Act that each 
nuclear commercial power plant must obtain a specified amount of private 
insurance as well as participate in the secondary financial protection 
program provides stability in the market that might otherwise not be there. 
Not only was the private insurance industry precarious in providing 
financial protection for the nuclear industry at the dawn of its development, 
but the liability insurance market is also a volatile entity by nature.  
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106 Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 90-91 (citation omitted). 
107 Richard Jones, Nuclear Insurance: Where Does it Fit in the Green 
Generation?, 16 J. REINSURANCE 71, 77 (Spring 2009). 
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (2006). 
109 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 56. 
110 Id. 
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  This very instability was demonstrated by the liability insurance 
crisis from late 1984 through 1986, when major economic disruptions in 
the commercial liability insurance market created concerns over the 
availability and affordability of a number of commercial insurance policies 
– notably for chemical and pharmaceutical companies, the medical system 
and municipalities.111 However, when the liability insurance crisis hit the 
nation in the mid-1980s, the nuclear liability insurers continued to provide 
a stable market for their limited customer base as a result of the system 
provided by the Price-Anderson Act.112 The nuclear industry was shielded 
from any increase in liability premiums, cancellation of policy coverage or 
diminishment in scope of coverage113 – not only was this critical for the 
nuclear industry but it also protected the public from any exposure to an 
uninsured, or volatile, nuclear industry. 
 
VII. CARBON SEQUESTRATION: AN OVERVIEW 
 
  With the growing demand and development of carbon 
sequestration technology, insurers are beginning to determine the best 
approach in providing liability frameworks for private, state and federal 
projects using this new technology. Briefly, carbon sequestration is the 
process that involves capturing carbon dioxide at the point of combustion – 
most notably from coal power plants – and injecting it into geological 
formations beneath the surface of the earth.114 Essentially, the technology is 
the reverse of pumping oil or natural gas from a confined geological 
aquifer.115 The life-cycle of a carbon sequestration project can last over a 
couple of centuries as the process involves several phases from site 
selection, characterization, and regulatory review;116 to CO2 injection and 
well closure;117 to post-closure monitoring;118 and finally to long-term 
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111 G.C. Lai et al., “On Liability Insurance Crisis”, Risk Theory Seminar 
Conference, Univ. of Ala. 1 (Apr. 1997).  
112 See Quattrocchi, supra note 13, at 58. 
113 See Lai, supra note 111.  
114 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: CARBON CAPTURE AND 
STORAGE 8-9 (2009). 
115 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115 (2008). 
116 Id. This phase is expected to last anywhere from one to ten years. 
117 Id. (twenty to thirty year life-span). 
118 Id. (estimating that this phase of the life-cycle lasts for a period of fifteen to 
thirty years). 
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stewardship.119
 To date, carbon dioxide is the most abundant anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere largely due to human activities.120 The 
release of these gases into the atmosphere has contributed to global 
warming and increasing concerns of altering climatic, biological, and 
natural environments. The demand, and necessity, for solutions to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions are the propellant behind carbon sequestration 
projects. 
 While the technology is only increasing, carbon capture and 
storage projects are technically ready – but the associated costs, including 
insurance, need to be lowered and investment needs to increase in order for 
large-scale implementation of this technology.121 In essence, the industry 
today parallels the circumstances of the nuclear industry in the 1950s, when 
the Atomic Energy Act was originally enacted. The manner in which the 
insurance industry approaches the long-term liability with carbon 
sequestration could significantly affect the development and investment in 
the technology.  



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119 Id. (estimating that CO2 remains sequestered underground for hundreds of 
years).  
120 Carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas (see 
Figure SPM.2). The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has 
increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm in 2005. The 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeds by far the 
natural range over the last 650,000 years (180 to 300 ppm) as determined from ice 
cores. The annual carbon dioxide concentration growth rate was larger during the 
last 10 years (1995–2005 average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since the 
beginning of continuous direct atmospheric measurements (1960–2005 average: 
1.4 ppm per year) although there is year-to-year variability in growth rates.  The 
primary source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since 
the pre-industrial period results from fossil fuel use, with land-use change 
providing another significant but smaller contribution. Eleven of the last twelve 
years (1995–2006) rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental record of 
global surface temperature (since 1850). See INTERGOVERMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (S. Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
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VIII. CARBON SEQUESTRATION RISK ASSESSMENT & 
COMPARISON TO THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
 
 In regards to insurance necessities, policy writers must first 
understand the risks in which the technology presents. The inquiry first 
begins with what is to be protected and what threshold of risk mitigation 
required or desired by the client.122 In general, insurance policies are 
structured, priced and conditioned based on the frequency and the severity 
of potential loss.123 In developing such policies, insurers look towards past 
events and historical trends within the insured’s field and practice area.  
 The difficult part of carbon sequestration is that the infancy of the 
technology does not lend itself to any insight in its past history. As a result, 
the insurance industry has reluctantly provided coverage for the risks and 
trends of the technology. However, this should not detract insurers, as the 
underlying liabilities and risks of carbon sequestration technology are 
analogous to the same uncertainties that faced the nuclear industry in the 
1950s.  
  First, the main concern with carbon sequestration is the release of 
carbon dioxide from the project site. In its natural state carbon dioxide is 
non-toxic, however concentrations of 5-10% by volume is harmful to the 
life and health of plants, humans and animals.124 Thus, there is a direct and 
measurable potential for damage resulting from the release of large 
quantities of carbon dioxide in the event of a site failure or storage site 
leakage due to a number of reasons such as equipment or construction 
failure, unexpected tectonic movements or unforeseen large-scale 
migration.125 The inherent risks associated with the storage of carbon 
dioxide are similar, although much smaller, to radioactive exposure 
resulting from a nuclear power plant failure.  
 Secondly, there is general consensus that potential leakage of 
hazardous pollutants from storage reservoirs is very low – the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that for well-
selected sites, there is a 90-99% probability that over 99% of liquefied CO2 
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122 PA. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RES., ASSESSMENT OF RISK, 
LEGAL ISSUES, AND INSURANCE FOR GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN 
PENNSYLVANIA 5-1 (2009). 
123 Id. 
124 Christina Ulardic, Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance for 
Geological Carbon Sequestration Projects, in INTERNATIONAL RISK GOVERNANCE 
COUNCIL WORKSHOP ON REGULATION FOR CCS 1, 3 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_CCS_SwissRe07.pdf. 
125 Id. 
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injected into underground wells will remain underground for over 100 
years.126 Again, this is analogous to the nuclear industry’s low-frequency 
yet high-risk nature.  
Also, while immediate injuries and harm can arise from industrial 
incidents with carbon sequestration at the time of the failure, the associated 
liability is often a result of storage leakage. In turn, this leads to injuries 
and harm that are latent in nature, as leakages tend to arise over long-term, 
chronic exposure to low-levels of hazardous materials. Likewise, a 
radiological incident can result in acute, short-term exposure as well as 
chronic, long-term exposure to surrounding communities and 
environments.127 In both cases, victims are hindered with the difficulty of 
proving causation arising from both nuclear incidents and carbon 
sequestration failures. Finally, carbon sequestration is beginning to solidify 
itself as a crucial part in our national energy policy similar, albeit on a 
smaller scale, to the nuclear industry’s rapid accent to the forefront of the 
energy sector in the middle of the twentieth century.128 This commitment 
from the federal government intensifies the need to create an indemnity 
scheme that can serve the dual purpose of promoting the technology while 
also protecting the public.  
 Admittedly the release of radioactive materials is far more 
damaging to the public than concentrated volumes of carbon dioxide, 
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126 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE 
CAPTURE AND STORAGE 14 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005). 
127 NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS 405 (Eric K. 
Noji ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (Acute effects from radiological exposure vary 
in dosage from individual showing no outward symptoms, but instead having 
increased chromosomal aberrations in blood lymphocytes and lower blood count to 
high doses, which may affect the central nervous system causing seizures, gait 
disturbances and coma, almost always resulting in death. However, this high-
dosage acute exposure is extremely rare in nuclear incidents; instead it is seen in 
intentional nuclear warfare.). 
128 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 26 U.S.C. § 46 
(2009) (The Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit, also known as Internal 
Revenue Code Section 48C, provides a 30% tax credit for future expenditures to 
support new, expanded, or re-equipped domestic manufacturing facilities for 
advanced energy projects.  The tax credit was promulgated pursuant to the 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) section 1302, which 
authorized the Department of Treasury to extend $2.3 billion for qualified 
investments in domestic manufacturing facilities that can be completed within a 
four year period. Credits are available for a two year period, or until the maximum 
dollar amount of credits has been reached.). 
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however the risk that is being covered by both industries mirror each other 
in associated problems – leakage of material causing exposure to 
individuals; groundwater contamination; wind-blown migration of the 
elements; and property damage due to an industrial meltdown or explosion.  
The Price-Anderson Act has already accounted for the similarities in the 
problems associated with each industry through, among other provisions, 
its liability channeling, no-fault causation standard, and removal to federal 
jurisdictions. 
 In addition, the private-public partnership of the Price-Anderson 
Act provides suitable incentives such as a liability cap, industry-wide 
pooling, and policies written on a continual basis that would attract greater 
financial investment, insurance coverage and ultimately employment of 
carbon sequestration technology.  
 
A. NECESSITY OF A LIABILITY CAP  
 
First of all, the liability cap is essential in attracting private 
insurance interest in new, clean energy sources that have yet to reach 
maturity within the market. This was an essential component for the 
nuclear industry, as the potential liability costs associated with a nuclear 
incident detracted private insurance companies from providing coverage 
for nuclear power plants. Likewise, the long-term risks associated with 
carbon sequestration concern insurance underwriters today. Thus, there 
needs to be incentives for private investment to generate the necessary 
development of the field – the liability cap is the first step in doing so. As 
was the case with the Price-Anderson Act, the federal government should 
implement a preliminary system that caps site-specific liability at a certain 
threshold while also ensuring federal indemnification in the event of an 
incident exceeding the primary, site-specific insurance. Then, once the 
industry begins to mature, the federal government can slowly turn the 
second-tier of the indemnification system over to private insurers that begin 
to adapt to and draw interest in the technology.  
The tiered-system that blends site-specific insurance and an 
industry-wide pool of funds “both provide[s] site-tailored risk management 
and ensures[s] that adequate funds are available to cover damage in the 
post-closure period.”129 In addition, an industry-wide pool would allow for 
risk sharing on a national scale and financial protection for a variety of 
different projects. If indemnification was instead based on a state-level then 
proper financial protection might quickly be exhausted without the same 
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129 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 115, at 167. 
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amount of diversity, contribution and risk sharing that occurs in a tiered, 
mutual insurance pool.130  
Federal involvement is even more crucial with carbon 
sequestration because the technology does not tend to yield intensive 
amounts of revenues. In fact, the main concern of the technology is in 
diminishing the amount of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, not in 
turning a profit. Therefore, if there is to be individual and private 
investment in such projects, monetary or regulatory incentives must be in 
place for further development.131  
 
B. REMOVAL OF CLAIMS TO FEDERAL COURT 
 
  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was signed 
into law by President Obama on February 17, 2009 and provided the Office 
of Fossil Energy with $3.4 billion in the attempt to fund initiatives focused 
on research, development and deployment of technologies to use coal more 
cleanly and efficiently.132 In order to accomplish these goals, federal 
agencies have invested significantly in carbon capture and storage projects 
across the nation. When dealing with issues such as our national energy 
policy, federal courts should be the forum for settling disputes, rather than 
in a plethora of state courts, especially if the technologies are targeted to 
decrease national carbon emission standards. Such an approach maintains 
cohesiveness as well as ensures an unbiased, equitable forum. The Price-
Anderson Act contains a preemption provision133 that not only gives federal 
courts jurisdiction over tort action arising out of nuclear accidents, but it 
also provides for removal of such actions brought in state court even when 
they assert only state-law claims.134 This provision is essential for carbon 
sequestration claims.  
 First, the provision will limit the consequences of arriving at 
different conclusions on the applicable law as a result of a inherent 
differences throughout jurisdictions and variances in state tort law.  
Second, the tension between state law and federal preemption is a constant 
theme for CCS, especially due to the potential damages occurring in 
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130 Id. at 167-68.  
131 See ULARDIC, supra note 125, at 2. 
132 The Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Carbon Sequestration: American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act Funding (AARA), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carb 
on_seq/arra/index.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006). 
134 See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999). 
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domains with strong state laws governing groundwater protection, mineral 
rights, or surface rights.135 Carbon sequestration claims, however, should be 
heard under a federal overlay due to the fact that a lot of the water and 
mineral resources that will be in question involve several states as well as 
multiple state interests such as agriculture, urban development, tax 
revenues and wildlife preservation.136 Thus, an indemnity system must 
include a provision that removes any claims from state court in order to 
preserve all interests in the matter, provide for efficiency and efficacy, and 
establish cohesive law regarding carbon sequestration facilities and 
events.137  
 Federal jurisdiction eliminates many of the uncertainties individual 
victims might encounter in state courts, such as more stringent causation 
standards or heightened burdens of proof. Additionally, the carbon 
sequestration liability scheme should adopt similar provisions to the Price-
Anderson Act that give the chief judge of the federal district court the 
authority to consolidate cases, set priorities, expedite cases or allow more 
equitable considerations of claims, and implement any measures as that 
will encourage the equitable, prompt, and efficient resolution of cases 
arising out of the nuclear incident.138 Such provisions will expedite 
compensation for affected individuals, which is in essence, the entire 
objective of the system. 
 
C. CAUSATION: NO-FAULT IS GOOD 
 
 In order to provide proper protection to the public in the case of a 
storage leakage, the insurance policy should be written in such a manner 
that establishes a strict liability standard. Due to the long duration of carbon 
storage facilities, it will be much more difficult to detect and assign 
responsibility for any harm that might occur.139 Furthermore, the latent 
nature of injury or property damage associated with carbon storage leakage 
hinders individual claimants from providing any other standard of legal 
causation.  
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138 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(n)(3)(C)(i), (ii), (v), (vi) (2006). 
139 SEAN MCCOY, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. DEP’T OF ENG’G & PUB. POLICY, 
POLICY BRIEF: COMPENSATION, LIABILITY AND LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP FOR 
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 In addition, the judicial system has already established a long 
history of strict liability standard for torts similar to carbon sequestration 
leakages. This principal stems from Rylands v. Fletcher, the English 
decision which held that an individual “who for his own purposes brings on 
his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequences of its 
escape.”140 
 This body of tort law has been extended in United States laws 
regarding cases of abnormally dangerous activities, and also, hazardous 
materials. Thus, in order to maintain consistency with legal precedent as 
well as ensure that affected individuals are duly compensated, a no-fault 
liability system is essential in carbon leakage claims.  
 
D. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
 
 The Price-Anderson system contains several other provisions that 
would be highly beneficial for the carbon sequestration system to 
incorporate. First, the Act channels liability to the particular facility that is 
responsible for any industrial incident. Carbon sequestration technology 
has the potential of including a large network of individuals due to its 
operating, post-injection and long-term stewardship phase. Thus, a large 
number of individuals are exposed throughout the phases of the technology, 
creating issues of widespread liability. Thus, an “omnibus” liability system, 
which allows for all suppliers, transporters, and participants of the carbon 
sequestration industry to be covered under the insurance system would not 
only be instrumental for the industry, but also for the public as an 
“omnibus” feature “permits a more unified and efficient approach to 
processing and settlement of claims.”141 Additionally, this establishes a 
centralized defendant in the event that affected individuals are unsure as to 
the negligent, or directly responsible party.   
 Second, the Price-Anderson Act provides a mutual insurance 
program that guarantees a certain amount of available funds in the event of 
an incident. This system provides for compensation to be evenly distributed 
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to all affected individuals, while also assuring federal indemnification 
when necessary. This is more functional that having multiple state systems, 
which may not sufficiently spread risk and may not be adequately 
capitalized to cover actual damages incurred above insurance coverage 
limits.142 Also, the Price-Anderson Act policies are written on a continual 
basis, ensuring the public that regardless of the timing of an incident the 
policy will cover any injuries, harm, or property damage so long as the 
claims are filed within a timely manner as provided for by the statute of 
limitations.  
 Finally, the Price-Anderson system includes litigation and 
investigating costs.  This is crucial in order for the insurance industry to be 
fully aware of the risks that they are taking. Companies are able to properly 
assess the amount of financial protection they want to provide, while also 
allowing them to secure reinsurance to spread the risk over an even greater 
base.  
 
IX. GEOTHERMAL ENERGY 
 
In the past couple of years, investor interest in geothermal 
technology has increased significantly. This rapid increase in investment 
has been accelerated by growing demand for energy sources, increases in 
the price and scarcity of oil, and the developing awareness of the risks 
presented by carbon emissions.   
With Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS), a well known as a 
production-injection well is drilled into hot basement rock that has limited 
permeability and fluid content.143 Hot, dry rock that is closer to the earth’s 
surface is ideal for this technology. The production-injection well consists 
of two drill points, the first being the injection well that serves to pump 
water under high pressure into the earth’s core. Pumping the water under 
high pressure is to ensure fracturing or increase fracturing within the 
geological environment, thus creating an artificial geothermal reservoir.144 
Water is then circulated through the reservoir and the hot water is extracted 
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GEOTHERMAL TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/geothermal 
/pdfs/egs_basics.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
144 Kai Sametinger, How to Invest in Geothermal, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
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from the production well, which is drilled with the intent to intersect the 
stimulated fracture system created by the injection well in a manner in 
which the most amount of the artificial reservoir is in contact with the well.  
In turn, the water extracted, known as brine, is pumped through an 
electrical power plant and the brine heats a working fluid that produces 
vapor to drive a turbine-generator.145 The original water is then recycled 
through a cooling facility and is re-injected into the reservoir, thus 
completing the cycle.146  
With the increase in investment in geothermal interest and the 
growing development of geothermal energy facilities, policy providers 
must be concerned and appropriately assess the inherent technical perils in 
the testing, construction and maintenance of these geothermal facilities. 
Most geothermal power projects take five to seven years to be operational, 
as each phase of the project has its own set of requirements and risks 
attached.147 This concern is further exacerbated by installation, operation 
and development of projects in harsh unstable terrain, proximity to marine 
environments, and drilling necessities.  
The current investment market for geothermal technologies is 
relatively weak. The length of the projects combined with the nascent 
history of the technology deters investors of these projects. The success of 
drilling – determined by the volume, temperature and pressure of the fluids 
discovered – is crucial to the financial stability of the project, as it consists 
of up to 30-40% of the entire project.148 Therefore, in some cases 
government support and subsidies are necessary to help get the project off 
the ground.149 Investors that then have to worry about insurance costs 
associated not only with the building but also with the maintenance and 
operation of the project are further deterred, as additional costs must be 
accounted for. Therefore, the Price-Anderson Act, which would provide 
incentive for financial investment by implementing liability caps in the 
event of an incident, failure in project development, and other instances, is 
crucial to incentivize financial investment.  
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X. CONCLUSION 
 
 The rapidly rising demand for electricity, increasing costs of oil 
and gas, and concerns about energy security demonstrate the need not only 
for the “nuclear renaissance,” but also for investment in alternative, clean 
energy technologies and sources.150 The past few years have illuminated a 
heightened national interest and political commitment, from both sides of 
the aisle, regarding these objectives.  
 If the United States expects to continue to be atop the global 
pyramid, then it must reassess its current energy policy – especially its 
commitments to nuclear energy as well as alternative, clean energy 
technologies. Currently, the nuclear industry accounts for 19.4% of 
electrical production within the United States, while at the same time 
accounting for 73.6% of the emission-free electricity production.151 In 2006 
alone, the nuclear industry saved the United States and the world 681.2 
million metric tons of CO2 emissions while providing the lowest-cost 
producer of base-load electricity at 1.72 cents per kilowatt-hour.152  
However, the United States’ nuclear production is ninth in the world in 
percent of its total domestic electricity generation.153  
Clean energy technologies, such as nuclear energy, are at the 
forefront of the national discourse on energy policy, while others, such as 
solar and wind power, geothermal developments, and carbon sequestration, 
are being pushed into the discussion. It is in these developments that the 
proper financial instruments and insurance policies must adequately 
support and protect this increasing development.  
 Accordingly, analysis of the Price-Anderson Act provides insight 
into an underlying insurance indemnification system that would provide a 
well-suited framework in addressing the growth of clean energy 
technologies, such as geothermal energy and carbon sequestration 
technology. These and similar technologies are currently struggling for the 
necessary financial backing and protection in order to become a key 
contributor to our national energy policy. As such, the liability cap 
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instituted under the Price-Anderson Act is essential in encouraging growth 
within the clean energy sector.
 Likewise, a no-fault system in which liability is channeled to the 
particular operator or owner of the facility is crucial in upholding 
accountability and protection to the American public. Finally, once a 
national market is established, creating a tiered system that requires site 
specific private insurance, a secondary, industry-wide pool, and finally 
federal indemnification in the event of exhaustion of the initial two layers 
will create a reliable network of compensation in the event of an industrial 
incident while also balancing the competitive needs of the clean energy 
sector. In addition to these components, future clean energy 
indemnification systems should include written insurance policies; 
inclusion of litigation and investigation costs in the liability limitations; and 
removal and consolidation of all claims to one federal district court. 
 Clean energy technologies are the future in American power 
production. Such technologies offer a number of similarities – most notably 
the inherent nature of high-impact, low frequency risk in their 
development, maintenance and production processes. Accordingly, these 
energy sources invite a more in-depth analysis into the best practices in 
promoting and developing the proper technological advancements, 
financial investments, and insurance policies to protect and promote the 
development of clean energy while safeguarding the American public. The 
Price-Anderson Act should be at the forefront of this analysis.  

